Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rav Sheisha brings a fifth explanation of an ambiguous line in the braita brought on Menachot 5b, “If you had raised a difficulty on the logical argument.” As in all the previous explanations, also this one is rejected. Rav Ashi suggests that one could knock out the logical argument from the beginning as perhaps one could not even bring a kal v’chomer from blemished animals as they have a stringency. This suggestion of Rav Ashi is modified a few times and ultimately his explanation is that if one were to make a kal v’chomer with both blemished animals and ones born not through natural...
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There are three different opinions about the status of the mincha offering of the omer that is offered for the sake of a different offering. Rav says it is completely disqualified, Reish Lakish holds it is valid, but the obligation to bring the mincha is not fulfilled and a new one must be brought, and Rava holds that it is valid and the obligation is fulfilled. Rav added another disqualified case to the list – a guilt offering of the nazir and leper. After a discussion about why he would distinguish between that guilt offering and a guilt offering for theft or misuse of consecrated...
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What was clear to Raba on one hand and Rava on the other - regarding how to understand Rabbi Shimon’s words and whether a noticeably incorrect intent (machshava nikeret) disqualifies or not - was not clear to Rav Hoshaya, who deliberated on how to interpret Rabbi Shimon’s position. The Gemara explains why he did not accept the opinions of Raba, Rava, or Rav Ashi as a sufficient explanation for his doubt. The Mishna mentions two exceptions to the rule of a meal offering (mincha) that was perfomed for the wrong purpose (where the offering is valid but the owner has not fulfilled their...
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There are three ways to resolve the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two braitot: in one, he states that a meal-offering (mincha) brought for a different purpose than its original intent is valid and fulfills the owner's obligation, while in the other, he states that it is valid but does not fulfill the owner's obligation. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to this contradiction. Raba explains Rabbi Shimon’s words according to their simple meaning - that when it is evident from a person's actions that their stated thought was not sincere (or was...
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If one takes a dough of a mincha that was designated for a specific type of meal offering and takes the kemitza with the intention that it be offered for a different type of mincha, the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the mincha. There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering - specifically in a mincha of a sinner and of the sotah. The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela"...
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Introduction to Masechet Menachot
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Rabbi Zeira raises the question of an offering designated for a private altar: if it was slaughtered on the private altar, then brought into the Tabernacle, and afterward taken back out, must it now be returned to the Tabernacle and treated like a public‑altar sacrifice with all its associated requirements? Initially, the Gemara suggests that this issue might hinge on the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef regarding high level sanctity offerings that were slaughtered in the South instead of the required Northern area and were then mistakenly placed on the altar. Ultimately, however,...
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During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: “For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala.” Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word “to” between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no...
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The Gemara explains the basis of the disagreement in the braita between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, and how the second position of the Rabbis differs from the first position in the name of the rabbis in that same braita. Rabbi Shimon’s source in the Torah for his view limiting the communal offerings brought in Gilgal is a verse in Yehoshua 5:10, which describes the Jews bringing the Paschal offering just a few days after crossing the Jordan River into the Land of Israel. The reason the structure of Shilo was built with stone walls while its ceiling was only a curtain is derived from...
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Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai held that during the period of the Temple there were four distinct “camps,” since the Ezrat Nashim constituted its own camp. However, in the period of Shilo there were only two camps. The Gemara struggles to identify which camp, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai, did not exist in Shilo, since the Torah clearly assigns separate zones for each category of impurity - one who is impure from contact with a corpse, a zav, and a leper - implying the need for three distinct camps. Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Shimon’s statement refers to an entirely...
info_outlineThe hide of burnt offerings is given to the kohanim, as stated in Vayikra 7:8. However, the Mishna explains that if the offering became disqualified before the blood was sprinkled, the kohanim do not receive the hide. If it was sacrificed for the sake of a different type of offering, since the sacrifice remains valid, the hide is given to the kohanim.
In addition to burnt offerings, the kohanim also receive the hides of all kodshei kodashim, such as guilt and sin offerings. This is derived through a kal va’chomer argument in the Mishna, but later a braita brings different opinions of how to derive this.
A braita records a debate between two tannaim regarding the phrase “the burnt offering of a man” in the verse that grants the kohen rights to the hide. One opinion says it excludes a burnt offering of hekdesh, property belonging to the Temple, while the other says it excludes the burnt offering of a convert. Three explanations are offered for what is meant by a burnt offering of hekdesh, and one explanation is given for the case of a convert, since a convert is certainly considered a “person.”
The three explanations of hekdesh are: a burnt offering brought from leftover funds of an offering; one who consecrates an offering for bedek habayit, the maintenance of the Temple; and one who consecrates all of their property, among which there were animals.
The exemption regarding a convert refers to a case where the convert designated a burnt offering and then died without heirs. Since the sacrifice is ownerless, it does not qualify as a “burnt offering of a man.”
A braita is cited to explain the derivation of the laws in the Mishna. Although the verse says “man,” the offerings of women and slaves are included as well, as is derived from a phrase in the verse. It also records a debate about how kodshei kodashim are included and kodashim kalim excluded from this law - whether it is learned from a kal va’chomer, from a verse, or whether no derivation is needed at all, since the hide always follows the meat, and the meat of other kodshei kodashim goes to the kohen.
The Mishna concludes that the determining factor for whether the hide goes to the kohen in a case where the meat was disqualified is whether the hide was still attached at the moment of disqualification.