Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Hadran.org.il is the portal for Daf Yomi studies for women. Hadran.org.il is the first and only site where one can hear a daily Talmud class taught by a woman. The classes are taught in Israel by Rabbanit Michelle Cohen Farber, a graduate of Midreshet Lindenbaum’s scholars program with a BA in Talmud and Tanach from Bar-Ilan University. Michelle has taught Talmud and Halacha at Midreshet Lindenbaum, Pelech high school and MATAN. She lives in Ra’anana with her husband and their five children. Each morning the daf yomi class is delivered via ZOOM and then immediately uploaded and available for podcast and download. Hadran.org.il reaches women who can now have access to a woman’s perspective on the most essential Jewish traditional text. This podcast represents a revolutionary step in advancing women’s Torah study around the globe.

Shevuot 35 - June 5, 9 Sivan 06/05/2025

Shevuot 34 - June 4, 8 Sivan 06/04/2025

Shevuot 33 - June 3, 7 Sivan 06/03/2025

Shevuot 33 - June 3, 7 Sivan The Mishna ruled that if there were two groups of witnesses and each group denied knowing testimony, both groups are liable. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this case, arguing that the first group should not be liable since another group of witnesses can still testify. Ravina resolves this difficulty by limiting the Mishna's ruling to a specific case: where the second group of witnesses are related to each other (as their wives are sisters) and both wives are about to die when the first group takes their oath denying knowledge of the testimony. The Mishna lists various cases where witnesses are asked to testify about multiple things. In some cases, they are only liable one sacrifice and in others multiple sacrifices. An oath of testimony only applies in monetary cases. A question is asked: Does this also include cases involving fines (kenas)? Before answering this question, the Gemara limits the question to the rabbis' position in their debate with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elazar rules that if someone admits owing a fine, they are exempt, but if witnesses come forward even after the confession, they are obligated to pay the fine. Therefore, an oath of testimony would clearly apply here, since the witnesses would definitively obligate the defendant. However, the rabbis hold that witnesses can only obligate the defendant if they testify before a confession. Therefore, the question arises whether an oath of testimony would apply here, since it's possible the witnesses are not causing a loss to the claimant—the defendant could simply confess and be exempt. This question is further limited by assuming the rabbis also hold by the position of the rabbis on a different issue: that davar hagorem l'mamon (something that can possibly lead to a monetary obligation) is not considered a monetary obligation. Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that such potential obligations are considered monetary obligations which would obligate the witnesses a sacrifice if they do not testify. After establishing these parameters for the question, the Gemara examines various cases from our Mishna and other sources to attempt an answer. However, neither source provides a conclusive resolution. From where do they derive that an oath of testimony is only for monetary cases? Four different rabbis each bring different proofs. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/36829585

Shevuot 32 - Shevuot - June 2, 6 Sivan 06/01/2025

Shevuot 31 - June 1, 5 Sivan 06/01/2025

Shevuot 30 - Shabbat May 31, 4 Sivan 05/30/2025

Shevuot 29 - May 30, 3 Sivan 05/30/2025

Shevuot 28 - May 29, 2 Sivan 05/29/2025

Shevuot 28 - May 29, 2 Sivan Today's daf is sponsored by Batsheva and Daniel Pava. "Eighty-one years ago, on bet Sivan, the deportation of Hungarian Jewry to Auschwitz began. May our learning be dedicated to the memory of my great-grandmother, Raizel, my grandmother, Batsheva bat Yisroel, the Steinmetz and Vegh families of Apsha, and all the Jews of Marmarosh who were murdered in Auschwitz. May their memories be a blessing." Rava rules that one who takes an oath to not eat a loaf of bread, even if they have already eaten most of it, as long as there is still an olive bulk of bread left, the person can go to a chacham to repeal the oath retroactively. How can this case work with both the language of "I will not eat any of it" and "I will not eat it in its entirety"? A source is brought regarding a nazir to raise a contradiction to Rava. However, it is resolved in three possible ways. Ameimar disagrees with Rava and holds that one has even longer to repeal the oath, as long as the punishment has not yet been implemented. Rava explains that if an oath is made with a condition, if the condition is fulfilled without intention, the oath does not take effect. If the person remembers the condition but forgets the oath when eating the forbidden item, one is liable to bring a sacrifice. If the person remembers both the condition and the oath when eating both, and first eats the one fulfilling the condition, they will receive lashes. If the person first eats the forbidden one and then eats the one fulfilling the condition, it is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding a warning given in doubt, hatraat safek. Rava continues with another case where a person said that each item is forbidden on condition that they eat the other item. He discusses four possible permutations of what the person did unintentionally and intentionally and explains the law in each case. Rav Meri brings support from a Mishna and braita for Rava's principle in the above cases that if the condition is fulfilled unintentionally, the oath does not go into effect. Avimi asks his brother Eifa about the ruling in different cases of a double/overlapping oath. Each time Eifa answers, Avimi disagrees with Eifa's ruling. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/36765860

Shevuot 27 - Rosh Chodesh Sivan - May 28, 1 Sivan 05/28/2025

Shevuot 26 - May 27, 29 Iyar 05/27/2025

Shevuot 26 - May 27, 29 Iyar Today's daf is sponsored by Tali Oberman in honor of her grandmother, Miriam Sklar, who has reached the incredible milestone of 90. A braita has a more expanded version of the debate between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva about whether or not the oath of expression for which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering includes oaths regarding events that already happened (about the past). Each uses a different exegetical principle in reaching his conclusion, based on the method adopted by their teachers, Rabbi Nechunia Ish haKane, klal and prat (Rabbi Yishmael), and Nachum Ish Gamzu, ribui and miyut (Rabbi Akiva). An oath of expression is only brought if the person is shogeg, unwitting, when they forgot their oath, but not if they did it on purpose or if it was totally beyond their control. The Gemara brings an example of an oath that would be beyond one's control. A braita extrapolates from the verse that an oath of expression is only brought by one who forgot the oath but not the object. Is it possible to find a case of remembering that oath, but forgetting the object? Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be the case if one forgot both the oath and the object. This question is left unanswered as one can make an argument both to obligate and to exempt. Rava asks Rav Nachman what would be a case of shogeg for an oath of expression about the past? Rav Nachman answers that one who remembers the oath, but does not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. This seems initially to match only Munbaz's approach in Shabbat 68b that one can be obligated to bring a sacrifice if one knew it was Shabbat and that the action was forbidden, but did not know that one is obligated to bring a sacrifice. But, then the Gemara explains that even the rabbis would agree by oaths as it is a unique halakha, as usually one is only obligated in oath for a prohibition punishable by karet. Shmuel rules that one is only obligated for an oath of expression that is expressed in words, not one that is in one's heart. Two sources are brought to raise a difficulty on Shmuel's position, but are resolved. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/36724380

Shevuot 25 - Yom Yerushalayim - May 26, 28 Iyar 05/26/2025

Shevuot 25 - Yom Yerushalayim - May 26, 28 Iyar Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Ariel Bruce on her birthday. "A wonderful daughter, wife, and mother of three beautiful, strong, sweet children. May this year bring you only happiness and peace to Kol Yisrael. All our love, Saba, Steve and Savta Lisa." Today's daf is sponsored by Rebecca Darshan in memory of (lilui nishmat) Helene Isaacs, her mother, on the occasion of her 25th yahrzeit. "She encouraged women's learning and especially loved learning in Jerusalem during the last 10 years of her life. Her life was too short in years, but full every day." The Mishna delineates different possible oaths of expression (shevuot bitui), both those relating to future actions and past actions. Rabbi Yishmael does not hold that past oaths are considered oaths of expression for which one would be liable to bring a sacrifice. Oaths can apply to intangible matters, whereas vows cannot. However, vows can apply to a mitzva while an oath cannot, as one can render the object of a mitzva forbidden, such as a sukka, through a vow. Rav and Shmuel disagree about a case where one takes an oath that someone else threw or didn't throw a stone in the sea. Rav holds the oath is valid as it can be stated in both the positive and negative formulations. Shmuel holds the oath is invalid as it cannot be stated in the future, as one cannot take an oath regarding an action that is out of one's control, and whether or not someone else will throw a stone or not is out of one's control. The Gemara makes two attempts to connect the debate of Rav and Shmuel to a tannaitic debate, but both attempts are unsuccessful. The Gemara raises two difficulties on Shmuel's opinion from tannitic sources but resolves both difficulties. Why did the Torah create a different category for a shevuat haedut, one who withholds testimony, if it could have been considered an oath of expression? Rava and Abaye have different approaches to understanding the connection between the two categories. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/36709925

Shevuot 24 - May 25, 27 Iyar 05/25/2025

Shevuot 24 - May 25, 27 Iyar This week's learning is sponsored by Dvora Lopez in loving memory of her mother on her 51st yahrzeit. "She had great strength and abundant love." This week's learning is sponsored by the Futornick family in honor of Shira's 21st birthday. This week's learning is sponsored by Yisroel and Masha Rotman, for a refuah shleima, a complete and speedy recovery, for Elisheva Mindel bat Masha Tzivia. The Mishna appears to contradict itself regarding general oaths about eating. It implies that a general oath "not to eat" would not include foods that cannot be eaten (which would encompass non-kosher food), yet another case in the Mishna rules that someone who makes a general oath "not to eat" does include non-kosher food in that prohibition. Two different resolutions are offered. The first resolution distinguishes between someone who made a general oath ("I will not eat") and someone who made a specific oath ("I will not eat regular and non-kosher foods"). The sages provide two different interpretations for why an oath that specifically mentions both non-kosher and kosher foods would be effective. Difficulties are raised against both positions, and one remains unresolved. The second interpretation explains that the previous implication from the Mishna is incorrect—"foods that cannot be eaten" refers to truly inedible items and does not include non-kosher foods, which are technically edible. The final case in the Mishna is cited as proof for this position but is ultimately rejected. What distinguishes issur kollel from issur mosif? Issur kollel occurs when a second prohibition encompasses additional prohibited items, while issur mosif occurs when a second prohibition adds further restrictions to the same item or extends the prohibition to additional people. Based on this distinction, Rava explains why someone who accepts that issur mosif applies would not necessarily accept the same for issur kollel. Since issur mosif relates to a single item—adding a prohibition to the item itself or prohibiting the item to more people, it can apply. However, when additional items are included in the prohibition, it will not necessarily apply to what was already forbidden. Rava further explains that just as issur kollel takes effect, the same principle applies to an oath that includes other items. He needed to specify this because one might have assumed it only applies to prohibitions that arise independently, not to oaths where a person creates the prohibition. Rava the son of Raba raises a challenge to Rava's statement based on a Mishna in Kreitut, which suggests that an oath adding additional prohibitions would not apply to what was already forbidden. Six different explanations are offered to resolve this contradiction. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/36701600

Shevuot 23 - Shabbat May 24, 26 Iyar 05/23/2025

Shevuot 22 - May 23, 25 Iyar 05/23/2025

Shevuot 22 - May 23, 25 Iyar Today's daf is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in gratitude for the love and support of the Hadran Family during his latest medical misadventures. Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis had a back-and-forth discussion in the Mishna each supporting their own position. The rabbis claimed that there is no other place in the Torah where one who eats any amount is liable. The Gemara raises several instances where one is liable for eating any amount but then explains why these are expectations to the rule. Rabbi Akiva answered that there is no other place where one speaks and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The Gemara suggests a few cases where that would be the case and also then explains why they are not the same as what Rabbi Akiva was referring to. Rava limits their debate to cases where one did not specify that "I will not each any amount" or where one said, "I will not taste." Rav Pappa limited the case to oaths, not to konamot. A difficulty is raised on Rav Pappa's assertion from a braita where it is clear there is a requisite amount for konamot. There are two resolutions. One is to explain the case of konamot in the braita where one used the language of eating. Ravina offers an alternative answer and differentiates between the obligation of lashes (no requisite amount) and the obligation to bring a meila sacrifice (requisite amount at a value of a pruta). However, not all agree that there is a prohibition of meila by konamot. If so, how can the braita be explained according to Ravina? Rava raises two dilemmas about the requisite amounts required for oaths in particular situations where the item discussed is not edible or not generally eaten on its own. They are both left unanswered. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma about a nazir who takes an oath to forbid grape pits. Is the oath invalid as it is already forbidden, or since the nazir can't eat an olive-bulk of grape pits, perhaps the oath is forbidding any amount? The Gemara quotes the upcoming Mishna regarding one who took an oath not to eat and then ate non-kosher meat. Based on the amoraim's interpretation of the Mishna, they conclude that the oath would not be valid, as an unspecified oath would be forbidden only at an olive-bulk, and that is already forbidden to the nazir by Torah law. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/36685865

Shevuot 21 - May 22, 24 Iyar 05/22/2025

Shevuot 20 - May 21, 23 Iyar 05/21/2025

Shevuot 19 - May 20, 22 Iyar 05/20/2025

Shevuot 18 - May 19, 21 Iyar 05/19/2025

Shevuot 18 - May 19, 21 Iyar The Gemara discusses a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then explains the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment. The man is a Torah scholar who engages in relations with his wife when she is about to menstruate. When she informs him in the middle of the act that she has begun menstruating, he withdraws immediately. He is considered shogeg (unintentional transgressor) regarding entering the woman's body, as he incorrectly assumed he would be able to complete relations before she began menstruating. He is also considered shogeg regarding his immediate withdrawal from her body, as he, despite being a Torah scholar, was unaware of the halakha requiring him to wait until he is no longer erect before withdrawing. Rava explains that the obligation to bring a sacrifice for each of these acts can be found in tannaitic sources. The rule about withdrawing appears in our Mishna, while the rule about entering appears in a Mishna in Nidda 14a. Rav Ada bar Matna debates with Rava whether the Mishna in Nidda actually refers to the case under discussion. Rav Ada suggests that it instead refers to withdrawal. Rava and Abaye disagree about why a man who withdraws while not erect is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. Rava maintains that intercourse without an erection is not considered a true act of intercourse. Abaye, however, argues that the exemption exists because a situation where his wife begins menstruating during intercourse is considered beyond the person's control (ones). Where can one find in the Torah a source for both a negative commandment (prohibition) and a positive commandment regarding a man's obligation to withdraw when not erect and to not withdraw when erect in the situation described above? Additionally, what is the source for the rabbinic prohibition against engaging in relations when a woman expects to begin her menstrual period soon? Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the Mishna, though the precise point of their disagreement is unclear. Chizkia clarifies the subject of their debate. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/36620850

Shevuot 17 - May 18, 20 Iyar 05/18/2025

Shevuot 17 - May 18, 20 Iyar Today's daf is dedicated to Mimi and Rafi Schachat on the birth of a daughter! Rava and Rav Ashi each pose a series of unresolved questions concerning the minimum duration one must spend in the Temple to incur the obligation of bringing a sacrifice if they became ritually impure while inside. They debate whether these requirements apply only to unwitting impurity or also to intentional cases, and whether similar requirements would apply to a nazir who unknowingly entered a cemetery. The Mishna states that one who leaves the Temple by the shortest path after becoming impure will be exempt from bringing a sacrifice, while one who takes a longer path will be obligated. The Gemara then questions whether this distinction is measured in terms of time or physical distance. Rabbi Oshaya offers a ruling regarding a leprous house: if one enters backward with only their nose remaining outside, they would not become impure, as the Torah imposes impurity only when entering a house in the typical manner. A braita supports this reasoning, noting that an impure person entering the Temple through the roof would not be liable for entering the Temple while impure, as entering through the roof is not the conventional method. The Mishna clarifies that entering the Temple while impure is excluded from cases where the community would bring a bull offering for an erroneous court ruling. The bull offering applies only to sins requiring a fixed sin offering, not to those requiring a sliding scale offering. However, a bull sin offering would be brought for an erroneous court ruling involving nidda, specifically in a case where a man had relations with his wife and she became a nidda during the act. Abaye and Rava each quote different rabbis stating that in such a case, the man could incur an obligation of two sacrifices. Rava then attempts to understand the specific circumstances that would warrant this double punishment. /episode/index/show/hadran/id/36611485

Shevuot 16 - Shabbat May 17, 19 Iyar 05/16/2025

Shevuot 15 - May 16, 18 Iyar 05/16/2025

Shevuot 14 - May 15, 17 Iyar 05/15/2025

Shevuot 13 - May 14, 16 Iyar 05/14/2025

Shevuot 12 - May 13, 15 Iyar 05/13/2025

Shevuot 11 - May 12, 14 Iyar 05/12/2025

Shevuot 10 - May 11, 13 Iyar 05/11/2025

Shevuot 9 - Shabbat May 10, 12 Iyar 05/09/2025

Shavuot 8 - May 9, 11 Iyar 05/09/2025

Shavuot 8 - May 9, 11 Iyar Today's daf is dedicated in memory of my uncle, Richard Cohen, Naftali ben Yosef haKohen v'Henna who passed away this week. He was a man who loved and appreciated by every person and was loved and appreciated by everyone who met him. The goat sin offering whose blood is sprinkled in the kodesh kodashim on Yom Kippur atones for sins for one who knew they were impure, then forgot and went into the Temple or ate sacrificial items while impure and did not yet remember that they are impure. A braita explains from where this is derived. The different parts of the braita are analyzed. First, the braita suggested that perhaps it atones for the three most grievous sins - idolatry, murder and licentious behavior. The Gemara explains this suggestion - in what manner of performing these transgressions would one have thought this sacrifice could atone for? The first opinion in the braita, Rabbi Yehuda, is that entering the Temple/eating sacrificial items while impure is uniquely distinguished and therefore it is clear that is the one being atoned for by this special offering. The Gemara explains what the braita meant by 'uniquely distinguished' - as it has a sliding scale offering. Several other sacrifices are also uniquely distinguished, such as idol worship as one can only bring a sin offering of a female goat, a woman after childbirth, a leper, and a nazir who became impure who also can bring a sliding scale offering. Why are these not considered 'uniquely distinguished'? Rabbi Shimon derives this from the verse itself describing the offering, as it says "It atones for sanctified items from impurities." Why didn't Rabbi Yehuda accept that understanding - how does he understand the verse? Why doesn't this offering atone for all sins relating to impurity? Why is it only for a person who knew at first they were impure, then forgot, and does not have awareness of the sin? The braita explains that this atones for something not atoned by a sacrifice of an individual, as can be derived from the verse. What is being excluded by this derivation that isn't already obvious? Another derivation in the braita teaches why it specifically atones for a sin that can eventually be atoned for by an individual sin offering (when the person will realize that a sin was committed, and not for one where the person did not know before entering the Temple that one was impure, as that type can never be obligated to bring an individual offering. Why does this case need excluding, if it is already known that the latter is atoned for by the sin offering whose blood is sprinkled on the outer altar on Yom Kippur? If the offering does not completely atone for the sin, but simply provides atonement until such time that the sinner realizes their sin and brings an individual offering, what is the purpose of the temporary atonement? Rabbi Zeira and Rava each offer a suggested answer - either to atone for the sin in case the sinner dies before realizing their sin or to protect from suffering. If the type of sin atoned for by the outer sin offering is derived from the inner sin offering, why can't the inner one atone for both types of sins? Or why can't the outer one atone for both? /episode/index/show/hadran/id/36504765

Shevuot 7 - May 8, 10 Iyar 05/08/2025

Shevuot 6 - May 7, 9 Iyar 05/07/2025

Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

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