3.132 Fall and Rise of China: Beginning of the Kumul Rebellion
Ages of Conquest: a Kings and Generals Podcast
Release Date: 12/30/2024
Ages of Conquest: a Kings and Generals Podcast
Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Kumul Rebellion. In 1931, tensions in Kumul escalated after a Muslim girl spurned Han tax collector Chang Mu, leading to his violent death at a family dinner. Enraged, Uyghurs retaliated against Chinese officials, igniting a rebellion. Chaos ensued as rebels targeted Han settlers, ultimately capturing Kumul with little resistance. Amidst the unrest, Yulbars Khan sought support from military leader Ma Chongying, who planned to mobilize his forces to help the Uyghurs. What began as a local incident spiraled into an all-out revolt against oppressive...
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#132 The Beginning of the Kumul Rebellion
Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.
So last we left off, things had reached a boiling point in Kumul. The explosion at Kumul would begin mostly as a result of a religious and cultural slight against the Muslim population both Turkic speaking and Tungan. They became offended and banded together against the Chinese officials. As a result of the new administration and annexation of the Kumul Khanate, a young Han named Chang Mu from Gansu, was appointed tax collector and chief of police over the small village of Xiaopu, lying due north of Kumul. According to the Nanjing official Wu Aichen “this Chang Mu was a 'wastrel' whose conduct soon became a public scandal”. In early 1931, Chang Mu met a pretty Turkic Muslim girl in Xiaopu and tried to force her father, a Uyghur called Salih, to give him her hand in marriage. Now for those unaware shari law specifically prohibits marriage between Muslim women and men of other religions. What followed is described in two differing accounts.
The first account has it that on April 4th of 1931, Chang Mu was invited to eat at the girls house, allegedly in honor of the forthcoming wedding. During the dinner, Chang Mu was attacked by Uyghur’s and slaughtered alongside 32 members of his personal bodyguard. It was further implied by our friend Wu Aichen, Chang Mu had already seduced the girl and that the ulama, those being islamic scholars who act as a sort of authority under shari law, upon discovering so, took it upon themselves to correct the situation. On the night of the proposed ceremony a mob appeared in the streets of Xiaopu. Chang Mu and his guard detail were already thoroughly drunk and easily overcome by the pissed off Uyghurs. All were killed, including the poor Uyghur girl. The Uyghurs then took 30 rifles from the dead and turned their attention towards the Gansu Chinese who were said to number in about a hundred families in the area. All of them were massacred and “had their heads buried in the soil of their farms”.
Following this the Uyghurs marched upon the Chinese outposts at Tuluhu and Laimahe killing their garrisons and tax collectors while acquiring even more weapons. Better armed, the Uyghurs elected to make a move against Kumul. Kumul held an overwhelming Uyghur majority and easily fell into the hands of the rebels with little to no fighting. Most of the Han fled into the fortified Old City barring its gates. The Han caught outside the Old City were massacred brutally. Soon the rebel forces controlled Kumul’s Muslim part of the city and the surrounding countryside, but the provincial forces remained secure within the Old city and its key arsenal. It is unclear whether the Xiaopu incident was carefully planned prior or simply just came into being. Regardless it was a spark that ignited a much larger rebellion. According to Mildred Cable and Francesca French, two members of the China inland Mission, who resided in Xiaopu at the time, it was indeed a systematically planned rebellion. “While officials surreptitiously transferred their wealth to a place of safety, the instigators of trouble were equally persistent in their secret preparations for war. Camels and mules were requisitioned to transport weapons, ammunition and stocks of food over little-known tracks, that they might be stored in mountain caves known only to the few. Steady streams ofsmall caravans carrying ammunition to the mountains came from the South Road, from Tunhwang and across the most lonely tracks of the desert connecting Kansu with Barku!. All these converged on the Khan's summer palace grounds in AraHim, and the stronghold of Bardash was stocked with huge supplies of food and firearms”.
Yulbars Khan, the former chancellor of Maqsud Shah claimed he was in the Tien Shah escaping heat when the fighting began. Many speculate he had a hand in planning the uprising. Cable and French argued the Tungan population of Kumul also joined the rebellion early on. The insurgents of Kumul were quickly joined by neighboring Kirhiz of the Karlik Tagh who also held grievances against Jin as he had imposed Chinese officials upon them in 1929. According to Wu Aichen the Barkul and Kazakhs in the area also joined the rebellion. Thus Jin had succeeded in alienating the Turkic speaking peoples of northeastern Xinjiang now had a full scale Muslim rising on his hands.
Jin reacted with a strong show of force despite his Commissioner of Education Liu Wenlung and Commissioner for Reconstruction Yen Yushan both arguing for a policy of conciliation. Jin ordered troops to crack down on the rebels without mercy. Meanwhile back in Kumul the rebels were unable to breach the Old City so they fanned out into the countryside hunting Han settlers and soldiers down. According to the British Vice Consul General at Kashgar, R.P Watts, an initial detachment of 300 troops sent by Jin relieved Kumul Old City were ambushed and killed nearly to a man. Its also implied they had lost so easily because many of them were sleeping off the effects of opium. Despite the initial success, the rebels were unable to prevent provincial forces led by Zhu Juiqi, the Taoyin of Aksu from relieving the Old City. By late April the siege was lifted, Zhu Juiqi occupied the Old City and ordered his second in command Xiong Fayu to occupy Kumul’s Muslim quarters. The rebels still controlled the countryside and were harassing Zhu’s forces whenever they strayed a bit too far from their forts, but overall were not much of a match. Meanwhile Chinese troops under the leadership of Xiong Fayu began a series of reprisal massacres against Muslim civilians in Kumul and the surrounding villages. The Uyghur leaders quickly determined they needed external help in their rebellion against Jin. According to testimony from Yulbars Khan, they sent an appeal to the KMT government in Nanjing. Then in June of 1931 Yulbars was chosen, most likely because he was fluent in Mandarin, to head out secretly to Nanjing to carry the appeal. Along the way, Yulbars went to Suzhou to meet with Ma Chongying, known as the youngest and most extreme of the 5 Ma Tungan warlords.
Ma Chongying was a Gansu native. Very little is known about his early years nor about his father, but he shared the same paternal grandfather of the Gansu/Qinghai warlords Ma Puqing and Ma Pufang. He was also distantly related to the Gansu/Ningxia warlords Ma Hongkuei and Ma Hungpin. Altogether the 5 were known as the 5 Ma warlord clique. Ma Congying entered military service in 1924 at the age of 14 when he joined a local Muslim militia. A year later the Guominjun forces of Feng Yuxiang invaded Gansu, but the Tungan warlords of western Gansu remained for the most part untouched. Ma Chongying became an officer for the forces of his uncle Ma Kechong and laid a siege and captured the important city of Huzhou on his own initiative. His troops easily defeated reinforcements sent to relieve the city under the command of Ma Lin. With this great victory, at the age of 16, Ma Chongying earned the reputation of a military genius and the nickname Ga Ssuling or “little commander”. His triumph would be short lived however for his superior Ma Kuchung had not ordered the seizure of Huzhou and dismissed his nephew for insubordination. Thus Ma Chongying took his men to Xining in Qinghai and there began building a private army.
The Guominjun eventually left Gansu after devastating it. In 1927 the northwestern parts of Gansu was hit by a massive earthquake and this combined with Feng Yuxiang’s regional commander Liu Yufen using much of its land for opium cultivation led to a mass famine. In the spring of 1928, the northwestern Tungans began a revolt against the Guominjun led by the Muslim General Ma Tingxiang. Ma Chongying tossed his lot into the fighting leading to three successive attacks against the Guominjun at Huzhou. According to Robert Ekvall, an American traveler in the region “The revolt had by this time assumed all the aspects of a holy war. Chanting prayers, forty or fifty thousand fighters went into battle with fanatical zeal ... the young rebel leader Ma Chong-ing [sic] seemed to bear a charmed life and by his reckless courage gained the utmost in obedience and devotion from his ruffian troops. The Chinese were panic-stricken at the desperate courage of the Moslems, but eventually, by machine gun fire and light artillery, proved superior”. Alongside this American diplomats reported that the famine and war in Gansu had reduced many to cannibalism with a possible two million people dying between 1926-1929. One of the many to die was Ma Chongyings father who was executed by Liu Yufen as a reprisal against him for his actions in 1929.
That year Ma Chongying had strengthened his position by defeating several Guominjun forces. He traveled to Nanjing where he enrolled briefly at the military academy there. Rumors had it there he offered his services to the KMT on the understanding that if he could win control over Xinjiang that they recognize him. After departing Nanjing he traveled to Chongwei along the Yellow River where he joined his army before marching across the southern friends of the Ala Shan desert to head into northwestern Gansu. There he seized control over 4 districts; Kanzhou, Suzhou, Anxi and Tunhuang. Thus by the time of the Kumul uprising in April of 1931, Ma Chongying had established himself the Tungan warlord over northwestern Gansu. In June of that year, Yulbars Khan visited him at Suzhou while enroute to Nanjing. After a dinner, Ma Chongying asked Yulbars what was going on with the Kumul rebellion and the state of Kumul. Ma Congying then proceeded to criticize Jin Shujen whom he thought was unfit to govern Xinjiang. Upon hearing this Yulbars disclosed why he was going to Nanjing.
Yulbars told him that many in Gansu did not support Jin and that he was appealing to Nanjing to see if Jin could be replaced with a new governor. Ma Chongying sat silently for some time before asking if Yulbar’s had any personal contacts in Nanjing, to which he replied he did not. He then advised Yulbars to not go to Nanjing because of three reasons: 1) The Kuomintang had just completed its Northern Expedition and was in need of stability, so it was not in a position to replace its frontier governors, despite any shortcomings they had.2) Even if the Nanking government agreed to remove Chin Shu-jen, implementing the decision would likely take two or three years due to the vast distances involved. 3) Furthermore, Chin’s greed would likely make him unwilling to step down, and he might even seek support from a foreign power to secure his position. Under these conditions, Sinkiang could potentially come under foreign control.
The points were sound, however Yulbars stated the people had sent him to Nanjing, what should he do if he failed? Ma Congying replied “I have a way ... I can meet the needs of the Uighurs of Ha-mi ... In the name of Muslim brotherhood, I shall take my army into Sinkiang. First I shall alleviate the suffering of the Uighurs of Ha-mi, then I shall drive Chin Shu-jen from the stage by force of arms.” A lot of this is conjecture, as it would seem impossible Ma Chongying spontaneously decided to invade Xinjiang over dinner. Ma Chongying was interested in the Kumul uprising long before the arrival of Yulbars in Suzhou and based on other sources it seems Yulbars was well aware of this prior to his visit. Ma Chongying most likely had decent information on the political ongoings of Xinjiang as two Muslim Turks from Istanbul had traveled to northwestern Gansu from Urumqi in early 1931 and entered Ma Chongying’s military HQ. One was Kamal Kaya Efendi who went on to become his chief of staff. Ma Chongying was also gun running to places like Kumul, meaning he would have a lot of intel. Ma Chongyings powerbase in Kanzhou was also temporary. As pointing out by Mildred Cable and Francesca French “based on the assumption of the paralysing effect of frightfulness in action, and as a method of temporary invasion it answered his purpose well, but it never served him as a basis of true conquest, nor did he ever establish rule over one single acre of the land which he invaded. His was the method of the locust. . . and his army was always viewed as a plague. It came, it devoured, and when it had passed over, the patient, constructively minded peasants instantly began to repair the damage done to their fields, and to begetsons to replace those who had been swept away in his train”
In 1931 Ma Chongyings private army was not a large one, it was perhaps no more than 1000 men and given the account of Mildred Cable and Francesca French, his army had to roam around like locusts to survive. Ma Chongying was a very ambitious and young warlord who like many in this part of China dreamed of carving out a Muslim empire in central asia. In the spring of 1931, Ma Chongying had only two possible directions to take. One was through China proper where he would most likely face his uncle Ma Pufang, whom at the time he was in this sort of propaganda war with. The other was to go through Xinjiang, where it seemed he could receive aid from other Muslim groups seeking to be rid of Jin Shujen.
Ma Chongying assembled a force of 500 Tungan cavalry and swiftly crossed the desert between Anxi and Kumul during the full heat of midsummer, arriving in the oasis on the 28th of June, at around the same time as the French Citroen expedition. The French Citroen expedition got to see an encounter between Ma Chongyings Tungan Cavalry and some Chinese machine gun detachment outside of the village of Yikoshu. The French account indicated the Chinese forces also had some Mongol soldiers with them decisively beating back the Tungan riders. After witnessing this the French headed for Kumul’s Old City which they found in a state of chaos. Everyone within the city was busy organizing defenses. The French were taken immediately to the local Chinese commander, Zhu Juichih. As they made their way they could see anxious Muslims peering out of their windows and on telegraph poles were heads, hearts and livers, most likely from captured insurgents. Commander Zhu gave the French permission to continue to Urumqi, stating they could do so at their own risk. Most of the French departed on July 1st, leaving behind 3 members at the Old City who would become eyewitnesses to Ma Chongyings attack.
On July 3rd, Ma Chongying dispatched two messangers to Zhu Juichich baring the following message. “By order of the National Government of China I have been appointed commander-in-chief of all military forces of Kansu and Sinkiang. Having assumed my new occasional pistol shot could be heard as hand-to-hand fighting began on the wall Its self ... Just when the place seemed to be doomed a machine gun, which up to this had been silent ... suddenly came to life. Emplaced in a blockhouse flanking the wall, It opened fire, mowing down the assault, and the glacis was soon cleared except for heaps of corpses”.
Ma Chongyings Tungan cavalry force lacked heavy artillery necessary to breach the Old city walls. Three separate attacks were made on the night of the 3rd, all beaten back. Zhu Juichih, a military veteran had zero intention of surrendering to the so called “little commander” whom he dismissed as a “thieving cub”. Ma Chongying seemed to have little stomach for siege warfare so on the 5th he led a large portion of his Tungan cavalry away from Kumul Old City. By doing so he had left roughly 1000 Uyghur insurgents with a handful of Tungans to continue a siege against the Kumul Old City who had 2000 provincial troops. Zhu Juichih was unaware of Ma Chongyings true purpose so he elected not to sortie fearing a trap. Meanwhile Ma Congying led his riders over the Karlik Tagh to Barkul surprising its defenders. Barkul would end up surrendering without much of a struggle. The commander at Barkul named Hedin handed over 2000 rifles and opened the Barkul arsenal to Ma Chongying. Ma Chongying left a hundred man garrison to capture the town as he turned south. According to Wu Aichen, the sudden small victories of the young commander emboldened other groups to join his cause such as the Kazakhs and Tungans north of Karlik Tagh. By mid-July Muslim insurgents were effectively controlling the entire territory of the Old Kumul Khanate, from Xingxingxia to Iwanquan. Groups of invading Tungans from Gansu formed an alliance with the Muslims of Xinjiang, notably from Xingxingxia and Barkul to hold the siege of Kumul Old City. Ma Chongying seemed to also hold the full support of indigenous Muslims of the area whether it be Hazakh, Kirghiz, Uyghur or Xinjiang Tungans.
Jin Shujen’s received word of the young commander leading a force of Tungan cavalry attacking various places. It seemed his next target was to be Qiqiaoqing. Jin appointed his chief secretary, Lu Xiaozu to be his commander in chief of the provincial forces; Tu Qikuo and Sheng Shihtsai were to be his joint chiefs of staff. Lu Xiaozu was a younger brother to Jin Shujen, a civilian with little to no military experience and was the bitter rival of the current commissioner for military affairs at Urumqi, Jin Shuxin. Lu Xiaozu mustered a force roughly 1000 strong of men almost all lacking any military training or experience. They were immediately tossed over to Qiqiaoqing with orders to halt the Tungan advance pending further reinforcements. Shortly after their arrival, the troops were met by a surprise night attack and killed nearly to a man. Their commander Tu Qikuo committed suicide in disgrace. According to Kamal Kaya Efendi, the Tungans were led personally by Ma CHongying during the daring attack. He had taken his forces into the oasis through little known trails in Karlik Tagh and Bogdo Ula after his capture of Barkul.
Following this victory, Ma Chongying returned to Kumul Old City to see if the siege was providing any results. This was a rather bizarre decision as Jin Shujens capital of Urumqi was basically open for the taking, but perhaps the young commander had overestimated his enemy. When Ma Congying arrived at Kumul Old City, the besiegers' morale improved greatly. Between July 3rd to October 16th over 43 attacks had been levied against the Chinese garrison. The Tungans dug trenches and built barricades trying to storm the walls. Meanwhile within the old city walls the besieged people were forced to eat their camels, horses and mules to survive. By October 1st the defenders were reduced to a ration of 750 grammes of kaoliang floor per day and were expected to run out by the end of the month. Likewise ammunition was running low, prompting Zhu Juichih to resort to more archaic weapons such as fire arrows and Dao swords that the men had found preserved in the arsenal going back to the time of Zuo Zungtang’s campaign in the 19th century. One of the French expeditionaries reported the only thing being sold in the bazaars was opium. One could not even obtain oil as it was boiled and hurled over the walls at the attackers. The Tungans attempted numerous times to breach the walls using mines, but they lacked sufficient powder to create large enough explosions. On one occasion a breach was made in the walls, but the defenders were quickly able to block the hole with wool before the attackers could get through. Afterwards a ditch was dug around the walls and flooded so the Tungan trenches would be unable to continue mining. Siege warfare is neat isn't it? Horrible to be sure, but so much ingenuity. By Mid-October the defenders were very desperate. According to the French expeditionaries inside after 108 days of siege, the defenders sortied out of the town on October 16th and tried to reach Urumqi. “What sustained the men was opium. They could not have held out without it, and so long as it lasted and no strenuous effort was demanded of them, they could get along on practically no food. At night the opium lamps of the sentries could be seen sparkling like little stars the length of the ramparts. The whole garrison was in fact intoxicated. It was fantastic!”
It is quite probable the defenders chose to make a break for it because they were a majority Han Chinese and greatly feared their fate if the Tungans got in. If you know Islamic history, well you know. Ma Chongying had refused any terms other than unconditional surrender and given the feelings of Kumuls Muslim insurgents, it seemed highly unlikely any prisoners would be taken. Regardless, the siege had delayed the Tungans for a long time, allowing Jin Shujen to hastily organize provincial forces at Urumqi. After his first military campaign had failed horrendously, Jin now orderedTsetsen Puntsag Gegeen, the “living Buddha” of Xinjiang of the Torgut Mongols to lead his famous Torgut Cavalry regiment against the Tungans at Kumul. The Turgot troops were by far the best available at the time to Jin, and the most capable to go one on one with Tungan cavalry. However Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen was one of the many Torguts who had grievances with Jin over his policy of enforcing Han Chinese officials upon his people to take positions of leadership. Moreover a plot had recently been discovered that one of his subordinates had been paid off to assassinate him. Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen suspected Jin Shujen to be the culprit to the plot and when the said assassins fled to Urumqi, Jin refused to hand them over for justice, all but confirmed his suspicions.
Thus Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen refused to become involved in the war over Kumul and instead took his forces to Kara Shahr as a demonstration of power. Lacking sufficient numbers or reliable Han Chinese troops, Jin turned next to the White Russian community. Lu Xiaozu who proved himself an imbecile at military matters was replaced with Chang Peiyuan, the Military commander of the Ili Region which also happened to be the region where most White Russians resided. Chang Peiyuan went to work rallying White Russian volunteers who more or less refused to fight for the Chinese, until Jin threatened to repatriate them to Stalin’s USSR. In late September Chang Peiyuan had a force headed by 250 White Russians under the leadership of Colonel Pappengut with the mission of relieving Kumul Old City.
During this time Ma Chongying decided to march upon the capital, drawing most of his Tungan cavalry away from Kumul heading westwards along the Qiqiaoqing road. This took him directly into the path of the advancing White Russians who began skirmishing around the village of Liaotun. At some point Ma Chongying was seriously wounded, shot through both of his legs. Despite this both sides had negligible casualties. Yet as a result of his grievous injury a large portion of Ma Congying’s Tungan riders retreated back into northwestern Gansu. Rumor has it, at this time Ma Congying was bought off by Jin Shujen, regardless he had to take a prolonged time to recuperate and was away from the front lines. Once safely across the Gansu-Xinjiang frontier, Ma Chongying handed control of his four districts of Tunhuang, Anxi, Yumen and Suzhou to his uncle Ma Pufang.
Meanwhile Chang Peiyuans forces with Pappenguts White Russians in the spearhead were still advancing towards Kumul Old City. They managed to relieve it on November 1st. The victorious Chinese troops sacked Kumul as a reward, that was denied to the White Russian forces. The provincial troops then performed a systematic destruction of large parts of Kumul, levelling entire villages and terrorizing the population. Zhu Juichih had returned to Urumqi, but his Lt Xing Fayu had remained at Kumul and began a series of mass executions. The reprisals were so heinous, all of the Uyghurs who had remained neutral during the ordeal threw their lot in with the rebellion. Refugees began to pour westwards towards Turfan while Uyghur insurgents withdrew to Karlik Tagh, notably to their well stocked mountain fort at Bardash. Those who went to Bardash unleashed a guerilla war against Jin troops in collaboration with Ma Chongyings Tungans who awaited their leader in Xinjiang. A communication network led from Bardash and Anxi for this purpose. While Ma Chongying was licking his wounds he reorganized his forces.
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Thus the Kumul Rebellion had just been unleashed. Those who were oppressed were gradually forming a rebellious coalition against Jin Shujen. Although Ma Chongying had literally been cut down at the legs so to say, he was not down for the count. The Rebellion had only just begun.