Oral Arguments of the Supreme Court of Virginia

Public domain audio of oral arguments from the Supreme Court of Virginia. Whether you're a lawyer, law student, or just an interested citizen, this podcast is a great way to learn how the Supreme Court of Virginia operates and what's expected of each side in a case. Not affiliated with the Supreme Court of VA. Created by entrepreneurs.

November 2019 - Massenburg v City of Petersburg 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Yoder v Commonwealth 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Watson-Scott v Commonwealth 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Davison v Commonwealth 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Taylor v Commonwealth 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Flint Hill School v McIntosh 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Flint Hill School v McIntosh This podcast is provided by Ben Glass and Steve Emmert www.BenGlassReferrals.com - www.Virginia-Appeals.com Granted Appeal Summary Case FLINT HILL SCHOOL v. ALESSIA MCINTOSH (Record Number 181678) From The Circuit Court of Fairfax County; D. Bernhard, Judge. Counsel Timothy B. Hyland, Elizabeth A. Dwyer, Tyler Southwick (HYLAND LAW PLLC) for appellant. Harris D. Butler, III (BUTLER ROYALS, PLC), Cyrus Mehri (MEHRI & SKALET, PLLC) for appellee. Assignments of Error The trial court erred in holding that Roger McIntosh, a co-obligee under the parties’ contract, was not a necessary party to Alessia McIntosh’s declaratory judgment action against Flint Hill School. The trial court erred in holding that the filing of a declaratory judgment action “trigger[s] the applicability of a contract clause sought to be declared unlawful,” as such holding is contrary to law as set forth, inter alia, in Martin v. Garner, 286 Va. 76, 84, 745 S.E.2d 419, 423 (2013) (holding that the fact that the relevant parties “were before the court and the relevant deeds were in evidence,” is insufficient to establish a justiciable controversy between the parties.). The trial court erred in overruling Flint Hill School’s demurrer to Alessia McIntosh’s declaratory judgment claim, because the complaint did not contain an allegation that there existed an actual or justiciable controversy, nor an actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right, and because the complaint sought relief as to a hypothetical and speculative claim. The trial court erred in overruling Flint Hill School’s plea in bar to Alessia McIntosh’s declaratory judgment claim, because the uncontroverted evidence presented to the trial court established that there was no actual or justiciable controversy, nor an actual 2 antagonistic assertion and denial of right, and because Alessia McIntosh sought relief as to a hypothetical and speculative claim. The trial court erred in granting Alessia McIntosh’s motion for summary judgment, because material facts were genuinely in dispute as to whether there existed an actual or justiciable controversy, and an actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right, and because Alessia McIntosh sought relief as to a hypothetical and speculative claim. The trial court erred in granting Alessia McIntosh’s motion for summary judgment as to the unenforceability of the attorneys’ fees clause in the parties’ contract, because material facts were genuinely in dispute, and the trial court was presented with no facts, as to whether the challenged contractual clause was procedurally unconscionable. The trial court erred in granting Alessia McIntosh’s motion for summary judgment as to the unenforceability of the attorneys’ fees clause in the parties’ contract, because material facts were genuinely in dispute, and the trial court was presented with no facts, as to whether the challenged contractual clause was substantively unconscionable. The trial court erred in granting Alessia McIntosh’s motion for summary judgment as to the unenforceability of the attorneys’ fees clause in the parties’ contract, because material facts were genuinely in dispute, and the trial court was presented with no facts permitted to be considered under Rule 3:20, as to whether the challenged contractual clause significantly bars potentially meritorious resort to the courts by Alessia McIntosh. The trial court erred in granting Alessia McIntosh’s motion for summary judgment as to the unenforceability of the attorneys’ fees clause in the parties’ contract, because there is no “corollary principle discerned from the Rules of Professional Conduct not to punish the prevailing party in litigation with payment of the loser’s expenses,” as (a) no such principle exists; and (b) even if such principle existed, it does not mandate invalidation of the challenged contractual clause; and (c) material facts were genuinely in dispute, and the trial court was presented with no facts, relating to such a principle or upon which its applicability could be determined. Source Document: http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/appeals/181678.pdf /episode/index/show/oralargumentsscva/id/12230213

November 2019 - McClung-Logan v Harbour Constructors et al 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Butcher v Commonwealth 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Watson v Commonwealth 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Corriveau v State Farm Mutual et al 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Ross v Commonwealth 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Futuri Real Estate v Atlantic Trustee Services et al 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Jackson v Jackson 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Davis v Davis et al 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Portsmouth 2175 v City of Portsmouth et al 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Ehrhardt et al v SustainedMed 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Ehrhardt et al v SustainedMed This podcast is provided by Ben Glass and Steve Emmert www.BenGlassReferrals.com - www.Virginia-Appeals.com Granted Appeal Summary Case MARILYN EHRHARDT, ET AL. v. SUSTAINEDMED, LLC (Record Number 181003) From The Circuit Court of Fairfax County; M. Devine, Judge. Counsel Norman A. Thomas (Norman A. Thomas, PLLC) and Jerome C. Baker (The Law Office of Jerome C. Baker, Ltd.) for appellants. Robert W. Loftin, Richard D. Holzheimer, Jr., and Anastasia P. Cordova (McGuireWoods LLP) for appellee. Assignment of Error The trial court misinterpreted the Stock Purchase Agreement regarding SustainedMED’s due diligence rights and obligations. The court reversibly erred in failing to hold SustainedMED bound by the facts its representatives discovered and should have discovered in conducting preclosing due diligence. The trial court misinterpreted the Stock Purchase Agreement regarding Sellers’ disclosures, representations and warranties. The court reversibly erred in over-broadly interpreting the agreement’s provisions to admit parol and irrelevant evidence and to rule that Sellers materially breached the agreement. The trial court reversibly erred in ruling for SustainedMED on its declaratory judgment count and against Sellers on their counterclaims regarding amounts due under the Promissory Notes. SustainedMED’s failure to timely pay amounts due to Sellers materially breached the Promissory Notes and the Stock Purchase Agreement. The trial court reversibly erred in failing to set off against SustainedMED’s purported indemnity claim losses the amounts received by SustainedMED from licensing payments derived from Cyfluent software. The trial court reversibly erred in ruling that SustainedMED met its burden to prove damages with reasonable certainty. The trial court misinterpreted the Stock Purchase Agreement and failed to follow Virginia law regarding its awards to SustainedMED of attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs. The court reversibly erred in making such awards because they exceeded the Stock Purchase Agreement’s cap on indemnity claim losses, and the awards were not limited to specific indemnity claims on which SustainedMED succeeded. Source Document: http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/appeals/181003.pdf /episode/index/show/oralargumentsscva/id/12230114

November 2019 - Spratley v Commonwealth 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Cromartie v Billings 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Schmuhl v Commonwealth 11/30/2019

November 2019 - Crum v Clarke 11/30/2019

September 2019 - Thoburn Limited Partnership v Brisa Fund et al 09/29/2019

September 2019 - Transparent GMU et al v George Mason University et al 09/29/2019

September 2019 - Transparent GMU et al v George Mason University et al This podcast is provided by Ben Glass and Steve Emmert www.BenGlassReferrals.com - www.Virginia-Appeals.com Granted Appeal Summary Case TRANSPARENT GMU, ET AL. v. GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, ET AL. (Record Number 181375) From The Circuit Court of Fairfax County; J. Tran, Judge. Counsel Evan D. Johns (Appalachian Mountain Advocates) for appellant. Carrie S. Nee and David G. Drummey (Office of the Attorney General), Brian Walther (University Counsel), Toby J. Heytens, Matthew R. McGuire, and Michelle S. Kallen (Office of the Solicitor General), E. Rebecca Gantt, Matthew A. Fitzgerald, and Sean F. Murphy (McGuireWoods LLP) for appellees. Assignments of Error 1. The circuit court erred by concluding that accepting, administering, and disbursing funds for the sole benefit of a public university is not a form of “public business” under the Act. 2. The circuit court erred by sustaining the University’s plea and demurrer to Count I of the Amended Petition and concluding that the Act did not consider the University the custodian of records held by its agents in the transaction of public business. 3. The circuit court erred by sustaining the Foundation’s demurrer to Count V of the Amended Petition and concluding that the Act did not consider the Foundation the custodian of records it held as the University’s agent in the transaction of public business. 4. The circuit court erred by sustaining the University’s plea and demurrer in Count II of the Amended Petition and concluding that the University was not the custodian of records possessed by its Vice President for University Development in the transaction of public business. 5. The circuit court erred by sustaining the Foundation’s demurrer to the alter-ego claim in the Original Petition and concluding that the Act did not allow an alter-ego claim absent an allegation of “impermissible” conduct. 6. The circuit court erred by dismissing Count III of the Amended Petition and concluding that the Foundation was not an “other entity . . . of [a] public body created to perform delegated functions of the public body” under the Act. Source Document: http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/appeals/181375.pdf /episode/index/show/oralargumentsscva/id/11439209

September 2019 - Janis et al v Trust Company etc et al 09/29/2019

September 2019 - Janis et al v Trust Company etc et al This podcast is provided by Ben Glass and Steve Emmert www.BenGlassReferrals.com - www.Virginia-Appeals.com Granted Appeal Summary Case THOMAS JANIS, ET AL. v. TRUST COMPANY, AS CERTIFICATE TRUSTEE ON BEHALF OF BOSCO CREDIT II TRUST SERIES 2010-1, ET AL. (Record Number 181307) From Circuit Court of Prince George County; W. Tomko, Judge. Counsel Henry W. McLaughlin (The Law Office of Henry McLaughlin, P.C.) for appellant. Daniel K. Eisenhauer for appellee. Assignments of Error 1. The Circuit Court of Prince George County, Virginia (“the trial court”) erred in its oral ruling on July 24, 2017 that the claim of the appellants, Thomas Janis and Kimberly O. Janis (“the Janises”) for an injunction based on usury failed because their claim of usury was based on averred improper charges that were de minimus. This was error, even though the trial court noted that injunctions are not to be granted liberally, because of the following: A. The Janises sought an injunction to prevent a foreclosure of their home based on usury in a subsidiary mortgage loan based on Va. Code Ann. Section 6.1-330.72 (“Section 6.1- 330.72”). B. Section 6.1-330.72, at all relevant times, provided what charges are allowed in subsidiary mortgage loans, and stating, in pertinent part (excluding certain charges otherwise allowed by such statute not applicable to this case) “No other charges of any kind shall be imposed on or be payable by the borrower either to the lender or any other party in connection with such loan ....” C. In Garrison v. First Federal Savings and Loan, 402 S.E. 2d 25 (1991) this Court held that any charge not attributable to principal or all allowed charge for collateral services is interest. Therefore, if the lender in this case imposed charges on the Janises that were neither towards principal or allowable collateral charges, such imposed charges were 2 interest and any such interest disallowed by Section 6.1-330.72 constituted disallowed interest and therefore usury. D. The Janises’ complaint (“the complaint”) verified by Kimberly O. Janis under oath, plausibly set forth that the lender imposed on the Janises two usurious charges -one for $1 as an overcharge of the recordation fee and the other for $158 for a claim of payment of a charge owed by the Janises which was tendered but not completed and not refunded to them. E. There is no de minimum [sic] exception to the usury prohibition in Section 6.1-330.72. F. Under the provisions of Va.Code Ann. Section 6.2-304 (“Section 6.2-304”) because the subject loan was usurious, no interest was owed on the loan. G. In their complaint, vertified [sic] by the Janises under oath, because they owed no interest on the subject loan (pursuant to Section 6.2-304) they had satisfied the loan in full because they had paid more than the $26,000 of the principal of the loan. H. Because the Janises had satisfied the loan in full, it was error for the trial court on July 24, 2017 to rule against their plea for an injunction to prevent foreclosure of their home on July 25, 2017. 2. The trial court erred in its written order entered on July 25, 2017 denying injunctive relief as to Count One of the complaint. This was error for the reasons set forth in Assignment of Error No.1, in Assignment of Error No.1 [sic], including subsections A thorugh [sic] H of that assignment of error. 3. The trial court erred in that part of the final order entered on July 9, 2018 which dismissed the complaint with prejudice. This was error because: A. The final order thereby dismissed that part of the complaint which prayed that the trial court appoint a special commissioner with instruction to mark the deed of trust as satisfied on grounds, avrred [sic] in the complaint, that (a) the loan was usurious; (b) as a result of such usury, no interest was due on the subject mortgage loan; and (c) with interest removed, the Janises had paid the loan in full. B. The final order thereby dismissed that part of the complaint which sought a declaratory judgment that the Janises were not responsible for the lender’s foreclosure costs related to scheduling a foreclosure for July 25, 2017. C. The loan was usurious because the lender imposed on the Janises as to the secondary mortgage loan at issue in this case a $1 charge claimed for a recordation charge paid to the clerk’s office but not actually so paid and not among the charges for a secondary mortgage oan [sic] under the provisions of Section 6.1-330.72. 3 D. The loan was also usurious because the lender imposed a $158 charge for a claim of payment of an amount owed by the Janises which was tendered but not completed and not refunded to them. E. Because the loan was usurious, pursuant to Section 6.2-304 no interest was due on the subject loan. F. Because no interest was due on the subject loan, the Janises had paid the loan in full. G. Because the loan was paid in full, the Janises were entitled to have the deed of trust marked as satisfied. Source Document: http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/appeals/181307.pdf /episode/index/show/oralargumentsscva/id/11439191

September 2019 - Sumner Partners v Venture Investments 09/29/2019

September 2019 - Sumner Partners v Venture Investments This podcast is provided by Ben Glass and Steve Emmert www.BenGlassReferrals.com - www.Virginia-Appeals.com Granted Appeal Summary Case SUMNER PARTNERS LLC v. VENTURE INVESTMENTS LLC (Record Number 181259) From The Circuit Court of Stafford County; V. Willis, Judge. Counsel Michael R. Shebelskie, William H. Wright, Jr., Jonathon L. Caulder (Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP) for appellant. William E. Glover (Glover & Dahnk) for appellee. Assignments of Error The trial court erred in finding in favor of Venture on its counterclaim and entering judgment for Venture on the same, because Sumner did not default by not closing and had otherwise fully performed. The petroleum contamination on the property excused Sumner’s obligation to close. The trial court’s ruling rests on its erroneous interpretation that oil, petroleum products, and their byproducts are neither “hazardous wastes or substances” nor “hazardous materials” under the parties’ contract. The trial court erred in finding in favor of Venture on Sumner’s claims and dismissing those claims with prejudice, because the parties’ contract gives Sumner the right to postpone closing and remediate the petroleum contamination before closing. The trial court’s ruling rests on its erroneous interpretation that oil, petroleum products, and their byproducts are neither “hazardous wastes or substances” nor “hazardous materials” under the parties’ contract. The trial court erred in holding that Venture did not breach §§ 5.6, 17.1 (h) and 17.1 (i) of the parties’ contract, because the petroleum contamination on the property comprises “hazardous wastes or substances” and “hazardous materials” under the parties’ contract. The trial court’s holding contradicts the contract’s plain terms and is contrary to the evidence. The trial court erred in denying in part Sumner’s motion for reconsideration and not altering its final order, to enter judgment for Sumner instead of Venture. Because oil, petroleum products, and their byproducts are “hazardous wastes or substances” under § 5.6 of the parties’ 2 contract, Sumner had the right to postpone the closing, remediate the contamination, and then close, irrespective of whether those contaminants also are “hazardous materials” under § 17.1(h). Source Document: http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/appeals/181259.pdf /episode/index/show/oralargumentsscva/id/11439104

September 2019 - Everett v Tawes 09/29/2019

September 2019 - City of Richmond v New Irish etc 09/29/2019

September 2019 - Faneuil Inc v 3M Company 09/29/2019

September 2019 - Jefferson v Commonwealth 09/29/2019

September 2019 - Burnham v Commonwealth 09/29/2019

September 2019 - Spruill v Garcia et al 09/29/2019

Oral Arguments of the Supreme Court of Virginia

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