S1/E63: Collective Leadership in the Face of Internal and External Threats?
Release Date: 02/04/2025
Iran's Gambit
Assessing the initial and subsequent rounds of bilateral negotiations with the United States, Iranian officials have expressed surprise at the rapid pace of diplomatic engagement. This acceleration is primarily ascribed to the limited scope of U.S. demands, the relative inexperience or subject-matter unfamiliarity of American negotiators, a pronounced strategic urgency to secure an agreement, and the personalized and unconventional diplomatic style characteristic of President Donald J. Trump. Nonetheless, the trajectory toward a comprehensive accord remains encumbered by persistent structural...
info_outlineIran's Gambit
info_outlineIran's Gambit
info_outlineIran's Gambit
Foreign Minister Dr. Abbas Araghchi has asserted that U.S. interlocutors have refrained from introducing extraneous, non-nuclear issues during the most recent round of negotiations. He confirmed that technical-level discussions would resume in Muscat on Wednesday, April 23, and that he would reconvene with U.S. Special Envoy Mr. Steven Witkoff on Saturday, April 26, to evaluate progress. This indicates Mr. Witkoff's April 15, on X, stating: "Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment" was not expressed as a U.S. demand in the course of the negotiations.
info_outlineIran's Gambit
Receiving the Saudi Defense Minister in Tehran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei chose a condescending attitude in dealing with the younger brother of the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, but the fact that he received him undermines policy recommendation of Iranian strategist Dr. Mehdi Kharatian, who argues Iran can improve its negotiation position vis a vis the United States by attacking Saudi interest. In the meantime, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi downplays the significance of the change in U.S. Middle East Envoy Steven Witkoff’s ever-changing positions as expressed on television and social media.
info_outlineIran's Gambit
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei states he is “neither excessively optimistic, nor excessively pessimistic” regarding Iran’s bilateral diplomatic engagement with the United States—an appropriate stance, given the latest recalibration in U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East Steven Witkoff’s position on Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity. While Iranian media appear condemn the change in Witkoff’s position, Deputy Foreign Minister and member of the negotiation team Kazem Gharibabadi delivered a more careful assessment indicating Iran is more interested in what...
info_outlineIran's Gambit
As a prelude to potential diplomatic engagement with the United States, the Islamic Republic is strategically signaling both deterrence and openness to negotiation. The activation of Yemeni Houthi proxies and the controlled disclosure of the Revolutionary Guard’s subterranean missile infrastructure serve as calibrated demonstrations of Iran’s strategic depth and military resilience, aimed at reinforcing its bargaining position vis-à-vis President Donald J. Trump. Simultaneously, the of the U.S. flag from the facility’s floor, alongside Tehran’s formal diplomatic response,...
info_outlineIran's Gambit
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s March 20 New Year address was far from jubilant, conveying a tone of somber resilience rather than triumphalism. He acknowledged that Iranians had endured significant economic hardship over the past year, with further adversities likely in the year ahead. Regarding recent communications from President Donald J. Trump and other U.S. officials, Khamenei adopted a posture of defiance, though his rhetoric was not categorically intransigent: Iran has no proxies in the Middle East region, he asserted, which may indicate Khamenei willingness to accommodate Trump's...
info_outlineIran's Gambit
As the Islamic Republic of Iran prepares for negotiations with the administration of President Donald J. Trump, the Islamic Republic finds itself in urgent need of expendable bargaining assets to safeguard the strategic core of its nuclear program. Yemen’s Houthis, a key force aligned with Iran’s regional ambitions, present an ideal sacrificial piece: First, Tehran escalates Houthi aggression against U.S. interests, using the Yemeni proxy as a tool to apply pressure and shape the regional security landscape. Then, at the negotiating table, Tehran offers de-escalation—promising to rein...
info_outlineIran's Gambit
Iran faces escalating environmental and infrastructural crises, exposing governance deficiencies. Tehran’s seismic vulnerability is critical, with accumulated tectonic stress indicating a high-probability magnitude 7+ earthquake. Rapid urbanization and inadequate disaster preparedness put millions at risk. Simultaneously, Iran’s energy crisis worsens as demand outpaces supply. Dr. Hashem Oraee highlights policy mismanagement, with heavy subsidies fueling excessive consumption. Prioritizing residential energy over industrial needs has led to economic stagnation, inflation, and public...
info_outlineThe Islamic Republic operated under a system of collective leadership throughout the 1980s. At the time, this governance structure remained largely unrecognized by external observers, but those with insight into Iran’s political dynamics understood that supreme authority did not rest solely with Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Instead, the Islamic Republic’s decision-making and policy implementation were effectively managed by a quadrumvirate comprising key institutional figures: the head of the legislative branch, Parliamentary Speaker Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; the head of the executive branch, President Ali Khamenei; and the head of the judiciary, Mr. Abdol-Karim Mousavi Ardabili. The fourth figure in this arrangement was Mr. Ahmad Khomeini, son of the Grand Ayatollah, who wielded significant procedural power by controlling access to his father’s seal, thereby formalizing state decrees in his father’s name. This oligarchic configuration not only ensured the continuity of state functions but also reinforced regime legitimacy and facilitated the enforcement of policy decisions.
I perceive that the Islamic Republic is once again reverting to a form of collective leadership. While Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may not be physically incapacitated, he appears increasingly insulated from both internal political realities and the broader geopolitical landscape. The heads of the three branches of government, cognizant of Khamenei’s evolving role, seem to be consolidating authority in response to both domestic instability and external strategic pressures. This emergent political arrangement suggests a recalibration of power within the regime, potentially signaling a return to coordinated elite decision-making as a mechanism for regime preservation. Should the Revolutionary Guard cooperate with the heads of three branches of the government, they regime may significantly improve its chances of survival. However, should Ayatollah Khamenei, feel left out by the president, the parliamentary speaker and the judiciary chief, he may use the Revolutionary Guard to counter balance the civilians and thereby undermine the regime.