The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics, Doctrine and Leadership.
Professional Military Education in 30 minute sessions. Historic Battles study through current doctrine to gain lessons learned. Tactics, Strategy, Combined Arms, Military Leadership in a format for Unit PME programs. We study the great battles to draw the lessons on strategy, tactics and leadership. Get your lessons learned here rather than in AAR format.
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Strategic Context for Australia's WW2 mobilisation
05/10/2026
Strategic Context for Australia's WW2 mobilisation
Australia spent 20 years preparing for a war most politicians refused to discuss publicly — and that systematic industrial strategy may be the nation's greatest governance success story. Dr. Mark Bailey traces how bipartisan policy from 1919 built the secondary industry that would have annihilated Japanese forces had they landed at Port Stephens in 1942, while Major General Jason Blake connects those lessons to today's Army transformation through HIMARS, PrSM missiles, and the AS9 Huntsman. This is a special seminar presentation in conjunction with the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's , "Firepower: Lessons from World War II" Our presenter is Dr Mark Bailey and it is followed by our Panel Discussion with Major General Jason Blaine, DSC, AM, CSC and Dr Mark Bailey and Dr Peter Layton. Key learnings: • Why defence spending increased 20% in 1932-33 despite the Great Depression, following Japan's Manchurian invasion • How 730,000 soldiers mobilised from a population of 7 million through national census and preserved training infrastructure • What the shift from manoeuvre supporting fires to fires supported by manoeuvre means for modern Australian capability Full show notes and transcript: https://theprinciplesofwar.com/ Support the podcast: https://www.patreon.com/principlesofwar More episodes: https://theprinciplesofwar.com/ Follow on X: https://x.com/surprisepodcast Subscribe for more Professional Military Education content.
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Australia's Road to War - 1936 to 1941 - Dr Peter Layton
04/27/2026
Australia's Road to War - 1936 to 1941 - Dr Peter Layton
Australia built a coherent defence industrial strategy in the 1920s and 30s that actually worked when tested by total war — yet we've forgotten most of what made it succeed. This seminar recording pairs Dr Peter Layton's analysis of the interwar Munitions Supply Board with Major General Jason Blake's discussion of current Army modernisation. This is a special seminar presentation in conjunction with the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's , "Firepower: Lessons from World War II" Our presenter is Dr Peter Layton and it is followed by our Panel Discussion with Major General Jason Blaine, DSC, AM, CSC and Dr Mark Bailey and Dr Peter Layton. Key learnings: • How the self-containment strategy and 243 shadow factories enabled Australia to achieve munitions self-sufficiency by 1943 • Why Essington Lewis had to bypass service bureaucracies that refused to place orders even after the Fall of France • What the five-to-six-year lead time for establishing missile production means for current capability timelines Full show notes and transcript: https://theprinciplesofwar.com/ Support the podcast: https://www.patreon.com/principlesofwar More episodes: https://theprinciplesofwar.com/ Follow on X: https://x.com/surprisepodcast Subscribe for more Professional Military Education content.
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149 - Why did the Marines stop 1,000 yards short of victory at 4th Matanikau - Guadalcanal
04/26/2026
149 - Why did the Marines stop 1,000 yards short of victory at 4th Matanikau - Guadalcanal
After the defeat at Henderson Field, Japanese 17th Army headquarters remained confident — fresh divisions and hundreds of aircraft were promised within weeks. But Vandegrift had no intention of letting them regroup. This episode traces the Fourth Battle of the Matanikau and the emergency pivot to Koli Point, revealing how interior lines and improving logistics let the Marines mount the largest US Marine land attack in history to that date. Key learnings: • How Vandegrift assembled 12 battalions for an offensive while his perimeter forces were already exhausted after two and a half months • Why Japanese logistics could deliver only one-third of the 200 tons per day needed to sustain 30,000 troops on Guadalcanal • What Ultra intelligence revealed about Japanese landing plans and how it forced Vandegrift to split his forces Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Fron Full show notes and transcript for the Guadalcanal . Support the podcast: https://www.patreon.com/principlesofwar More episodes: https://theprinciplesofwar.com/ Follow on X: View the videos on Youtube: Subscribe for more Professional Military Education content.
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148 - The Battle of Henderson Field - Guadalcanal 1942
04/05/2026
148 - The Battle of Henderson Field - Guadalcanal 1942
This episode is the 14th episode in our Guadalcanal series. We look at the Battle of Henderson Field, which is the decisive terrain for the campaign. Had the airfield been lost, it is likely that the US would not have been able to hold Guadalcanal. We discuss: How do you defend critical terrain against a numerically superior force?How should defensive positions exploit terrain to maximize effectiveness? How do you integrate combined arms in the defense? How does poor communication affect tactical coordination? How do you integrate unfamiliar units into ongoing operations? The 164th got their introduction into combat at Henderson Field. They were a North Dakota National Guard unit and had only been on Guadalcanal for 10 days. They were bought up to bolster the heavily outnumbered defences. Rather than have the unit deploy into the line and take over a part of the line, Puller had small groups lead into their positions next to Marines. Piecemeal deployment, the last thing you want to happen to your Regiment, but it employed the green troops to fight next to seasoned Marines. At the end of the fight, Chesty Puller said, "These farm boys can fight!" . - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon. Looking for YouTube PME videos? Check out the . Great Professional Military Education for your Unit. This episode covers static defence, combined arms, terrain and leadership.
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147 - The Japanese tank attack in the Battle of Henderson Field - Guadalcanal
03/29/2026
147 - The Japanese tank attack in the Battle of Henderson Field - Guadalcanal
This episode looks at the Sumiyoshi's tank attack across the Matanikau - an attempt to draw defenders away from the perimeter of Henderson Field. We also discuss why Muryama coundn;t synchronise his forces and the dysfunction within the Japanese Headquarters. We look at - What are the consequences of relieving a subordinate commander on the eve of battle? (And what role did Tsuji play in Kawaguchi's dismissal?) What happens when multiple attacking elements operate independently without coordination? How should armour, infantry, and artillery be coordinated in an assault? What is the value of pre-registered artillery fires in defense? How can the Japanese achieve tactical surprise despite proximity? What is the purpose and risk of outposts forward of the main defensive line? Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. . - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon. Looking for YouTube PME videos? Check out the . Great Professional Military Education for your Unit. This episode covers co-operation, the employment of armour and command dysfunction.
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146 - Halsey's question for Vandegrift about Henderson Field's defence that influenced Pacific Strategy.
03/22/2026
146 - Halsey's question for Vandegrift about Henderson Field's defence that influenced Pacific Strategy.
This episode looks at the defensive and offensive planning undertaken by the IJA and the USMC. It also looks closely at Vandegrift's meeting with Halsey and the outcome of the meeting. This is a pivotal moment in the campaign. Halsey has taken over from Ghormley and he prepares to back Vandegrift with everything the Navy has to help defend Guadalcanal. How does intelligence fusion enable a commander to choose the time and place of battle? The combination of coast-watchers, aerial photography, signals intercepts, prisoner interrogation, and traffic analysis gives Vandegrift sufficient warning to disengage from the Matanikau and assume a prepared defensive posture before the Japanese assault begins. What are the compounding effects of logistics failure on combat power? Japanese soldiers carry only five days' rations for a march that takes far longer than planned. By the time the assault goes in, troops are hungry, exhausted, and degraded — before they have fired a shot. How does the defence leverage knowledge of terrain? The defenders have patrolled and observed their ground for months, have pre-registered every likely approach, and understand the avenues of attack in detail — advantages the attacking Japanese, navigating by inaccurate maps in pitch darkness, completely lack. What is the relationship between strategic commitment and tactical success? The Marines' ability to hold Henderson Field is directly tied to whether higher command is willing to accept naval losses to keep the sea lanes open. Halsey's personal commitment to "give you all I have" is the strategic enabler for everything that follows tactically. How does the defender's advantage of fighting on familiar ground translate into combat power? Vandegrift's troops are dug in, know their sectors, have rehearsed their fire plans, and can rotate reserves along interior lines — while the Japanese are exhausted, disoriented, under-supplied, and attacking in darkness across ground they have never seen. Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. . - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon. Great Professional Military Education for your Unit. This episode covers economy of effort, intelligence fusion, and defensive fires planning.
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145 - 973 rounds in 83 minutes. The Battleship Bombardment of Henderson Field
03/15/2026
145 - 973 rounds in 83 minutes. The Battleship Bombardment of Henderson Field
This episode looks at the IJN and IJA combined planning for the assault on Henderson's Field, including the naval gunfire from the Kongo and Haruna under Rear Admiral Kurita where 973 14-inch rounds were fired in 83 minutes. We also discuss the development of the Maruyama Trail for the approach march of the 2nd Sendai Division. This episode discusses: What happens when commanders visualise terrain from a distance rather than conduct ground reconnaissance? How does poor mapping degrade operational planning? How does confirmation bias infect intelligence assessment? What is the relationship between terrain and combat power? What munition selection tells us about the limits of naval gunfire support against land targets? How do you maximise the effect of a fire support mission through observation planning? What does the Henderson Field bombardment teach us about fire saturation and its psychological effects? How does loss of aviation fuel translate directly into loss of air superiority? What is the danger of planning based on the timeline you want rather than the timeline the terrain imposes? Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. . - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon. Great Professional Military Education for your Unit. This episode covers the Command and Control and generating combined arms.
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144 - Situational Awareness and the fight for Guadalcanal's Key Terrain - 3rd Battle of the Matanikau
03/08/2026
144 - Situational Awareness and the fight for Guadalcanal's Key Terrain - 3rd Battle of the Matanikau
USMC 1st Marine Division vs the IJA 2nd (Sendai) Division in the fight to control the Matanikau River. The 3rd Battle of the Matanikau Part II - This is the tenth episode of our with historian and author Dave Holland. This episode discusses: 1st Marine Division Combined Arms integration at the Third Battle of the Matanikau? How did the loss of the Matanikau River crossing have on planning for the assault on Henderson Field? How did Japanese command and control failures at the battalion and regimental level contribute to their defeat at the Third Matanikau? What are the tactical lessons from Marine Corps fire support coordination? How did weather and terrain shape manoeuvre and command and control? How did the Marines use reverse slope positions and indirect machine gun fire to defeat Japanese delaying forces? What were the contrasting night combat doctrines of the USMC and the Imperial Japanese Army? How did delayed battlefield reporting and communications breakdown affect IJA operational decision-making? What is the operational significance of denying an enemy its artillery firing platforms, as demonstrated at the Third Battle of the Matanikau? How did Lt Gen Hyakutake manage two simultaneous campaigns — Guadalcanal and the Kokoda withdrawal — from an austere forward headquarters in October 1942? How did American air superiority over Henderson Field shape Japanese logistics and sea control during the Guadalcanal campaign? What role did intelligence integration — coast watchers, signals intercepts, and radar — play in Allied air defence during the Guadalcanal campaign? Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. . - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon. Great Professional Military Education for your Unit. This episode covers the Command and Control and generating combined arms.
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143 - Inside the Japanese OODA loop on Guadalcanal - Vandegrift and 3rd Matanikau
02/15/2026
143 - Inside the Japanese OODA loop on Guadalcanal - Vandegrift and 3rd Matanikau
Maruyama vs Vandegrift in the fight to control the Matanikau River. The 3rd Battle of the Matanikau Part I - This is the ninth episode of our with historian and author Dave Holland. This episode discusses: How did the Japanese plan to exploit the Second Battle of the Matanikau to set up their October 1942 offensive to retake Guadalcanal? Why was the Matanikau River “key terrain” in the Guadalcanal Campaign for both the IJA and the US Marines defending Henderson Field? What was Japan’s concept for suppressing Henderson Field before the main assault? What was Vandegrift’s operational intent in launching the 7 October 1942 attack (Third Battle of the Matanikau), and why was it such a risk? What was the “One Log Bridge” on the Matanikau River, and why did it matter tactically? How did the weather have on the Matanikau operation? Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. . - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon. Great Professional Military Education for your Unit. This episode covers the operational art and importance of Offensive Action - seizing and retaining the initiative.
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Puller, Munro, and Monssen - the daring resuce of 1/7 Marines - 2nd Battle of the Matanikau Part II
02/01/2026
Puller, Munro, and Monssen - the daring resuce of 1/7 Marines - 2nd Battle of the Matanikau Part II
2nd Matanikau - Guadalcanal and Pullers rescue of the 1/7th Marines. The 2nd Battle of the Matanikau Part II - This is the eighth episode of our with historian and author Dave Holland. This episode discusses: What was the plan for 27 September, and why was it inherently risky? How did a breakdown in command-and-control affect the Marines’ river-crossing plan at the Matanikau River? How did the Japanese react so fast, and what trap did they set behind Chesty Puller? Why did the Raiders get stopped short of the One Log Bridge—and what happened to Ken Bailey? What role did comms failure play once the fight started to go wrong? How did the amphibious “end run” force end up trapped west of Point Cruz? What made the situation worse once they were cut off—equipment and radios? How did the “HELP” undershirt signal actually work, and what did the pilot do? How was the rescue executed—who coordinated it, and what enabled withdrawal under fire? What were the lessons learnt and why are they important today? Who was Samuel B. Griffith? - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. Check out the show notes for this . - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon. Great Professional Military Education for your Unit. This episode covers C2, Littoral Manoeuvre and naval support to land operations.
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141 - Chesty Puller, 1/7 Marines and 2nd Matanikau, Guadalcanal
11/28/2025
141 - Chesty Puller, 1/7 Marines and 2nd Matanikau, Guadalcanal
The 2nd Battle of the Matanikau - This is the seventh episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland. This episodes discusses: - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. Check out the show notes for this . - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon.
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140 - Battle of Edson's Ridge: How the Marines saved the Cactus Air Force
11/13/2025
140 - Battle of Edson's Ridge: How the Marines saved the Cactus Air Force
This is the sixth episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland. This episodes discusses: - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. Check out the show notes for this . - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon.
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139 - Guadalcanal - Edson and the defence of Bloody Ridge
11/01/2025
139 - Guadalcanal - Edson and the defence of Bloody Ridge
This is the fifth episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland. This episodes discusses: - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. Check out the show notes for this .
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138 - Guadalcanal - Battle of the Tenaru: How the Marines stopped Ichiki's night assault on the Alligator Creek
10/09/2025
138 - Guadalcanal - Battle of the Tenaru: How the Marines stopped Ichiki's night assault on the Alligator Creek
This is the fourth episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland. This episodes discusses: How did the Marines employ the 37 mm gun firing canister at Alligator Creek? Why did Colonel Ichiki attack without heavy weapons— trading firepower for speed and what was the cost? What are the myths about scout Jacob Vouza? How did barbed wire obstacles and coconut-log bunkers employed for to create an engagement zone? How did pre-registered fires shape the Battle of Tenaru? What early warnings did coastwatchers and patrols provide before the assault? How did Marine tanks at dawn finish the fight across the sandbar? What role did the Cactus Air Force play in the Battle of Tenaru? Was Ichiki killed in action or by seppuku—what’s the best evidence? What operational lessons from Tenaru guided both sides at Henderson Field? Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. Check out the show notes for this .
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137 - The Marines' Assault on Guadalcanal
09/23/2025
137 - The Marines' Assault on Guadalcanal
This is the third episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland. This episodes discusses: How the Marines seized conducted the landing and seized Guadalcanal’s decisive terrain. Red Beach landing bypasses IJA fortifications at Lunga Point. Vandegrift prioritizes tight perimeter, airfield defense. Carriers withdraw; logistics halved, myths debunked. Japanese forces surprised and how they reacted. Combined arms landings: infantry, artillery, engineers. What really happened with the Goettge Patrol? Logistics speed amphibious resupply. Amtracs and beachmasters enable rapid combat buildup. Modern littoral operations: enduring risk management lessons. Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. Check out the show notes for this .
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136 - Marines vs Japanese: Brutal Battles for Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo
09/15/2025
136 - Marines vs Japanese: Brutal Battles for Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo
This is the second episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland. Shoestring invasion planning Koro rehearsals fiasco Risking the aircraft carriers vs time to unload the convoy Crutchley’s covering cruisers Rupertus leads Tulagi Blue Beach landing Fighting at “the Cut” Improvised cave tactics Gavutu–Tanambogo battles Tanks combat Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front. Check out the show notes for this .
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135 - How the Marines Prepared for Guadalcanal | Operation Watchtower Explained
08/31/2025
135 - How the Marines Prepared for Guadalcanal | Operation Watchtower Explained
This is the first in a major series of podcasts looking at the Battles of Guadalcanal. This is an interview with Dave Holland. This episode looks at: Guadalcanal's strategic significance Terrain and Climate of Guadalcanal Development of Marine Amphibious Doctrine Combat experience within the 1st Marine Division Strength and structure of a Marine Division US intelligence preparation before the landings Japanese intelligence and intentions US decision to land on Guadalcanal and Tulagi Operation Shoestring Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.
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134 - Preparing Today's Armies for Tomorrow's Wars: Battlefield Innovation and Disruption
08/07/2025
134 - Preparing Today's Armies for Tomorrow's Wars: Battlefield Innovation and Disruption
This is the final episode of three in our series from our interview with Retired Colonel John Antal discussing his research into contemporary combat and how technology is changing the modern battlefield. John makes a series of great points during the interview: Modern War Is Fought in a Transparent Battlespace Visibility through drones, sensors, and AI means traditional massing of forces is now lethal. You must deceive and disrupt enemy sensors or be destroyed. Masking Should Be a Principle of War Masking = multi-domain deception to confuse enemy ISR. Use decoys, optical/thermal camouflage, and emission control—make the enemy see what you want them to see. Camouflage and Concealment Are Critically Neglected Western armies (incl. U.S. and Australian) have virtually no meaningful camouflage training. Without drones for perspective or thermal checks, soldiers can't learn what the enemy sees. Command Posts Are Death Traps Tents and Winnebago-style mobile HQs are vulnerable to drone and artillery strikes. Forces must restructure command posts: smaller, distributed, better masked, and mobile. Infiltration Is the Primary Tactic of Modern War Seen in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, and Gaza, infiltration bypasses strongpoints and succeeds in high-transparency environments where massing is suicidal. Mobile Phones Kill Units Civilian phones constantly emit signals. Unless militaries ban personal devices or deploy secure comms, they invite precision targeting. Drones Are the Machine Guns of the 21st Century Drones must be ubiquitous, especially at the squad level. But to manage this, armies need a dedicated drone corps—trained, maintained, and operationalised like any combat arm. Resilience Beats Exquisite Systems Over-reliance on billion-dollar platforms (e.g., B-2s, F-35s) is a strategic risk. Operation Spiderweb Cheap drones can destroy exquisite systems. Forces must be able to take hits and continue fighting. Training Is Outdated and Unrealistic Many exercises simulate conventional war (e.g., Desert Storm) rather than dispersed, dark, denied environments. We fall to the level of our training—not rise to our expectations. Leaders Must Prepare for First Strike and Distributed Ops The enemy will hit first. Western forces must train to disperse, operate without emissions, reassemble fast, and strike with real-time decision-making. The key: agility, initiative, and survivability. Check out the for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
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133 - Kill webs and super swarms - building survivable CPs for decision superiority
07/28/2025
133 - Kill webs and super swarms - building survivable CPs for decision superiority
This is the second episode of our interview with Retired Colonel John Antal discussing his research into contemporary combat and how technology is changing the modern battlefield. We discuss the lessons learnt from 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine and recent Israeli battles and how technology is changing the modern battlefield. Check out the for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
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132 - Ten Battlefield Disruptors for Tomorrow's Wars
07/13/2025
132 - Ten Battlefield Disruptors for Tomorrow's Wars
How is the modern battlefield changing? What role is technology like Artificial Intelligence, drones, precision strike and electronic warfare changing command and control, ISR and combined arms? This is the first of 3 episodes with retired Colonel John Antal, who has studied 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh, recent Israeli battles and the war in Ukraine. Check out the for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
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131 - Amphibious Ambitions and Island Defeats - How Kinman and Hainan shaped China's Navy
06/14/2025
131 - Amphibious Ambitions and Island Defeats - How Kinman and Hainan shaped China's Navy
This is the second of a two-part series looking at the origin story of the PLA Navy. This episode looks at the crucial Kinmen and Hainan Islands campaigns. This is an interview with Dr Toshi Yoshihara, an expert in the history of China's Navy. How was each campaign planned and executed? What were the results for the Chinese Navy? What did the PLA Navy learn from these campaigns? How have these early littoral manoeuvre campaigns shaped the PLA today? We discuss the roles of Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Xiao Jinguang, in these early important battles for China. Check out the for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
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130 - From River Crossings to Amphibious Operations - How the PLA Built a Navy from scratch and learned littoral manoeuvre
06/05/2025
130 - From River Crossings to Amphibious Operations - How the PLA Built a Navy from scratch and learned littoral manoeuvre
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129 - Slim in Burma - Innovation, Air Power and Special Forces
05/25/2025
129 - Slim in Burma - Innovation, Air Power and Special Forces
How did Field Marshall Slim innovate in the Burma Campaign? This is a look at military innovation through necessity that developed key capabilities for the 14th Army to defeat the Japanese forces in the Burma theatre. We discuss: Slim's innovation overcame critical resource shortages in Burma. Developed aerial resupply, air evacuation, and improvised naval logistics. Used teakwood barges to cross rivers with tanks. Created monsoon-proof airfields with hessian and tar. Strong advocate of Special Forces—mobilized Force 136 and Karen levies. Outmanoeuvred Japanese by leveraging terrain and logistics. Fought against Generals Aida, Mutaguchi, and Kimura. Trained the Indian Army in combined arms warfare. Built floating bridges across vast rivers like the Chindwin. Crossing the Irrawaddy. Led with humility and authenticity, known to Indian troops as “Uncle Bill.” This interview is the third part of a 3-part series with Dr Robert Lyman, the expert on the Burma Campaign and Field Marshall Sir William Slim. Check out the for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
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128 - Rebuilding an Army: Morale, Leadership, Training and Mission Command in the 14th Army with Slim
05/03/2025
128 - Rebuilding an Army: Morale, Leadership, Training and Mission Command in the 14th Army with Slim
How did Slim rebuild the 14th Army after it's 1,000 mile withdrawal from Burma? We look at how lessons were learnt and doctrine was developed to forge an Army capable of taking on the Japanese. We discuss the important question - what makes an Army officer a good trainer of soldiers. This interview is the second part of a 3 part series with Dr Robert Lyman, the expert on the Burma Campaign and Field Marshall Sir William Slim. Check out the for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
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127 - The General who wouldn't quit: Slim and the longest retreat
04/25/2025
127 - The General who wouldn't quit: Slim and the longest retreat
The withdrawal from Burma was almost 1,000 miles in 100 days and yet Slim, as commander of Burma Corps, maintained his optimism throughout the operation. We look at Slim's early career and background to study his optimism and resilience in the face of an overwhelmingly poor tactical situation. This interview is the first part of a 3 part series with Dr Robert Lyman, the expert on the Burma Campaign and Field Marshall Sir William Slim. Check out the for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
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126 - Care of the wounded on the Kokoda Track
04/12/2025
126 - Care of the wounded on the Kokoda Track
This episode looks at the care of the wounded on the Kokoda Track. What level of care did sick and wounded soldiers receive? Why was the medical planning still being conducted whilst the Battle of Isurava was in progress? What was the issue with medical logistics and how were casualties to be casevaced from the battlefield? We listen to the story of CAPT Stan Bissett as he describes how his brother Butch was wounded just north of Isurava and later died of his wounds. Medical care was provided under the most difficult conditions, in the jungle, in steep terrain and during the withdrawal. Important lessons for the planning and execution for the treatment of wounded during combat. This episode continues our Check out the for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
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The Military Decision Making and Planning Process
03/20/2025
The Military Decision Making and Planning Process
This episode is a cross-post from . This is a recording of MAJGEN Mick Krause, AM - the author the new ADF-I-5 doctrine - Decision Making and Planning Processes. He presented a PME session at Holdsworthy Barracks to discuss the new doctrine. ADF-I-5 Decision Making and Planning Processes replaces the Joint JMAP (Joint Military Appreciation Process) doctrine along with the Army LWD 5-1-4 The Military Appreciation Process. It covers in role of the Commander in the planning process and the importance of timeliness in the decision making and production of orders process. Check out the for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
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125 - Medical considerations on the Kokoda Track
03/12/2025
125 - Medical considerations on the Kokoda Track
What medical treatment was avaiable for the soldiers fighting on the Kokoda Track. How were ill and injured soldiers cared for and what were the difficulties in providing surgical and medical care in the austere conditions of the Jungles of Kokoda? This episode continues our Check out the for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
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124 - Leadership lessons from the Jungles of Vietnam with Gary McKay
11/28/2024
124 - Leadership lessons from the Jungles of Vietnam with Gary McKay
This episode is the second of a two part interview with retired LTCOL Gary McKay, who was a Platoon Commander in Vietnam, in D Coy, 4 RAR. He fought in Op Ivanhoe at the battle of Nui Le, where he was wounded. For his awarded the Military Cross for his performance during the battle. He was later the Commanding Officer of 8/9 RAR between 1988 and 1990. This episode continues our The training, doctrine and tactics used in Vietnam are a legacy of the expensive lessons learnt in the jungles of New Guinea. Gary discusses the Battle of Nui Le, a part of Op Ivanhoe. Gary shares his reflections on leadership, with some excellent thoughts for Junior Officers and SNCOs. Check out the for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
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123 - Jungle Combat in Vietnam with Gary McKay
11/15/2024
123 - Jungle Combat in Vietnam with Gary McKay
This episode is the first of a two part interview with retired LTCOL Gary McKay, who was a Platoon Commander in Vietnam, in D Coy, 4 RAR. He fought in Op Ivanhoe at the battle of Nui Le, where he was wounded. For his awarded the Military Cross for his performance during the battle. He was later the Commanding Officer of 8/9 RAR between 1988 and 1990. This episode continues our It specifically looks at how Australian soldiers were prepared for combat in the jungle and also looks at what makes jungle combat one of the most difficult types of terrain to fight in. As you are listening to Gary's story, compare that with the soldiers from the Second World War fighting the early jungle battles. The legacy of those hard won lessons on the Kokoda Track can clearly be heard in Gary's story. Check out the for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.
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