Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Blood from a sin offering is disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. But what about sin offering blood that was designated to be presented in the Sanctuary and was instead brought into the Kodesh HaKodashim - is it similarly disqualified? And if it is, what about blood that was supposed to go into the Kodesh HaKodashim but was taken out and then brought back in? Or taken out and brought to the altar and then back to the parochet? Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon disagree regarding sacrifices whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary. Is the offering disqualified merely by...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
There are varying opinions on several issues relating to blood that is meant to be brought on the outer altar but becomes disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. From what verse is this derived? Does it apply to all sacrifices, or only to sin offerings? And does it apply only if one actually sprinkled the blood there, and not merely by walking inside with the blood? If the blood of one sin offering is placed in two cups, and one is brought outside or one is brought into the Sanctuary, is the other cup (that remains in the Azara) disqualified? Rabbi Yosi HaGelili and the Rabbis...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi’s explanation of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
When different bloods are mixed together, how are they brought on the altar? If both sacrifices require the same number of placements, that number is performed, with the assumption that the blood placed on the altar represents a combination of both offerings. However, if the mixture includes blood from a sacrifice requiring one placement and another requiring four, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree on the proper procedure. Why does the Mishna introduce the case of blood from blemished animals mixed with valid blood, when it has already discussed a similar case regarding limbs of...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
A contradiction between the Mishna in Mikvaot 10:6, which seems to be Rabbi Yehuda’s position anrules according to majority, and Rabbi Yehuda in the braita, who follows appearance, is resolved in two ways. Abaye suggests that in the braita, where the position is stricter, Rabbi Yehuda is quoting Rabban Gamliel, who was known for his stringency in cases of nullification, as he did not allow nullification at all in mixtures of the same type (min b’mino). Rava, however, explains that the more lenient opinion in Mikvaot refers to a case where only the outside of the cup was impure. By Torah...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The Mishna addresses the case of blood that becomes mixed with water or other substances: under what circumstances can it still be offered on the altar? If the mixture retains the appearance of blood, it may be brought. If it is mixed with a substance of the same color, such as wine or blood not designated for sacrifice, but had that substance been water the blood would still be recognizable, then the blood is likewise valid for the altar. Rabbi Yehuda, however, rules that blood is not nullified in other blood, since they are of the same essence. Therefore, even if only a minimal amount of...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The Gemara concludes its explanation of how, according to Rabbi Shimon, a safek leper may bring the oil for his purification process as either a possible leper’s offering or a possible voluntary oil offering, by resolving the multiple complications inherent in this situation. Rav Rachuma said to Ravina that Rav Huna bar Tachlifa asked why Rabbi Shimon suggested that the safek leper bring an animal as either a guilt offering or a voluntary peace offering, when he could have instead proposed bringing it as either a guilt offering or a hanging guilt offering, thus avoiding the issue of...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Four difficulties are raised against Rava’s explanation of Rabbi Shimon—that he permits sanctified items to be potentially disqualified only after the fact, but not ab initio. Most of these challenges are resolved, though not all. In the fourth difficulty, the case of the leper’s guilt offering is discussed. The Gemara then seeks to clarify how the log of oil is brought in the case of a leper when sacrifices have become intermingled.
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
If sacrifices of the same type become intermingled, the Mishna rules that they are offered for “whichever owner they belong to.” However, in cases where smicha is required, how can the sacrifice be brought, since one cannot perform smicha on another’s offering? Rav Yosef explains that the Mishna must be referring to women, who are not obligated in smicha. Men’s sacrifices, by contrast, would not be offered; instead, they would be left to graze until they developed a blemish and then sold, with new animals purchased for the altar. Abaye raises a difficulty from a braita that discusses...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
In a set of intermingled parts of sacrifices, including from a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer rules that if one was sacrificed, we can “assume” that the one sacrificed was the blemished one and all the others are permitted. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer follows a unique opinion, that of Chanan the Egyptian, who holds that animals, even after slaughter, are not considered “rejected,” and if they are brought on the altar, they can be accepted. Similarly, Rav Nachman cites a ruling of Rav that if one ring of idol worship was mixed in with many other rings, and one fell into the...
info_outlineRav Huna holds that the one who claims the item was lost or stolen, must swear that the item is no longer in their possession. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a braita and suggests four, one of which is rejected. A case is brought where one claimed jewels were lost and Rav Nachman's court seized his palace to replace the lost jewel. When he then produced the "lost" item which had gone up in value, Rav Nachman said to give him his palace back and return the jewels to the owner. Rava tried to argue with this ruling based on our Mishna saying that he should have acquired rights to the appreciation by having paid for the jewels. But then he realizes the difference between the cases and explains that. In connection with this, the Gemara raises the issue regarding a loan - if it gets repaid by foreclosing on land, if and when the borrower has the money to pay, can the borrower get his/her land back? In Nehardea they ruled that one can get back the land and there is a debate about whether or not there is a time limit. The ruling is that there is no time limit because of l'fnim meshurat ha'din, it is the right thing to do, even if not required by the letter of the law. However, there are different permutations of the case in which the law would not apply. At what point of foreclosure does the creditor get rights to the proceeds of the land? If one rents an animal and then lends it to someone else and it dies in a typical manner (for which a borrower is responsible and a renter is not), there is a debate about to whom the borrower pays - to the renter (after the renter swears that it died in a typical manner) or to the original owner. The Gemara questions exactly by what mechanism the renter acquires rights to the animal. A creative, extreme case is discussed in which an owner can borrow from a renter their item and incur payment for four animals. Some disagree and hold it would only be two animals. What is the case?