Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Hadran.org.il is the portal for Daf Yomi studies for women. Hadran.org.il is the first and only site where one can hear a daily Talmud class taught by a woman. The classes are taught in Israel by Rabbanit Michelle Cohen Farber, a graduate of Midreshet Lindenbaum’s scholars program with a BA in Talmud and Tanach from Bar-Ilan University. Michelle has taught Talmud and Halacha at Midreshet Lindenbaum, Pelech high school and MATAN. She lives in Ra’anana with her husband and their five children. Each morning the daf yomi class is delivered via ZOOM and then immediately uploaded and available for podcast and download. Hadran.org.il reaches women who can now have access to a woman’s perspective on the most essential Jewish traditional text. This podcast represents a revolutionary step in advancing women’s Torah study around the globe.

Menachot 47 - February 27, 10 Adar 02/27/2026

Menachot 46 - February 26, 9 Adar 02/26/2026

Menachot 45 - February 25, 8 Adar 02/25/2026

Menachot 44 - February 24, 7 Adar 02/24/2026

Menachot 43 - February 23, 6 Adar 02/23/2026

Menachot 42 - February 22, 5 Adar 02/22/2026

Menachot 41 - Shabbat February 21, 4 Adar 02/20/2026

Menachot 40 - February 20, 3 Adar 02/20/2026

Menachot 40 - February 20, 3 Adar Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the law of a sadin (a linen garment) in the context of tzitzit. While Beit Shammai exempts a linen garment from the obligation of tzitzit to avoid the prohibition of shaatnez (mixing wool and linen), Beit Hillel holds it is obligated. Their reasoning is based on the textual juxtaposition of the laws of shaatnez and tzitzit, which teaches that the positive commandment (aseh) of tzitzit overrides the negative prohibition (lo taaseh) of shaatnez. Although the halakha follows Beit Hillel, Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Tzadok testifies that anyone who attached tchelet (wool) to a linen garment in Jerusalem was viewed with wonder - as it caused onlookers to mistakenly believe shaatnez was generally permitted. Rabbi explains that the Sages eventually prohibited this practice because people did not know about the drasha permitting shaatnez and would come to think that shaatnez was permitted in general. Since difficulties were raised against Rabbi’s explanation, Rava and Rabbi Zeira offer four alternative reasons for why the Sages prohibited wool tzitzit on linen garments: Decree of "kala ilan": There is a concern that one might use a dye that looks like techelet but is not the authentic wool dyed with snail secretions. In such a case, the wearer violates the prohibition of shaatnez (wool and linen) without having fulfilled the mitzvah that allows it. Decree of "teima" (testing): A concern regarding the validity of the tzitzit - lest the techelet used was dyed during the "testing" of the color, which is invalid because it was not dyed specifically for the sake of the mitzva (lishma). Concern of "ta’aseh ve’lo min he-asui ": Rava and Rabbi Zera explain a concern that if the linen garment tears within three fingerbreadths of its edge, a person might sew it back up and leave the sewing threads to serve as tzitzit. This would be invalid because the Torah requires the mitzva to be actively made by attaching the strings to the garment, rather than utilizing threads that were already there for a different purpose. Decree of night garments: Since a garment worn exclusively at night is exempt from tzitzit, wearing wool strings on a linen night garment would constitute a shaatnez violation without any mitzva to permit it. The Gemara discusses the definition of a garment obligated in tzitzit regarding a hybrid garment made of leather and fabric. Rava rules that we follow the primary material of the garment: if the body of the garment is fabric and the corners are leather, it is obligated; if the body is leather and the corners are fabric, it is exempt. Rav Achai disagrees, arguing that the status follows the material of the corners themselves. Regarding the construction of the tzitzit, Rav Huna rules that if one attached tzitzit to a garment while it only had three corners and then completed the fourth corner afterward, the tzitzit is invalid due to "ta’aseh ve’lo min he-asui" (Make it, and not from that which is already made). The Gemara challenges this from the practice of the "Early Pious Ones," who would attach techelet after weaving only three fingerbreadths of the garment (when only two corners were in existence). The Gemara resolves this by understanding the custom of the pious ones to be performed at the end, when there were only three fingerbreadths left to weave (when the four corners were already in existence). Finally, the Gemara challenges the invalidation of "ta’aseh ve’lo min he-asui" based on Rabbi Zera’s ruling, which validates attaching new tzitzit onto a garment that already has tzitzit (and then removing the old ones). Rava suggests that because of the prohibition of "bal tosif" (do not add to the mitzvot), the act of attaching the strings before the obligation exists is not considered a significant "act." However, Rav Papa challenges Rava’s reasoning, explaining that it depends on human intent: if one intends to cancel the first set of strings and replace them with the new ones, it is considered a significant act. This raises the question: if intent makes it a valid act, why was the case of attaching tzitzit before the garment was finished invalid in light of Rabbi Zeira permitting the case of the extra strings? /episode/index/show/hadran/id/40172810

Menachot 39 - February 19, 2 Adar 02/19/2026

Menachot 39 - February 19, 2 Adar Rava explains that the top knot on the tzitzit (after all the windings) must be of Torah origin. If it were not, the attachment would be considered temporary, and there would be no need for the Torah to permit the use of mixed types (shatnez—wool and linen) in tzitzit. Raba bar Rav Ada transmitted in the name of Rav that if a single thread is torn at its base (the top of the tzitzit), the tzitzit are no longer valid. When Rav Nachman taught this, Rava raised a challenge from a braita, but Rav Nachman reinterpreted the source in a way that resolved the contradiction. Raba stated in the name of Rav that the specific thread used for the windings counts as one of the required threads of the tzitzit. Rav Yosef corrected the attribution, noting that the statement actually originated from Shmuel. Raba taught in the name of Shmuel that if the techelet thread was mostly consumed by the windings, leaving only a small amount of string to hang down, the tzitzit remain valid. Rav Yosef again corrected him, clarifying that this statement came from Rav. Rav is quoted by another source as establishing the halakha on three points: a minimum of set of one windings is necessary, and the ideal tzitzit consists of one-third windings and two-thirds hanging string. According to Rebbi, each winding (chulya) should of one thread wound at least three times. However, a different braita states there should be between seven and thirteen windings, representing the seven firmaments and the spaces between them. One should also begin and end the windings with a white string, as derived from the biblical verse. Rav and Raba bar bar Hana disagree about whether a garment with only windings and no loose strings hanging is valid. Their debate is rooted in different ways of understanding the purpose of the terms petil and gedilim used in the Torah. Shmuel says in the name of Levi that even the white threads can be made of wool when placed on a linen garment. A question is then raised as to whether a woolen garment can have linen threads; Rav Yehuda’s statement is cited to answer this, as he explicitly permits linen strings in a woolen garment. He even permits using both wool and linen strings in a silk garment. Rav Nachman disagrees with this last point and exempts a silk garment from tzitzit entirely. Rava challenges Rav Nachman’s position, but Rav Nachman resolves the difficulty. Their underlying dispute is whether the word beged (clothing) in the Torah refers to all materials or only to those made of wool or linen. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/40160875

Menachot 38 - Rosh Chodesh Adar - February 18, 1 Adar 02/18/2026

Menachot 38 - Rosh Chodesh Adar - February 18, 1 Adar Link to website. The Gemara brings two different versions of the incident involving Mar bar Rav Ashi, whose tzitzit were torn on Shabbat while he was walking home. This raises the subject of "kevod haberiyot" (human dignity), which overrides a "lo ta'aseh" (negative commandment) in the Torah. Both versions bring the explanation of Rav bar Shaba, who explained that this law refers specifically to the negative commandment of "lo tasur" (do not stray from the words of the Sages), meaning that it only overrides Rabbinic prohibitions. For tzitzit, one must place two strings of techelet and two white strings. The Mishna rules, however, that this is not essential – one can have only white or only techelet. Also regarding the tefillin of the hand and the tefillin of the head - they are two independent mitzvot and do not hinder one another; someone who has only one of them puts it on and recites the blessing over it. The Gemara suggests that the Mishna does not follow the view of Rebbi, who holds that the techelet and the white do hinder one another. He learns this from the verse "And you shall see him" (u're-item oto), which teaches that both must be together, while the rabbis learn that it is possible to see each kind separately. However, two other suggestion were brought to explain the Mishna according to the view of Rebbi: Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav: The law in the Mishna (that they do not hinder) was stated regarding the order of precedence. It is a mitzva to first place the white (since the white is the color of the "corner" of the garment, which appears in the verse first), but if one placed techelet before white, one has fulfilled the obligation, though the mitzva has not been performed in the most ideal way. Rava: The Mishna is speaking about gerdumin (remnants) of one of the colors - strings that were torn after they were already placed in the garment - the tzitzit remains valid. His words rely on the words of the sons of Rabbi Chiya, who said that remnants of techelet are valid. The minimum measure that must remain in a string to maintain its validity is "enough to tie them" (kedei le'anvan), meaning a length sufficient to make a slipknot. From the statement of the sons of Rabbi Chiya, Rava concludes that one must tie a knot on each and every "chulya" (group of windings) in the tzitzit. The reason for this is that if one does not tie a knot at every chulya, if just a short strand is permitted, the moment the string is severed above the first knot, all the windings will unravel and disappear. The knots between the chulyot ensure that even if part of the string is cut off, the structure of the rest of the tzitzit will be preserved and it will remain valid under the law of gerdumin. However, Rava’s assumption is rejected as the sons of Rabbi Chiya may only permit gardumim when there are knots at every chulya. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/40148535

Menachot 37 - February 17, 30 Shvat 02/17/2026

Menachot 36 - February 16, 29 Shvat 02/16/2026

Menachot 36 - February 16, 29 Shvat Rav Chisda explains that if one speaks between placing the tefillin shel yad and the tefillin shel rosh, an additional blessing must be recited upon the shel rosh. From this, one can infer that if no interruption occurs, only one blessing is required. However, this poses a difficulty in light of Rabbi Yochanan’s statement that there are separate blessings for the shel yad and shel rosh. Abaye and Rava resolve this conflict, yet their resolution is interpreted differently by Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam, resulting in two distinct customs. The tefillin shel yad is placed first, followed by the shel rosh. When removing them, the order is reversed: the shel rosh is removed first, then the shel yad. This specific sequence is derived from the verse in Devarim 6:8. If one dons tefillin early in the morning before the proper time has arrived, the blessing is recited the moment the obligation begins. As stated in Berakhot 9b, this occurs when it becomes light enough to recognize an acquaintance from a distance of four cubits. There are three opinions regarding how late one may wear tefillin: until sunset, until the last people leave the market, or until one goes to sleep. Two versions of Rav Nachman’s ruling exist - either supporting or opposing the middle position. This ruling either aligns with or contradicts the practice of Rav Chisda and Raba bar Rav Huna, who would pray Maariv while still wearing tefillin. A challenge is raised against Raba bar Rav Huna’s practice based on his own statement implying that tefillin must be removed as darkness falls. This is resolved by explaining that his statement referred specifically to Shabbat. There are two different derivations for the exemption of tefillin on Shabbat: one links it to the exemption of wearing tefillin at night, while the other does not. Is it forbidden to don tefillin at night? If so, does one transgress a positive commandment or a negative one? One should touch the tefillin while wearing them to maintain constant awareness of them. This is derived via a kal v’chomer (a fortiori argument) from the tzitz (the Kohen Gadol's forehead plate). Tefillin are worn on the left hand, as derived from various verses indicating that the word "yad" refers specifically to the left hand. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/40121340

Menachot 35 - February 15, 28 Shvat 02/15/2026

Menachot 34 - Shabbat February 14, 27 Shvat 02/13/2026

Menachot 34 - Shabbat February 14, 27 Shvat Rav Huna states that a closed-in staircase opening (lul) between a house and an upper story requires one mezuza if it has one entrance and two mezuzot if it has two. Rav Papa infers from this that a room (indrona) with four doors requires four mezuzot, even if the resident typically utilizes only one of them. Amemar rules that a doorway situated at a corner is obligated in a mezuza; though Rav Ashi questions this due to the lack of formal doorposts (patzim), Amemar maintains that the edges of the walls themselves serve as the post. Rav Papa observes a doorway in Mar Shmuel's house that had only a left-side post yet was fitted with a mezuza. He questions this practice, as it seems to follow Rabbi Meir, who obligates a mezuza for a house with only one post—but even Rabbi Meir only holds that a mezuza is placed on the right side. The source for the right-side placement is derived from the word "beitecha" (your house), which is interpreted as "biatcha" (your entry). The connection between entry and the right side is either because a person begins their entry by leading with the right foot, or it is derived from the verse regarding Jehoiada the kohen, who placed a chest for donations to the right of the altar as people “came in.” The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis regarding a single doorpost centers on the plural phrasing of "mezuzot." The Rabbis hold this implies a minimum of two posts, while Rabbi Meir explains how the term can signify a single post, based on the interpretations of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva who utilize various exegetical principles. A braita derives the obligation to write the mezuza on parchment and then affix it to the wall, rather than writing it directly on the stones of the doorpost as might be understood from a simple reading of the verse. Regarding tefillin, the four paragraphs are all essential (me’akvot); even the omission of a single letter, or the "tip" of the letter yud, renders them invalid. Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav adds that every letter must be surrounded by blank parchment on all four sides. The Gemara discusses the source for the four compartments of the head tefillin (shel rosh). Rabbi Yishmael derives the number four from the number of mentions and spelling variations of the word "totafot," while Rabbi Akiva explains that the word is a compound of "tat" (two in the Katpi language) and "pat" (two in the Afriki language). A braita clarifies that while the tefillin shel rosh contain four separate scrolls in four compartments, the arm tefillin (shel yad) consist of all four paragraphs written on a single scroll. If one wrote the tefillin shel rosh on one scroll, it is valid, as long as it is put into four separate compartments. If one wrote the tefillin shel yad on four separate scrolls and placed them in one compartment, it is valid, though Rabbi Yehuda requires them to be glued together to appear as one. Rabbi Yosi rules that a tefillin shel rosh can be used on the arm if it is covering by one piece of leather. A contradiction is raised against Rabbi Yosi as Rabbi Yochanan ruled that this is not possible as one cannot lower an item in sanctity, i.e. from the head to the arm. The order of the paragraphs to be placed in the four compartments of the tefillin shel rosh is established as: kadesh and v’haya ki yeviacha on the right, followed by shema and v’haya im shamoa on the left. To resolve a contradiction with another source that reverses this, Abaye clarifies that each source refers to a different perspective of “right” and “left,” depending on whether one is looking from the perspective of the reader or the wearer. Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam (among others) disagree about how to understand the specific order of the tefillin described in the Gemara. Rav concludes that if a scribe switches the order of the paragraphs, the tefillin are invalid. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/40087720

Menachot 33 - February 13, 26 Shvat 02/13/2026

Menachot 33 - February 13, 26 Shvat Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel rules that a mezuza written on two sheets or columns is invalid. The Gemara raises a difficulty from a braita that invalidates a mezuza written on two sheets only when it is placed within two separate sippin (doorposts), implying that if it were placed within a single post, it would be valid. The difficulty is resolved by explaining that Shmuel’s intent was that even if it is placed in one post, the mere fact that it is "fit" or able to be divided between two posts renders it invalid, as a mezuza. Regarding the determination of the right side in doorways between two rooms, Shmuel rules that one follows the "heker tzir" (the placement of the hinges). Rav Adda explains that this refers to the socket in which the door hinge turns; the side toward which the door opens is considered the primary room, and the right side is determined according to the direction of entry into that room. Rav Nachman instructed the Exilarch (Resh Galuta), who wished to fix a mezuza in his house before its construction was complete, that he must first hang the doors and only afterward fix the mezuza. Concerning the manner of placing the mezuza, Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav invalidates a mezuza placed "k'min neger" (like a bolt), meaning like a horizontal bar inserted into the doorway. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the practice in Rabbi’s house, where the mezuzot were placed "k'min neger," and resolves it by distinguishing between a completely vertical placement and a horizontal placement. It is further mentioned in this context that Rav Huna would fix a mezuza in the doorway between his house and the Beit Midrash even though Rabbi did not do so, because Rav Huna followed the practice of those accustomed to using that doorway, which renders it a doorway obligated in a mezuza. In the matter of the mezuza’s height, Shmuel rules that it should be placed at the beginning of the upper third of the doorway's height. Rav Huna disagrees, holding that the entire area of the doorway is valid, provided the mezuza is one handbreadth (tefach) away from the ground and one handbreadth away from the ceiling beam. The Gemara raises a difficulty against Shmuel from a braita and resolves it by explaining that Shmuel rules in accordance with Rabbi Yosi, who learns from a hekesh (textual comparison) between "u’kshartam" (tefillin) and "u’khtavtam" (mezuza) that just as tefillin are placed high up, so too the mezuza must be high up in the doorway. Rava adds that the mezuza should be placed in the handbreadth closest to the public domain so that a person encounters the mitzva immediately upon entry. Rabbi Chanina adds a conceptual dimension: unlike a king of flesh and blood who sits inside while his subjects guard him from the outside, God guards His servants from the outside while they sit inside, as it is written, "The Lord is your guardian." Additional laws discussed on this page deal with the requirements of a mezuza that depend on the structure of the doorway and the room. Rav Yosef in the name of Rava invalidates a mezuza that was recessed into the thickness of the wall more than a handbreadth. Rava exempts "pitchi shimai" (defective doorways) from mezuza; the Amoraim dispute whether this refers to a doorway without a ceiling or one without a proper doorpost. Similarly, an achsadra (portico) is exempt from mezuza because its posts are intended to support the ceiling rather than to create a doorway. A gatehouse (beit shaar) that opens both to a house and a courtyard needs a mezeua on both entrances. However, a gatehouse that opens to both a house and a garden, the Tannaim dispute - and the Amoraim dispute the interpretation of their words - whether the obligation is determined by the entry to the house or the exit to the garden. Rav Ashi rules according to the stringency of Rav and Shmuel: any doorway used for entry into a house, even if it leads to an open space like a garden, is obligated in a mezuza. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/40096170

Menachot 32 - February 12, 25 Shvat 02/12/2026

Menachot 32 - February 12, 25 Shvat Rav Chelbo relates that he saw Rav Huna roll the mezuza from the word "echad" toward the word "shema" and format the paragraphs as setumot (closed). This practice is questioned by a braita where Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar notes that Rabbi Meir wrote mezuzot on duchsustos with margins at the top and bottom and formatted the paragraphs as petuchot (open). Rabbi Meir’s reasoning was that the paragraphs are not adjacent in the Torah text itself. Since Rav (Rav Huna’s teacher) rules in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, that raises a difficulty on Rav Huna’s practice. To resolve the difficulty, it is suggested that Rav only ruled like Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar regarding the margins. Abaye further supports this resolution by showing that Rav gives weight to local custom, and the established custom is to write them setumot. The Gemara brings an example to show that Rav gave weight to the established custom from a statement he made regarding use of a sandal for chalitzah, noting that even the testimony of the prophet Eliyahu would not overturn a practice the people have already adopted to use a sandal. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers an alternative explanation for the difficulty on Rav Huna. He explains Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s position as being that while it is a mitzva (ideal) to make them setumot, if they were written petuchot, it would be valid; he reads the words in the braita as “even petuchot.” Support for Rav Nachman is brought from a braita stating that a worn-out Sefer Torah or tefillin cannot be repurposed into a mezuza because one does not "lower" an object from a higher level of sanctity to a lower one. From the reason given in the braita, one can infer that if it were not a matter of “lowering” in sanctity, it could be repurposed. This would prove that setumot could be used, as those sections are setumot in a Sefer Torah. However, this suggested proof is rejected. The Gemara raises two other difficulties on the inference that, but for the issue of “lowering” sanctity, a Sefer Torah or tefillin could be repurposed for a mezuza. The first is that tefillin are written on klaf on the side facing the flesh, while a mezuza is written on duchsustos on the side facing the hair. The second difficulty is that a mezuza requires lines (sirtut), while tefillin do not. Both difficulties are resolved. Rav Chelbo further observes that Rav Huna would not sit on a bed while a Sefer Torah was resting upon it, opting instead to place the Torah on an inverted vessel on the ground. However, Rabba bar bar Hana, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, permits sitting on the same bed as a Torah. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel states that a mezuza written in a "letter" (iggeret) format is invalid, as it requires the formal writing style of a Sefer. He also rules that hanging a mezuza on a stick or placing it behind a door is invalid and even "dangerous," as it must be fixed "on your gates." Shmuel specifies that the mezuza must be placed within the hollow of the doorway. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/40083885

Menachot 31 - February 11, 24 Shvat 02/11/2026

Menachot 31 - February 11, 24 Shvat Ravin, the son of Chinina, said in the name of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Chanina that the law follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in "this" issue and anywhere else he issued a ruling. Rav Papa and Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak each identify a possible case where Rabbi Chanina ruled like Rabbi Shimon Shezuri. One suggests it was regarding how to measure 40 se’ah in a large box for purposes of impurity. The other suggests it was regarding the stringent ruling of the impurity of liquids - specifically, to which liquids this unique type of impurity extends. The Gemara brings a situation where Rabbi Shimon Shezuri mixed untithed produce with tithed produce and was told by Rabbi Tarfon to buy produce from the market to tithe upon it. In a different version, Rabbi Tarfon told him to buy produce from non-Jews. This advice is analyzed through two lenses: whether a market purchase is considered tithed by Torah law because most am ha’aretz tithe, or whether land ownership by non-Jews in Israel removes the Torah obligation of tithing the produce. Rav Papa confirms to Rav Yemar bar Shelamya that the halakha follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri even in this specific case. A statement by Rav regarding a tear in the parchment of a Sefer Torah is also analyzed. Rav rules that a tear spanning two lines may be sewn, but a tear of three lines may not. This is qualified by Rabba Zuti, who distinguished between "new" and "old" parchment, which is defined not by age but by whether or not it was processed with gall. Furthermore, the sewing must be done with sinews (gidin) and not plain thread. A question is left unresolved regarding whether these measurements apply if the tear occurs between columns or between lines. Regarding the writing of a mezuza, Rav Chananel in the name of Rav states that if it is written with two words on a line, it is valid. Rav Nachman explains that it can be written like a shira (song) - for example, two words, then three, then one. When questioned by a braita, he distinguishes between the requirements of a Sefer Torah and a mezuza. The Gemara clarifies that while a mezuza can be written in shira format, it must not be formatted like a "tent" or a "tail" (narrowing or widening). There is a discussion regarding the final words of the mezuza, "al ha’aretz." Should they be placed at the end of the line or at the beginning? The two views reflect different symbolic meanings: one highlights the height of heaven above the earth, while the other highlights the distance between them. Rav Chelbo mentions Rav Huna, who would roll the mezuza scroll from the end to the beginning and made the paragraphs "closed" (setumot). This is challenged by a ruling of Rabbi Meir, who made the paragraph breaks “open” (petuchot). /episode/index/show/hadran/id/40069965

Menachot 30 - February 10, 23 Shvat 02/10/2026

Menachot 30 - February 10, 23 Shvat Rav makes a statement that is contradicted by a braita. He says that the last page of a Sefer Torah can end in the middle of the page, while a braita says it must finish at the end. After trying to reconcile Rav’s position with the braita by limiting it to a Chumash (a parchment containing only one book of the Torah) and not a full Sefer Torah, the Gemara questions this from another statement of Rav (brought by Rabbi Yehoshua bar Aba in the name of Rav Gidal). There are two versions of the explanation for Rav’s second statement, which may affect whether his position can be reconciled with the braita and whether one needs or is permitted to finish the last line of the Torah in the middle of the line. Two other statements of Rabbi Yehoshua bar Aba in the name of Rav Gidal in the name of Rav are brought regarding the Torah. The first discusses a specific rule regarding the last eight verses of the Torah describing Moshe’s death: an individual reads them in a shul. There is a debate among the commentaries regarding the meaning of this rule. Initially, it is suggested that this rule follows the view that Yehoshua wrote these verses, but the Gemara concludes it can also be explained according to Rabbi Shimon, who held that Moshe wrote them b’dema. The second statement is that one who buys a Sefer Torah in the market does not fulfill the mitzva in the proper manner, as ideally one should write a Sefer Torah rather than buy it. A piece of parchment used in a Sefer Torah can contain between three and eight columns. A column should include approximately 30 letters. However, there are different rules regarding the last page of the Torah. How many letters can be added in the margin if needed, and under what circumstances? If one omits the name of God, how can this be fixed? There are five tannaitic opinions, ranging from no solution to scraping the ink of a different word and inserting God’s name there (placing the other word between the lines) to even allowing half the name of God to be added between the lines. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri’s opinion is that the name of God can be added between the lines, but only if it is the whole name. Ravin son of Chinina said in the name of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Chanina that the law follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in "this" issue and anywhere else he issued a ruling. The Gemara tries to establish what "this" issue is. Each time a possibility is suggested, starting with our sugya, it is rejected because others also issued rulings, and when the Gemara listed who ruled like whom, Ravin bar Chinina and rabbi Chanina did not appear there. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/40055300

Menachot 29 - February 9, 22 Shvat 02/09/2026

Menachot 29 - February 9, 22 Shvat The Menora in the Temple featured various decorative parts, including goblets, knobs, and flowers. The Gemara details the quantity of each and their specific placement on the Menora. Rav explained that the Menora's height was nine handbreadths from the point where the lowest branches met. The text describes the gold used for the Menora as "michlot zahav." Rabbi Ami interpreted this phrase to mean that all the refined gold from King Solomon’s era was used for its construction. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani explained that the Menora is called "tehora" (pure) because it was shown to Moshe as a heavenly image. The Gemara explores why this same explanation is not applied to the "shulchan hatehora" (the pure table) used for the showbread; in that case, the phrase indicates that the table could potentially become impure. There were other items as well that God had to show Moshe, as they were difficult for him to grasp. The Mishna explains that the two parshiot (sections) in the mezuza are essential. Initially, it is assumed this refers to the small tip of the letter yud (kotzo shel yud), but this is rejected as being obvious. Instead, the Gemara suggests it serves to disqualify a mezuza if its letters are touching one another. Various rabbis discuss different issues regarding the letters hey and yud and whether or not certain formations disqualify them. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that when Moshe went to receive the Torah, he found God attaching crowns to the letters. When Moshe asked why, God showed him Rabbi Akiva, who was extrapolating heaps of laws from every crown. Moshe was taken aback, as he did not understand Rabbi Akiva’s teachings. However, once he heard Rabbi Akiva answer a student that a certain law was "a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai," Moshe was relieved. Yet, when he asked God what the reward would be for such a great scholar, God showed him Rabbi Akiva’s tragic death, and Moshe was once again disturbed. In both instances, God told Moshe, "Be silent, for this is My decree." Seven specific letters are adorned with three crowns. There were also special requirements for writing the letters yud and chet, with explanations provided for each. The rabbis discuss in which situations mistakes in a Sefer Torah can be corrected and in which situations they cannot. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/40017120

Menachot 28 - February 8, 21 Shvat 02/08/2026

Menachot 27 - Shabbat February 7, 20 Shvat 02/06/2026

Menachot 26 - February 6, 19 Shvat 02/06/2026

Menachot 25 - February 5, 18 Shvat 02/05/2026

Menachot 24 - February 4, 17 Shvat 02/04/2026

Menachot 24 - February 4, 17 Shvat A Mishna in Chagigah 20b explains that sanctified items placed in the same sanctified vessel are considered combined for purposes of impurity; for example, if a tvul yom touched one, everything else in the vessel would become impure. However, this is only if they are all touching. The sons of Rabbi Chiya asked Rav Kahana if that would hold true even if they weren’t touching. Rav Kahana derived from the word “tzeiruf” used in the Mishna there that they would combine. They ask two more related questions and Rav Kahana answers them. Then, Rav Kahana asks them a question about whether combining two items in a bowl, when not touching, would be valid for taking a kemitza (if the dough of the mincha was split into two parts). They attempted to make a comparison between the case in question and the case in our Mishna regarding the two minchas that got mixed together. However, Rava rejects the comparison as it is likely they were touching. Rabbi Yirmia asks a follow-up question about items being connected regarding impurity—in a case where the item is attached through water (in a pipe) to something outside of the vessel. Would the impurity extend to there as well? Or what if the outside piece became impure, would it extend to the other piece in the bowl as well? If a mincha offering was divided and one part became impure and was then added to a bowl with its other half, if a tvul yom then comes and touches the impure half while it is in the bowl with the other, is the other piece impure as well? This is in essence asking whether once something is impure, can impurity be added again? Rava asked this question and Abaye tried to answer it from a Mishna in Keilim 27:9, explaining that there is no such concept that once something is impure it cannot become impure again, but Rava rejects his proof as the cases aren’t comparable. The Gemara further tries to prove Abaye’s point from the continuation of that Mishna, but that is rejected as well. Rava and Abaye disagree about a case where there are three pieces—two from the original, one of which was lost temporarily, and a third that came to replace the lost half. What is the relationship between the three for laws of impurity and laws of kemitza? /episode/index/show/hadran/id/39989905

Menachot 23 - February 3, 16 Shvat 02/03/2026

Menachot 22 - February 2, 15 Shvat 02/02/2026

Menachot 22 - February 2, 15 Shvat Rav Mordechai reinstates the original interpretation of Shmuel’s limitation on the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7 - namely, that the court permitted the kohanim to use Temple salt for salting their sacrifices (for burning on the altar) but not for salting the meat of the sacrifices for consumption. This ruling of the court follows Ben Buchri’s opinion that kohanim are not obligated to pay the half-shekel (machatzit hashekel) used to fund communal items in the Temple. Since they did not contribute to the fund, one might have assumed they were ineligible to benefit from Temple salt; therefore, the court issued a specific stipulation to permit it. The Mishna in Shekalim also mentions that the kohanim could use wood from the Temple for their private sacrifices. The source for this is derived from Vayikra 1:8, which mentions the wood "which is on the fire on the altar." The phrase "on the altar" is considered superfluous, indicating that the wood shares the same status as the altar itself; just as the altar is built from communal property, so too the wood must be communal. This teaching establishes that individuals are not required to bring wood from their own homes for their voluntary offerings. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua defines the altar differently positing that the altar must be built using stones that have never been used. This requirement would also preclude individuals from bringing wood from their own homes. Consequently, the Gemara asks: what is the practical difference between these two opinions? The answer is that the latter opinion requires the wood to be brand new and never previously used, whereas the former does not. If a kometz, which contains one log of oil, is mixed with the mincha of a kohen or a mincha of libations, which contains three log of oil, there is a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree on whether the mixture may be burned on the altar or if the blending disqualifies both offerings. The concern is that the oil from the mincha becomes added to the kometz, potentially disqualifying both; the kometz would then contain an excessive amount of oil, while the mincha would be left with an insufficient amount. The Gemara cites a Mishna in Zevachim 77b featuring a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether two similar substances (min be'mino) can nullify one another. Rabbi Yochanan explains that both parties derive their respective positions from the Yom Kippur service, during which the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are mixed together. Despite the volume of the bull's blood being significantly greater than that of the goat, the Torah continues to refer to the mixture as both "the blood of the bull" and "the blood of the goat"—indicating that the goat's blood remains distinct and is not nullified. The rabbis derive a broad principle from this: items designated for the altar never nullify one another, regardless of their type. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda derives a different principle: blood does not nullify blood because they are the same type of substance (min be'mino). The Gemara raises challenges against both derivations, and they are left unresolved. Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in our Mishna appears to contradict his ruling in the Mishna in Zevachim; if two similar substances (min be'mino) do not nullify each other, then the oil of the mincha should not be nullified by (or absorbed into) the kometz. Rava resolves this contradiction by explaining that this case is an exception, as it is considered a situation where one substance "adds to" the other rather than merely mixing with it. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/39959600

Menachot 21 - February 1, 14 Shvat 02/01/2026

Menachot 21 - February 1, 14 Shvat The braita initially listed two items offered on the altar that do not require salting: wood and blood. However, the Gemara notes a difficulty: this braita appears to follow the position of Rebbi, yet Rebbi himself maintains that blood does require salting. Consequently, the Gemara emends the text, removing "wood" and replacing it with libations (wine). To support this, a second braita is cited which lists wine, blood, wood, and incense as exempt from salting. Yet, this proof-text presents its own challenge, as it aligns neither with Rebbi (who requires salting for blood) nor with the Rabbis (who require it for incense). Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that this braita follows Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, who uses a different categorization based on the characteristics of a mincha (meal offering) to determine which items require salt. A further challenge on the braita quoted in Menachot 20a is raised. The braita implies that blood is excluded from salting only because of a specific scriptural derivation (drasha). However, according to Zeiri, if blood is salted, it becomes disqualified for use on the altar regardless; if so, why is a drasha necessary to exclude it? To resolve this, the Gemara distinguishes between two levels of salting: a small amount of salt, which might not disqualify the blood but is still excluded by the verse, and a large amount, which renders the blood physically unfit for the altar. This leads to a discussion regarding the status of salted or coagulated blood: is it still considered "blood" enough to be valid for the altar, and conversely, does the prohibition against eating blood still apply to it? A braita is then introduced expounding on the biblical verses regarding salting to derive various procedural laws. These include the type of salt required, the quantity ushttps://five.libsyn.com/showed, and the specific method of application. Another braita clarifies the legal status of salt found in the sanctuary: if salt is found directly on a sacrificial limb, it is considered sanctified and subject to the laws of meila (misappropriation of sacred property). However, if the salt is found on the altar's ramp or on the roof of the altar itself, it does not carry this sanctity. A Mishna in Shekalim states that the rabbis allowed the kohanim to benefit from the salt of the Temple. Shmuel explains that this permission applies only to the kohanim’s offerings and not for eating. The Gemara analyzes whether Shmuel meant that salt is permitted only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbidden for the meat the kohanim eat, or if it is permitted for seasoning their sacrificial meat but forbidden for use with non-sacred food. The Gemara initially concludes that since the kohanim were even permitted to use Temple salt for tanning animal hides, they must certainly be allowed to use it to season the holy meat they consume. Under this view, Shmuel’s restriction only excludes using the salt for personal, non-sacred food. This is further supported by the logic that if even an Israelite’s sacrifice is salted with Temple salt, a kohen’s sacrifice surely would be as well, meaning the court's special decree must have addressed something else. However, Rav Mordechai suggests an alternative reading that could reinstate the first possibility: that the court permitted salt only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbade it for the meat the kohanim eat. He explains that the Mishna’s decree was specifically necessary to account for the position of Ben Buchri, as will be explained further on. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/39949295

Menachot 20 - Shabbat January 31, 13 Shvat 01/30/2026

Menachot 19 - January 30, 12 Shvat 01/30/2026

Menachot 19 - January 30, 12 Shvat The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning was based on “a phrase can relate to both the upcoming and previous action,” but after showing that in a different issue, Rabbi Shimon did not employ that principle, they explain the “vav”(“and”) connects the previous section to the kohen. Rav explains that if the words torah and chukka appear in a verse, that signifies that a failure to perform a detail exactly as described invalidates the entire offering. Through a series of challenges involving the nazir, the metzora, and the service of Yom Kippur, the Gemara refines this: if either term is employed, it indicates it is an essential detail. However, after raising a difficulty from all sacrifices, Rav’s statement is further refined: the term chukka is the primary indicator of indispensability, whereas torah on its own is not. Repetition serves as another marker of necessity in the eyes of Rav, who argues that when the Torah returns to a subject multiple times, it is to emphasize that the detail is essential. This leads to a clash with Shmuel about whether or not is it essential that the scooping (kemitza) be performed by hand. Rav considers the method essential because it is repeated in the context of the Tabernacle’s inauguration. Shmuel, however, holds that a one-time historical event is not a binding source for future generations. A difficulty is raised against the principle of Rav that if something is repeated, it is indispensable, as the act of hagasha, bringing the mincha offering to the Altar, is repeated and yet is listed in the Mishna as not essential. The Gemara responds by explaining that the second mention is needed for a different purpose – to pinpoint the exact location on the Altar where the mincha offering is to be brought. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/39932370

Menachot 18 - January 29, 11 Shvat 01/29/2026

Menachot 18 - January 29, 11 Shvat The Gemara explains the braita in a different way than previously to show that there is really no Tannaitic opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds one is liable for karet if they have a pigul thought to eat something normally burned or burn something normally eaten. They explain that the braita is highlighting a three-way debate between tanna kama, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbl Elazar ben Shammua about whether in a case of someone who has a thought to leave over part of the blood until the next day without sprinkling it, would both the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that is it valid, invalid or do they disagree as they do in the previous case. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yehuda’s position from an intruiging story in which his position is mentioned in an interaction between Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua and Yosef the Babylonian, who repeatedly questioned Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua on this very point. The story was witnessed and told by Rabbi Yehuda haNasi when he went to the Beit Midrash of Rabbi Elazar to either learn his positions on various topics or to garner wisdom from him. In the end, the difficulty is resolved. The conclusion of the Gemara leads to the understanding the Rabbi Eliezer disqualified an offering with a thought to eat something that is normally burned, as a rabbinic ordinance. The Mishna lists various parts of the mincha offering that are not essential. The Gemara explains that when it lists pouring the oil as a non-essential action, that cannot be right, as it is essential. Therefore, they explain it must mean it can be done by a non-kohen. However, the next item in the Mishna, one does not need to mix, must be understood literally, i.e. is not essential at all, as is proven from a different sugya. The Mishna in Menachot 104a teaches that that one may volunteer a meal offering of up to sixty esronim (tenths of an ephah) in a single vessel, because sixty tenths can be properly mixed with a log (a liquid measure) of oil. However, if one volunteers sixty-one tenths, they must be brought in two separate vessels, as such a large quantity cannot be effectively mixed. Rabbi Zeira establishes a fundamental principle: "Anything that is fit for mixing, the lack of mixing does not invalidate it; but anything that is not fit for mixing, the lack of mixing invalidates it." This means that as long as it is physically possible to perform the mitzva of mixing, the offering is valid even if the mixing wasn't actually done. But if the quantity is so large (61 tenths) that mixing is physically impossible, the offering is disqualified even if the kohen attempts to proceed without mixing. From here it is clear, it does not need to be mixed. The Gemara suggests, and then conclusively proves, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who rules in a braita that pouring the oil must be performed by a kohen. Rav Nachman attempts to reconcile Rabbi Shimon with the Mishna, but Rava rejects his suggestion. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/39920150

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