Iran's Gambit
"Iran's Gambit" is a daily podcast produced by Ali Alfoneh, on Iranian politics, and Iran's national security strategy.
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S1/E58: Mashayekhi on Maladministration
01/12/2025
S1/E58: Mashayekhi on Maladministration
The central government in Iran, whether under the Pahlavi regime or the Islamic Republic, has historically provided institutionalized spaces for experts to engage in debates on technical—and occasionally political—issues aligned with state interests. These platforms, often manifesting as think tanks, policy research centers, and other quasi-official institutions, fulfill several critical functions: First, they channel dissent by allowing critics of government policies to articulate their objections within controlled environments, thus preventing such dissent from escalating into mass mobilizations or street protests against the regime. Second, they serve as a mechanism for the state to gauge the prevailing intellectual currents among elite circles, potentially co-opting and incorporating ideas that align with state priorities. Third, these fora can act as a tool for the regime to coopt members of oppositional elites by integrating them into the bureaucratic or executive apparatus. With the advent of the internet, both opposition groups and the regime have utilized digital spaces to establish new platforms for discourse. Alongside entertainment content such as cooking shows, pet videos, and pornography, these digital spaces occasionally host serious and substantive debates. Notably, the Islamic Republic has refrained from censoring these discussions, likely because entertainment content overwhelmingly dominates viewer attention. From a political strategy standpoint, this ensures that the regime can extract value from these debates without risking significant political activation or mobilization among the broader Iranian public. A pertinent example is the January 11 debate between Dr. Ali-Naqi Mashayekhi, Professor Emeritus at Sharif Institute of Technology (often referred to as Iran’s MIT), who holds a Ph.D. in management, and Seyyed Ehsan Khandouzi from Allameh Tabatabaei University. The two scholars engaged in a critical discussion on the structural and institutional factors underlying the stagnation of Iran’s development, with a particular focus on economic development.
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S1/E57: IRGC Commander on Assad's Ineptitude and Putin's Treachery
01/09/2025
S1/E57: IRGC Commander on Assad's Ineptitude and Putin's Treachery
Commander Behrouz Esbati, the Public Affairs Director of the Joint Force Cyber Command, on January 7 centered his speech on his firsthand observations of the systemic collapse of the Assad regime. Approximately one hour of his speech was published by Tabnak News Agency, an outlet affiliated with Dr. Mohsen Rezaei, the longest-serving Chief Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Commander Esbati's remarks can be categorized into two distinct sections. The first section presents an Iranian perspective on the progressive disintegration of the Syrian regime, including the erosion of military morale and widespread demoralization among the Syrian populace. This portion of his analysis appears to be both credible and candid. The second section, however, where Commander Esbati projects the future trajectory of the so-called 'Axis of Resistance,' is imbued with ideological rhetoric and serves more as propaganda. I have chosen to place limited emphasis on this part of his discourse.
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S1/E56: Iranians Connect to the Internet by Starlink
01/06/2025
S1/E56: Iranians Connect to the Internet by Starlink
There has always been a correlation, if not causality, between technological innovation and sociopolitical transformation: Gutenberg’s printing press catalyzed the Protestant Reformation, and from his exile in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini famously utilized cassette tape recordings of his sermons to galvanize the Iranian populace against the Pahlavi regime during the 1970s. BBC Persian's radio service too aided the Iranian revolutionaries. The Internet similarly embodies revolutionary potential, a reality that underscores the Islamic Republic’s systematic strategies to regulate and suppress it since Iran's initial connection in 1993. Following Israel, Iran became the second nation in the Middle East to gain access to the World Wide Web in 1993. However, during this nascent stage, Internet usage in Iran was confined to academic research within universities, rendering it inaccessible to the broader public sphere. Concurrently, an increasing number of Iranians began to adopt satellite television as an alternative information ecosystem. In 1994, the Iranian parliament enacted legislation criminalizing the ownership and use of satellite receivers—colloquially referred to as "dishes"—which facilitated access to transnational satellite broadcasts. This legislative intervention was intended to preserve the monopoly of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) as the hegemonic apparatus for information dissemination and cultural programming within Iranian society. Nevertheless, despite state-enforced compliance mechanisms such as law enforcement raids to confiscate satellite equipment and the deployment of advanced signal-jamming technologies, a substantial segment of the population—including members of the political elite—circumvented these restrictions. Satellite television emerged as a parallel media domain, offering alternative narratives that undermined the state-controlled information architecture, thereby challenging the government's capacity to sustain informational hegemony. Back to the internet, initially, Internet access in Iran was restricted to universities and research institutions. However, according to World Bank data, fixed broadband subscriptions in the country surged from 176 in year 2000 to nearly 11 million in 2021. Similarly, mobile cellular subscriptions grew from 9,200 in 1994 to almost 136 million in 2021. An increasing proportion of these mobile devices are Internet-enabled, granting users access to social media platforms. This exponential growth signifies a notable milestone for a developing nation but simultaneously presents profound challenges to an authoritarian regime intent on constraining personal and political freedoms. To preserve its dominance over the digital information ecosystem, the regime has systematically imposed restrictions on widely used platforms, including YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Telegram. Nonetheless, Iranian citizens have adeptly utilized Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to circumvent state-imposed censorship and access restricted content. From the regime’s perspective, this challenge has been further exacerbated by advancements in satellite Internet technology. Increasingly, Iranian users are bypassing government-controlled telecommunications infrastructure by connecting to global satellite networks, such as Starlink, provided by the international aerospace and telecommunications corporation SpaceX. This trend is extensively documented in the Tehran E-Commerce Association’s fourth report on the "State of the Internet in Iran.
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S1/E55: Larijani Defends Iran's Track Record in Syria
01/05/2025
S1/E55: Larijani Defends Iran's Track Record in Syria
· On January 1, Dr. Ali , former Supreme National Security Council secretary, and adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, defended Iran's track record in Syria. It is not known if Dr. Larijani's spin is only meant for the Iranian public, or he delivers the same message to Khamenei.
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S1/E54: Foreign Ministry vs. Quds Force Part II
01/04/2025
S1/E54: Foreign Ministry vs. Quds Force Part II
As the Islamic Republic commemorated the fifth anniversary of assassination of Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem Suleimani, many public figures, who had personal interactions with him delivered lengthy interviews discussing this near-mythical individual. On January 2nd, I discussed former Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif's interview with Khorasan newspaper, and today, I'll discuss current Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi's interview. He delivered the interview on January 1, and my translation is based on the partial transcription released by Iran's al-Alam network. As you will see, there are significant differences between Dr. Zarif's account and Dr. Araghchi's, but this is understandable: the former no longer serves as foreign minister, and the latter is and must deal with the Quds Force bureaucracy in his everyday work. Nevertheless, as you will hear, you can always detect signs of inter-agency rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force, even in the guarded comments delivered by Dr. Araghchi.
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S1/E53: Foreign Ministry vs. Quds Force Part I
01/03/2025
S1/E53: Foreign Ministry vs. Quds Force Part I
Former Foreign Minister Dr. Mohammad-Javad Zarif's interview with January 1, 2025 edition of Khorasan newspaper not only provides some insights into his relationship with the late Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem, but also into inter-agency rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force. An audio recording, allegedly leaked to the media in 2021, provides greater insights into how the Quds Force undermined the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic efforts.
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S1/E52: Khamenei Commemorates Suleimani
01/01/2025
S1/E52: Khamenei Commemorates Suleimani
In the history of most countries, some eras appear more glorious than others. And at times, the past appears more glorious than what we expect of the future. This was my sense monitoring Iran's state-censored media today. Addressing the families of martyrs, including the family of Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem Soleimani, widows of Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon, and other affiliated groups, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delivered a speech commemorating the fifth anniversary of Soleimani's assassination. In his address, Ayatollah Khamenei reflected on the apex of Soleimani's influence, particularly from 2003 to 2020—a period, which coincides with the height of Iranian geopolitical leverage in the Middle East. Regarding future prospects, however, Ayatollah Khamenei’s rhetoric conveyed aspirations and hope but lacked a clearly articulated strategic framework. Clearly, glory was in the past and the future looks more uncertain.
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S1/E51: Dueling Rallies in Iran
12/31/2024
S1/E51: Dueling Rallies in Iran
On December 30, Tehran witnessed two competing demonstrations emblematic of Iran's polarized political climate: one orchestrated by the regime and the other a spontaneous expression of public dissent triggered by the latest depreciation of the Iranian Rial against the U.S. Dollar. The state-organized rally aimed to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of what the regime frames as "the sedition of 2009," a characterization starkly contrasting with global narratives that recognize this period as the Green Movement uprisings in Iran. As some may recall, Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election in 2009 under contentious circumstances ignited political contention. His rivals, Mr. Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mr. Mehdi Karrubi, contested the election results, sparking mass mobilizations. On December 27, 2009, millions of demonstrators took to the streets, marking a pivotal moment as chants against Ayatollah Ali Khamenei emerged for the first time. In reaction, the regime organized pro-government demonstrations on December 30, 2009, events that the Islamic Republic’s propaganda apparatus celebrated yesterday in an act of political mythmaking. In contrast, the second rally, as noted earlier, arose organically as thousands of merchants in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar protested the Rial's devaluation against the Dollar. This economic grievance underscores the regime’s persistent struggle with public dissatisfaction fueled by economic mismanagement. In today’s program, I will analyze the Iranian media’s selective coverage—or deliberate omission—of these dueling demonstrations, alongside a critical examination of the function and symbolism of pro-regime rallies within the broader context of Iranian political strategy and governance.
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S1/E50: Tahrir al-Sham's Iranian Fighters - Radicals or Infiltrators?
12/29/2024
S1/E50: Tahrir al-Sham's Iranian Fighters - Radicals or Infiltrators?
While presence of Iranian nationals among the Tahrir al-Sham Movement risks radicalizing the Sunnis in Iran, and therefore constitutes a security threat to the Islamic Republic, some of those radicals may be Intelligence Ministry infiltrators. However, infiltrators too can at times go rogue and pursue their self-interests.
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S1/E49: Why Did the Regime Shelve the "Hijab and Chastity Bill"?
12/28/2024
S1/E49: Why Did the Regime Shelve the "Hijab and Chastity Bill"?
On December 15, Iran's Supreme National Security Council issued a statement announcing suspension of the so-called "Hijab and Chastity Law," formally known as the "The Bill Supporting Families By Propagating the Culture of Chastity and Hijab". The bill, which was passed on June 13, 2024, was the regime's reaction to anti-hijab protests in the wake of the September 16, 2022 killing of 22-year-old Ms. Mahsa Amini in the custody of the so-called "Morality Police". It was also a reaction to the fact that increasingly, many women ignore the requirements for covering their head with a scarf in public spaces. Why is the regime capitulating on the hijab issue? In short, because President Masoud Pezeshkian, his Cabinet, and even the Revolutionary Guard and the Law Enforcement Forces, no longer believe enforcement of the bill can intimidate Iran's urban middle class into submission. On the contrary, enforcement of the Hijab bill can potentially provoke another round of anti-regime protests. The 1980's are over!
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S1/E48: Regime Conflicted On How to Deal With Syria
12/26/2024
S1/E48: Regime Conflicted On How to Deal With Syria
While President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and the technocratic elites of the Islamic Republic appear to have accepted Iran’s total defeat in Syria, and are reaching out to the new rulers of that country to establish formal relations, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Revolutionary Guard and IRGC affiliated media outlets are still in denial and talk of “Syrian youth” rebelling against the new regime.
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S1/E47: Does Ayatollah Khamenei Believe His Own Propaganda?
12/24/2024
S1/E47: Does Ayatollah Khamenei Believe His Own Propaganda?
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's December 22 address on the occasion of the birth anniversary of Fatemeh Zahra had little to do with plight of women, and a good deal to do with regional developments, in particular Syria. He appeared irritated by Israel's "boasting" and "grand standing," assured the Iranian public that Israel was defeated rather than victorious, and expressed hope Israel would be "evicted" from the Middle East region. On the same day, Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, Supreme National Security Council secretary, delivered an interview expressing similar views. Doest the regime, and in particular, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, believe his own propaganda? If his advisers, the likes of Mr. Ahmadian, constantly confirm his worldview, is Ayatollah Khamenei capable of distinguishing between propaganda and reality?
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S1/E46: Shamkhani's Swan Song Part III
12/21/2024
S1/E46: Shamkhani's Swan Song Part III
In the Islamic Republic, there is no government. Everyone is a member of the opposition when there is public criticism of the regime's performance. Rear Admiral Ali Shamkheni, Supreme National Security Council secretary from 2013 to 2023 is one of the few exceptions to this rule, and today's program is dedicated to his answers to critical questions from a group of students visiting Nour News Agency's headquarters at the Supreme National Security Council.
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S1/E45: Shamkhani's Swan Song Part II
12/20/2024
S1/E45: Shamkhani's Swan Song Part II
In the Islamic Republic, there is no government. Everyone is a member of the opposition when there is public criticism of the regime's performance. Rear Admiral Ali Shamkheni, Supreme National Security Council secretary from 2013 to 2023 is one of the few exceptions to this rule, and today's program is dedicated to his answers to critical questions from a group of students visiting Nour News Agency's headquarters at the Supreme National Security Council.
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S1/E44: Shamkhani's Swan Song Part I
12/19/2024
S1/E44: Shamkhani's Swan Song Part I
In the Islamic Republic, there is no government. Everyone is a member of the opposition when there is public criticism of the regime's performance. Rear Admiral Ali Shamkheni, Supreme National Security Council secretary from 2013 to 2023 is one of the few exceptions to this rule, and today's program is dedicated to his answers to critical questions from a group of students visiting Nour News Agency's headquarters at the Supreme National Security Council.
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S1/E43: Khamenei and the IRGC Slam Critique
12/17/2024
S1/E43: Khamenei and the IRGC Slam Critique
Collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and manifest defeat of the Revolutionary Guard’s strategy in Syria have exposed the organization to public critique in Iran. While still short of demanding accountability, reformist politicians are openly calling for civilian control over the military, and civilian supremacy in national security decision-making. There is, however, no indication that the Revolutionary Guard leadership is willing to voluntarily subject itself to civilian control or give up its decisive influence over national security decision-making. On the contrary, as evident on the front page of Revolutionary Guard mouthpiece Javan newspaper, the Guard is likely to use the Judiciary to prosecute and terrorize critics.
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S1/E42: Khamenei on Syria: Defiance in Defeat
12/12/2024
S1/E42: Khamenei on Syria: Defiance in Defeat
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei showed defiance in defeat in his first public statement in the wake of the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. Indirectly, he accused the new rulers of Syria of being agents of the United States and Israel. Furthermore, he claimed Iran was willing, but incapable of airlifting troops to Syria due to U.S. and Israel closing the skies over Syria to Iranian airplanes. He further added that former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had not requested military assistance from Iran. Khamenei used many a minute talking of invulnerability of the Axis of Resistance, his term for what remains of Iran’s proxies, despite collapse of the Assad regime, but his final warnings against those, who try to “demoralize” the Iranian public prove what is evident for all to see: the Assad regime’s collapse was Iran’s defeat, and defeat of Iran’s proxy strategy.
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S1/E41: In the Wake of Fiasco, Catastrophic Outlook
12/10/2024
S1/E41: In the Wake of Fiasco, Catastrophic Outlook
On Asr-e Iran's satirical commentary on the 95% of Syrian voters, who voted for Bashar al-Assad in the May 2021 presidential election in Syria, but failed to support him in the face of armed opponents; and Fars News Agency's involuntarily commical comment on Ayatollah Ali Khamenei urging Assad to "democratise Syria". The program also features an English translation of an undated interview by Ahmed hussein al-Shara, Tahrir al-Sham group leader, who in an undated interview threatened to "bring the war to Iran" by inciting Iran's ethnic and religious minorities against the central government in Tehran. Finally, the program features a translation of Foreign Minister Dr. Abbas Araghchi's interviw with Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, in which he assured the viewers that changes in Syria will not significantly weaken the Axis of Resistance.
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S1/E40: Fiasco!
12/08/2024
S1/E40: Fiasco!
Fiasco!
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S1/E39: Iran: Economic Failure, Introspection and Denial
12/06/2024
S1/E39: Iran: Economic Failure, Introspection and Denial
Iran’s national security strategy is evident. Lebanese Hezbollah, Tehran’s most prominent proxy, is in disarray, while the Assad regime in Syria, once a linchpin for the strategic overland corridor linking Iran to Lebanon via Iraq, is on the verge of either disintegration or defection from Iran’s camp. Today, rather than delving into real-time updates from Syria or elsewhere which other media do much better than yours truly, I will point at a few really simple economic factors driving the unraveling of Iran’s geopolitical strategy.
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S1/E38: Domino Dancing From Beirut to Aleppo
12/01/2024
S1/E38: Domino Dancing From Beirut to Aleppo
If you’ve been keeping an eye on global developments, as I assume many of you have, you’re likely aware of the seismic shift in Syria: Aleppo has fallen under the control of Tahrir al-Sham, a faction designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States in May 2018. While the rapidity of this development may have taken some by surprise, the evolving power dynamics in Syria were long evident. Lebanese Hezbollah, a strategic ally of Syria and a linchpin in Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance, is in disarray. Having incurred devastating losses in Lebanon, it has redeployed many of its forces from Syria to Lebanon to confront perceived threats from Israel. Iran, Hezbollah's primary patron, is increasingly constrained in financing its regional alliances, while Russia, whose aerial campaigns were instrumental in preserving the Assad regime, has deprioritized Syria amid its protracted conflict in Ukraine. Additionally, the Assad regime, potentially under Israeli pressure and enticed by wealthy Arab states, has sought to distance itself from Tehran, potentially even curtailing arms transfers to Hezbollah. With the United States maintaining only a minimal military footprint in Syria and a likely complete withdrawal once President-elect Donald J. Trump takes office, the geopolitical calculus has shifted. Tahrir al-Sham, reportedly backed by Turkey, has seized the opportunity to expand its territorial gains in this fragmented and volatile environment. Today, we’ll delve into Iranian media reactions to these developments and assess the broader implications of losing northern Syria for Tehran's defense doctrine – which I can assure you, is in ruins.
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S1/E37: Preposterous Commentary On Ceasefire in Lebanon, Sensible Commentary on Iran-U.S. Relations
11/27/2024
S1/E37: Preposterous Commentary On Ceasefire in Lebanon, Sensible Commentary on Iran-U.S. Relations
In today’s program, I’ll spend a few minutes critiquing the Revolutionary Guard-affiliated media's preposterous commentary on the ceasefire in Lebanon. However, I won’t dwell on these absurdities for too long. Instead, I’ll transition to discussing an interview in Etemad newspaper with Mr. Mohsen Mir-Damadi, a reformist political activist, who provides an astute and pragmatic assessment of the state of Iran-U.S. relations.
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S1/E36: Intelligence Failure
11/26/2024
S1/E36: Intelligence Failure
Today’s program focuses on a story from Jamaran News Agency, which may not be a familiar name to most of you, but it represents a noteworthy institution expressing the perspectives of the household of the late Grand Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. For context, "Jamaran" refers to a village situated on the mountain slopes of northern Tehran, where Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s compound was located during the Iran-Iraq War. At that time, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini was often referred to as “Pir-e Jamaran,” or the Old Man of Jamaran. While I am not entirely convinced that members of the Khomeini household harbor explicit political ambitions—having lost the post-Khomeini power struggle to Messrs. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Khamenei—it seems Mr. Hassan Khomeini, the most prominent figure of the Khomeini clan, is intent on remaining relevant. This is evident in Jamaran News publishing quality interviews with figures who held key public offices in the 1980s. Yesterday, Jamaran News released an interview with Hojjat al-Eslam Seyyed Mahmoud Alavi, a politician who began his career in the 1980s and rose to prominence under President Hassan Rouhani. Mr. Alavi served as Minister of Intelligence from 2013 to 2021. Now, I can imagine what some of you might be thinking at the mention of a Minister of Intelligence in the Islamic Republic of Iran—perhaps picturing a figure combining Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor with the KGB. Yet, believe it or not, Mr. Alavi is known as an intellectual, and Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, for the most part, operates as a professional institution. Currently, Mr. Alavi serves as an adviser to President Masoud Pezeshkian on matters concerning ethnic minorities, religion, and religious sects. Yesterday, he attended a book launch for a publication titled Oral History Biographies of Nuclear Martyrs, dedicated to Iran’s nuclear scientists who were assassinated, allegedly by Israeli intelligence.
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S1/E35: Ali Larijani Greenlights Washington
11/25/2024
S1/E35: Ali Larijani Greenlights Washington
Today, my focus is on two articles featured in yesterday's edition of Sazandegi newspaper, a publication representing the technocratic elites of Iran. The editor and most of the columnists associated with this newspaper have held governmental responsibilities, which grants them a distinctly pragmatic approach to politics compared to the average Iranian journalist, who is typically oppositional—oppositional to the Cabinet, or oppositional to the opposition! In contrast, Sazandegi adopts a perspective focused on practical political solutions. Yesterday’s edition of the newspaper featured two particularly intriguing articles—an uncommon occurrence in any daily publication. It’s not every day you find two exceptional articles even in The New York Times, let alone elsewhere. The first article delves into the political resurgence of Mr. Ali Larijani, the former parliamentary speaker and erstwhile Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Mr. Larijani has re-emerged in Iranian politics and appears highly active in signaling toward the United States. The second article discusses the policy options of the incoming administration of U.S. President-Elect Donald J. Trump vis-à-vis Iran.
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S1/E34: Iran Responds to IAEA Resolution
11/24/2024
S1/E34: Iran Responds to IAEA Resolution
Today's program is dominated by the escalating tensions between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On November 21, select members of the IAEA Board of Governors, including Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, passed a urging Iran to enhance its cooperation with the agency and provide a “comprehensive” report. This move, seen as an effort to pressure Tehran back to the negotiating table over its nuclear program, was met with a defiant response from Iran’s Foreign Ministry, which vowed to “respond in kind.” The Iranian media landscape reflects a growing polarization over this issue. Iran's state-affiliated outlets have offered a range of perspectives, revealing internal and external political strategies aimed at countering what is perceived as Western coercion.
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S1/E33: Sanctioned by the EU, Iran Looks to the Trump Presidency for Salvation
11/19/2024
S1/E33: Sanctioned by the EU, Iran Looks to the Trump Presidency for Salvation
There was a time when the European Union (EU) was perceived as Iran’s ally, counterbalancing what Tehran labeled as the U.S. “Great Satan.” During those years, Europe often sought to shield Iran from Washington’s more aggressive policies. However, the geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically. Iran’s growing alignment with Russia has alienated the Europeans to such an extent that their stance toward Tehran now appears more assertive and antagonistic than that of the United States. Amid these tensions, a cautious sense of optimism is palpable in Tehran, particularly following the meeting between Iran’s UN Ambassador, Amir Saeid Iravani, and Elon Musk, a close adviser to President-Elect Donald J. Trump. Yet, no such optimism exists regarding Iran-EU relations, where prospects appear grim. The EU’s recent sanctions against Iran reflect a hardening stance fueled by Tehran’s strategic alignment with Moscow. As Iran faces intensified European hostility, it appears to pin its hopes on the more ideologically fragmented Trump administration. Domestically, the recalibration of Iran’s diplomatic leadership underscores a shift toward pragmatic engagement in the region. These developments signal a pivotal moment for Iran, as its foreign and domestic policies face heightened scrutiny and evolving challenges on multiple fronts.
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S1/E32: Iran Denies Meeting Elon
11/18/2024
S1/E32: Iran Denies Meeting Elon
As some of you may recall, yesterday’s program was dedicated to the November 14 meeting between Mr. Amir-Saeid Iravani, Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations, and Mr. Elon Musk, entrepreneur and adviser to President Donald J. Trump. Today’s program will continue this discussion, as the alleged meeting remains a focal point in Iran’s heavily censored media. Iran’s Foreign Minister Mr. Abbas Araghchi has outright denied that such a meeting took place. The conservative Kayhan newspaper prominently celebrated the dismissal of the meeting's news, while reformist outlets such as Ham-Mihan praised the initiative. There is also an intriguing front-page article in the Javan newspaper, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which merits our closer attention, and so does rumors of Mr. Ali Larijani being appointed Supreme National Security Council secretary in the near future.
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S1/E31: Iran Meets Elon
11/16/2024
S1/E31: Iran Meets Elon
The focus of today’s discussion is the November 14th meeting between Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Amir Saeid Iravani, and Mr. Elon Musk, the prominent entrepreneur and perceived confidant of President-elect Donald J. Trump. According to the November 14th edition of the New York Times, the two gentlemen engaged in discussions lasting over an hour at an undisclosed location. Subsequent reporting by other outlets revealed that the meeting occurred at Ambassador Iravani’s official residence in New York City. An unnamed source cited by the New York Times claimed that during the meeting, Ambassador Iravani urged Mr. Musk to pursue sanctions exemptions from the U.S. Department of the Treasury and consider extending some of his business ventures to Tehran. The meeting has predictably caused significant debate within Tehran, where perceptions of Iran’s vulnerability to Israeli military actions have heightened concerns. Mr. Musk, likely motivated by his own economic interests, is seen as offering Tehran an opportunity to circumvent the Israel lobby in Washington, potentially opening a new chapter in U.S.-Iran relations. However, more cautious observers anticipate a potential rift between Mr. Musk and President Trump in the longer term. Should such a schism arise, it could empower pro-Israel factions within the incoming Trump administration to dominate U.S. national security policy-making. To judge by the media coverage, the meeting has also its critics in Iran, most prominently Kayhan newspaper. But just as remarkably, the Revolutionary Guard appears more cautious and has been largely silent.
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S1/E30: The Islamic Republic Reacts to Trump
11/13/2024
S1/E30: The Islamic Republic Reacts to Trump
The Islamic Republic has reacted with measured caution to the election of Mr. Donald J. Trump in the U.S. presidential elections. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei remains uncharacteristically silent, refraining from any direct commentary. Beneath surface-level official statements, such as “it does not matter who is president in the United States,” lies a profound apprehension over managing the implications of Mr. Trump’s victory—a sentiment echoed across Iran’s state-censored media. Amid these muted or guarded responses, an outline of a possible strategy emerges, likely influenced by figures such as former Foreign Minister Dr. Mohammad-Javad Zarif and former Ambassador Hossein Mousavian. This approach may include diplomatic overtures involving flattery, lauding Mr. Trump’s avowed anti-war stance, and suggesting the prospect of a historic “grand deal with Iran.” However, such a strategy risks being jeopardized by recent allegations linking the Iranian government to a purported plot to assassinate Mr. Trump. The strategy is also vulnerable to the outcome of the factional power struggle in Mr. Trump’s circle: Who will prevail in that power struggle, will also impact U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic.
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S1/E29: Faltering Pillars of Iran’s National Security Doctrine: Proxies, Missiles, and the Nuke
11/04/2024
S1/E29: Faltering Pillars of Iran’s National Security Doctrine: Proxies, Missiles, and the Nuke
Iran’s proxy networks and missile capabilities are currently under significant strain. This situation could propel Iran towards a nuclear breakout—not necessarily the regime’s first-choice option, but rather a potential consequence of these two other pillars faltering.
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