Menachot 18 - January 29, 11 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The Gemara explains the braita in a different way than previously to show that there is really no Tannaitic opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds one is liable for karet if they have a pigul thought to eat something normally burned or burn something normally eaten. They explain that the braita is highlighting a three-way debate between tanna kama, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbl Elazar ben Shammua about whether in a case of someone who has a thought to leave over part of the blood until the next day without sprinkling it, would both the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that is it valid, invalid or do they...
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Menachot 17 - January 28, 10 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The sharp scholars (charifei) of Pumbedita argue that one burning can create pigul for another. Specifically, if one burns the kometz (handful) with the intention to burn the levona (frankincense) outside its designated time, it becomes pigul. They explain that even the Rabbis - who generally hold that a pigul thought during only half of a permitting act (matir) is ineffective - would agree here, because the levona was included in the person's thoughts. Rava supports this from the general rule in the Mishna, however, his proof is rejected as it is inconclusive. Rav Hisda, however, cites...
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Menachot 16 - January 27, 9 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether the meal offering can become pigul if the pigul thought was only during part of the permitting act (matir), such as during the burning of the kometz, but not the burning of the frankincense, or the slaughtering of one sheep of the two sheep offerings on Shavuot. Rabbi Meir holds that it is pigul, while the rabbis do not. Rav and Shmuel disagree regarding this debate. Rav holds that if the first action included a pigul thought, while the second was performed in silence, it is pigul, even according to the rabbis, as the second action follows the...
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Menachot 15 - January 26, 8 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
If one of the loaves of the two loaves for Shavuot or one of the sets of six loaves of the showbread become impure, are the others to be burned as well? Rabbi Yehuda holds that public offerings are all treated as one unit and therefore they are all disqualified and are burned. The rabbis disagree and permit them to be eaten. Rabbi Elazar limits their debate to a case where they became impure before the blood was sprinkled. According to Rav Papa, the debate centers on whether the tzitz atones for items that are to be eaten. If it atones for the bread, then the blood can be sprinkled and is...
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Menachot 14 - January 25, 7 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rabbi Yosi and the rabbis debate in the Mishna whether a pigul thought about eating one of the two loaves, while slaughtering both sheep of the Shavuot offering, would render only one loaf pigul or both. Rav Huna explains that Rabbi Yosi, who held that only one loaf is disqualified, would hold the same for a pigul thought about one limb of an animal sacrifice - and only that limb, and not the others, would be pigul. The Gemara brings a braita as a difficulty against Rav Huna. Since the braita cannot be explained according to the rabbis, it can only be explained according to Rabbi Yosi;...
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Menachot 13 - Shabbat January 24, 6 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The Mishna states that an intent to eat half an olive-bulk and an intent to burn half an olive-bulk do not combine to create a status of pigul. The Gemara infers from this Mishna that two intents regarding eating - one concerning an item meant to be eaten and one concerning an item not meant to be eaten - would indeed combine to render the item pigul. This inference, however, contradicts the previous Mishna. Rabbi Yirmia simply rules that this Mishna follows a different opinion than the previous one, while Abaye rejects the inference entirely. The second chapter begins with a debate between...
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Menachot 12 - January 23, 5 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The Mishna details the cases in which a meal-offering (mincha) becomes pigul (disqualified due to improper intent), carrying the penalty of karet (divine excision), and the cases where it is merely disqualified (pasul) without the liability of karet. A question is raised: According to the opinion that if the remnants (shirayim) were diminished between the removal of the handful (kemitza) and the burning of the handful (haktara), one still burns the handful - even though the remnants may not be eaten - does this act of burning still "count" regarding the laws of pigul (such that it is...
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Menachot 11 - January 22, 4 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
When a Kohen performs the kemitza, the presence of a pebble, a grain of salt, or a shard of frankincense within the handful renders the offering invalid. This is because the Torah requires a precise "handful," and these foreign objects either displace the necessary flour (making it "missing"). The Gemara explains the need for the Mishna to bring all these examples. Rava explains that kemitza is performed with all five fingers. Abaye questions this from a braita that explains the need for all five fingers, as can be seen from the name of each of the fingers. The fourth finger is called kemitza,...
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Menachot 10 - January 21, 3 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The section of the Torah concerning the metzora (leper) details two distinct tracks for sacrifices: one for the wealthy, who bring three animal offerings, and a modified track for the poor. The purification process involves pouring oil into the kohen’s left hand, followed by sprinkling it toward the parochet and placing it on the leper’s right ear, thumb, and toe. Notably, the text contains several seemingly superfluous phrases in the wealthy leper’s section, as well as extensive repetitions in the poor leper’s section that could have been simplified with a cross-reference like "as...
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Menachot 9 - January 20, 2 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Earlier, Rabbi Yochanan employed the principle that something that takes place in the Temple courtyard can obviously also be performed in the Sanctuary (such as slaughtering the peace offering), as the Sanctuary is more sanctified. However, in a different situation, a verse is needed to derive that items permitted to be eaten in the courtyard can also be eaten in the Sanctuary (in unique circumstances). Why was a verse needed if the principle of Rabbi Yochanan could have been used? The Gemara answers by distinguishing between a ritual (slaughtering) and eating. There are three debates between...
info_outlineRav Huna holds that the one who claims the item was lost or stolen, must swear that the item is no longer in their possession. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a braita and suggests four, one of which is rejected. A case is brought where one claimed jewels were lost and Rav Nachman's court seized his palace to replace the lost jewel. When he then produced the "lost" item which had gone up in value, Rav Nachman said to give him his palace back and return the jewels to the owner. Rava tried to argue with this ruling based on our Mishna saying that he should have acquired rights to the appreciation by having paid for the jewels. But then he realizes the difference between the cases and explains that. In connection with this, the Gemara raises the issue regarding a loan - if it gets repaid by foreclosing on land, if and when the borrower has the money to pay, can the borrower get his/her land back? In Nehardea they ruled that one can get back the land and there is a debate about whether or not there is a time limit. The ruling is that there is no time limit because of l'fnim meshurat ha'din, it is the right thing to do, even if not required by the letter of the law. However, there are different permutations of the case in which the law would not apply. At what point of foreclosure does the creditor get rights to the proceeds of the land? If one rents an animal and then lends it to someone else and it dies in a typical manner (for which a borrower is responsible and a renter is not), there is a debate about to whom the borrower pays - to the renter (after the renter swears that it died in a typical manner) or to the original owner. The Gemara questions exactly by what mechanism the renter acquires rights to the animal. A creative, extreme case is discussed in which an owner can borrow from a renter their item and incur payment for four animals. Some disagree and hold it would only be two animals. What is the case?