Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The Gemara brings a third source to attempt to prove Rav Yosef's assertion that Sumchos holds one who eats two olive-bulks of forbidden fat (chelev) in a single lapse of awareness is liable for two sin-offerings, but this attempt also fails. A Mishna details four times during the year - the eves of the last day of Sukkot, the first day of Pesach, Shavuot, and Rosh Hashanah - when an animal seller must inform the buyer if its parent or offspring were sold that day for slaughter, due to high meat demand raising concerns of same-day slaughter. On these four occasions, the Sages also instituted...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rav Hamnuna states in the name of Rabbi Shimon that the prohibition of oto v'et beno does not apply to consecrated animals (kodashim). This is based on Rabbi Shimon's principle that an invalid slaughter is not halakhically considered a slaughter (shechita she'eina reuya lo shema shechita), and since the meat of a sacrifice is not permitted for consumption until its blood is sprinkled, the slaughter itself is initially unfit. Rava challenges this using a text discussing various combinations of slaughtering consecutive sacrifices inside or outside the Temple courtyard (bifnim or bachutz),...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
After the Gemara establishes the root of the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis regarding a koy, Rav Papa clarifies the specific type of koy they dispute concerning the prohibition of slaughtering a parent and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno) and the distribution of priestly gifts (matnot kehuna). He also explains that the Mishna's ruling—which prohibits slaughtering a koy on Yom Tov due to the uncertainty of whether its blood requires covering (kisuy hadam)—aligns specifically with the Rabbis' position. The Gemara then introduces three other opinions regarding the...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The Gemara discusses the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day (oto v'et beno). The Mishna presents various permutations of non-sacred animals (chullin) and consecrated sacrifices slaughtered either inside or outside the Temple courtyard, outlining the respective punishments incurred and the halakhic status of the meat. A braita derives from biblical verses that this prohibition applies to consecrated animals, and the Gemara subsequently demonstrates that it applies to non-consecrated animals as well. Since the laws of oto v’et beno are learned from...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
If a bone is broken but the majority of its width is surrounded by flesh and skin, the animal is not considered a treifa—even if the break is above the knee joint (arkuva)—and the limb is not considered a limb severed from a living animal (ever min hachai). A case came before Rava where the bone was covered by a majority of "flesh" only when including soft sinews. Rava initially permitted this based on Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion that soft sinews are considered like meat for fulfilling the mitzva of eating the Pesach sacrifice. However, Rav Papa challenged this from Reish Lakish’s...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
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The Mishna states that the four physiological signs of a kosher bird are not explicitly detailed in the Torah, but are instead established by the Sages. The Gemara challenges this assertion based on a braita, which indicates that these kosher indicators are actually derived through a comparison of the anatomical details of each type of bird—specifically evaluating the characteristics of the nesher (griffin vulture), which is listed as non-kosher, against those of the tor (turtledove), which is known to be kosher due to its role in sacrificial offerings. Abaye resolves this difficulty by explaining that the analytical comparison of the physical details between the tor and the nesher outlined in the braita is precisely the methodology employed by the Sages to formulate and define these diagnostic signs.
Rabbi Chiya introduces a braita asserting that a bird possessing even a single kosher sign is permitted, based on the premise that only a bird structurally identical to the nesher—which lacks all four signs—is fundamentally excluded, along with the other non-kosher species explicitly enumerated in the Torah. The Gemara raises a difficulty, noting that one could argue the exact inverse: using the tor as the absolute paradigm, one could deduce that a bird is kosher only if it possesses all four signs. Since the other non-kosher birds listed in the Torah possess either one, two, or three kosher signs, the Gemara resolves the difficulty by explaining that if all four signs were universally required to render a bird kosher, there would be no logical necessity for the Torah to detail the other twenty-three non-kosher species, as their status as non-kosher would already be self-evident.
The Gemara then proceeds with a series of analytical queries, asking why the halakhic paradigm should not be derived from those forbidden birds that possess three signs, two signs, or one sign, respectively. In each instance, the Gemara answers using a redundant-case logic: if any of those categories served as the baseline paradigm, the Torah would have had no need to explicitly list the remaining forbidden species that possess fewer kosher signs (simanim).
The premise of the final query assumes that the peres and ozniyah (birds possessing a single kosher sign) could have established a binding paradigm were it not for the counter-example of the nesher. The Gemara immediately questions this, invoking the hermeneutical rule that two biblical verses teaching the same law cannot serve as a general paradigm (shnei ketuvim haba'im k'echad). Since both the peres and ozniyah share the same baseline characteristics, how could it be suggested that they form a general rule? The Gemara answers that they represent two distinct halakhic categories; one of them is completely unique because, within the entire biblical list of non-kosher birds, it is the sole species that possesses a specific, distinct kosher sign not found in any of the others.
In conclusion, the ultimate paradigm is the nesher (representing the principle that a bird is kosher unless it shares all the forbidden traits of the listed species), and we do not derive the rule from the tor. The tor (with all four kosher signs) is explicitly mentioned in the Torah solely to indicate its validity for sacrifices, rather than to serve as a universal archetype for kosher birds.