Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Hadran.org.il is the portal for Daf Yomi studies for women. Hadran.org.il is the first and only site where one can hear a daily Talmud class taught by a woman. The classes are taught in Israel by Rabbanit Michelle Cohen Farber, a graduate of Midreshet Lindenbaum’s scholars program with a BA in Talmud and Tanach from Bar-Ilan University. Michelle has taught Talmud and Halacha at Midreshet Lindenbaum, Pelech high school and MATAN. She lives in Ra’anana with her husband and their five children. Each morning the daf yomi class is delivered via ZOOM and then immediately uploaded and available for podcast and download. Hadran.org.il reaches women who can now have access to a woman’s perspective on the most essential Jewish traditional text. This podcast represents a revolutionary step in advancing women’s Torah study around the globe.
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Chullin 5 - May 5, 18 Iyar
05/05/2026
Chullin 5 - May 5, 18 Iyar
After explaining that the source for Rav Anan’s statement in the name of Shmuel, that one can trust the slaughter of a person who worships idols was derived from Yehoshafat, the Gemara seeks evidence that Yehoshafat actually consumed Achav's meat. Two additional sources are examined to support Rav Anan. The first involves Eliyahu, who was fed meat by ravens (orvim), which supposedly originated from Achav’s kitchen. However, this is dismissed as a unique divine decree that cannot serve as a legal precedent. The second source is a braita previously cited about accepting the slaughter of a Jew who does not observe the commandment. While it was initially thought to support Rav Anan, and referring to one who worships idols, the proof is deemed inconclusive as it can also be reconciled with Rava’s position, and be referring to one who eats non-kosher mean to satisfy one’s appetite. A challenge is raised against Rav Anan from a braita that equates an idol-worshipping Jew to one who rejects the entire Torah. This difficulty remains unresolved. The braita cites the biblical source for the rule that an apostate cannot bring sacrifices from a verse regarding a burnt offering. However, another braita derives this from verses regarding a sin offering. The Gemara explains why both derivations are necessary. Rabbi Yaakov notes that Rabban Gamliel and his court prohibited slaughter performed by a Cuti. Rabbi Zeira suggests this only applies when no Jew is supervising. Rabbi Yaakov disagrees, arguing that such a case was already prohibited; Rabban Gamliel’s decree applied even when a Jew is present. The Gemara questions whether Rabbi Zeira ultimately accepted this view.
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Chullin 4 - May 4, 17 Iyar
05/04/2026
Chullin 4 - May 4, 17 Iyar
Abaye and Rava each found support for their respective positions in a braita - Abaye from the first sentence and Rava from the second. How does each Sage address the proof cited by the other? The second case in the braita permits a Jew to rely on a Cuti and consume birds strung together, provided the Cuti eats the head of one of the birds on the string. The Gemara raises difficulties with this case: perhaps the Cuti is merely tricking the Jew, or perhaps Cutim do not hold that one must slaughter birds at all, as the requirement is not explicitly written in the Torah. The Sages resolve the latter difficulty by explaining that Cutim accepted the laws of shechita upon themselves; therefore, they can be trusted even regarding details not explicitly stated in the Torah, including all the ways in which a slaughter can be disqualified. This, however, is a Tannaitic debate: whether or not Cutim can be relied upon regarding laws not mentioned in the Torah that they are known to have accepted. A separate braita is brought to demonstrate this dispute. Rava holds that one may rely on the slaughter of a person who does not observe the laws of kashrut, specifically one who eats nevelot, provided the knife was checked beforehand. Rava’s ruling is based on the principle that a person would rather perform an act in a permissible way than a forbidden way, so long as it does not require significantly more effort. This is proven from a braita regarding the chametz of those who are generally untrusted; one can eat their food after Pesach, relying on the fact that they must have traded their food with gentiles to avoid the prohibition of chametz that remained over the holiday. A Tosefta is brought to further support Rava's position, but it is subsequently rejected. The Gemara explains that the Tosefta refers to a person who worships idols, rather than one who merely consumed non-slaughtered meat. This reading is supported by a statement of Rav Anan in the name of Shmuel that one can trust the meat of a person who worships idols. The source for this is the biblical figure Yehoshafat, who ate from Achav’s meat in an incident that appears in Chronicles II, Chapter 18. The Gemara raises several difficulties about deriving this law from that incident, but all difficulties are eventually resolved.
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Chullin 3 - May 3, 16 Iyar
05/03/2026
Chullin 3 - May 3, 16 Iyar
Following the presentation of Raba bar Ulla’s interpretation, the Gemara introduces five alternative explanations of the Mishna. After surveying these options, it clarifies why each sage rejected the competing positions, highlighting the specific logical or textual difficulties inherent in each.
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Chullin 2 - Shabbat May 2, 15 Iyar
05/01/2026
Chullin 2 - Shabbat May 2, 15 Iyar
The Mishna rules that all are permitted to slaughter animals, and if they do, the meat is kosher. While establishing this broad permission, the Mishna excludes minors, deaf-mutes (cheresh), and the mentally incompetent (shoteh). However, if an adult supervises them to ensure the slaughter was performed correctly, the meat is valid. The Gemara questions the Mishna’s phrasing: the opening phrase “all may slaughter” implies an ab initio (l’chatchila) permission, yet the concluding phrase “their slaughtering is kosher” suggests the act is only valid post facto (b’dieved). Initially, Rav Acha attempts to prove from other Mishnayot that the term “all” can indeed refer to a post facto case, neutralizing the question. Conversely, Rav Ashi cites other Mishnayot to show that “all” is a term typically used for ab initio rulings. While both ultimately concede that “all” can technically carry both meanings, Rav Ashi argues that the context here implies ab initio. To resolve the Gemara’s original difficulty, Rava bar Ulla explains that each phrase in the Mishna refers to a different specific case, and he proceeds to re-interpret each line accordingly. However, three difficulties are subsequently raised against Rava bar Ulla’s interpretation, all of which the Gemara eventually resolves.
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Introduction to Masechet Chullin with Dr. Ayelet Hoffman Libson
04/30/2026
Introduction to Masechet Chullin with Dr. Ayelet Hoffman Libson
Introduction to Masechet Chullin
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Menachot 110 - May 1, 14 Iyar
04/30/2026
Menachot 110 - May 1, 14 Iyar
Rav Huna differentiates between those living in exile in Babylonia and those living in other places regarding their nature. Rav Chisda (or Rav) is quoted as making a statement differentiating between gentiles who live in different places in the world, specifically in reference to whether or not they recognize God and the place of the Jewish people. However, after raising a difficulty, this statement is emended. A number of Sages extrapolate different verses to highlight the importance of Torah study by comparing it to sacrifices. One view explains that God treats those who study Torah as if they have physically offered sacrifices in the Temple. Another view goes further, suggesting that one who studies Torah has no need for sacrifices at all, effectively idealizing Torah study as a superior form of divine service. The Mishna compares one who sacrifices animals to one who sacrifices birds and to one who sacrifices mincha offerings, stressing that all sacrifices are equal before God—those of the wealthy and those of the poor—as the most important element in sacrifices is the intent. Sacrifices are offered to God and are not intended for God’s benefit, but for the person bringing the sacrifice, which further highlights the importance of the person’s intention rather than the outward action.
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Menachot 109 - April 30, 13 Iyar
04/30/2026
Menachot 109 - April 30, 13 Iyar
A third challenge is brought against the ruling of Raba bar Avuha, which posits that one who vows to bring "an ox from my oxen" must provide his best ox. The difficulty arises from a comparison to commercial law: if a person sells "a house among my houses," they are not legally obligated to provide the buyer with their finest property. This discrepancy is resolved by distinguishing between the laws of hekdesh (consecration to the Temple), where the Sanctuary maintains the "upper hand," and the laws of sales, where the seller retains the "upper hand." If an individual vows to bring an offering to the Temple of Onias in Egypt, the fulfillment of that vow depends on its specific phrasing. Generally, if the vow was intended for a Temple for God, the offering must be brought to the Temple in Jerusalem; however, if the vow was specific to the Temple of Onias, there is a dispute as to whether the offering is considered a sacrifice and would be punished by karet or if the person has merely committed a "meaningless" act. A kohen who served at the Temple of Onias and subsequently repents is barred from performing service in the Temple in Jerusalem. This was a penalty to such priests, categorizing them as equivalent to a blemished kohen; while they are disqualified from performing the sacrificial service, they are still permitted to eat and share in the distribution of the sacrificial foods (kodashim) with their fellow priests. Likewise, a kohen who served in idolatrous worship is disqualified from serving in the Temple. Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet debate four specific scenarios to determine if they constitute "serving" an idol and whether a priest who performed them can return to Temple service. These four cases are: slaughtering an animal to an idol intentionally, sprinkling the blood unwittingly, bowing down to the idol, and accepting the idol as a god by verbal declaration. A fundamental debate exists between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda regarding the nature of the Temple of Onias itself - specifically, whether it was established for worship of God or for idolatry. Each Sage cites a different historical tradition regarding the political and family disputes that led Onias to flee to Egypt and build his Temple.
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Menachot 108 - April 29, 12 Iyar
04/29/2026
Menachot 108 - April 29, 12 Iyar
Six containers were used in the Temple for collecting voluntary offerings, for which six different explanations are provided to clarify their specific purposes. If a person vows to bring a specific animal for a voluntary offering and it becomes blemished, the animal must be redeemed and replaced. The Rabbis permit using the redemption money to purchase a different type, size, or number of animals, whereas Rebbi requires the replacement to match the original animal's type, size, and number exactly. When a person vows to bring "one of my oxen," the best and the middle-quality oxen are sanctified because the specific intent remains unclear. Raba bar Ulla distinguishes this from the phrase "an ox from my oxen," explaining that such language clearly indicates the best ox was intended. The Gemara challenges this distinction by citing laws from house sales, where the definitions of intended property follow different standards.
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Menachot 107 - April 28, 11 Iyar
04/28/2026
Menachot 107 - April 28, 11 Iyar
The Mishna lists various vows, such as “I vow to bring gold to the Temple” or “I vow to bring wine,” and specifies the exact quantities required to fulfill each obligation. The Gemara then analyzes and clarifies the Mishna’s rulings for every case mentioned. A debate exists between Rebbi and the Sages regarding the minimum amount of oil required for a vow—specifically, whether it is one log or three. The scholars who preceded Rav Papa suggested that the root of this dispute lies in their hermeneutical methods: whether to derive both a general principle and its details from a single external source, or to derive the principle from one source while drawing the details from the case itself. Rav Papa proposed an alternative theory but ultimately conceded after Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, cited a braita that definitively refuted his explanation. Regarding the minimum value for one who vows to bring a specific animal to the Temple, the law stipulates that different species require different minimum expenditures to fulfill the obligation.
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Menachot 106 - April 27, 10 Iyar
04/27/2026
Menachot 106 - April 27, 10 Iyar
The Mishna rules that if one vows to bring a mincha (meal offering) but cannot recall which type, they must bring all five standard types. Abaye explains that this ruling can also align with Rabbi Shimon’s position, which recognizes a sixth type consisting of both wafers and loaves; he argues that bringing the wafers and loaves separately covers the possibility of the combined type as well. The Gemara raises several practical difficulties regarding this possibility but resolves them all. Rav Kahana asks Rav Ashi why the person in the above case would not also need to offer a minchat nesachim (a meal offering brought with libations), given Rava’s view that it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Rav Ashi identifies five distinct differences between a minchat nesachim and other voluntary meal offerings, demonstrating that someone in doubt about their vow would certainly not have been referring to an offering so fundamentally different. The Rabbis and Rebbi disagree in the Mishna regarding a case where one says, “I vowed to bring a mincha of esronim in one vessel, but I do not remember how many.” The dispute centers on whether they must bring sixty esronim in one bowl or every amount from one to sixty in sixty separate bowls. The Gemara suggests five different explanations for the nature of this debate and analyzes each suggestion. The Mishna explains the minimum value one must provide when vowing to bring wood, frankincense, gold, silver, or copper to the Temple. The required amount depends on the phrasing used: if one said, “I vow to bring [the item],” they are required to bring the minimum. However, if one said, “I vowed an amount, but I do not remember what amount,” they are required to bring the maximum.
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Menachot 105 - April 26, 9 Iyar
04/25/2026
Menachot 105 - April 26, 9 Iyar
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Menachot 104 - Shabbat April 25, 8 Iyar
04/24/2026
Menachot 104 - Shabbat April 25, 8 Iyar
There is a contradiction raised against Rav Bibi, who testified about a case where the blood of a carcass was measured to see if there was enough to convey impurity. This contradicts a Mishna in Eduyot, where others testified that the blood of a dead animal is pure. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that there is a tannaitic debate on the matter and clarifies why those who declare it impure set the requisite amount at a quarter-log (revi’it). One may offer voluntary wine libations in the Temple, but only in the volumes used for obligatory offerings: three, four, or six log (or a combination thereof). A question is raised: must the pledged libations be offered all at once, or can they be split? This question is asked egarding someone who pledged five log (an invalid single amount): can one "divide" the five - meaning offer four and redeems the fifth or gives it away - or must one wait until one acquires another log to complete a set of six? Although Abaye and Rava both attempted to bring proofs to resolve this, their answers were rejected as inconclusive. Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon disagree over whether one can offer voluntary oil libations. Their debate centers on whether the laws of oil can be derived from the laws of wine. Regarding ownership, a mincha cannot be brought if it is jointly owned by partners. The Gemara explores why this differs from animal and bird sacrifices, which can be brought by partners. There are five (or six, according to Rabbi Shimon) types of voluntary mincha offerings: solet (no pre-baking/frying), machavat (pan), marcheshet (deep pan), rekikim (wafers), and challot (loaves). The Mishna delves into various ambiguous formulations used in vows and explains what specific type and quantity the individual is obligated to bring to ensure they fulfill their commitment.
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Menachot 103 - April 24, 7 Iyar
04/24/2026
Menachot 103 - April 24, 7 Iyar
There is a dispute regarding a case where someone vowed to bring a mincha of barley. The Tana Kama says that because such a thing does not exist, we obligate them to bring a mincha of wheat. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says that what was said is nothing, as there is no voluntary mincha of barley. Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan attempt to understand the Tana Kama's position. For Chizkiya, it is based on the view of Beit Shammai who hold that we seize the first expression - the statement "I take upon myself a mincha" already creates an obligation to bring a wheat offering, and what one said afterward (where perhaps it was a retraction) is not accepted at all because it is too late. According to Rabbi Yochanan, who establishes an ukimta for the Mishna, it refers to a case where, when told there is no mincha of barley, the person says that they did not know, and had they known, they would have vowed wheat. There is another dispute in our Mishna between Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan that appears to present opinions opposite to what they said previously, but the Gemara explains the matter. Chizkiya retracted and agreed with Rabbi Yochanan, while Rabbi Yochanan challenged his retraction and explained how Chizkiya could have explained the words of the Mishna according to his original logic. Zeiri limits the words of the Mishna to a case where one said "I take upon myself a mincha...", but if one did not say "mincha" but rather "I take upon myself barley" or "I take upon myself a barley mincha," we do not apply the principle of seizing the first expression. Rava challenges Rav Nachman regarding Zeiri's words based on our Mishna, but Rav Nachman resolves his challenges. One who volunteers to bring more than sixty issaron must bring sixty in one vessel and the remainder in another vessel. Why is sixty established as the maximum amount for a single vessel? The Tana Kama explains this based on the day that has the most libations in the Temple - the first day of Sukkot that falls on Shabbat, when they bring libations in the amount of sixty-one issaron. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says it is based on what can be mixed in one vessel; more than sixty is impossible. The Sages challenge him as to why specifically this number was chosen. Rabbi Shimon responds that this is the case with all measurements established by the Sages. The Gemara challenges Rabbi Shimon, noting that a mincha is valid even if it was not actually mixed, so why is the potential for mixing so important? They answer based on the words of Rabbi Zeira, that it must be eligible for mixing (anything eligible for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything not eligible for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it).
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Menachot 102 - April 23, 6 Iyar
04/23/2026
Menachot 102 - April 23, 6 Iyar
The Gemara raises a difficulty from the laws of pigul against the principle that "anything ready to be sprinkled is considered as if it were already sprinkled," which implies viewing the act of sprinkling the blood as having already occurred. After resolving this difficulty, the Gemara presents the position of Rav Ashi, who rejects this principle. However, following a challenge from the laws of meilah (misuse of consecrated property), it is clarified that his statement applies only to the laws of ritual impurity of foods; regarding meilah, conversely, Rav Ashi admits that the principle is valid, and the meat is released from the status of meilah the moment it is ready for sprinkling. Subsequently, another difficulty is raised against Rav Ashi from Rabbi Yosi's ruling regarding the meat of an asham talui, as Rabbi Yosi - according to Rava's understanding - agrees with Rabbi Shimon that "anything standing to be sprinkled is considered as if it were already sprinkled." This difficulty is resolved by providing an alternative explanation for Rabbi Yosi's position that does not rely on this principle. Additionally, Rav Ashi challenges the opposing view, and this difficulty is also resolved. The Mishna discusses the laws of deviations in meal-offering vows, detailing the law for cases where an individual vowed or pledged a specific type of mincha but brought a different type instead.
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Menachot 101 - Yom Haatzmaut - April 22, 5 Iyar
04/22/2026
Menachot 101 - Yom Haatzmaut - April 22, 5 Iyar
The Gemara cites Vayikra 27:11 to teach that blemished animals are called impure. Although the verse refers to “impure animals,” there is a different verse (Vayikra 27:27) that explains that impure animals be redeemed; therefore, the first verse must refer specifically to blemished animals. Shmuel maintains that items consecrated for their value can be redeemed even if they are unblemished. Two difficulties are raised against Shmuel - one by Rav Huna bar Manoach from our Mishna and another by Rav Papa from a braita. Both are resolved by distinguishing between common items and rare items suitable for Temple use; the Sages prohibited the redemption of rare items to avoid a shortage in the Temple. Several rabbis disagree with Shmuel, holding that items dedicated for their value cannot be redeemed if they are pure. There are two versions of Rabbi Oshaya’s position regarding whether he agreed with Shmuel. A difficulty is raised against the version that he permitted their redemption, but it is ultimately resolved.
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Menachot 100 - Yom Hazikaron - April 21, 4 Iyar
04/21/2026
Menachot 100 - Yom Hazikaron - April 21, 4 Iyar
The Mishna states that when Yom Kippur fell on a Friday, preventing the meat from being cooked, the Babylonians would eat the goat sin offering raw. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that these people were actually Alexandrians, but they were called Babylonians due to a general dislike of the Babylonians. The Mishna discusses various errors that can occur while setting up the showbread and the frankincense, such as placing one or both on the wrong day or burning the frankincense at the incorrect time. For each scenario, the text explores the resulting legal status and the solution, if there is one. A Mishna from Tractate Yoma mentions a case where the Tamid offering was brought too early and had to be burned because it was disqualified. A braita applies this same rule to a mincha offering where the kemitza was taken at night. This raises a question: if sanctified vessels do not normally sanctify their contents at night when offerings cannot be brought, why is the mincha disqualified? To resolve this, it is explained that the offering is sanctified enough to be disqualified even if it is not sanctified for the altar. However, Rabbi Zeira raises a difficulty from our Mishna, noting that when the bread is placed too early, it is not sanctified enough to be disqualified and can remain on the table for extra days. Raba resolves this by distinguishing between an act performed the night before it is due and an act performed several days early. Yet, this distinction still faces issues with the Mishna’s case, as the bread should theoretically become sanctified on Friday night and be disqualified by the next Shabbat morning. Ultimately, two resolutions are offered to address this difficulty. The Mishna outlines how many days after baking the two loaves and the showbread may be eaten. Different scenarios are presented based on whether festivals fall before or after Shabbat, since these loaves cannot typically be baked on Shabbat or a festival. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this, permitting the baking on a festival though not on Shabbat. Items whose value is sanctified can be redeemed whether they are ritually pure or impure. However, items sanctified within a sacred vessel possess inherent sanctity and cannot be redeemed even if they become impure. The only exception to this rule is a blemished animal, which retains the possibility of being redeemed despite its status.
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Menachot 99 - April 20, 3 Iyar
04/20/2026
Menachot 99 - April 20, 3 Iyar
The Gemara raises a difficulty regarding the opinion that the Table (Shulchan) was positioned in an east-west orientation. It resolves this by explaining that the Table crafted by Moses was not placed centrally between the other rows of tables, but rather stood on the western side, close to the Parochet, not in between the others. Regarding the ten Tables and ten Menoras added by King Solomon, there is a Tannaic dispute: were they purely decorative - with only the one from Moshe’s time being used for the service - or were the lamps lit and the bread arranged on all of them? In addition to the main Table, two other tables stood in the Ulam (the Entrance Hall) to serve as transition stations for the showbread. One was made of marble (or silver), where the bread was placed before being brought into the Sanctuary, and the other was made of gold, where the bread was placed upon its removal. This distinction is based on the halakhic principle "ma'alin b’kodesh v'lo moridin" (one ascends in holiness but does not descend). Since the bread had already been on a golden table inside the Sanctuary, it could not be placed on a table of lesser value when being taken out. The Gemara finds support for this concept in the fact that the broken Tablets were placed in the Ark also. This leads to a discussion on the importance of preserving one’s Torah learning and the gravity of forgetting it, while emphasizing that one must still honor a Torah scholar who has forgotten his learning due to circumstances beyond his control. The Mishna brings a tannaitic debate about how the bread was replaced each week, based on how each opinion understands the word "tamid" (continually) regarding the showbread. This triggers a fundamental debate regarding the mitzvah of Torah study and the verse, "This book of the Torah shall not depart (lo yamush) from your mouth." While some view this as a mandate to toil in Torah at every available moment, Rabbi Yochanan suggests that even a person who recites the Shema in the morning and evening has fulfilled "lo yamush." For such an individual, it is considered as if they had occupied themselves with Torah day and night.
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Menachot 98 - April 19, 2 Iyar
04/19/2026
Menachot 98 - April 19, 2 Iyar
Rabbi Yochanan explains that a "medium-sized cubit" consists of six handbreadths. This terminology implies the existence of a larger cubit. A Mishna in Middot (1:3) is brought to explain that there were two measuring sticks kept in a room at the entrance to the Temple Mount (where a depiction of Shushan the capital was displayed). Both were larger than the medium cubit used by Moshe for the Tabernacle: one was a fingerbreadth longer, and the other was two fingerbreadths longer. The purpose of this was to prevent craftsmen from accidentally misusing consecrated property (Me'ilah). Since they received payment based on exact measurements, if they had erred and made an item slightly too small, they would have personally benefited from the Temple treasury. The shorter one was used for gold and silver, and the longer one for other materials. The verses in Vayikra (24:5-6) describe exactly how many loaves of showbread there were, how many arrangements were on the Table, and how many loaves were in each arrangement. Why were all those descriptions necessary? In what directions did the Ark, Menorah, and Table face in the room, and in which part of the room were they placed?
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Menachot 97 - Shabbat Rosh Chodesh - April 18, 1 Iyar
04/17/2026
Menachot 97 - Shabbat Rosh Chodesh - April 18, 1 Iyar
The Gemara offers three suggestions for why the Shulchan, which was made of wood and covered in gold, was treated as a wooden vessel regarding the laws of impurity. After rejecting the first two possibilities, they conclude that the status is derived from a verse in Yechezkel, which describes the structure as "wood." This establishes that despite the gold plating, the table’s essence is wood. Relating to the debate in the Mishna of the length and width of the Shulchan in handbreadths, there is a tannaitic debate regarding the two types of cubit measurements used in the Temple: some measuring five handbreadths and others measuring six. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree over which items followed which measurement, though both derive their positions from the same verse in Yechezkel 43:13. The verse specifically identifies four items - the yesod (base), the sovev (ledge), the keren (horns), and the Golden Altar - as using the five-handbreadth measurement. The core of their debate is whether this smaller measurement was restricted to these items or extended to all other vessels, including the Shulchan. In analyzing how these measurements were applied to the yesod and sovev, the Gemara initially assumes the five-handbreadth cubit referred to their height. When this is rejected, the Sages suggest it referred to their width. However, this second suggestion is also dismissed as the math does not align with the traditional dimensions of the Altar. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that a uniform rule cannot be applied across all four items. Instead, it determines that for certain components, the five-handbreadth measurement applied to the height, while for others, it applied to the width.
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Menachot 96 - Rosh Chodesh - April 17, 30 Nisan
04/17/2026
Menachot 96 - Rosh Chodesh - April 17, 30 Nisan
Unlike the showbread (lechem hapanim) and the two loaves (shtei halechem), for which there is a debate about when they are sanctified the minchat chavitin of the Kohen Gadol and regular meal offerings are sanctified the moment they are placed into a service vessel (kli sharet). From that point forward, they are considered holy and can be disqualified by factors such as being left overnight (linah) or leaving the Sanctuary. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding the dimensions of the Table (Shulchan) and the measurements of the individual loaves that made up the showbread. The Mishna explains how the loaves were arranged on the Table according to these two opinions. Rabbi Yochanan calculated the maximum height at which the Table could sanctify the bread, based on the total height of the stacked loaves according to the respective views of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir. The Gemara raised several difficulties with his statement but ultimately resolved them. Following this discussion, a dispute arose regarding the frame (misgeret) of the Table—whether it was fixed above the tabletop or beneath it. From there, Rabbi Yochanan linked these different opinions to a question regarding the ritual impurity of a "reversible table" (tavla hamit'pachet). What is clear from his words is that the Table was susceptible to ritual impurity. However, if it was a wooden vessel, a "wooden vessel made to rest in a fixed place" (kli etz ha'asui lenachat) should not be susceptible to impurity. The Gemara resolves this by Reish Lakish’s explanation that the Table was moved and lifted to be shown to the festival pilgrims, thus categorizing it as a mobile vessel.
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Menachot 95 - April 16, 29 Nisan
04/16/2026
Menachot 95 - April 16, 29 Nisan
Did the lechem hapanim become disqualified in the desert whenever the Tabernacle was dismantled for travel? Furthermore, does this status depend on whether the bread remained on the Table (Shulchan) or had already been removed? There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, which the Gemara interprets in three ways. In the final explanation, Ravin explains that there is actually no disagreement; rather, each Sage was referring to a different scenario - one discussed bread still on the Table, while the other addressed bread that had been removed. The Mishna presents a three-way Tannaitic debate regarding the preparation of the loaves: Can the kneading, shaping, and baking be performed outside the Temple courtyard, or must they occur within? Additionally, could these tasks be performed on Shabbat? This debate centers on the moment the loaves become sanctified. The three positions - held by the Tana Kamma, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon - differ on the catalyst for sanctification: When the flour is first placed into a sacred vessel. When the bread is baked in the oven. When the loaves are formally arranged on the Table. A challenge is raised against the Tanna Kamma's position that remains unresolved. Rabbi Abbahu attempts to derive the basis of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon from a verse, but this derivation is ultimately rejected. Instead, the Gemara explains that their positions are rooted in the specific traditions they each received.
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Menachot 94 - April 15, 28 Nisan
04/15/2026
Menachot 94 - April 15, 28 Nisan
The Mishna compares the details regarding the laws of semicha (leaning) and tenufa (waving). Semicha has a stringency in that all owners of the sacrifice are obligated to perform it, while the same does not hold true for tenufa. However, waving applies to both individual and communal sacrifices, to animals that are both alive and slaughtered, and to both animals and non-living items, such as breads. These do not apply to semicha, which is only performed on live animals and primarily for individual sacrifices. The Gemara brings a scriptural source for the ruling that semicha is obligatory for all owners of the sacrifice, while only one person performs tenufa on behalf of the others. A difficulty is raised against the fact that semicha is limited only to live animals based on a Mishna in Tamid 33b, which describes a process of semicha performed by a Kohen Gadol on a slaughtered animal. However, Abaye explains that this specific semicha is performed merely out of respect for the Kohen Gadol and is not a formal requirement of the sacrificial service. The loaves of the lechem hapanim (showbread) and the loaves of the shtei halechem (two loaves) were kneaded separately. The shtei halechem were baked separately, while the lechem hapanim - twelve in total - were baked two at a time. The Gemara brings the scriptural source for these details. What shape were the lechem hapanim? Rabbi Chanina and Rabbi Yochanan each describe a different shape: either like an "open box" or like a "rocking boat." The Gemara analyzes these different opinions based on other known details regarding the various components of the table (shulchan) upon which the bread sat.
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Menachot 93 - April 14, 27 Nisan
04/14/2026
Menachot 93 - April 14, 27 Nisan
There is a Tannaitic debate regarding whether an heir performs semicha (the laying of hands) on an inherited sacrifice and whether they are subject to the laws of temura (substitution) for such an animal. The Gemara provides scriptural sources for each of these positions. The Mishna specifies who is exempt from the requirement of semicha and the Gemara brings the reason/derivation for each exemption. Although semicha is a significant element of the sacrificial service, it is not indispensable; atonement is achieved even if the ritual is omitted. The Mishna details the location and manner in which semicha must be performed, and the Gemara cites the biblical sources for those details.
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Menachot 92 - April 13, 26 Nisan
04/13/2026
Menachot 92 - April 13, 26 Nisan
There is a tradition that there are two communal offerings that require semicha. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about which two they are. They both agree that the communal bull offering (brought for an unintentional sin of the congregation) requires semicha by the elders, but they disagree about the identity of the second one. Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is the scapegoat on Yom Kippur, noting that according to the verse in the Torah, the Kohen Gadol performs semicha on it. Rabbi Shimon disagrees because he holds that semicha must be performed by the owner, and he argues the Kohen Gadol is not the owner of that sacrifice; the scapegoat atones only for the sins of the Israelites, while the kohanim receive their atonement from the confession of the Kohen Gadol on his own bull offering. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Shimon's position, holding instead that the scapegoat atones for the sins of the kohanim as well, which makes the Kohen Gadol an owner of that sacrifice. Rabbi Shimon includes the communal goat offering for idolatry as the second sacrifice requiring semicha, deriving this from the word "goat" written in the context of the semicha of the nasi’s (leader's) sin offering (Vayikra 4:24); the extra word implies that another goat - the communal one - is included in the requirement. Rabbi Yehuda, however, uses the verse in Vayikra 4:15, which specifies "the bull," to exclude the goat and limit the requirement to the bull alone. The Gemara questions why each sage needs a specific verse to prove his opinion when they could have simply relied on the established tradition that only two communal offerings require semicha. All individual offerings require semicha, with the exception of the firstborn animal, animal tithes, and the Pesach offering. The exclusion of these three is derived from the verse regarding peace offerings, "his offering," which implies an offering that is designated as "his" by choice.
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Menachot 91 - April 12, 25 Nisan
04/12/2026
Menachot 91 - April 12, 25 Nisan
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Menachot 90 - Shabbat April 11, 24 Nisan
04/10/2026
Menachot 90 - Shabbat April 11, 24 Nisan
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Menachot 89 - April 10, 23 Nisan
04/10/2026
Menachot 89 - April 10, 23 Nisan
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Menachot 88 - April 9, 22 Nisan
04/07/2026
Menachot 88 - April 9, 22 Nisan
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Menachot 87 - 7th Day of Pesach - April 8, 21 Nisan
04/07/2026
Menachot 87 - 7th Day of Pesach - April 8, 21 Nisan
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Menachot 86 - April 7, 20 Nisan
04/07/2026
Menachot 86 - April 7, 20 Nisan
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