Menachot 4 - January 15, 26 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
What was clear to Raba on one hand and Rava on the other - regarding how to understand Rabbi Shimon’s words and whether a noticeably incorrect intent (machshava nikeret) disqualifies or not - was not clear to Rav Hoshaya, who deliberated on how to interpret Rabbi Shimon’s position. The Gemara explains why he did not accept the opinions of Raba, Rava, or Rav Ashi as a sufficient explanation for his doubt. The Mishna mentions two exceptions to the rule of a meal offering (mincha) that was perfomed for the wrong purpose (where the offering is valid but the owner has not fulfilled their...
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Menachot 3 - January 14, 25 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
There are three ways to resolve the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two braitot: in one, he states that a meal-offering (mincha) brought for a different purpose than its original intent is valid and fulfills the owner's obligation, while in the other, he states that it is valid but does not fulfill the owner's obligation. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to this contradiction. Raba explains Rabbi Shimon’s words according to their simple meaning - that when it is evident from a person's actions that their stated thought was not sincere (or was...
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Menachot 2 - January 13, 24 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
If one takes a dough of a mincha that was designated for a specific type of meal offering and takes the kemitza with the intention that it be offered for a different type of mincha, the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the mincha. There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering - specifically in a mincha of a sinner and of the sotah. The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela"...
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Introduction to Masechet Menachot with Dr. Ayelet Hoffman Libson
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Introduction to Masechet Menachot
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Zevachim 120 - January 12, 23 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rabbi Zeira raises the question of an offering designated for a private altar: if it was slaughtered on the private altar, then brought into the Tabernacle, and afterward taken back out, must it now be returned to the Tabernacle and treated like a public‑altar sacrifice with all its associated requirements? Initially, the Gemara suggests that this issue might hinge on the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef regarding high level sanctity offerings that were slaughtered in the South instead of the required Northern area and were then mistakenly placed on the altar. Ultimately, however,...
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Zevachim 119 - January 11, 22 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: “For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala.” Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word “to” between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no...
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Zevachim 118 - Shabbat January 10, 21 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The Gemara explains the basis of the disagreement in the braita between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, and how the second position of the Rabbis differs from the first position in the name of the rabbis in that same braita. Rabbi Shimon’s source in the Torah for his view limiting the communal offerings brought in Gilgal is a verse in Yehoshua 5:10, which describes the Jews bringing the Paschal offering just a few days after crossing the Jordan River into the Land of Israel. The reason the structure of Shilo was built with stone walls while its ceiling was only a curtain is derived from...
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Zevachim 117 - January 9, 20 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai held that during the period of the Temple there were four distinct “camps,” since the Ezrat Nashim constituted its own camp. However, in the period of Shilo there were only two camps. The Gemara struggles to identify which camp, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, did not exist in Shilo, since the Torah clearly assigns separate zones for each category of impurity - one who is impure from contact with a corpse, a zav, and a leper - implying the need for three distinct camps. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon’s statement refers to an entirely...
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Zevachim 116 - January 8, 19 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Before the Tabernacle was erected, even blemished animals or male or female could be offered as sacrifices. This is derived from the juxtaposition of animals to birds in Bereishit 8:20, which describes the offerings Noach brought after the Flood; since blemishes do not disqualify birds and females can be brought as burnt offerings, they likewise did not disqualify blemished animals or females. However, if an animal was missing a limb, it could not be offered. This is learned from Bereishit 6:19, “From all live animals,” implying that only fully intact animals were acceptable. The Gemara...
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Zevachim 115 - January 7, 18 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The Mishna rules that one who offers the leper’s guilt offering outside the Azara before the proper time for the owner to bring it (i.e., before the eighth day of purification) is exempt from liability. Rav Chilkiya bar Tuvi limits this exemption to a case where the offering was brought for its own sake. If, however, it was offered not for its own sake, one would be liable for offering it outside, since such an offering could theoretically be valid if brought inside. Rav Huna disagrees with Rav Chilkiya. He maintains that if an offering cannot be brought for its own sake - because its proper...
info_outlineRav Huna holds that the one who claims the item was lost or stolen, must swear that the item is no longer in their possession. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a braita and suggests four, one of which is rejected. A case is brought where one claimed jewels were lost and Rav Nachman's court seized his palace to replace the lost jewel. When he then produced the "lost" item which had gone up in value, Rav Nachman said to give him his palace back and return the jewels to the owner. Rava tried to argue with this ruling based on our Mishna saying that he should have acquired rights to the appreciation by having paid for the jewels. But then he realizes the difference between the cases and explains that. In connection with this, the Gemara raises the issue regarding a loan - if it gets repaid by foreclosing on land, if and when the borrower has the money to pay, can the borrower get his/her land back? In Nehardea they ruled that one can get back the land and there is a debate about whether or not there is a time limit. The ruling is that there is no time limit because of l'fnim meshurat ha'din, it is the right thing to do, even if not required by the letter of the law. However, there are different permutations of the case in which the law would not apply. At what point of foreclosure does the creditor get rights to the proceeds of the land? If one rents an animal and then lends it to someone else and it dies in a typical manner (for which a borrower is responsible and a renter is not), there is a debate about to whom the borrower pays - to the renter (after the renter swears that it died in a typical manner) or to the original owner. The Gemara questions exactly by what mechanism the renter acquires rights to the animal. A creative, extreme case is discussed in which an owner can borrow from a renter their item and incur payment for four animals. Some disagree and hold it would only be two animals. What is the case?