Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
What is the source for the opinion of the rabbis in the Mishna that one who slaughters outside and then offers it outside is liable? Three possible derivations are presented, and the Gemara raises difficulties with the different possibilities. What is the source for the law in an upcoming Mishna that one who sprinkles the blood outside the Temple is liable? Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael each derive it from different verses. The Gemara then asks: what does each of them learn from the verse that the other used for this prohibition? What is the source for the law in an upcoming Mishna that one...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Since Rabbi Shimon holds that one becomes impure only through direct involvement in the burning of the bulls and goats, the Gemara asks how he interprets the verse “outside the camp” in the context of the Yom Kippur offerings. He applies it to a gezeira shava linking these offerings to the para aduma, establishing that they must be burned outside all three camps and specifically east of Jerusalem. The rabbis, however, reject this comparison and distinguish between the two burning sites: the para aduma was burned to the east, whereas the sin offerings of Yom Kippur were burned to the north...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Two additional questions are raised regarding the impurity status of those who handle the bull and goat offerings whose bodies are burned outside Jerusalem, but neither question receives a definitive answer. Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about the impurity of the scapegoat (se’ir la’azazel) that is sent off a cliff on Yom Kippur. While both sides agree that the red heifer and the bulls and goats burned outside Jerusalem impart impurity to food and drink, they dispute whether the scapegoat does the same. According to the rabbis, since the scapegoat is a live animal - and live animals...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The hide of burnt offerings is given to the kohanim, as stated in Vayikra 7:8. However, the Mishna explains that if the offering became disqualified before the blood was sprinkled, the kohanim do not receive the hide. If it was sacrificed for the sake of a different type of offering, since the sacrifice remains valid, the hide is given to the kohanim. In addition to burnt offerings, the kohanim also receive the hides of all kodshei kodashim, such as guilt and sin offerings. This is derived through a kal va’chomer argument in the Mishna, but later a braita brings different opinions of how to...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rav held that Moshe served as a kohen gadol. Four tannaitic sources are brought to challenge this position, but each one is ultimately resolved. A braita is then cited to show that whether Moshe was a kohen gadol is itself a tannaitic dispute. One of the tannaitic views in that debate cites a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha: whenever the Torah uses the expression charon af, anger, it implies some concrete action or consequence. His statement is challenged by the verse in Shemot 11:8, where Moshe becomes angry at Pharaoh, yet no action seems to follow. Reish Lakish resolves this...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
There is a dispute between Rabbi Nechemia and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding the reason Aaron burned the sin‑offering goat on the eighth day of the inauguration (miluim). Rabbi Nehemiah holds that the reason was aninut (the status of a mourner on the day of death), whereas Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda argue that the goat was burned because it had become impure. They raise three objections to Rabbi Nechemia’s position - how can these objections be resolved, and how does each of them interpret the verses in the passage? When did Pinchas become a kohen? According to Rav, Moshe...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Three additional resolutions, bringing the total to five, are proposed to reconcile the contradiction between the two baraitot, each of which presents a different view of Rabbi Shimon on whether an onen may eat the Pesach offering at night. A challenge is raised against the third resolution, evidence is presented in support of the fourth, and a statement of Rava bar Rav Huna is cited to bolster the fifth.
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
After the Mishna discusses which kohanim are entitled to portions of sacrificial meat, Reish Lakish derives from the verse “the kohen who offers it shall eat it” that only those who perform the service may partake, excluding a tvul yom and mechusar kipurim. The Gemara challenges this, noting that priests on weekly rotation receive a share even if they did not offer that sacrifice, and that minors also eat despite being unfit for service. The verse is therefore reinterpreted to mean that those “fit for service” may receive a portion, though others, such as children, may still partake in...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
If mixtures of an offering are cooked together with those of another offering of a different status, or with non-sacred food, the resulting food assumes the status of the more stringent offering, as stated in Vayikra 6:20. Although this law is presented in the context of the sin offering, a drasha on the verse in Vayikra 7:37 which juxtaposes various types of offerings, teaches that this principle applies to all sacrifices. Each offering mentioned in that verse serves to transmit a particular law to the others. A braita quoted in the name of Rabbi Akiva derives the law of foods cooked together...
info_outlineRav Huna holds that the one who claims the item was lost or stolen, must swear that the item is no longer in their possession. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a braita and suggests four, one of which is rejected. A case is brought where one claimed jewels were lost and Rav Nachman's court seized his palace to replace the lost jewel. When he then produced the "lost" item which had gone up in value, Rav Nachman said to give him his palace back and return the jewels to the owner. Rava tried to argue with this ruling based on our Mishna saying that he should have acquired rights to the appreciation by having paid for the jewels. But then he realizes the difference between the cases and explains that. In connection with this, the Gemara raises the issue regarding a loan - if it gets repaid by foreclosing on land, if and when the borrower has the money to pay, can the borrower get his/her land back? In Nehardea they ruled that one can get back the land and there is a debate about whether or not there is a time limit. The ruling is that there is no time limit because of l'fnim meshurat ha'din, it is the right thing to do, even if not required by the letter of the law. However, there are different permutations of the case in which the law would not apply. At what point of foreclosure does the creditor get rights to the proceeds of the land? If one rents an animal and then lends it to someone else and it dies in a typical manner (for which a borrower is responsible and a renter is not), there is a debate about to whom the borrower pays - to the renter (after the renter swears that it died in a typical manner) or to the original owner. The Gemara questions exactly by what mechanism the renter acquires rights to the animal. A creative, extreme case is discussed in which an owner can borrow from a renter their item and incur payment for four animals. Some disagree and hold it would only be two animals. What is the case?