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S1/E56: Iranians Connect to the Internet by Starlink

Iran's Gambit

Release Date: 01/06/2025

S1/E80: Tehran Prepares For the Third Round of Talks show art S1/E80: Tehran Prepares For the Third Round of Talks

Iran's Gambit

Assessing the initial and subsequent rounds of bilateral negotiations with the United States, Iranian officials have expressed surprise at the rapid pace of diplomatic engagement. This acceleration is primarily ascribed to the limited scope of U.S. demands, the relative inexperience or subject-matter unfamiliarity of American negotiators, a pronounced strategic urgency to secure an agreement, and the personalized and unconventional diplomatic style characteristic of President Donald J. Trump. Nonetheless, the trajectory toward a comprehensive accord remains encumbered by persistent structural...

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S1/E79: Pragmatist vs. Obstructionist - Rafsanjani Junior vs. Shariatmadari Senior show art S1/E79: Pragmatist vs. Obstructionist - Rafsanjani Junior vs. Shariatmadari Senior

Iran's Gambit

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S1/E78: U.S.-Iran Negotiations - The Devil In the Detail show art S1/E78: U.S.-Iran Negotiations - The Devil In the Detail

Iran's Gambit

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S1/E77: Rome - “I’m Picking Up Good Vibrations” show art S1/E77: Rome - “I’m Picking Up Good Vibrations”

Iran's Gambit

Foreign Minister Dr. Abbas Araghchi has asserted that U.S. interlocutors have refrained from introducing extraneous, non-nuclear issues during the most recent round of negotiations. He confirmed that technical-level discussions would resume in Muscat on Wednesday, April 23, and that he would reconvene with U.S. Special Envoy Mr. Steven Witkoff on Saturday, April 26, to evaluate progress. This indicates Mr. Witkoff's April 15, on X, stating: "Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment" was not expressed as a U.S. demand in the course of the negotiations.

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S1/E76: Embrace Or Attack Saudi In Preparation for Negotiations? show art S1/E76: Embrace Or Attack Saudi In Preparation for Negotiations?

Iran's Gambit

Receiving the Saudi Defense Minister in Tehran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei chose a condescending attitude in dealing with the younger brother of the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, but the fact that he received him undermines policy recommendation of Iranian strategist Dr. Mehdi Kharatian, who argues Iran can improve its negotiation position vis a vis the United States by attacking Saudi interest. In the meantime, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi downplays the significance of the change in U.S. Middle East Envoy Steven Witkoff’s ever-changing positions as expressed on television and social media.

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S1/E75: Khamenei On Iran-U.S. Talks: “Neither Excessively Optimistic, Nor Excessively Pessimistic” show art S1/E75: Khamenei On Iran-U.S. Talks: “Neither Excessively Optimistic, Nor Excessively Pessimistic”

Iran's Gambit

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei states he is “neither excessively optimistic, nor excessively pessimistic” regarding Iran’s bilateral diplomatic engagement with the United States—an appropriate stance, given the latest recalibration in U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East Steven Witkoff’s position on Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity. While Iranian media appear condemn the change in Witkoff’s position, Deputy Foreign Minister and member of the negotiation team Kazem Gharibabadi delivered a more careful assessment indicating Iran is more interested in what...

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S1/E74: Tehran Positions Itself for Renewed Talks with Washington show art S1/E74: Tehran Positions Itself for Renewed Talks with Washington

Iran's Gambit

As a prelude to potential diplomatic engagement with the United States, the Islamic Republic is strategically signaling both deterrence and openness to negotiation. The activation of Yemeni Houthi proxies and the controlled disclosure of the Revolutionary Guard’s subterranean missile infrastructure serve as calibrated demonstrations of Iran’s strategic depth and military resilience, aimed at reinforcing its bargaining position vis-à-vis President Donald J. Trump. Simultaneously, the of the U.S. flag from the facility’s floor, alongside Tehran’s formal diplomatic response,...

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S1/E73: Iran Celebrates 1404: New Year, Old Problems show art S1/E73: Iran Celebrates 1404: New Year, Old Problems

Iran's Gambit

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s March 20 New Year address was far from jubilant, conveying a tone of somber resilience rather than triumphalism. He acknowledged that Iranians had endured significant economic hardship over the past year, with further adversities likely in the year ahead. Regarding recent communications from President Donald J. Trump and other U.S. officials, Khamenei adopted a posture of defiance, though his rhetoric was not categorically intransigent:  Iran has no proxies in the Middle East region, he asserted, which may indicate Khamenei willingness to accommodate Trump's...

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S1/E72: In the Shadow of War & Negotiation show art S1/E72: In the Shadow of War & Negotiation

Iran's Gambit

As the Islamic Republic of Iran prepares for negotiations with the administration of President Donald J. Trump, the Islamic Republic finds itself in urgent need of expendable bargaining assets to safeguard the strategic core of its nuclear program. Yemen’s Houthis, a key force aligned with Iran’s regional ambitions, present an ideal sacrificial piece: First, Tehran escalates Houthi aggression against U.S. interests, using the Yemeni proxy as a tool to apply pressure and shape the regional security landscape. Then, at the negotiating table, Tehran offers de-escalation—promising to rein...

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S1/E71: Iran's Other Problems: Seismic Vulnerability, Energy and Water Crises show art S1/E71: Iran's Other Problems: Seismic Vulnerability, Energy and Water Crises

Iran's Gambit

Iran faces escalating environmental and infrastructural crises, exposing governance deficiencies. Tehran’s seismic vulnerability is critical, with accumulated tectonic stress indicating a high-probability magnitude 7+ earthquake. Rapid urbanization and inadequate disaster preparedness put millions at risk. Simultaneously, Iran’s energy crisis worsens as demand outpaces supply. Dr. Hashem Oraee highlights policy mismanagement, with heavy subsidies fueling excessive consumption. Prioritizing residential energy over industrial needs has led to economic stagnation, inflation, and public...

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There has always been a correlation, if not causality, between technological innovation and sociopolitical transformation: Gutenberg’s printing press catalyzed the Protestant Reformation, and from his exile in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini famously utilized cassette tape recordings of his sermons to galvanize the Iranian populace against the Pahlavi regime during the 1970s. BBC Persian's radio service too aided the Iranian revolutionaries. The Internet similarly embodies revolutionary potential, a reality that underscores the Islamic Republic’s systematic strategies to regulate and suppress it since Iran's initial connection in 1993. Following Israel, Iran became the second nation in the Middle East to gain access to the World Wide Web in 1993. However, during this nascent stage, Internet usage in Iran was confined to academic research within universities, rendering it inaccessible to the broader public sphere.

Concurrently, an increasing number of Iranians began to adopt satellite television as an alternative information ecosystem. In 1994, the Iranian parliament enacted legislation criminalizing the ownership and use of satellite receivers—colloquially referred to as "dishes"—which facilitated access to transnational satellite broadcasts. This legislative intervention was intended to preserve the monopoly of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) as the hegemonic apparatus for information dissemination and cultural programming within Iranian society. Nevertheless, despite state-enforced compliance mechanisms such as law enforcement raids to confiscate satellite equipment and the deployment of advanced signal-jamming technologies, a substantial segment of the population—including members of the political elite—circumvented these restrictions. Satellite television emerged as a parallel media domain, offering alternative narratives that undermined the state-controlled information architecture, thereby challenging the government's capacity to sustain informational hegemony.

Back to the internet, initially, Internet access in Iran was restricted to universities and research institutions. However, according to World Bank data, fixed broadband subscriptions in the country surged from 176 in year 2000 to nearly 11 million in 2021. Similarly, mobile cellular subscriptions grew from 9,200 in 1994 to almost 136 million in 2021. An increasing proportion of these mobile devices are Internet-enabled, granting users access to social media platforms. This exponential growth signifies a notable milestone for a developing nation but simultaneously presents profound challenges to an authoritarian regime intent on constraining personal and political freedoms.

To preserve its dominance over the digital information ecosystem, the regime has systematically imposed restrictions on widely used platforms, including YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Telegram. Nonetheless, Iranian citizens have adeptly utilized Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to circumvent state-imposed censorship and access restricted content. From the regime’s perspective, this challenge has been further exacerbated by advancements in satellite Internet technology. Increasingly, Iranian users are bypassing government-controlled telecommunications infrastructure by connecting to global satellite networks, such as Starlink, provided by the international aerospace and telecommunications corporation SpaceX. This trend is extensively documented in the Tehran E-Commerce Association’s fourth report on the "State of the Internet in Iran.