Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Hadran.org.il is the portal for Daf Yomi studies for women. Hadran.org.il is the first and only site where one can hear a daily Talmud class taught by a woman. The classes are taught in Israel by Rabbanit Michelle Cohen Farber, a graduate of Midreshet Lindenbaum’s scholars program with a BA in Talmud and Tanach from Bar-Ilan University. Michelle has taught Talmud and Halacha at Midreshet Lindenbaum, Pelech high school and MATAN. She lives in Ra’anana with her husband and their five children. Each morning the daf yomi class is delivered via ZOOM and then immediately uploaded and available for podcast and download. Hadran.org.il reaches women who can now have access to a woman’s perspective on the most essential Jewish traditional text. This podcast represents a revolutionary step in advancing women’s Torah study around the globe.
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Bava Batra 153 - November 25, 24 Cheshvan
11/25/2024
Bava Batra 153 - November 25, 24 Cheshvan
Rav and Shmuel disagreed regarding a case where one promised a gift using the phrase "in life and in death." Rav held that this language indicated a deathbed gift, with "in life" being mentioned merely as an expression of hope. Shmuel, however, interpreted it as a gift from a healthy person. In Nehardea, they followed Rav's ruling. Later, Rava introduced a distinction: he argued that Rav would agree that using the phrase "from life" (rather than "in life") would be treated as a gift from a healthy person. Ameimar, however, rejected Rava's interpretation of Rav's position. When a case of this nature came before Rav Nachman in Nehardea, he sent it to be adjudicated in a different city, not wanting to rule against Shmuel in Shmuel's own city of Nehardea. In another instance, Rava ruled against a woman who tried to reclaim her gift, which was consistent with his position (as she had used the phrase "from life and in death"). When she persistently complained about his ruling, Rava arranged for another rabbi to write her the ruling she desired, but instructed him to add a citation at the bottom of the document from Bava Metzia regarding deception, signaling that he was deceiving her and the ruling should not be followed. Upon realizing this subterfuge, the woman cursed Rava that his boat should sink—and indeed, his boat sank. When a gift document lacks language indicating either a deathbed or healthy status of the giver, and there is a dispute between the giver claiming it was written while dying and the recipients claiming otherwise, who bears the burden of proof? Rabbi Meir holds that we presume the person was healthy until proven otherwise. The rabbis, however, rule that the money remains with the giver until proven otherwise. A case arose involving a deathbed gift that used appropriate deathbed gift language, but the document didn't record that the person had died. After the person's death, the recipients claimed the gift, while the heirs argued that their father had recovered from his illness (thus invalidating the gift) before becoming sick again and dying. Raba ruled in favor of the recipients, reasoning that since the person was now dead, it was likely they died from the original illness, making the gift valid. Abaye challenged Raba's ruling by citing the case of a sunken ship: even though we presume the passengers died, we must consider the possibility they survived if their bodies aren't found. Similarly, he argued, we should consider the possibility of recovery, as most sick people do recover. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, resolved the difficulty by explaining that Raba was following Rabbi Natan's position. Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov disagreed about a case where the document did not include whether given while healthy or on one's deathbed. Rabbi Yaakov held that we follow the last known presumption of ownership, regardless of current possession. Rabbi Natan ruled that we follow the current presumption - if the person is currently on their deathbed, we assume the gift was given on their deathbed; if healthy, we assume they were healthy at the time the document was written. Rabbi Elazar noted that this same dispute between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yaakov applies to a case in Mishna Taharot 6:7 regarding ritual impurity. The case involves a valley enclosed by a fence that is defined as a public space in summer (due to heavy foot traffic) but as a private space in winter (due to minimal traffic). When there's a known dead body present but uncertainty about whether someone passed over it, the rule is: doubt in a public space yields ritual purity, while doubt in a private space yields impurity (based on Sotah laws). If it's unknown whether the person was there in summer or winter, Rabbi Yaakov would rule based on the last known presumption of the person, which means they are deemed pure, while Rabbi Natan would rule based on the current season - they would be declared impure if the issue arises in the winter, and pure if it is summer.
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Bava Batra 152 - November 24, 23 Cheshvan
11/24/2024
Bava Batra 152 - November 24, 23 Cheshvan
This week's learning is sponsored in honor of Elana Storch on her birthday. With love from her kids - Ruth, Ira, Elsa, Julianna, Reuben, Elia, Adele, Emanuel and Arianne. "We are inspired by the example you continue to set for us in your commitment to your learning." Rav and Shmuel disagree on a few different situations regarding a gift given on one's deathbed. If there was a document in which it states that a gift was given on one's deathbed with an act of acquisition - Rav and Shmuel disagree about whether the kinyan was added to override the laws of one on one's deathbed and only wanted it to be effective with a document, which cannot be given after one's death (Shmuel), or do we assume it was done to strengthen the ownership of the receipt of the gift (Rav)? Rav and Shmuel's position on this issue seems to contradict their opinions in a different case where one says to write and give a document to another and then dies before it is given. The Gemara resolves the contradiction by differentiating between the cases. The contradiction regarding Rav's position is resolved by explaining that there was no act of kinyan in the second case. The contradiction regarding Shmuel's position is resolved by establishing (u'kimta) the second case as one in which the giver was clear about the document's purpose - that it was only to strengthen the recipient's power. A second difficulty is raised against Shmuel's position in the first case (there is a concern that the gift was only to be effected with a document, which cannot be done after death) from a ruling of Shmuel regarding one who gave away all of one's possessions with a kinyan, whose gift can be retracted if one gets better, implying that if the person dies, the gift is effective. This too is resolved by establishing the latter ruling in a case where the giver was clear that the kinyan was done to strengthen the recipient's power. If one writes to give all one's possessions to one and gives them a document and then does the same to another, does the first one acquire it or the second? Rav and Shmuel disagree as they do in the first case discussed earlier. Why was there a need to say they disagreed in both cases? In Pumbedita there was a different version of Shmuel's opinion.
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Bava Batra 151 - Shabbat November 23, 22 Cheshvan
11/22/2024
Bava Batra 151 - Shabbat November 23, 22 Cheshvan
What else does the word "possessions" include? Some stories are brought of women on their deathbeds who promised their property to one person and then changed their minds and promised it to someone else. The rabbis debated what the ruling should be - if one's word on one's deathbed and as if they were already acquired, is one not able to change one's mind? A case is brought of a woman who gave her possessions to her son before her second marriage to prevent them from going to her husband. When she later got divorced, was she able to retrieve her possessions from her son? Another case was a woman who would give her orchard to her brother every time she got sick, as she thought she was dying. Each time she got better, the gift would be canceled. One time, at her request, he acquired it in a way that it would be effective even if she lived - he had her leave over a bit and did a kinyan. However, Rav Nachman ruled that since she said she was giving it to him because she thought she would die, once she got better, the kinyan was ineffective. The Gemara clarifies the case of a gift on one's deathbed where one only gives away part of one's property. Some understand that the gift is effective even if there was no kinyan and quoted this in the name of Rav Nachman. But Rava corrects them and explains that Rav Nachman holds that the Mishna was referring only to cases where a kinyan was effected, meaning that if one gave away not all of his possessions and then died or got better, if the gift was given without a kinyan, the person would not acquire the possessions. Additionally, if one did do a kinyan and didn't give away all of one's possessions but stated that it was because the person thought they were dying, then if they got better, the gift would be returned to him/her.
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Bava Batra 150 - November 22, 21 Cheshvan
11/22/2024
Bava Batra 150 - November 22, 21 Cheshvan
Abaye questions Rav Yosef's difficulty with Rav Yehuda and Rav Yirmia's interpretation of the Mishna by showing that sometimes the Mishna uses the word "karka (land)" to include movable items (metaltelin) and "kol shehu (any amount)" can refer to a particular size (larger than just any amount). One Mishna is in Peah 3:8 regarding the language used to free a slave. The other is in Chulin 11:2 regarding the first shearings where "kol shehu" means a particular amount. However, in conclusion, they explain these words in the above-mentioned Mishnayot as exceptions to the rule, and Abaye's difficulty against Rav Yosef is resolved. What is the difference between one who says "My metaltelin (movable property)should be given to...," "All my metaltelin (movable property) should be given to...," and "Anything that is metaltel (can be moved) should be given to..."? Are slaves considered property (karka) or movable items (metaltelin)? Two sources are brought to prove that they are categorized as movable property, but both suggestions are rejected. Five cases are brought where the halakha will only be effective if ALL of one's property is included. Regarding four out of five of these rulings, "all of one's property" includes movable and non-movable items, meaning that even if one were to leave out some movable items, the halakha would not be in effect. The one case where it does not include movable items is a woman who forfeits the right to collect her ketuba if all of the property is divided between her and the sons. If movable items were not divided, we can still assume she forfeited her right to collect the ketuba, as a ketuba can only be collected from land. If one gives away all of one's "nechasim (possessions)," what items does that word include?
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Bava Batra 149 - November 21, 20 Cheshvan
11/21/2024
Bava Batra 149 - November 21, 20 Cheshvan
What language must be used for a gift stated on one's deathbed to be valid? If one sells all of one's property on one's deathbed, is it a valid sale if one recovers from one's illness? If one admits on one's deathbed that one owes money, do we believe the admission or is it possible the person is lying and just wants to show they don’t have a lot of money? A story is brought with Issur the convert and how he was able to use this (an admission) as a solution to passing on his money that was in Rava’s possession (as Rava was watching it for him) to his son, who was conceived before his conversion and therefore was unable to inherit the money. The Mishna says the gift is valid if one divides up one's possessions on one's deathbed but leaves over land of any amount, and then recovers. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that "any amount" actually means an amount worthy of sustaining him/her. Rav Yirmiya bar Abba says that even if one leaves movable items worthy of sustaining the person. Rav Zeira supports their opinions and Rav Yosef questions them based on the wording in the Mishna ("land" and "any amount"). Abaye supports Rabbi Zeira from a Mishna in Peah where land includes movable items.
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Bava Batra 148 - November 20, 19 Cheshvan
11/20/2024
Bava Batra 148 - November 20, 19 Cheshvan
Rav Nachman ruled that one cannot transfer intangible items, like the right to live in a house or the right to future fruits from a tree even on one's deathbed. By doing this, he equates a gift on one's deathbed to a regular gift. However, he ruled elsewhere that the rights to collect a loan with an oral agreement can be transferred to another on one's deathbed, even though this right can't be transferred from one who is not on one's deathbed. The Gemara brings two resolutions. If one gave a tree to one person and the fruits to another, can we assume that when the giver gave the tree to one, he retained the space on the tree where the fruits grow and passed those on to the other, making it an effective gift as he is giving a part of the tree that is in existence. Or did the giver not retain the space where the fruits go and gave the second person the right to collect fruits that will grow that are not yet in existence, which is not a valid gift? If the answer is that it is not effective, would it be the same work in a case where one gives the tree to someone but retains the fruits for oneself? A different version of this question is brought by Rabbi Abba. In his version, this differentiation between selling to two people and selling to one person and retaining part for oneself was asked on a statement that Reish Lakish made about one who sold a house without the upper level. According to both versions, the answer is that we can definitively say in the case that one sold/gave part to someone else, the part they retained would remain in their possession as surely people retain generously when it affects themselves. If one begins dividing up one's possessions and stops in the middle and then continues and gives away the rest, are the first gifts viewed as regular gifts (as one was only giving part of their possessions at that point) or are they viewed as gifts on one's deathbed since in the end, all of the possessions were given away? Rav Acha rules that even if one gave away one's possessions on one's deathbed and then healed, even if those were all of that person's known possessions, one should be concerned that maybe the person has other possessions in another country and therefore the gift is effective. This seems to contradict the Mishna. How can this be explained? If one gives away money on one's deathbed and then changes one's mind about part of the funds, does that cancel the entire first gift or only part? What are the ramifications of this? The Gemara brings a braita to prove that the first gift is completely canceled. At first, the Gemara rejects the proof but then reestablishes it and concludes that the first gift is completely canceled. If one consecrates all of one's property on one's deathbed, or declares it all ownerless, or gives it all to charity, and then gets better, is this canceled?
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Bava Batra 147 - November 19, 18 Cheshvan
11/19/2024
Bava Batra 147 - November 19, 18 Cheshvan
Today's daf is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of Manny Gross on his 2nd yahrzeit. "May his memory forever be a blessing." Today's daf is sponsored by Marc and Debbie Pershan in loving memory of Marc's mother, Perel Bayla bat Simcha, on the occasion of the shloshim. From where do we learn that a declaration of a person on their deathbed is effective as if an act of acquiring was performed? The sages brought sources for the law from two verses in the Torah and two from the Prophets. Rava says in the name of Rav Nachman that this law is not derived from the Torah, but the rabbis instituted it to prevent the person from being overly distressed. The Gemara questions Rav Nachman from a different statement of Rav Nachman on a ruling of Shmuel. Shmuel held that if one sold a promissory note of a loan to another and then pardoned the original loan, the loan would be canceled, and even the heir of the original lender could cancel the loan. Rav Nachman explained that even Shmuel would agree though that if the promissory note were not sold to another but given as a gift from the lender on his/her deathbed, the heir cannot cancel the loan. This seems to show that the power of the words of a person on their deathbed is valid by Torah law as they are stronger than a regular gift. They resolve this difficulty by explaining that Rav Nachman gave it the strength of Torah law, even though it is rabbinic. Rava quoted Rav Nachman that one cannot transfer intangible items - like the right to live in a house or the right to future fruits from a tree, even on one's deathbed. This seems to show that Rav Nachman treats a gift on one's deathbed like laws relating to gifts of one who is healthy. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this assumption.
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Bava Batra 146 - November 18, 17 Cheshvan
11/18/2024
Bava Batra 146 - November 18, 17 Cheshvan
Today's daf is sponsored by Diana Bloom in loving memory of her Zayde, Israel (Ignacio) Marmurek on his 41st yahrzeit. Today's daf is sponsored by Rhona Fink in honor of our fellow Daf learner Elana Weinberg and her husband Rabbi Brahm Weinberg on the occasion of the Bar Mitzvah of their son Joseph Asher in Silver Spring, Maryland, Parshat Vayera, this past Shabbat. "Joseph is already following in the footsteps of his parents with his demonstration of confidence, knowledge, and humility." After a betrothal, a groom would bring gifts to the bride called sivlonot. If the marriage was canceled, under what circumstances would the sivlonot be returned? This depends on what kinds of gifts were given (perishable or long-lasting), whether they were (small) gifts meant to be used in her father's house or (large) gifts for the couple's future home. If the groom ate in her father's home when bringing the gift, he would not be able to retrieve the gifts. What if the husband drank but did not eat, or ate outside the house, or the husband's messenger ate the food? If the groom ate less than a dinar's worth, can he claim back all the presents or only a percentage? If the gift went up in value and was then returned, who gets the enhanced value? Rava asks: If the gifts were to be consumed, but were not yet consumed when the marriage was canceled, are they returned? Almost all these questions remain unanswered. Two stories are brought relating a situation that happened with an engaged couple. In one, the husband sent gifts and in the other, there was a rumor that the bride had no sense of smell and the groom wanted to cancel the betrothal, but he tested her to see if it was true, and it was not. Each comes to teach something unique either about Israel or about a claim a husband could make and whether it would be accepted. Ravin ruled that even though we distinguished between perishable and non-perishable gifts, this distinction does not hold if the woman is the cause of the canceled wedding. In that case, all gifts are returned, even a bundle of vegetables. What assumptions can be made about a declaration on one's deathbed? A distinction is made between one who gives away all of their possessions and one who only gives away part. If they gave it all away, it is assumed they thought they were dying. Therefore, if they heal, the gift is ineffective. If only part were given away, the gift would be effective. This is based on an "umdana" - an assessment of their intent. The Gemara tries to match the opinion in our Mishna to tannaim who said the same thing regarding other cases in other places to determine who is the author of the Mishna.
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Bava Batra 145 - November 17, 16 Cheshvan
11/17/2024
Bava Batra 145 - November 17, 16 Cheshvan
A contradiction was brought from a braita against the Mishna regarding returning reciprocal gifts for a wedding (shushbinim). There were three resolutions. The third established the case of the Mishna of one when the groom died and left a yabam, a brother to perform levirate marriage. When the gifts are given to the yabam, he must share them with his brothers. To raise a difficulty against this answer they compare the case to one where the groom dies after betrothal and before the marriage. Just as in that case, the money from the betrothal does not have to be returned as the woman can claim that it is not her fault that they are not getting married, likewise with the shushbinim, the family that first received gifts can claim that there is no need for them to send gifts if the groom is no longer alive since they did not rejoice with him at the wedding. However, Rav Yosef explains that the cases aren't comparable as the case with the yabam was one where the other family did join the brother's wedding before he died and rejoiced with him, but did not yet bring the gifts. The Gemara attempts to establish that the opinion mentioned previously, that a woman does not have to return the money of the betrothal if the husband died as she can claim it was not her fault they never got married, is a subject of a tannaitic debate. However, this suggestion is rejected and the tannaitic debate is explained to be regarding a case where the woman, not the man, died and the debate is whether or not betrothal money was meant to be given and kept even if the marriage never happened. If one holds that it was not intended to be kept even if the marriage never happened, the woman's heirs would need to return the money if that was the custom in the place where they lived. That issue was not only a debate between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yehuda haNasi in the source quoted previously, but also can help explain a debate in a different braita between Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yossi. In the time of the amoraim, there were different opinions about whether the betrothal money would be returned or whether other gifts given from the groom to the bride were to be returned. The five unique laws that govern the shushbinot gifts. The court can enforce its collection. It is returned only when the one who gave first gets married. There is no interest if the reciprocal gift is larger than the first. It is not canceled in the shmita year like other loans. And a firstborn would not collect a double portion if the father was owed shushbinot gifts for his sons. If one doesn't attend the wedding, one is still obligated to bring reciprocal gifts. However, if he was not invited to the wedding, while he still needs to pay, he can hold a grievance against the person. However, since he did not eat at the wedding, he can deduct the amount he would have eaten from his gift. How is the amount of the deduction calculated? A braita sets up various cases in which one is not obligated to return the shushbinot. In the context of that braita, they mention a public wedding (pumbi) and therefore another braita that mentions this word pumbi in a different context is brought. That braita quotes various drashot comparing one who is wealthy in different types of property to one who is wealthy in different types of Torah knowledge. What is the ideal? Rav and Rava deliberation about whether it is better to master Mishna or better to matter Talmud. They each derive their opinion from Proverbs 15:15. Other drashot are brought on that verse which relate to middot or other things that will make a person happy or will cause them to lead an unhappy life. Some of these sources view having a happy life as a good thing whereas others do not view it in a positive light.
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Bava Batra 144 - Shabbat November 16, 15 Cheshvan
11/15/2024
Bava Batra 144 - Shabbat November 16, 15 Cheshvan
How are estate profits divided if only some or one of the heirs invested either time or money in improving it? What are the factors that affect the law? When are some exceptions to the rules? It was customary that a father who married off his oldest son in a house adjacent to his own house, would give that house to the son as a gift. Since this was the generally accepted practice, even if the father didn't specify it as a gift to the son, the law presumes that the house was given to the son. This is one of three laws that are declared "A halakha without a clear explanation." If brothers are living off the father's estate, in what situation would a brother's salary be shared with the other brothers? Are doctor bills for one of the heirs paid for by the estate? The Gemara differentiates between those who get sick because they brought it upon themselves and those who get sick due to circumstances beyond their control. Reciprocal marriage gifts (which were common in those days and could be demanded in a court) - how are they divided among heirs? On what do those laws depend?
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Bava Batra 143 - November 15, 14 Cheshvan
11/15/2024
Bava Batra 143 - November 15, 14 Cheshvan
Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey Levant in honor of Geri Goldstein Geudalia's grandson, Moshe, on his bar mitzvah in Ottawa, Canada this Shabbat. In explaining why the commitment of the father to his son, "I will give you a portion with all your yet-to-be-born children" is ineffective, it is compared to one who says "Acquire it like a donkey." If one says to another, "You and a donkey shall acquire the item" is the kinyan effective? Rav Nachman holds that the person acquires half, Rav Hamnuna holds this is entirely ineffective and Rav Sheshet holds that the person acquires the entire item. Rav Sheshet brings a source regarding teruma to prove his position. However, this proof is rejected. Rav Avia brings a difficulty against those who were against Rav Sheshet's position from a case regarding a man who betrothed five women, two of whom could not be betrothed by him in this way as they were sisters (kiddushin that are not able to be consummated, shelo nimseru l'bia). Since the betrothal is effective to some, it can be compared to the "you and the donkey" case. However, this is also rejected as the case was misunderstood by Rav Avia and in fact, the man only had already excluded the sisters in the act of betrothal as he said, "Whoever is eligible to have relations with me will be betrothed." Therefore, the case is not similar at all to the donkey case. If one says, I will give my wife and my sons my possessions, does she get 50% or an equal share with all the sons? Rav Yosef ruled that she receives half and proved it from a verse about the lechem hapanim (shewbread) being divided between Aharon and his sons, where Aharon received half. Abaye rejects the comparison and rules that she receives an equal share. This is questioned in light of rulings where rabbis granted the wife half, and a ruling of Rebbi regarding a division of taxes. However, the ruling of Rebbi is rejected as it is more similar to the case of Aharon and his sons, than to the case of the woman and her sons. A difficulty is raised against Rav Yosef's ruling from the laws regarding dividing up a large meal offering into two vessels. However, the comparison to the meal offering is rejected as well. The halakha is like Rav Yosef in this case and in two others previously cited in Bava Batra (Bava Batra 12b and Bava Batra 114a). If one sends silk to his family, how is it divided between sons, daughters, and daughters-in-law? If one has one son and one daughter and promised his property to his "sons", does that wording include the daughter as well? If one has one son and a grandson and promises his property to his "sons" does that include his grandson? When the estate is not yet divided and the older children invest the property, are the proceeds divided evenly between all the brothers or only the ones who invested? On what does it depend?
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Bava Batra 142 - November 14, 13 Cheshvan
11/14/2024
Bava Batra 142 - November 14, 13 Cheshvan
If one gives a gift to an unborn child, while it is a fetus, Rav Huna rules that the gift is not acquired. Rav Nachman holds that one can give a gift if they say, "I am giving this gift when the baby is born." Rav Sheshet holds that a fetus can acquire items in all cases and brings a braita to support his position. Abaye and Rava each provide different explanations for the ruling in braita to show that it does not necessarily prove Rav Sheshet's position. The Gemara brings a Mishna in Nidda 44a to reject Rav Sheshet's opinion. But this is dismissed as Rav Sheshet himself explained the Mishna as referring to a particular case, without ramifications for this debate. Another explanation of that Mishna is brought in the name of Rava can also resolve the difficulty raised against Rav Sheshet. Rabbi Yochanan holds that in most situations, a gift given to an unborn fetus is not effective, but our Mishna is an exception to the rule as a father feels a closeness to an unborn child and it can therefore effectively transfer ownership of the gift to the fetus. The Gemara rules like Rabbi Yochanan. A case is brought where a man promised his wife that the sons she would have with him in the future would inherit all of his property, excluding his sons from a previous wife. When the son of the other wife complained, the father promised him a portion with his future brothers. The rabbis were split about whether or not that son would receive an extra portion when the inheritance was later divided between him and the other sons. Those who hold he does not deserve an extra portion claim that the promise was that he would get a portion like his unborn brother, but since the father cannot give them a portion at that point, as they were unborn, the statement was meaningless.
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Bava Batra 141 - November 13, 12 Cheshvan
11/13/2024
Bava Batra 141 - November 13, 12 Cheshvan
Abaye and Rava disagreed on their understanding of the Mishna regarding the ruling of a tumtum who tries to collect money form a father's estate. A difficulty is raised against Abaye's explanation from a braita, but is resolved. Why in the case of the Mishna did the husband commit 200 zuzim to his unborn child if she is a girl and 100 if he is a boy - wasn't there a preference in those days for male children, as per the words of Rabbi Yochanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai? Three answers are brought. Two tannaitic sources are brought with cases similar to the ones in our Mishna but without enough details so the Gemara establishes the details of the cases discussed. A case happened where a man on his deathbed promised all of his property to his unborn baby. Rav Huna ruled that this was ineffective as one cannot effect a transaction with someone who is not yet in existence, Rav Nachman questions this ruling from our Mishna where in all the cases the father promised money to an unborn child. Rav Huna rejects the Mishna saying, "I don't know who is the author of this Mishna!" The Gemara questions why Rav Huna couldn't have given a different answer. It raises seven possibilities but ultimately rejects them all.
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Bava Batra 140 - November 12, 11 Cheshvan
11/12/2024
Bava Batra 140 - November 12, 11 Cheshvan
The Mishna established the division of the father's possession when there is a lot of money and when there is not a lot of money. What if the financial status of the estate changes after the father's death? Does the distribution change as well? After the Gemara had discussed how the amount in the estate is determined, Rabbi Yirmiya asked if other things enter into the calculation - do we deduct the amount needed to feed the deceased's widow until she gets remarried or dies, or her daughter from a previous marriage in a case where the husband committed to supporting her for some time, or a loan that is owed to a creditor? If there is a widow and only a daughter left to inherit and not enough money for both of them, which one receives money from the estate? Why did Admon disagree with the rabbis and hold that the male children should receive inheritance at the expense of the daughters losing their food payments? Rava and Abaye each suggest different explanations. How is a tumtum viewed regarding these laws - as a lame, female, or neither? If a man on his deathbed left a pregnant wife and stipulated: if the baby is male give him this gift, if female, this gift, what do they receive if twins are born or if the baby is a tumtum?
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Bava Batra 139 - November 11, 10 Cheshvan
11/11/2024
Bava Batra 139 - November 11, 10 Cheshvan
Today's daf is sponsored by Judith Shapiro in loving memory of her brother David Tychman z"l on his eleventh yahrzeit. "He was a passionate Zionist and a wonderful uncle to my children." If a father gives their land as a gift to one son "from today and after death," the father has exclusive rights to all the produce detached from the ground throughout his lifetime. Upon his death, the heirs receive any produce detached from the ground, not the gift recipient. However, in Tosefta Ketubot, the ruling is that if the son sold the field and then the father died, the buyer would have to return the value of produce attached to the ground at the time of the father's death to the heirs, as even produce attached to the ground belongs to the giver. Ulla resolves the contradiction by differentiating between the generosity of a father to a son as opposed to a non-relative (the buyer). If a father died and left older and younger children, before the inheritance is divided, they all get an equal portion for their needs - food, clothing, dowry. However, if some children were married in the father's lifetime, the younger children who were not yet married cannot demand the same amount of money for the wedding/dowry as the older ones received when the father was still alive. Rava brings an exception to the rule - if the oldest brother is managing the inheritance money and he takes money from the estate for clothing so he can dress respectfully when dealing with the inheritance, we do not insist that all the other brothers receive an equal share for their clothing. The son of Geneiva asked Rava: If a woman takes out a loan without a document (oral loan) and then gets married - since her husband has rights to her possessions, is he considered a "buyer" in which case, the creditor can't collect the loan (as an oral loan is not collected from land that is sold) or is he considered an inheritor and the loan can be collected. Rava tries to prove that he is considered an heir from our Mishna, but the proof is rejected. Rav Papa and Abaye each bring other sources to prove that a husband is considered an heir, but Rava raises a difficulty based on the takana in Usha which treats the husband as a buyer since a woman who sells her usufruct property and dies, the husband can demand it back from the buyers. This would only make sense if he was considered a buyer. Rav Ashi resolves the contradiction by explaining that sometimes the rabbis gave the husband status like an heir and sometimes like a buyer, depending on the situation - whatever is in the husband's or someone else's best interest, i.e. providing for a widow. Sons have rights to the inheritance but daughters have rights to sustenance from the estate. If there aren't sufficient funds for both, the rabbis give the girls rights to sustenance before giving rights to the sons. The sons are expected to ask for charity. Admon questions their position and Rabban Gamliel supports Admon. The amoraim discuss what is considered sufficient funds for both the sons and daughters.
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Bava Batra 138 - November 10, 9 Cheshvan
11/10/2024
Bava Batra 138 - November 10, 9 Cheshvan
If one receives a gift and doesn't immediately say, "I don't want it," the gift is acquired by that person, even if they later scream that they don't want it. However, if someone else accepted the gift on their behalf and they were in the room and did not protest, there is a debate between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the rabbis about whether or not the gift is acquired. If on one's deathbed, one promised different amounts of money to a few different people in one sentence, it is assumed that the person intended to gift it to them each at the same time. Therefore, if a creditor of the deceased comes to collect a debt, it is collected proportionally from each of them, depending on the amount they were given. However, if the person promised the gift in a particular order, the creditor collects first from the one who received last, and then from the second-to-last, etc. If on one's deathbed one said he was giving an amount of money to one who was "owed" money by them (i.e. a firstborn, wife, or creditor), was the intention to return the money owed or was this a gift in addition to money owed. This depends on how the promise was worded. If he said, "as is appropriate for him/her," the money is considered an addition to what was owed. But if the promise was "for his portion as a firstborn/for her ketuba, then the son/wife receiving can choose to accept either the amount of money promised on the deathbed or the double portion/ketuba. If it is a creditor, the amount promised is taken for the debt. Rav Nachman explains that this is based on Rabbi Akiva's position that if one adds unnecessary words, they must be adding something. Therefore, when one says "as is appropriate," it is understood to be adding something more than what was owed. If on one's deathbed one says that someone owes him/her money, can witnesses document the statement without verifying? Is there a concern the court will act upon it without checking into it (therefore the witnesses can't write it) or can we assume the court will do their homework (and therefore the witnesses can write it)? According to a braita, Rabbi Meir holds that it can be written without verifying and therefore when the heirs want to collect based on the document, they must prove they are owed the money. The rabbis hold that it cannot be written unless it is verified and therefore do not require any further proof to collect. However, Rav Nachman explains that there is a different version of the braita that Rabbi Meir says the document cannot be written based on the statement of the person on their deathbed, whereas the rabbis permit. He further explains that Rabbi Meir is concerned about a court that may rule without checking for further proof and therefore the document should not be written. The ruling is that we are not concerned that a court will err and not check into the details. However, this is true for a case of witnesses, not for a previous court ruling. If a court supervises a chalitza or mi'un, they must check the details carefully as a later court will rely on it, permitting a woman to remarry, without checking that it was all done properly. However, a document signed by witnesses testifying to what a person said on their deathbed can be written without checking the details, as the court will check the veracity of the contents of the document before ruling based on it.
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Bava Batra 137 - Shabbat November 9, 8 Cheshvan
11/08/2024
Bava Batra 137 - Shabbat November 9, 8 Cheshvan
In resolving a contradiction between two braitot, the Gemara answers that there is a tannaitic debate (between Rebbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel) regarding the same issue that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish were debating - when one acquires the produce do they acquire rights to the property itself, meaning do they have rights to sell it? The case where they disagree is one who promised one's possession to one person and after that person's death, they will go to another person and after them to a third person. If the first person sold the property, would the second person be able to demand the property after the death of the first person? Rebbi holds a sale of the property would be invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the sale would be valid even though in the case discussed, he thinks one should not be able to sell it ab initio. Rabbi Yochanan held like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with one exception. He also added a few cases that would be included within this ruling. If one received an etrog as a gift that was to be passed on after their death to another or taken from the estate's funds before they were divided, is one able to fulfill the mitzva or not? While in the former case, they can fulfill the mitzva, Rebbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would disagree about whether they could sell the etrog. Is a gift given upon the condition that it be returned considered a gift? Can one fulfill a mitzva with an etrog that they received in this manner?
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Bava Batra 136 - November 8, 7 Cheshvan
11/08/2024
Bava Batra 136 - November 8, 7 Cheshvan
What is the language in a document that makes it clear that the document itself only served to strengthen the commitment of the person on their deathbed, and was not meant as a document necessary for affected the transaction? What wording must be used to designate one's property to others in his lifetime when he is healthy? Rabbi Yehuda holds that one must write "From today and after my death." Rabbi Yossi does not require adding "From today." Once this is written, the property is considered to belong to the recipient, while the proceeds belong to the giver. Can either of them sell their rights to their share? Why does the language of "From today and after my death" work here, but it is not effective in a divorce document? Raba bar Avuha accepted Rabbi Yossi's opinion because the date on the document makes it clear that it is in effect from the date it was written, even without adding the words "from today." If an act of acquiring was performed from the giver to witnesses on behalf of the recipient, this would preclude the need for writing "from today," even according to Rabbi Yehuda. However, there is a debate about whether this applies across the board or is it dependent on the language used in the document. If the recipient sells their rights and then predeceases the giver, does the buyer acquire the property upon the giver's death or does it revert to the giver's heirs? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree on this based on a debate about whether one who acquires proceeds to an item (in this case the giver retains rights to the proceeds) is considered the main owner of the item. They debate this issue in another case as well. Why is there a need to mention their debate here if it could be inferred from the other case? To answer this question, the Gemara explains why one could have differentiated between the cases. Rabbi Yochanan raises a difficulty from a braita on Reish Lakish's position, but it is resolved.
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Bava Batra 135 - November 7, 6 Cheshvan
11/07/2024
Bava Batra 135 - November 7, 6 Cheshvan
Two statements in the name of Rabbi Yochanan contradicted each other. In one he ruled that a husband is believed to say he divorced his wife and in the other, he is not believed. The resolution was that the former meant that we accept his statement regarding her status from this moment forward and the latter is retroactive. Despite this resolution, Rava was unwilling to rule using this principle in a case that was before him where a man said his wife was exempt from levirate marriage (and should be believed since he could have said he divorced her) and preferred to be stringent and require chalitza. In another case, where it was presumed the man had no brothers and as he was dying, he also said he had no brothers. Abaye was stringent as there were rumors that there were people far away who could testify that he had brothers. Even though in the case of a woman taken captive, Rabbi Chanina did not forbid her to her husband based on rumors that people far away could testify that she engaged in relations with her captors, Abaye distinguishes between that case and this one. The Mishna brought a case where one brother claimed they had another brother, but the other brothers denied the claim. The Gemara establishes that the other brothers must have said "We don't know if he is our brother," meaning, their claim was one of uncertainty. This qualification is meant to explain why they receive an inheritance from that brother if they deny he is their brother. Can we learn from here regarding other cases where one has a confident claim (bari) and the other is unsure (shema), such as, one claimed money from another and the other responded, "I don't know if I owe you"? If the comparison is true, the ruling would be that the claimant who is unsure would not have to pay, like the brothers who do not have to give up their inheritance to the others. Rava agrees with this comparison, but Abaye denies it and rather compares our case to one where the confident claim is that the other owes money to a third party, not to the claimant. In the ruling of the Mishna, if the brother whose status is unclear dies, the property he received from the inheritance from one of the brothers is returned to that brother. Rava asks what happens if the property goes up in value. Would the brother receive the added value as well or would it be like money that the brother in question acquired on his own, which would be divided evenly between all the brothers? If one has a will wrapped around one's leg at the timeof death, it is invalid, even if it is later found in the hands of the person to whom the money was promised in the will. But if before the person died, they transferred ownership of the document to someone else, it is valid. What wording must be used to designate one's property to others in his lifetime when the person is healthy? The person needs to say, "From today and after my death. If one intended to transfer money to another using a document, i.e. on one's deathbed one said, "Write and give this document to...," if the person dies before the document was given, we do not write and give the document as one cannot transfer items using a document after one's death. However, if it is clear that the document was intended just as proof of the property transfer, one can write and give the document even after the person dies.
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Bava Batra 134 - November 6, 5 Cheshvan
11/06/2024
Bava Batra 134 - November 6, 5 Cheshvan
A story is told of one who bypassed his sons and passed his inheritance to Yonatan ben Uziel who returned a third of it to the sons. Shamai attacks him for doing it but he proves to Shamai that he was correct. Yonatan ben Uziel was considered the greatest of Hillel the Elder's students. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai was on the opposite end of the students. And yet, he was well versed in all areas of Torah study, and more. Is one believed for inheritance and levirate (yibum) marriage to say that one has a son or a brother? On what basis? With what claims is a man believed to exempt his wife from levirate marriage? On what basis is he believed? Can a court split testimony in half and accept only part of what a person says?
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Bava Batra 134 - November 6, 5 Cheshvan
11/06/2024
Bava Batra 134 - November 6, 5 Cheshvan
A story is told of one who bypassed his sons and passed his inheritance to Yonatan ben Uziel who returned a third of it to the sons. Shamai attacks him for doing it but he proves to Shamai that he was correct. Yonatan ben Uziel was considered the greatest of Hillel the Elder's students. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai was on the opposite end of the students. And yet, he was well versed in all areas of Torah study, and more. Is one believed for inheritance and levirate (yibum) marriage to say that one has a son or a brother? On what basis? With what claims is a man believed to exempt his wife from levirate marriage? On what basis is he believed? Can a court split testimony in half and accept only part of what a person says?
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Bava Batra 133 - November 5, 4 Cheshvan
11/05/2024
Bava Batra 133 - November 5, 4 Cheshvan
Some cases are brought, with different circumstances, where the wife received property from the husband with her children and the rabbis deliberated whether she was able to also demand her ketuba money. Rav Huna explained that if a person on their deathbed wrote all of his property to another without specifying a language of inheritance or gift, we see whether the heir was a relative or not. If the heir was a relative who was in line to inherit, they received it as inheritance. If not, they receive it as a gift. Rav Nachman questions Rav Huna, "Why didn't you say directly that you hold by Rabib Yochanan ben Broka!" Rav Nachman answers his own question by quoting a case where the ruling was worded in the same way as Rav Huna's ruling. Still, it was unclear what was the relevance of the inheritance/gift differentiation in both rulings. Rav Ada bar Ahava suggested that the ramification was whether the deceased widow could demand food supplements from the heir. However, Rava rejected this suggestion and explained the ramifications - if the deceased had promised it only to the heir until their death, and after the property would go to someone else. If it is considered an inheritance, this statement is disregarded, but if it is a gift, it is upheld. Is it permitted to bypass one's son's inheritance and give one's property to someone else? Does it make a difference if the son does not behave appropriately or does not behave appropriately toward the father? Is there a debate about the latter question in the Mishna or do both tannaim agree? Two sources are brought to answer this question. The first source explains that Yosef ben Yoezer bypassed his son and a story is told about the aftermath. However, the story is inconclusive regarding this question as there are two different versions of the punchline of the story. A second source, a statement of Shmuel to Rav Yehuda, proves that there is a debate between the tannaim. Another story is told of one who bypassed his sons and passed his inheritance to Yonatan ben Uziel who in turn returned a third of it to the sons. Shamai attacks him for doing it but he proves to Shamai that he was correct.
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Bava Batra 132 - November 4, 3 Cheshvan
11/04/2024
Bava Batra 132 - November 4, 3 Cheshvan
If one wrote all of his possessions to his wife it assumed that the man intended only to appoint her as a steward and wrote it in that manner so that the recipients of the will would respect the executor. Would this be the case only if he wrote it on his deathbed or would it apply even if it was written when the husband was healthy? The answer to this question is brought from a braita relating to a case where the husband wrote to give his wife all of his property and on account of a debt of the husband, the property was collected from the wife, does she forfeit the right to collect her ketuba. Although there is a debate about this, it is clear that if he wrote to give her all of his property, she inherits it all and is not appointed to be a steward. First, the Gemara assumes that it is a case where the husband is not on his deathbed, as on his deathbed, she would be appointed to be a steward. However, this answer is rejected as the rule on one's deathbed has some exceptions, like a woman who was only betrothed or divorced. If the case was in one of those situations, then it could have been even if he was on his deathbed, thus leaving the original question unanswered. Rav Nachman ruled in the ketuba case above that the woman forfeits her right to collect the ketuba when she accepts all of the husband's property. A difficulty is raised from a braita, from a different case where Rav Nachman ruled that we assess one's intention and allow one's possessions to be returned, which we do not do by the woman regarding her ketuba. It was resolved by differentiating between the cases. A Mishna in Peah is quoted, as later Rava will ask if the ruling also applies only if it was done on a man's deathbed or even if he was healthy. If a husband writes all of his possessions to his son and gives his wife any size portion of land, she loses her right to her ketuba. Three amoraim suggest different explanations for this puzzling ruling - each suggesting that the woman indicated (although not explicitly) her acceptance of this arrangement. The Gemara quotes the continuation of the Mishna to raise a difficulty on the three opinions as Rabbi Yossi holds that even if the husband did not write a document to her granting her the land, but the woman accepts it she gives up her rights. This implies that the first tanna requires both a written document and the woman's explicit consent. There is no resolution to the difficulty against the three amoraim. Rav Nachman ruled that the woman forfeits her right to collect the ketuba in the case described above. He explained that the woman is willing to give up these rights as the husband made her his partner is dividing the property to the sons and this affords her honor on account of which she is willing to forfeit her right to her ketuba. Rava asked if this ruling applies also to a man who divided his property in this manner when he was healthy, or only on his deathbed. The Gemara explains the two sides of the question but leaves the question unresolved.
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Bava Batra 131 - November 3, 2 Cheshvan
11/03/2024
Bava Batra 131 - November 3, 2 Cheshvan
Today's daf is sponsored by Aviva Appleman in loving memory of Florence Appleman on her first yahrzeit yesterday. "May her neshama have an aliya." Rava asks if Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka's allowance for the father to favor one child over the others is only when one says so on one's deathbed or even when healthy. Rav Meshashia answers from a braita where Rabbi Natan the Babylonian questions Rabbi Yehuda haNasi about the fact that the Mishna Ketubot 52b, in discussing the commitment in the ketuba to the wife's male children, seems to follow Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka's position. As the case related to a healthy person, it is clear Rabbi Yochanan Ben Broka also held his opinion for a healthy person. There is a further discussion between Abaye and Rav Pappa regarding the content of the braita and the question of why Rabbi Yehuda haNasi specifically answered the way he did and didn't suggest a different answer. If one writes that one is selling all of his possessions to his wife, or his oldest son, or his youngest son, or some random person, is it understood literally, that he is giving them all the possessions instead of giving to all his sons, or is it assumed that the man intended only to appoint them as an executor of his will and wrote it in that manner so that the recipients of the will would respect the executor?
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Bava Batra 130 - Shabbat Rosh Chodesh - November 2, 1 Cheshvan
11/01/2024
Bava Batra 130 - Shabbat Rosh Chodesh - November 2, 1 Cheshvan
The Mishna brings a debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka regarding one who wants to bequeath to one's heirs in a way different than the Torah law - is it allowed and if so, in what cases is it allowed? The Mishna can be understood in two different ways - that there is a debate or that there is just one opinion and that depends on whether Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka is referring to a person who wants to give one son all of the inheritance and nothing to the others sons (or prefer one daughter over the others, in a case where there are no sons) or to a case where one wants to bypass the heirs and give it to the next heir in line, i.e. daughter, instead of son. The Gemara quotes various amoraim in Babylonia and in Israel who all ruled like Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka who allows one to favor one son over the others or one daughter over the others (in a case where there are no sons). There is a debate regarding Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi's ruling - whether he said, "The halakha is like Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka" or whether he ruled in a case like Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka. This leads to a discussion regarding what the best way to learn the halakha - by what someone says or by case law? What are the pros and cons of each approach? A braita explains that one cannot learn from either unless the rabbi says "halakha l'maase," i.e. tthis is the halakha and you can act upon it.
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Bava Batra 129 - !st Day Rosh Chodesh Cheshvan - November 1, 30 Tishrei
11/01/2024
Bava Batra 129 - !st Day Rosh Chodesh Cheshvan - November 1, 30 Tishrei
This month's learning is sponsored by Sami Groff in loving memory of her father, Rabbi Avraham Yair Groff, whose Yahrzeit was this week and Rabbi Raymond Harari, who sadly passed away this week. "Both Rabbis taught me that a woman’s place in Judaism is in the Shul and in the Bet Midrash. To my father, Rabbi Avraham Yair Groff, who passed a Torah to the women’s section every Simchat Torah. And to Rabbi Raymond Harari, who taught us Gemara in Yeshiva of Flatbush, who challenged his female students to delve into the Talmud and make it our own and whose Thursday night Mishmar class after school, we were excited to voluntarily stay late to attend. Rabbi Harari’s legacy in inspiring women to learn lives on directly in the hundreds of women taught by Rabbanit Michelle Farber every day." Today's daf is sponsored by Rachel and Oren Seliger in loving memory of her mother Rifka Esther bat Sara Gitel and Yishaya Halevi. "14 years and I still see your beautiful smile and your shine in your eyes, also in memory of the fallen soldiers friends of my son from the tank brigade 401/52 that have fallen this week. ברק ישראל ,אלישי יונג, אופיר ברקוביץ, אחסאן דקסה, גיא ניזרי may their memory be a comfort to all of am yisrael עם של גיבורי על" When Mar Zutra stated that we follow Rabbi Abba's rulings, to which cases was he referring? The Mishna discusses what constitutes valid gift language at the beginning, middle, and end of a statement, that would allow one to pass on property to those who were not his direct heirs. In what cases would this work? There are four different opinions about this: - Does it only work with one field and one person? - Does it also work with two fields and one person? - Does it work with two people and one field? - Or does it even work with two fields and two people? Both amoraim from Israel and Babylonia disagreed on this matter. Rav Sheshet tries to prove his position but then rejects his proof. Rav Ashi does succeed in proving Rav Sheshet's approach. However, we also rule according to Reish Lakish. How can we explain this apparent contradiction?
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Bava Batra 128 - October 31, 29 Tishrei
10/31/2024
Bava Batra 128 - October 31, 29 Tishrei
Today’s daf is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari who inspired me to love learning Gemara in high school. He brought each case in the Gemara to life, making the material engaging and relevant. He was a master teacher who cared deeply about his students and their growth. He was a true role model whose legacy will live on in the countless lives he touched. Tanchumim to his wife, Vicky, a Hadran learner, and to the entire family. Yehi zichro baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by Miri Kadosh in memory of her dear friend Yafit Yaffa bat Yitzchak Mazal who passed away this morning. Seven teachings of Rabbi Abba from Israel are sent to Babylonia on various topics and Mar Zutra in the name of Rav Shimi bar Ashi paskens like him. If one claims that the person in another's house is his/her slave and it was stolen. The accused denies the claim and says that the slave was given as a gift/sold by the accuser. If the accused offers the accuser to take an oath that the slave is owned by him/her, then the accused can no longer reclaim the slave. The Gemara explains that the unique teaching of Rabbi Abba here is that the rabbis hold this even when money/property is being taken away from one side and given to the other (change of status quo). Others hold that this only in a case where the status quo is maintained. Creditors of a deceased can only collect from land that the father left the orphans. Rabbi Abba ruled that slaves are considered like land. Rav Nachman disagrees and does not equate slaves with land for this purpose. A person can testify for their father's first cousin as their connection is somewhat removed. It is called a third-generation testifying for a second-generation relative as they are both connected through brothers who are first-generation relatives. Rava holds that even a first-generation can testify for a third, i.e. a person and his great-uncle. Mar bar Rav Ashi even held that a person and his grandfather, but the ruling is not like his position as they are direct relatives. If one knew testimony about land borders and then became blind, one cannot testify. Shmuel rules that if the blind person can identify markers in the field, his testimony is accepted. Rav Sheshet and Rav Pappa extend this to other cases as well where one can identify items by size or weight (cloak and bar of silver). A braita is brought to raise a difficulty with Shmuel, Rav Sheshet and Rav Pappa. There are two interpretations of the fifth ruling of Rabbi Abba. One is he ruled like Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka that one can choose to bequeath all of one's property to one of the heirs (a son among sons or daughter among daughters). The other is that if a father identifies one of the sons to be the oldest, when a different one was presumed to be the oldest, he is believed, as per the position of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Abba on this ruling and holds by the rabbis' position (either in their disagreement with Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka or with Rabbi Yehuda). If a man says that his wife will inherit among the sons, this is effective. However, this would only include items owned by the man at that point and does not include possession he acquires later. And if there were more sons born later, the wife would have to divide the property with them as well. If a creditor puts out a promissory note and the borrower says that half was already paid back and then witnesses come and testify that the entire loan was paid back, Rabbi Abba rules that the borrower takes an oath (modeh b'miktzat) and pays the other half but the creditor can only collect from property in the borrower's possession and not from liened property as the buyers can rely on the witnesses' testimony. Mar bar Rav Ashi disagrees and views the borrower as one returning a lost item who would be exempt from an oath.
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Bava Batra 127 - October 30, 28 Tishrei
10/30/2024
Bava Batra 127 - October 30, 28 Tishrei
Today's daf is sponsored by the Greenstone cousins in honor of Lana Kerzner's birthday. "With love to our dear cousin Lana. Your commitment to learning is a profound tribute to the legacy of our parents, a testament to the values they instilled in us. May the merits of this learning bring you peace, joy, and health this year and every year, not only for yourself but as a blessing to all those around you." Today's daf is sponsored by Gabrielle and Daniel Altman in loving memory of Lisa Altman z"l on her 20th yahrzeit. "We miss her love, warmth, kindness, wisdom and spirit. Her memory and legacy will remain with us always." There are various halakhot relevant to males that do not apply to a tumtum (one whose genitals are covered up and it is unclear if they are male or female) whose skin is then perforated and is found to be a male. He cannot inherit as a firstborn, he cannot become a ben sorer u'moreh, his brit milah does not override Shabbat, and his mother does not have laws of impurity of a woman who gave birth. A difficulty is raised against two of these laws from a Mishna in Nidda 28a. A braita is brought to support the position that a tumtum described above cannot inherit a double portion as a firstborn. The braita also derives that one cannot be a firstborn if it is doubtful whether or not he is the firstborn. The Gemara then explains why this was stated - to explain that if two brothers are born at around the same time (from two different mothers) but it was dark and it was impossible to determine who was born first, no one receives the double portion. Rava held otherwise - they could each write an authorization that "If I am the firstborn, I give you my share," and they can jointly receive the double portion. However, Rav Pappa raised a difficulty with Rava's position and Rava retracted. A father is believed to say a particular son is the firstborn but what if there is a chazaka that a different child is the firstborn? Shmuel ruled that the two brothers write an authorization as mentioned above. The Gemara explains Shmuel's position that he was unsure whether the ruling is like Rabbi Yehuda, who believes a father in that case, or the rabbis who do not accept the father's testimony when there is a chazaka. If the rabbis don't accept the father's testimony, for what purpose did the verse in the Torah use the language of "yakir"? If the father could have given the son a double portion as a gift, it would have been effective, so of course then we can believe the father that this is the firstborn?! The answer is that the father could have only given a double portion as a gift to the son for property in his possession at the time or possibly for items that would later be in his possession (according to Rabbi Meir), but it would not have covered property that would be brought into the father's possession as he was dying. For this situation, the verse taught "yakir." Regarding believing a father about the status of his son, Rabbi Yochanan describes a situation in which a father says that a person is his son and then says that he is his Caananite slave. He is not believed to render the person a slave as he would never have called his slave his son in the first place. However, if he first called him his slave and then his son, we accept his last words as it's possible he meant originally that the son served him like a slave. The reverse is true for one who made a statement in front of the tax authorities. They raise a difficulty against Rabbi Yochanan from a braita, but resolve it.
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Bava Batra 126 - October 29, 27 Tishrei
10/29/2024
Bava Batra 126 - October 29, 27 Tishrei
Rav Asi ruled that a firstborn who protests, his protest is valid. There is a debate among the Rashbam and Rabbeinu Chananel, about what he is protesting. According to the Rashbam, he is protesting the brothers investing in the item before dividing the property, as he will not receive a double portion on the enhancements. Rabbeinu Chananel explains he is agreeing to receive an equal portion of this property/item but is not giving up on his rights to receive the double portion on other property/items. Rabba limits this statement to grapes that were picked but not if they were turned into wine. Why? If a firstborn gives up his rights to a double portion when dividing a particular property, Rav Pappa and Rav Pappi debate (based on a situation where Rava gave a psak about in a different case) whether Rava held that he gave up rights to the double portion of all the properties or only of that particular property? This debate is based on whether one holds that the firstborn receives rights to his double portion immediately upon the death of the father, even before the land is divided, or whether he receives rights to it only once the property is divided. The Mishna differentiates between a father who says he will not bequeath the double portion to his firstborn and a father who says he will equally divide his portion. The first is not allowed as it goes against the Torah and the second is allowed because it is viewed as a gift. One can use the language of a gift to divide property differently than stated by the Torah. What type of proof can be used to prove one is the firstborn to enable him to receive the double portion?
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Bava Batra 125 - October 28, 26 Tishrei
10/28/2024
Bava Batra 125 - October 28, 26 Tishrei
Today's daf is sponsored by Glenda Sacks Jaffe in honor of Sari Esserman's birthday and on her first grandchild, and to Rhona Fink on the birth of another grandchild. "Yom huledet sameach and mazal tov!" Does the firstborn receive a double portion of a loan due back to his father after his death? Raba and Rav Nachman each hold that the firstborn can receive a double portion but only if it is paid back in land, according to Raba or in cash according to Rav Nachman. Abaye raises two difficulties against each of their positions. Firstly, he sees no reason to distinguish - if the money "(or land) is not considered in the possession of the father, then the land (or money) should not be either. Secondly, he quotes a case for each of them where they held differently than they do here. Raba responds for himself and for Rav Nachman, claiming that they were both explaining the positions of the rabbis in Israel, but they do not actually agree with that position. The difficulty raised against Raba was from a case where a person on their deathbed gave all their property to their grandmother, to be then given to his heirs (which was his daughter) upon the grandmother's death. However, the daughter died before the grandmother. When the grandmother died, the daughter's husband claimed the property as the heir of the daughter. The rabbis in Israel ruled that the property was not in the daughter's possession at the time of her death and the husband could not inherit the property, as a husband inherits land/items of his wife that were in her possession at the time of her death. Rav Huna held that the husband could inherit it as when the father promised the property to the daughter after it first went to the grandmother, it was as if he said, "It will be yours from now, but the grandmother will enjoy the proceeds until her death." Raba sided with the rabbis in Israel as he claimed that it clearly belonged to the grandmother since if she were to sell it, the sale would be valid, thus proving that it was considered in her possession, not the daughter's, until her death. This shows that Raba holds that land/items are not considered possessed by someone (muchzak) if another person can sell them. Rav Pappa ruled: 1. a husband only inherits property that the wife possessed, not property due to her; 2. A firstborn only inherits the double portion of property that his father possessed, not property due to him; 3. A firstborn does not get a double portion of a loan due to his father, whether they collected land or money for the loan; 4. A loan that the firstborn borrowed from his father and did not repay until after the father's death is a case of doubt whether it is considered due to the father or in his possession and therefore the double portion is split between him and the brothers.
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