Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Hadran.org.il is the portal for Daf Yomi studies for women. Hadran.org.il is the first and only site where one can hear a daily Talmud class taught by a woman. The classes are taught in Israel by Rabbanit Michelle Cohen Farber, a graduate of Midreshet Lindenbaum’s scholars program with a BA in Talmud and Tanach from Bar-Ilan University. Michelle has taught Talmud and Halacha at Midreshet Lindenbaum, Pelech high school and MATAN. She lives in Ra’anana with her husband and their five children. Each morning the daf yomi class is delivered via ZOOM and then immediately uploaded and available for podcast and download. Hadran.org.il reaches women who can now have access to a woman’s perspective on the most essential Jewish traditional text. This podcast represents a revolutionary step in advancing women’s Torah study around the globe.

Bekhorot 29 - Shabbat October 17, 6 Cheshvan 10/16/2026

Bekhorot 28 - October 16, 5 Cheshvan 10/16/2026

Bekhorot 27 - October 15, 4 Cheshvan 10/15/2026

Bekhorot 27 - October 15, 4 Cheshvan The braita states that an owner retains financial benefit (tovat hana'a) for priestly gifts, permitting an Israelite to accept payment from a fellow Israelite to direct teruma to a specific kohen who is a relative, whereas a kohen may not pay another kohen for it. The Gemara asks why the braita specifies teruma rather than other priestly gifts (matnot kehuna). It answers that teruma possesses intrinsic sanctity (kedushat haguf) and cannot be redeemed, so people will not mistakenly treat it as unconsecrated (chullin); whereas monetary-sanctity gifts (kedushat damim) might lead people to err, thinking they can redeem them for a small sum and treat them as chullin. The Gemara outlines several lenient rulings regarding teruma from outside the Land of Israel (terumat chutz la'aretz): it is exempt from the prohibition of a kohen assisting at the threshing floor, it is nullified by a simple majority, one may eat from the produce before separating it, and its prohibition applies only to someone whose impurity issues directly from their body (such as a zav or nidda), and even then only for eating rather than touching. Ravina applies this to challa outside Israel: a woman in a state of nidda may separate challa, which may then be eaten by a young kohen; if no such kohen is present, she burns it in the oven and separates a second challa to maintain the practice of challa, which an adult kohen may eat. Following a query posed to Rav Nachman, Rav Amram, and Rami bar Chama on a boat, Rav Amram held like Rav that one who is impure from corpse contamination must immerse in a mikveh, though he does not need to wait for sunset; however, the Gemara clarifies that we do not hold like Rav, but rather like Shmuel, that if the impurity is from an external source, there is no prohibition to eat this teruma in a state of impurity. The Mishna rules that a bekhor is eaten within its first year. Rav derives from the verse "before Hashem your God you shall eat it year by year" that a bekhor's year is calculated based on its own individual birth date rather than the calendar year. The school of Rebbi derives this law from sacrifices in general and derives a different law from the term "year by year"—that a bekhor may be eaten across two calendar years, specifically for two days and one night. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/43301299

Bekhorot 26 - October 14, 3 Cheshvan 10/14/2026

Bekhorot 25 - October 13, 2 Cheshvan 10/13/2026

Bekhorot 24 - Rosh Chodesh Cheshvan - October 12, 1 Cheshvan 10/12/2026

Bekhorot 23 (Full Episode) - October 11, 30 Tishrei 10/11/2026

Bekhorot 22 - Shabbat October 10, 29 Tishrei 10/09/2026

Bekhorot 21 - October 9, 28 Tishrei 10/09/2026

Bekhorot 20 - October 8, 27 Tishrei 10/08/2026

Bekhorot 20 - October 8, 27 Tishrei A braita presents opinions regarding an animal purchased from a non-Jew whose birthing history is unknown. Rabbi Yishmael establishes age-based presumptions (that a goat in its first year, a sheep in its second, and a cow or donkey in its third is assumed to have not yet produced a firstborn prior to the sale), while Rabbi Yosi bar Rabbi Yehuda requires four years for a donkey. Rabbi Yehoshua quotes his rabbis and counters that a bodily discharge (tinuf), which could indicate a prior miscarriage, would also exempt an animal from bekhora, while he himself adds that a goat that had a bodily discharge at six months could still have another offspring within a year. Rabbi Akiva breaks it all down into three cases—where it is known there was a prior birth, where it is known there was no prior birth, or where it is uncertain. The Gemara analyzes the debate between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Yehoshua—suggesting three possible ways to understand the disagreement. Is the debate whether a tinuf (murky discharge) will exempt an animal from the laws of bekhora, whether we need to be concerned that there was a murky discharge even though that only happens in a minority of cases, or whether an animal can miscarry and give birth again in the same year. The Gemara then analyzes the difference between what Rabbi Yehoshua quoted in the name of his rabbis and what he himself holds. Again, three possible explanations are brought: Do they disagree about Zeiri's ruling that an animal cannot become pregnant within thirty days of a discharge, can an animal give birth before five complete months of gestation (yoledet lemikuta'in), or can we count part of a day as a full day (miktzat hayom kekulo) in this context. It then explores the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva and explains the debate to be whether milk production serves as definitive proof of a prior birth to exempt the animal. A second braita discusses a case where a young goat and her three daughters each give birth to three female kids within a single year, enabling all twelve offspring to enter the pen for animal tithe (ma'aser behema). The Gemara clarifies why the braita specified three offspring per animal, reaching a total of twelve, rather than bringing a case that reached a total of ten, which is the minimum amount required for animal tithing. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/43219848

Bekhorot 19 - October 7, 26 Tishrei 10/07/2026

Bekhorot 18 - October 6, 25 Tishrei 10/06/2026

Bekhorot 17 - October 5, 24 Tishrei 10/05/2026

Bekhorot 17 - October 5, 24 Tishrei The Gemara continues to analyze the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda regarding the offspring generations of guaranteed livestock (tzon barzel) that one received from a non-Jew. It evaluates their views against the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the Mishna and against the statement of the tanna kamma in the first clause (reisha) of the Mishna, demonstrating how each Amora reinterprets the words of both Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the tanna kamma. Regarding a ewe that gives birth to a goat-like species or a goat that gives birth to a sheep-like species (nidmeh), a braita brought by Rav Oshaya from Nehardea records that Rabbi Meir obligates the offspring while the Sages exempt it. The Gemara clarifies the subject of their dispute. After rejecting the possibilities that it concerns firstborn status (bekhorah), first shearings (reishit hagez), or slaughtering a mother and child on the same day (oto veet beno), the Gemara returns to state that it indeed concerns firstborn status, but under special circumstances—presenting three options to explain the specific case in which they disagree and the precise point of dispute. Rabbi Yochanan notes that Rabbi Meir agrees that the Rosh Chodesh goat offering (se'ir shel rosh chodesh) must come from a female goat born to a goat and not from a hybrid offspring (nidmeh). An objection is raised against him: no sacrifice may come from a nidmeh, as derived from an explicit exposition! To resolve this, the Gemara explains that both verse derivations are necessary. The Gemara discusses the status of wool that came from a nidmeh (such as a ewe born to a goat). Such wool is exempt from the prohibition of mixed species (kilayim/ shaatnez), invalid for tekhelet threads in tzitzit, and immune to garment leprosy (nega'im), as derived by an analogy to flax (pishtan), which cannot have a nidmeh counterpart. Similarly, Rav Ashi rules that wine from a vine draped over a fig tree is invalid for altar libations (nesakhim). The Mishna addresses a ewe that gives birth to two male lambs whose heads emerge simultaneously. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili holds both go to the kohen based on the plural verse "the males belong to Hashem", whereas the Sages hold exact simultaneity is impossible (i efshar letzamtzem), so one belongs to the owner and one to the kohen. Rabbi Tarfon lets the kohen choose the better lamb, while Rabbi Akiva rules that the kohen receives the leaner one, with the second lamb grazing until it contracts a blemish; it remains liable for priestly gifts (matanot), whereas Rabbi Yosi exempts it. If one lamb dies, Rabbi Akiva rules that the burden of proof rests on the claimant (hamotzi mechavero alav hare'aya) and the animal remains with the owner. In analyzing the principle of simultaneity/exactness (tzimtzum), the school of Rav Yannai asks whether human precision (beyedei adam) is possible according to the Sages, even if exact simultaneity at birth is impossible. They bring four examples—the red line on the Altar (chut hasikra), the dimensions of Sanctuary vessels, impurity in equal halves of a broken earthenware vessel, and a corpse found equidistant between two cities—to reach a conclusion, but each possibility is rejected. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/43170893

Bekhorot 16 - October 4, 23 Tishrei 10/04/2026

Bekhorot 16 - October 4, 23 Tishrei The Gemara analyzes the braita brought to support Rav Sheshet’s position that the fetus of a sanctified animal that became blemished can be redeemed (i.e., designated before the mother is redeemed to be used for the same sacrifice as its mother). First, the Gemara explains what can be derived from the concluding line in each section of the braita, "this is the general rule" (klalo shel davar). Then, an inference from the braita is used to raise a difficulty against Rav Huna’s position that offspring of sanctified animals that became blemished cannot be fixed, but must be left to die. However, the Gemara suggests that Rav Huna could read the braita without making that inference. Two versions are presented regarding one who slaughters a blemished sanctified animal outside the Temple courtyard (azara): in one version, the person is exempt; in the other, obligated. The second position is explained as referring to a blemish in the cornea (dukin she-be'ayin) according to the position of Rabbi Akiva. Regarding the law of a substitution (temura) for a disqualified sanctified animal: Rav Nachman rules that if it was substituted after the original animal was redeemed, the substitute animal must be left to die, as there is no solution for it (similar to Rav Huna’s position above regarding the fetus). Rav Amram disagrees, deriving from the substitution of a firstborn and an animal tithe that such animals can be eaten/slaughtered after becoming blemished. However, Abaye explains why those cases are not comparable. A braita is then brought to support Rav Nachman’s position. The Mishna rules that if an Israelite receives livestock from a non-Jew under a guaranteed livestock arrangement (tzon barzel) where the Jew accepts responsibility for the livestock, agrees to return its value as assessed at the time of the arrangement, and splits the proceeds, the offspring are exempt from firstborn status (bekhora). However, the third generation will be obligated in bekhora, meaning the fourth generation firstborns will be given to the kohen. If the Israelite substitutes the offspring in place of the mothers to secure the principal, the third-generation offspring are exempt, but the fourth generation offspring are obligated meaning the fifth generation firstborns will be given to the kohen. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that even up to ten generations are exempt, as the non-Jew can always collect from the animals. If a ewe gives birth to a goat-like species or a goat gives birth to a sheep-like species, the offspring is exempt from bekhorah, unless it exhibits some physical characteristics (miktzat simanin) of its mother, in which case it is obligated. The Gemara questions whether tzon barzel remains in the domain of the non-Jewish owner, raising a contradiction from the laws of interest (ribbit), which prohibit an Israelite from accepting tzon barzel from another Israelite because it is considered to be in the recipient's domain and is therefore considered interest. Abaye distinguishes between cases based on whether the giver accepts responsibility for unavoidable loss and market depreciation. Rava rejects this distinction and explains that for bekhora, the exemption applies because if the Israelite fails to pay, the non-Jew can seize the animals or their offspring. Thus, "the hand of the non-Jew is in the middle" (yad goy ba'emtza), which invalidates the requirement of bekhora. The Gemara analyzes the dispute regarding the generations of offspring when offspring are substituted for their mothers under a tzon barzel arrangement: Rav Huna holds that the second generation is exempt while the third generation is obligated, whereas Rav Yehuda holds that third generation offspring are also exempt and only fourth generation offspring are obligated. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/43161368

Bekhorot 15 - Shabbat Shemini Atzeret - October 3, 22 Tishrei 10/02/2026

Bekhorot 14 - Hoshana Rabba - October 2 , 21 Tishrei 10/02/2026

Bekhorot 13 - October 1, 20 Tishrei 10/01/2026

Bekhorot 13 - October 1, 20 Tishrei The Gemara discusses a contradiction regarding the time for redeeming a firstborn donkey (peter chamor). One braita states that is can be done immediately, while another states that it cannot be performed before thirty days. Three resolutions are brought. Rav Nachman explains that if one redeemed it within thirty days, it is redeemed post-facto (b'dieved). Rav Sheshet suggests that the thirty-day timeframe teaches that one does not violate the prohibition against delaying the mitzva during this period. Rava resolves the conflicting opinions and explains that the dispute depends on whether one follows Rabbi Eliezer, who compares a firstborn donkey to a firstborn son, or the rabbis, who do not. The Mishna rules that if the owner does not wish to redeem the firstborn donkey, he decapitates it from behind and buries it. The commandment of redemption takes precedence. The Mishna lists additional mitzvot that have an order of precedence: the commandment of designation (ye'ida) takes precedence over the commandment of redemption for a Hebrew maidservant; the commandment of Levirate marriage (yibbum) originally took precedence over chalitza, but nowadays the commandment of chalitza takes precedence because people do not intend it for the sake of the mitzvah; and the commandment of redemption by the owner takes precedence over any other person in redeeming sanctified non-kosher animals. At the opening of the second chapter, the Mishna rules that if an Israelite buys, sells, enters a partnership in, or receives on a sharecropping contract (kibalat) a fetus or an animal of a Gentile, the offspring is exempt from firstborn status of kosher animals, as it is stated in the Torah "in Israel," excluding animals under joint or full ownership of Gentiles. Kohanim and Levites are obligated in the firstborn of a kosher animal, as their exemption applies only to pidyon haben and peter chamor. The Gemara asks why the masechet begins with laws of firstborn donkey and then of kosher animals given that kosher animals possess intrinsic sanctity (kedushat haguf) while a donkey possesses only monetary sanctity (kedushat damim). The Gemara answers that matters regarding non-kosher animals are few, and therefore the matter was concluded first, or because a firstborn donkey is cherished. Regarding transactions with a Gentile, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Nachmani said in the name of Resh Lakish, who quoted the words of Rabbi Oshaya, that an Israelite who gave money to a Gentile (and a Gentile who gave money to an Israelite) acquires through money alone, and does not require physical pulling (meshikha). This derives this from the verse "from the hand of your neighbor" (mi-yad amitekha), teaching that meshikha is required only between an Israelite and his neighbor, whereas a transaction with a Gentile is effected through money. Ameimar holds a dissenting opinion – that a transaction between a Gentile and an Israelite is effected through money. The Gemara analyzes how to understand the verse of amitekha according to Ameimar according to the positions of both Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. A difficulty is raised from a braita against the position of Rabbi Oshaya regarding one who buys pieces of silver (gruta'ot) from Gentiles and finds an idol inside, where ownership depends on whether money was given or physical pulling (meshikha) was performed. The Gemara resolves the difficulty through four different explanations. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/43119403

Bekhorot 12 - September 30, 19 Tishrei 09/30/2026

Bekhorot 12 - September 30, 19 Tishrei The Mishna lists animals that cannot be used for redemption, including a calf, an undomesticated animal, a slaughtered or treifa animal, a hybrid (kilayim), or a koy (a creature of doubtful status between a domesticated and undomesticated animal). Rabbi Eliezer permits redemption using a hybrid because it is nevertheless a lamb (born to two animals in the sheep family), but forbids a koy. The Gemara explains that the Mishna follows Ben Bag Bag, who derives from a textual comparison (gezeira shava) of the word seh from the Paschal sacrifice that only a standard, kosher lamb or goat fulfills the obligation. Four questions are asked regarding animals that may or may not be used to redeem a firstborn donkey. The first question: may a fetus that was in the womb of its mother when she was slaughtered (ben pekua) be used? At first, the Gemara assesses that the question is according to the Sages' position regarding a ben pekua, and not Rabbi Meir’s. Mar Zutra holds it is invalid because it does not require ritual slaughter, and therefore it is considered equivalent to a slaughtered animal. Rav Ashi permits it because the Torah repeats the word tifdeh (redeem) to include all kosher sheep. The second question: can an animal that does not resemble its mother (nidmeh) be used for redemption? At first, the Gemara assesses that the question is according to the Sages' position and not Rabbi Eliezer’s, since it is clear he would permit it, given that even kilayim is permitted for use. Two sources are brought to answer the question, but in the end, each source is inconclusive. The third question: may consecrated animals that became blemished (pesulei hamukdashin) be used to redeem a firstborn donkey? Rav Mari son of Rav Kahana proves from the verse comparing them to a gazelle and a deer (k'tzvi v'ka'ayal) that just as a gazelle or deer cannot be used to redeem a firstborn donkey, blemished consecrated animals likewise cannot be used. The final question: may one use an animal that possesses Sabbatical year sanctity for redemption? One clearly cannot use it to redeem a definite firstborn donkey, as the Torah specifies that Sabbatical produce is designated "for eating" (l'okhla) and not for commerce (l'skhora). To answer the question, a statement of Rav Chisda is brought showing that one may use a Sabbatical year animal to redeem a doubtful firstborn donkey, according to Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Chisda ruled on other issues regarding animals with the sanctity of the Sabbatical year—that they are exempt from firstborn status and obligated in priestly gifts. A difficulty is raised from a braita regarding halla, but it is resolved. If an Israelite gives an unredeemed firstborn donkey to a kohen, the kohen is not permitted to keep it until a lamb is designated in its place immediately, as kohanim were suspected of taking firstborn donkeys without properly redeeming them. If one designates a lamb for redemption and the lamb dies, Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages dispute who bears responsibility. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the owner remains responsible to provide another lamb (comparing it to redemption of a firstborn son, pidyon haben), whereas the Sages hold that the owner is free of responsibility (comparing it to the redemption of second tithe, ma'aser sheni). Testimony from Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Tzadok confirms the Sages' view that the kohen receives nothing if the designated redemption dies before reaching him. Rav Yosef and Rava subsequently explain the source for Rabbi Eliezer’s position. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/43083318

Bekhorot 11 - September 29, 18 Tishrei 09/29/2026

Bekhorot 11 - September 29, 18 Tishrei How much must one give to redeem a firstborn donkey? Rabbi Yosi bar Yehuda requires at least one shekel, whereas the Sages hold that any minimal amount is valid for redemption. Rav Yosef explained that the value of "any minimal amount" can even be a lamb worth a sixth of a zuz. However, in the story involving Rabbi Yehuda Nesia, Rabbi Tarfon presents three options—a generous eye, a stingy eye, and an average eye—ranging between two to four zuzim. To resolve this contradiction, it is explained that Rabbi Tarfon’s ruling applies when one comes to consult, but if one acts on their own, a sixth of a zuz is sufficient. Reish Lakish rules that if the owner does not have a lamb to redeem it with, he may redeem it with its financial equivalent, as the Torah did not specify "a lamb" to be stringent upon him, but rather to be lenient. Initially, it was thought that he ruled in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, but because it is unreasonable to say he ruled like him (for two distinct reasons), his ruling is ultimately explained according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. If a person redeems someone else’s firstborn donkey, the redemption is valid. However, the Gemara asks: to whom does the donkey belong after redemption—is it similar to consecrated property (hekdesh) and thus belongs to the redeemer, or not? This question is answered from the law stating that a thief who steals someone else's firstborn donkey pays double damages to the owner, showing that it is not treated as hekdesh. An Israelite who has ten doubtful firstborn donkeys in his house designates ten lambs for them, tithes them as animal tithe (ma'aser behema), and retains them for himself, since due to the doubt he is not obligated to give them to a kohen. The same applies to an Israelite who inherited ten definite firstborn donkeys from his maternal grandfather who was a kohen, who had inherited them from his maternal grandfather who was an Israelite, or untithed produce under similar circumstances, he sets aside the tithes for them and they remain his. One who purchases untithed, smoothed produce from a non-Jew in the Land of Israel is obligated to tithe it, because a non-Jew’s ownership in the Land of Israel does not exempt produce from tithes. Nevertheless, the tithes belong to him and he does not give them to a kohen, since he can say to the kohen: "My rights to this produce comes from the rights of a person with whom you have no legal claim." A contradictory source is brought, but it is resolved by differentiating between teruma gedola and teruma of maaser (that the Levite gives to a kohen). In explaining the words of the Mishna, the Gemara clarifies that from the moment the owner redeems the donkey for a lamb, it becomes the property of the kohen and stands in his domain, so that even if it dies in the house of the owner, the kohen can still derive benefit from the lamb. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/43068033

Bekhorot 10 - September 28, 17 Tishrei 09/28/2026

Bekhorot 10 - September 28, 17 Tishrei Even though Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding whether a firstborn donkey (peter chamor) is forbidden for benefit, Rabba maintains that Rabbi Shimon, who permits benefit prior to redemption, agrees that if the donkey was not redeemed and its neck was broken, it becomes forbidden for benefit. Rabba derives this law via a gezeira shava comparing the term "breaking the neck" (arifah) used here to that of an egla arufa, which is forbidden for benefit once its neck is broken. Rabba attempts to prove his assertion from a braita concerning a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Shimon over several items regarding susceptibility to food impurity, including a firstborn donkey. In that braita, Rabbi Shimon holds it is not susceptible to food impurity, which Rabba infers as evidence that it is forbidden for benefit after its neck is broken. However, Rabba’s proof is rejected after two alternative explanations for the core debate in the braita are proposed, though ultimately both alternative interpretations are refuted as well. A further challenge is raised against Rabba from another braita, but this difficulty is successfully resolved. Rav Huna supported Rabba’s ruling and cited two braitot to demonstrate that Rabbi Shimon considers the firstborn donkey forbidden for benefit after its neck is broken, yet both proofs are shown to be inconclusive. The Gemara then introduces a different version regarding how Rav Nachman’s opinion was framed, connecting it directly to a Mishna that discusses betrothing a woman with a firstborn donkey. An alternative version of the sugya pertaining to that Mishna is presented as well. The opinion of Rabbi Yochanan (and some say Rabbi Elazar) is brought: he disagrees with Rabba and Rav Huna, holding that according to Rabbi Shimon, the donkey remains permitted for benefit even after its neck has been broken. Resh Lakish, however, agrees with the position of Rabba and Rav Huna. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/43052478

Bekhorot 9 - September 27, 16 Tishrei 09/27/2026

Bekhorot 8 - Shabbat, 1st Day of Sukkot - September 26, 15 Tishrei 09/25/2026

Bekhorot 7 - September 25, 14 Tishrei 09/25/2026

Bekhorot 7 - September 25, 14 Tishrei Does Rabbi Shimon require an offspring to resemble its mother in its head and most of its body (ראשו ורובו) to be permitted for consumption, or does his requirement of its head and most of its body apply exclusively to firstborn (bekhorah) status? Three braitot are brought to answer this question, but all are deemed inconclusive. Is donkey urine permitted or forbidden? While horse and camel urine are thin and clearly just excreted water, donkey urine is thick and resembles milk. Is it absorbed and derived from the animal's body (and thus forbidden as an excretion of a non-kosher animal), or is it merely ingested water that became cloudy from body heat? Rav Sheshet proves from our Mishna ("that which emerges from the non-kosher is non-kosher") that donkey urine is forbidden because it derives from a non-kosher species. There are two versions of Rav Sheshet’s proof and how it is derived from the Mishna, with potential halakhic ramifications between the two versions. A difficulty is raised against Rav Sheshet’s opinion from a braita permitting honey—even though it is produced in the body of a non-kosher creature—as it comes from something outside the body. To resolve this, it is explained that Rav Sheshet follows a different tanna who permits honey because it is derived from a drasha in the Torah and is an exception to the rule, not the rule. Fallow deer secretions (chalei d'yachmurta) and the skin/placenta covering a donkey foal's face (or haba k'neged panav) are permitted as mere waste matter (pirsha). If a non-kosher fish swallows a kosher fish, the swallowed kosher fish is permitted for consumption. However, if a kosher fish swallows a non-kosher fish, the non-kosher fish remains forbidden because it is not the product of the kosher fish's growth. If one did not witness the swallowing, one might assume a non-kosher fish found inside a kosher fish was actually birthed by it (as non-kosher fish give birth to live young, while kosher fish lay eggs). This last point raises a difficulty, which four answers are brought to resolve. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/43029313

Bekhorot 6 - September 24, 13 Tishrei 09/24/2026

Bekhorot 6 - September 24, 13 Tishrei Following the dispute between the tanna of our Mishna and Rabbi Yosi HaGelili, where each derived from a different verse the exemption from firstborn status for an animal that gave birth to an offspring resembling a different species, the Gemara clarifies what Rabbi Yosi HaGelili derives from the proof-verses of our tanna ("peter hamor" twice). Rabbi Yosi HaGelili derives from there the source for exempting horses and camels from firstborn status. Rav Achai raises a difficulty against his derivation, but the Gemara answers his objection. Our tanna derives this rule (exempting the firstborn of horses and camels) from a general rule and a detail (klal u’phrat): "All your livestock you shall designate as male" is a general rule, "ox and sheep and donkey" is a detail, and a general rule includes only that which is in the detail; therefore, firstborn laws apply only to a donkey and not to other non-kosher animals. The Gemara discusses a series of uncertainties regarding an animal that gave birth to a different species that possesses some of the mother's features: regarding a cow that gave birth to a donkey-like offspring, do we judge it like a goat that gave birth to a sheep-like offspring that looks somewhat like its mother, which is subject to firstborn status because both are subject to firstborn status, or perhaps here the laws are different because one is sanctified with intrinsic holiness (kedushat haguf) and the other with monetary value (kedushat damim), and one is kosher while the other is not? Subsequently, the Gemara inquires about a donkey that gave birth to a horse-like offspring and a cow that gave birth to a horse-like offspring. From the braitot, the Gemara proves that the obligation when there are partial features was stated regarding a cow that gave birth to a donkey-like offspring, but it remains unclear regarding the other questions. Regarding eating, the Mishna clarifies the principle that what emerges from the non-kosher is non-kosher, and it is not judged according to the offspring's appearance but rather according to its mother - this rule was intended to remember the law. The source showing that a kosher animal born from a non-kosher mother is forbidden to be eaten is from the verse "These you shall not eat," whereas a non-kosher offspring born from a kosher mother is permitted, as it is said, "the camel... it is non-kosher" - it is non-kosher, but a non-kosher born from a kosher mother is kosher. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and forbids a non-kosher animal born from a kosher mother based on the repetition of the word "camel" in Leviticus and Deuteronomy, and he derives the prohibition of milk from a non-kosher animal from the phrase "et ha-gamal" (the camel), whereas the Sages forbid milk from "camel" "camel" and do not derive laws from the word "et." To show that there are those who derive laws from the word, et, the Gemara brings the position of Shimon HaAmsoni, who derives laws from that word, but changed his position when he reached "You shall fear the Lord (et Hashem) your God," until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that it serves to include Torah scholars. The Gemara clarifies why a special verse was needed to forbid the milk of a non-kosher animal and presents two possible explanations. Afterwards, it discusses the source for permitting the milk of a kosher animal and presents six proofs, of which three are rejected. The Gemara cites a braita stating that a sheep that gave birth to a goat-like offspring or a goat that gave birth to a sheep-like offspring is exempt from firstborn status unless it possesses some of the mother's features, and Rabbi Shimon disagrees, maintaining that it is not obligated until its head and most of its body resemble its mother. The Gemara concludes with the question: Does Rabbi Shimon require its head and most of its body to resemble its mother regarding the prohibition of eating as well? /episode/index/show/hadran/id/43017263

Bekhorot 5 - September 23, 12 Tishrei 09/23/2026

Bekhorot 5 - September 23, 12 Tishrei The Gemara continues analyzing the dispute regarding whether firstborns were sanctified in the desert. According to Reish Lakish, they were not sanctified until entering the Land, whereas Rabbi Yochanan holds they were already sanctified in the wilderness. Rabbi Eleazar explains that Rabbi Yochanan derived his position from the verse "לי יהיו" ("they shall be Mine") – b’havayatan yehu, meaning that their holiness remains intact and does not lapse. Rabbi Yochanan explains the verse "והיה כי יביאך... והעברת" in accordance with the exposition of the Academy of Rabbi Yishmael: perform this mitzva so that you will inherit and enter the Land. Rav Mordechai notes to Rav Ashi that in his academy the dispute was taught with reversed attributions - Rabbi Yochanan said they were not sanctified (meaning they did not need to be sanctified anew), while Reish Lakish said they were sanctified. Rav Ashi clarifies that the underlying explanatory principle is the exact same, but a person is obligated to speak in the language of his teacher. Two questions are asked by the officer Quntroqos to Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai. First, regarding the discrepancy between the detailed count of Levites (22,300) and their total sum (22,000), Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai explains that those additional 300 Levites were firstborns themselves, and a firstborn cannot discharge the firstborn obligation of another, as Abaye adds that it suffices for a firstborn to discharge his own personal holiness. Second, regarding the discrepancy between the silver collected (half a shekel for 601,550 men, equaling 201 kikar and 11 maneh) and the silver gathered and accounted for (100 kikar and 1,775 shekels, which equals 101 kikar and 11 maneh), Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai responds that Moses our teacher was a trustworthy treasurer and skilled calculator, and that the sanctuary maneh was doubled. After two failed attempts, Rav Chisda proves from a verse in Ezekiel that the sanctuary maneh was indeed doubled, and the Gemara establishes three principles regarding measures: additions may be made to measurements, additions cannot exceed a sixth, and this sixth is calculated from the outside. Rabbi Chanina relates three questions he asked Rabbi Eliezer in the Great Academy. Regarding why firstborn donkeys were singled out for redemption over horses or camels, Rabbi Eliezer explains that it is a divine decree (gezeirat hakatav), and also because donkeys assisted Israel during the Exodus, as every Israelite brought out ninety loaded Libyan donkeys with the silver and gold of Egypt. Regarding the place names Rephidim and Shittim, Rabbi Eliezer holds that they are literal place names, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua interprets them homiletically as allusions to behavior: Rephidim signifies that they loosened their grasp on Torah study, and Shittim signifies that they engaged in acts of folly. The Mishna rules that a cow giving birth to an offspring resembling a donkey, or a donkey giving birth to an offspring resembling a horse, is exempt from bekhora, as the repetition of the words "peter chamor" teaches that both the mother and offspring must be donkeys. Regarding consumption, an offspring born of a kosher animal that resembles an non-kosher animal is permitted to be eaten, while an offspring born of a non-kosher animal that resembles a kosher animal is forbidden, based on the principle that whatever emerges from the non-kosher is not kosher, and whatever emerges from the kosher is kosher. The Gemara compares our Mishna to a Mishna dealing with a ewe that gave birth to an offspring resembling a goat. Rav Yehuda derives from the verse "אך בכור שור..." that both parent and offspring must be of the same species, instead of using the verse in our Mishna. The Gemara explains the dispute between the tanna of our Mishna and Rabbi Yose HaGelili (upon whose view Rav Yehuda relied) regarding whether the textual derivations apply to monetary consecration (kedushat damim) and from there we learn to inherent sanctity (kedushat haguf) or the reverse. What does each do with the verse of the other? /episode/index/show/hadran/id/43003463

Bekhorot 4 - September 22, 11 Tishrei 09/22/2026

Bekhorot 4 - September 22, 11 Tishrei The Mishna rules that Kohanim and Levites are exempt from bekhora (firstborn male donkeys) based on a kal v’chomer: if they exempted the firstborns of Israelites in the desert, logic dictates that they exempt their own. The Gemara challenges the Mishna’s premise as the Levites themselves did not exempt the donkeys of the Israelites – they themselves exempted the Israelite firstborn males, and their animals exempted the Israelite firstborn donkeys. Two answers are offered to resolve this question, by both Abaye and Rava. Abaye answers that the Mishna means the livestock of the Levites exempted their own livestock. Rava rejects Abaye's interpretation on two grounds: first, the Mishna uses the verb "they exempted", referring to the Levites themselves; second, if Abaye were correct, Levites' kosher firstborn animals should be exempt from bekhora also, yet a Mishna explicitly teaches that Kohanim and Levites are obligated in the firstborn of kosher animals and exempt only from redeeming their sons (pidyon haben) and firstborn donkey (peter chamor). Rava provides his own answer, explaining that the Levites exempted themselves (their human firstborns) via kal v’chomer from what transpired in the desert where the Levites exempted the Israelite firstborns. To derive their exemption from the firstborn donkey (peter chamor), the Gemara cites a verse equating human firstborns with impure animal firstborns ("האדם ואת בכור הבהמה הטמאה תפדה"), establishing that whoever is exempt from human firstborn is exempt from the redemption of the donkeys. Rav Safra raises four difficulties against both Abaye and Rava: if the exemption depends on the Levites' exchange in the desert, what about those who were not involved in the exemption, such as a Levite who did not own animals or was under a month old, or a female Levite, or Aharon? All difficulties are resolved. Three other questions are asked and answered, namely, the source for kohanim being included in this exemption, that this exemption applies for future generations, and that the redemption of a firstborn donkey in the desert was performed specifically with a lamb (seh) just as it is for future generations. Rav Chanina states that a single lamb belonging to a Levite exempted multiple firstborn donkeys of Israelites in the desert. Abaye attempts to prove this from the fact that Scripture notes how many excess human firstborns there were compared to Levites, but did not mention any excess firstborn animals. After rejecting Abaye’s proof, the Gemara proves this from the precise phrasing "ואת בהמת הלוים תחת בהמתם" – “an animal (single) of the Levites in place of their (Israelites) animals (plural)”, and Rava notes that this aligns with a Mishna ruling that one may redeem with a lamb multiple times, and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Chanina’s statement was meant to give the reason for that Mishna. Rabbi Yochanan challenges Reish Lakish from two tannaitic sources, but both difficulties against Reish Lakish are resolved. An alternative version suggests that the second difficulty was brought by Reish Lakish to challenge Rabbi Yochanan’s position. A third source is brought by the Gemara to prove Rabbi Yochanan’s position, but Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak provides an alternative explanation of that source to reconcile it with Reish Lakish. Following a difficulty on this explanation, raised by Rav Papa, the Gemara is forced to slightly adjust Reish Lakish's view: it is clear that at the beginning of their stay in the desert, firstborns were sanctified; according to Reish Lakish, it was only after that specific event (the exchange of the firstborns for the Levites) that they ceased to sanctify them until entering the Land of Israel. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/42988198

Bekhorot 3 - Yom Kippur - September 21, 10 Tishrei 09/20/2026

Bekhorot 2 - September 20, 9 Tishrei 09/20/2026

Bekhorot 2 - September 20, 9 Tishrei The Mishna rules that if a Jew buys a donkey embryo from a non-Jew, sells one to him, enters into a partnership with him, or receives or gives an animal under a sharecropping agreement (kablanut), the offspring is exempt from bekhora. The Gemara questions why the Mishna needs to enumerate all these individual cases, and explains that each is necessary: selling must be taught so we do not fine a Jew who removes an animal from sanctity; partnering excludes Rabbi Yehuda’s view that a joint partnership with a non-Jew is obligated in bekhora; and sharecropping (kablanut) is needed because the primary animal belongs to the Jew, and had we exempted it from the firstborn law, we might have thought this would cause people to think that in a regular animal there is no law of firstborn. The Gemara asks what Rabbi Yehuda’s position is regarding selling an embryo to a non-Jew, given that he elsewhere permits selling a broken animal (shevura). Is an embryo treated like a broken animal because it cannot work, or is selling an embryo forbidden because it is standard practice, unlike a broken animal where there is a clear distinction (heker) since it is not standard practice? The Gemara first attempts to prove this from the Mishna, which mentions that selling an embryo is forbidden without noting a dissenting opinion. However, this proof is rejected, as Rabbi Yehuda clearly disagrees with another part of the Mishna without being mentioned there, so no proof can be brought from the Mishna. Next, a braita detailing fines for sharecropping (kablanut) transactions is brought to show that Rabbi Yehuda forbids it. However, the Gemara rejects this proof, clarifying that the fine in the braita applies specifically when giving a pregnant animal to be fattened. Ultimately, Rav Ashi proves from Rabbi Yehuda’s own rationale in another braita—that a broken animal is permitted because it cannot heal—which implies that selling an embryo is forbidden, as it naturally grows and "heals." This entire sugya was also taught in a different manner, as a question of whether the Mishna's prohibition on selling an embryo is only according to the Rabbis or if Rabbi Yehuda agrees with it as well. As in the previous version, the conclusion is that Rabbi Yehuda also forbids it. The Gemara asks whether selling a healthy animal solely for its fetus is permitted, analyzing the doubts according to both Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. An attempt is made to resolve the question from the Mishna regarding one who gives an animal under sharecropping (kablanut for offspring), as the phrase "even though he is not permitted" is omitted there. However, the Gemara ultimately concludes that in other forbidden cases (such as partnership) the Tanna also omits "even though he is not permitted," so no answer to the question can be derived from the Mishna. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/42963128

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