Ages of Conquest: a Kings and Generals Podcast
Mongol Invasions, Napoleonic Wars, Diadochi Wars, Rome and the Cold War. Every part of your life -the words you speak, the ideas you share- can be traced to our history, but how well do you really know the stories? We’ll take you to the events, the times and the people that shaped our world. Hosted by David Schroder for Kings and Generals.
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3.147 Fall and Rise of China: Battle for the Great Wall of China
04/21/2025
3.147 Fall and Rise of China: Battle for the Great Wall of China
Last time we spoke about Operation Nekka, the Invasion of Rehe Province. In 1932, the Kwantung Army eyed Rehe province as vital for Manchukuo's success. General Tang Yulin, ruling Rehe, initially favored Japanese interests due to economic ties, particularly in opium. Tensions escalated after a Japanese civilian was abducted, prompting military actions that led to skirmishes in Shanhaiguan. Amidst growing conflict, Zhang Xueliang mobilized forces against Tang, who eventually conceded. As Japan prepared for invasion, both sides strategized, with Chiang Kai-Shek reluctant to engage directly, fearing Japanese influence over his rivals. Operation Nekka commenced, showcasing the Kwantung Army's efficiency as they swiftly routed Chinese forces in Rehe. By March 4th, key passes were captured, but fierce resistance emerged. General Nishi faced counterattacks, leading to strategic retreats. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-Shek struggled with internal conflicts while managing the Japanese threat. As the Kwantung Army pushed beyond the Great Wall, logistical issues arose, prompting political maneuvers to secure local warlord alliances. However, plans faltered when Zhang Qingyao, a potential ally, was assassinated. #147 The Battle for the Great Wall of China Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Thus in the previous episode, Operation Nekka had been unleashed. The Kwangtung Army tossed 2 divisions into Rehe province with the intent of forcing its annexation into Manchukuo. They were under strict orders to not extend operations past the Great Wall of China. However they believed it was necessary to seize the main gateways along the Great Wall of China to establish their new borders, and in order to do so this absolutely required going past them. Yet military operations were not the only means to secure their goals. The Japanese forces faced significant logistical challenges, including a shortage of troops, having advanced into Rehe with only 20,000 men. Even the most resolute general in the Kwantung Army doubted that their military strength could prevail against the vast numbers of Chinese troops in the plains of Hubei. As a result, they needed to supplement their military efforts with political strategies targeting regional warlords. The tactic of bribing local elites had proven highly effective during the pacification of Manchuria, and there was no reason to think it wouldn’t work in North China as well. All of these actions were carried out without any oversight from Tokyo headquarters. On February 13, 1933, Itagaki Seishiro, who was then the head of the Mukden Special Service Agency, was transferred to the General Staff without any formal announcement of his promotion. He took up a position in Tientsin specifically to initiate political maneuvers in eastern Hubei, leading to the establishment of the Tientsin Special Service Agency. Initially, this agency sought to engage various competing warlords in North China, including Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, and Sun Chuanfang, but eventually focused on Zhang Qingyao. Zhang had previously been a protégé of Duan Qirui, serving as the civil and military governor of Henan province. He had fought against Zhang Zuolin in 1925 before shifting his allegiance to Wu Peifu. During the second phase of the Northern Expedition, Zhang Qingyao again battled Zhang Zuolin, who was then in control of the National Pacification Army. After the Northern Expedition concluded, he allied with Yan Xishan's forces in Shanxi. So yeah it would seem he was not a man of principles nor loyalties of any kind. The Tientsin Special Service Agency initially aimed to approach Zhang Qingyao in hopes that he could orchestrate a coup d'état against Chiang Kai-Shek. They also hoped to persuade other figures such as Song Queyuan, Zhang Zuoxiang, Fang Chenwu, Xu Yusan, Zhang Tingshu, Sun Tienying, and Feng Zhanhai to join in. If successful, this could lead to a swift takeover of North China as they were advancing towards Peiping after taking the Great Wall. However, on May 7, Zhang Qingyao was assassinated, completely derailing their plans. With Zhang Qingyao dead, the agency concentrated their efforts instead to instigate riots in the Peiping-Tientsin region. They also began encouraging and propping up new political organizations that sought to form an independent northern regime. One scheme they were performing was to form a committee composed of Northern Warlords headed by Lu Zengyu, a banker who had studied in Japan. The idea was to form an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition to carve out north china. The agency received a significant amount of funds to make ends meet. Itagaki alone would spend over 50,000 yen to try and bring about an anti-Chiang regime in the north. Some sources indicated over 3 billion yen being allocated to the IJA to be dished out to various Chinese warlords and elites in the form of bribes. Meanwhile operations in the district east of the Luan River saw attacks formed against the Xumenzhai and Lengkou gateways. On April 1st, the Kwantung Army issued Order 491, seeing the Iwata detachment of the IJA 6th Division storm through the Xumenzhai gate and succeed in securing a supply route behind the great wall to help with the assaults against the other gateways in the region. By April 10th, the IJA 6th Division was making steady progress against the Lengkou gate. The next day they stormed through and captured Qienqangying, pursuing the retreating Chinese to the banks of the Luan River. Meanwhile the IJA 8th Division were facing a much more difficult situation. On the 12th, they captured Xifengkou, but their assault against Quehlingkou was going nowhere. After repeated assaults, the Chinese finally retreated, allowing the Japanese to focus on Taitouying. Thus from the 10th to the 23rd the gateways in northeastern Hubei were all falling into Japanese hands. The Kawahara Brigade was well on its way towards Nantienmen. The Operations within the Great Wall area had been fully authorized by Generals Nishi and Sakamoto. However there still existed limits upon the operations. For example, Operations order 495 issued by General Muto given on the 11th stated "Without specific orders, pursuit by the main force of ground troops is to be limited to the line connecting Hotung, Chiench'angying, and T'ait'ouying; but air units are to be limited to the Luan River." Meanwhile the Special Service Agency in Tientsin had reported that Zhang Qingyao would stage a coup on the 21st and this prompted Song Queyuans troops to prevent the Central Army forces from fleeing towards Peiping. The Agency requested that the Kwantung Army not return to the Great Wall and instead perform a feint attack towards Peiping and Tientsin to scare the Chinese. As the plot was reaching its climax, on the 18th the Kwantung Army chief of staff, General Koiso Kuniaki issued a order for the 8th Division to strike in full force against the Gubeikou area. The Kwantung Army’s plan was to bomb Miyun while launching their feint attack in combination with an all out effort to break Gubeikou. However on the night of the 18th, all of these plans changed dramatically. Suddenly General Muto issued Operations Order 498, hastily ordering all forces to withdraw to the Great Wall. Emperor Hirohito had decided to put his foot down. In Tokyo the emperor asked the vice chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Mazaki Jinzaburö, "Has the Kwantung Army withdrawn from the Luan River line?" The vice chief retired from the imperial presence with a sense of guilt and wrote a confidential letter to the commander of the Kwantung Army. It was personally carried by Infantry Captain Katö [Michio] of the General Staff, who on April 19 arrived at the capital [of Manchukuo] bearing an imperial rescript. The vice chief also cabled to the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army a highly confidential dispatch, the main point of which stated, "Withdraw your troops immediately, or an imperial command will be issued." Thereupon the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army directed staff officer Endò Saburò to draft the withdrawal order. Thus as a result, the Kwantung Army began a withdrawal on the 21st, the same day the Peiping coup was to be unleashed. Those around Emperor Hirohito at this time have gone on the record to state it seemed to them, the emperor had hesitated heavily on issuing the withdrawal order. His motivations for giving the order are simply, the Kwantung Army had gone against his decrees, it was an identical situation to what had happened at Mukden in 1931. The Kwantung Army had no choice but to submit to what essentially was him “asking them to stop”. With that, operations east of the Luan River were over, for now. The order was certainly a critical blow to the Agency in Tientsin. How did they react? They doubled down on the coup effort. Likewise Koiso did not stop the 8th Division operation at Gubeikou. Instead the 8th Division was given orders "to maintain a menacing attitude toward hostile forces in North China." In accordance, the 3800 man Kawahara Brigade on direct orders from General Nishi, launched an attack against two Central Army Divisions numbered nearly 30,000 men stationed at Nantienmen. After a brutal week of battle the Kawahara Brigade seized the town. Meanwhile a battalion of 280 men led by Colonel Shimmura Eijiro attacked a central army force around 4000 strong at Xinglong. They suffered a 38% rate of casualties by the night of the 27th. The Battalion was nearly annihilated when suddenly the Chinese withdrew enabling the Japanese to slip by. Meanwhile the Piping coup did not materialize as planned on the 21st. Instead a secondary coup was initiated by Zhang Zuoxiang on the 26, but this misfired greatly. Reports began to emerge that troops led by Zhang Tingxu, Sun Tienying, Feng Zhanhai and Xu Yusan were willing to rebel in response to the failed coup attempts, but this proved completely false. A report issued on the 30th stated troops under Fang Chenwu were rebelling against Chiang Kai-Shek. However in reality Fang Chenwu only advanced his force north on May 10th and it was to join the anti-Japanese forces. From mid April to mid May, the United States, Britain, France and Germany finally entered the fray in North China. It was an extremely chaotic situation for everyone. The Japanese military in Tokyo had no control nor idea what the Kwantung Army was doing, so when they tried to explain their actions to the international community, they continuously were walking over rakes. All the talk from Tokyo seemed incomprehensible to the other great powers. The Chinese were clamouring the entire time for a ceasefire agreement, but lacked the means to force the Japanese to do so. Japan had left the League of Nations, thus was extremely isolated and insecure in regards to foreign relations. Thus if a nation like Britain or the US had actually put their foot down, the Japanese more than likely would have backed off. Another element to this debacle was the stance of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who had made it adamantly clear they had zero intention of fighting off the British or Americans because of their unruly siblings within the Army. However, both Britain and America were too preoccupied with internal strife, mostly the result of the Great Depression, to devote considerable effort to the crisis in China. The League of Nations remained completely useless during the North China incident, similarly to how they were useless with the Manchurian incident. The Lytton Commission had performed an on the spot inquiry, and it did play a role in establishing a ceasefire by the time of the Shanghai incident, but did nothing to really help China. China had begun appealing to the League when Shanhaiguan was attacked and this prompted the nations of the league to rapidly agree to the Lytton Commission report’s recommendations. In turn this led Matsuoka Yosuke to walk out on the league. With Japan out of the League, Wellington Koo proposed harsh sanctions upon Japan in response to their invasion of Rehe province. Yet they did nothing. China would continuously make pleas, but it was to no avail. Rather than rely upon the League, the Chinese began secret talks with Japanese officials aiming first for a ceasefire. Tang Erho, Lee Shuzheng and Wang Komin attempted talks, but failed. Then Chen Yi the political vice minister of military affairs, secretly spoke with Nemoto Hiroshi, an army attache at the Shanghai legation on April 27th. They established negotiations with Nemoto speaking on behalf of the Kwantung Army and Chen Yi on behalf of Ho Yingqin. The Chinese were clearly more eager than the Japanese for a ceasefire, but the Japanese no longer had a rationale to continue their operation. Regardless the Japanese took the victors stance and demanded the Chinese withdraw from the battlefield as a prerequisite to further Japanese advances. In the first meeting, Nemoto told Chen that the Kwantung Army had already withdrawn from the area east of the Luan River to give Ho Yingqin an opportunity to consider a ceasefire. He described the action as a friendly gesture and suggested the Chinese reciprocate it by withdrawing their troops. Chen countered this by claiming Ho Yingqin had shown his own sincerity at the battle of Nantienmen by ordering his troops to withdraw to a second line of defense, hoping this would allow the Japanese to pull away from Nantienmen. However by May 1st, the Japanese claimed they had captured and secured Nantienmen, so Nemoto informed Chen the Chinese forces north of the Great Wall should withdraw to a line connecting Miyun, Pinkou, Yutien and the Luan River. On May 2nd, the Chinese sent a reply to this, completely ignoring the line idea and instead referred to the recent battle at Xinglong and explained the local commander there was eager for a victory and refused to withdraw despite being asked twice to do so. The Chinese also notified Nemoto that a Political affairs council headed by Huang Fu was being established at Peiping, and it should be through that body that further negotiations were held. The Japanese welcomed this development. Just as it seemed the Shanghai talks were paving a way to a ceasefire, the leadership of the Kwantung Army abandoned their political maneuvers in favor of a settlement. On April 30th the Tientsin Special Service Agency insisted to their Japanese colleagues, the Chinese were just buying time and not sincere in their actions. That same day the Army General Staff and Foreign Ministry suddenly refused to initiate a ceasefire on the grounds the Chinese had agreed to an armistice only to save face. Lt Colonel Nagatsu Sahishige, the army attache at Peiping urged the 8th Division to rapidly strike southwards as far as Miyun to annihilate He Yingqin’s planned counteroffensive. Such an action would immediately threaten the Peiping-Tientsin region. To push the envelope, the Japanese could toss a new Division into the mix and force further negotiations when the Chinese withdrew south of Miyun. Clearly the Japanese had their eyes set on Miyun now. As such General Nishi was secretly told to capture it without any direction from Tokyo HQ, nor from most of the Kwantung Army leadership. The Operations department of the Kwantung Army also independently elected to move troops east of the Luan River again. They argued "the enemy again advances east of the Luan River and persists in its defiant attitude. Therefore we must again deal them a crushing blow." The IJA 6th Division had been evacuated to the Great Wall back on April 23rd and along the way were closely pursued by Chinese forces. General Sakamoto sent a plan to the Kwantung Army headquarters "to again drive the enemy west of the Luan River,". A lot of chaos was reigning within the Japanese military because they were in echo chambers and not relaying information to another. When the Kwantung Army Operations department suddenly proposed a new advance east of the Luan River, on May 2nd a heated exchange took place between them and the Kwantung Army Intelligence Section: “INTELLIGENCE SECTION: The defiant attitude of the enemy is a matter of degree. While it is indisputable that some of their forces continue defiant, their main force is still stationed west of the Luan River. Therefore, a defiant attitude on the part of the enemy is not sufficient reason to deal them a crushing blow. The Kwantung Army withdrew from the Luan River line only ten days ago. As we understand it, the purpose was to comply with the imperial wish. If the army begins operations on a flimsy pretext at this time, inviting intervention by the central leadership, how can the honor of the commander in chief be maintained? What we should now attack are rather the enemy forces facing the 8th Division. For this, we should employ additional strength. By dealing a severe blow to the Chinese Central Army forces in this area, we can threaten Peiping and the operation should be all the more effective. OPERATIONS SECTION: Due to the limitations of our supply capacity, we cannot use more than a certain level of forces against the enemy facing the 8th Division. Since the enemy east of the Luan River maintains a defiant attitude, they must be punished regardless of their strength. INTELLIGENCE SECTION: Since the seizure of Nant'ienmen the 8th Division lacks the capability of pursuing the enemy. This is an unavoidable consequence of the small strength of its force from the outset of the operation. Isn't the First [Operations] Section uncertain that the enemy can be defeated even by the main force of the 8th Division, and doesn't it intend ultimately to deploy the 6th Division southward in concert with action by the 8th Division? If this is the case, it is understandable, and this section is not necessarily against it. OPERATIONS SECTION: That is not what this section is considering. INTELLIGENCE SECTION: In that case, there is no clear justification for launching the operation. The objective of the operation must be plainly spelled out to all concerned, from His Majesty at the top down to the lowest private. There must not be the slightest doubt about it.” After this conversation the Intelligence department debated amongst themselves before relaying another response at midnight, ultimately not approving it. The next day the Operations department sent a telegram to the negotiations team in Peiping: “1) Under present conditions, the Kwantung Army has no intention of accepting a cease-fire proposal for the time being, particularly because there are signs suggesting intervention by third countries in the matter. 2) Previously the Kwantung Army suggested the Miyun-Yiit'ienLuan River line as the retreat line for the Chinese army; but this did not mean it was to be their front line after a cease-fire. It rather indicated a line to which the Chinese army should immediately and voluntarily retreat as evidence of their sincerity. In other words, a cease-fire cannot be negotiated until they retreat to this line and abandon their provocative attitude, and until this is confirmed by the Kwantung Army....
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3.146 Fall and Rise of China: Operation Nekka: the Invasion of Rehe
04/14/2025
3.146 Fall and Rise of China: Operation Nekka: the Invasion of Rehe
Last time we spoke about Manchukuo. In the early 1930s, Ishiwara Kanji sought to dominate Manchuria to secure resources and counter American influence. He envisioned Manchukuo as a Pan-Asian league promoting racial cooperation, despite it being a puppet state under Japan. With Puyi as a figurehead, Ishiwara aimed for autonomy, but his plans faced resistance from the Kwantung Army, which prioritized control. As conflicts arose, Ishiwara's vision of unity clashed with military interests, leading to his eventual isolation and reassignment, marking a tumultuous chapter in Manchukuo's history. In November 1931, Doihara orchestrated the "Tianjin Incident," facilitating the removal of Puyi from his home to establish the puppet state of "Manchukuo." By March 1932, Puyi was declared its ruler, but his authority was merely symbolic, overshadowed by Japanese control. Despite international condemnation, Japan solidified its grip on Manchuria, exploiting its resources and suppressing local resistance. By the late 1930s, Manchukuo became a colonial entity, suffering under harsh economic policies while Puyi's regime served as a facade for Japanese imperial ambitions. #146 Operation Nekka: the Invasion of Rehe Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. From the very beginning of their consolidation of Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army regarded the province of Rehe, today's Jehol province, to be an integral part of it. According to some of the Kwantung Army leadership, all of Rehe would be necessary to consummate Manchukuo. In April of 1932, the IJA 8th Division based at Hirosaki in Aomori prefecture was transferred to Manchukuo under secret orders to prepare for an invasion of Rehe. Now Rehe province covers 160,00 square kilometers and back then held some 2.3 million people. Since 1926 it was ruled by General Tang Yulin. His direct command was over the NRA 36th division, consisting of 13,000 regular troops with a provincial militia of 8500 men. As was the Warlord practice of the time, Tang Yulin exploited his population. Now until July of 1932, Tang Yulin’s attitude towards the emerging state of Manchukuo directly to his east was certainly favorable. That is because Tang Yulin favored the Japanese. During the debacle that was the invasion of Manchuria, Tang Yulin had done everything possible to prevent Zhang Xueliang from moving into Rehe whenever he was trying to consolidate forces there. Now Tang Yulin had no greater aspirations, its not like he loved Japan, or believed the Japanese were better leaders for his nation. What he was motivated by was a very practical concern, economics, more precisely the opium trade. Rehe number one source of income was opium, and they number one purchaser of it, was Manchuria. Thus as one can imagine, when Manchukuo was being formed, and the opium door closed on him, well he took heavy financial losses. On July 17th of 1932, an incident broke out between the towns of Chaoyangxu and Nanling. A Japanese civilian employed by the Kwantung Army, Ishimoto Gonshiro was abducted by a Rehe militia group while taking the train from Jinzhou to Chaoyang. General Nishi Yoshikazu, the commander of the IJA 8th Division stationed at Jizhou, dispatched a small unit to rescue Ishimoto. In doing so they occupied Chaoyangxi, where they also protested the Rehe provincial government. This did not see Ishimoto handed over to them, so General Nishi bombarded Chaoyangxu and then had his forces advance upon Nanling. Even doing so, no Ishimoto to be found. So Nishi withdrew back to Jinzhou. The following year during what would become the invasion of Rehe, Ishimoto’s body would be found at Chaoyangxu. Zhang Xueliang utilized this small incident to advance into Rehe. Claiming he was acting upon orders from Nanjing, he moved his Northeastern Army to the border of Rehe, due south of the Great Wall. Zhang Xueliang then threatened Tang Yulin and bribed his subordinates to defect over to him. Consequently, by late July, Tang Yulin tossed the towel and for the first time sanctioned passage of a volunteer army through Rehe. Come August Zhang Xueliang organized a volunteer force 40,000 strong, obviously all from his Northeastern army to advance from Gubeikou into Rehe, where he sought to confront the Kwantung Army if they advanced. Zhang Xueliang was heavily in contact with Chiang Kai-Shek during this period. Zhang Xueliang was making multiple proclamations about retaking Manchuria, and Chiang Kai-Shek was supporting him in that endeavor as best as he could. Meanwhile Tang Yulin was sort of stuck in the middle. Between October 1932 to January 1933, Shanhaiguan, the strategic gateway and midpoint between Mukden and Beijing became the focal area of 3 major skirmishes. The Boxer Protocol of 1901 dictated that some of the 8 nation alliance members, notably, France, Italy and Japan were allowed to maintain small contingents at Shanhaiguan. In 1932, the Japanese garrison there was 261, France had 61 men and Italy 69. After the establishment of Manchukuo, Japan had increased its garrison to have some more border guards in the town of Shanhaiguan itself. Of course the Chinese also had local troops, that was the 9th Independent Brigade commanded by Ho Chukuo, a force roughly of 9000 men. The first skirmish at Shanhaiguan broke out on October 1st, between Ho Chukuo’s men and an armored train of troops from the IJA 8th Division. Another exact same event occurred on December 8th, both occasions were settled locally and peacefully with the Chinese offering an apology and indemnity payment. Then a third clash broke out on January 1st, but this one got out of hand. The mastermind behind the third incident was Major Ochiai Jinkuro, the leader of the Japanese garrison at Shanhaiguan. Upon his orders, at 9pm, 3 Japanese soldiers tossed two hand grenades each into the backyard of the Japanese military police detachment and the railway track running in front of the Japanese garrison. This was of course immediately blamed upon the Chinese and at 11:30 pm Ochiai presented the local Chinese with 2 demands. The first was to evacuate the Chinese force and the second to allow the Japanese to occupy their south gate at Shanhaiguan for the time being. Now the Japanese had legitimate pretext for these demands based off the Boxer Protocol. It allowed them the right to ensure the security of the railway and telegraph lines and to defend their citizens and property within two miles of the railway zone. Since Ho Chukuo’s troops allegedly disturbed the peace in said zone, the Japanese were in their right to ask them to depart. According to Japanese sources, the Chinese refused at first then consented at 4:50 am on January 2nd. This effectively saw them surrender the south gate. However at 9:30 am the chief of staff for the Chinese Brigade requested that the takeover of said gate be postponed until the scheduled arrival of Ho Chukuo, coming over from Beiping. Ochiai turned down this request, whereupon the Chinese agreed that the south gate would be included within the area overseen by the Japanese. Yet at 10:50 am Japanese troops went to take over guarding the south gate whence Chinese guards tossed grenades at them. Yes, it is most certainly the Japanese who tossed those grenades. The Chinese account of this event is somewhat different. It asserts the Japanese attacked the gate while the issue of surrender was still being negotiated. By January 11th, China sent a formal appeal to Britain, France, the US and other signatories of the Boxer Protocol charging the Japanese for perverting the treaty to seize the south gate of Shanhaiguan. Meanwhile General Ho Chukuo called Ochiai from Qinhuangdao to tell him he would arrive by 8am on January 3rd to negotiate. But by 10am he failed to show up, as the Chinese and Japanese fired upon another. Ochiai thereupon resolved to take the south gate by force. By that point the IJA 8th Division had strengthened its position in front of Shanhaiguan. Two companies had become 10 and one air force company was made ready to strike. Additionally the commander of the 2nd China Fleet, Tsuda Shizue dispatched Hirado and the 16th Destroyer Squadron to Shanhaiguan and Qinhuangdao “to defend Japanese residents and assist the troops in case of hostilities”. At dawn on January 3rd, the Japanese launched a combined land, sea and air assault and by 2pm had taken Shanhaiguan. Ho Chukuo’s forces were pushed to the Shih River where they were reinforced during the night and hastily constructed fortifications against the incoming Japanese. Henceforth a propaganda war emerged over Rehe. Japan charged that Zhang Xueliang was mobilizing large forces to advance into Rehe, while China claimed the same of the Japanese. The Chinese protested the Japanese seizure of Shanhaiguan, but none of the western powers would intervene. However the League of Nations constant condemnation of Japan ever since the Mukden incident provoked the Japanese on march 27th to simply walk out on the league. The ordeal also prompted Prince Saioji Kimmochi to dispatch Major General Umezu Yoshijiro, the chief of General affairs of the army general staff and Consul Tanaka Sotaro of the foreign ministry to go over and restrain the unruly troops at various positions in the Beiping-Tientsin region. Saionji’s main concern was elevated by Army Minister Araki Sadao, who on March 6th stated to Harada Kumao “that if Japan were to land about 3 divisions at Qingdao and they strike into the Peiping-Tientsin region via Tsinan, Zhang Xueliang will probably flee even before they reach Tsinan. If we do anything at all, I’d like to act boldly and go that far”. Despite claims by various sources, mostly Chinese, the Shanhaiguan incident as it became known was not actually preplanned by the Kwantung Army, it really was an arbitrary act on the part of the garrison commander. How everything went down at Shanhaiguan provided vital intel on the Northeastern Army, and what to expect in Rehe. In December of 1932, the IJA 6th Division was dispatched to Manchuria and assigned security detail in southern Jilin province. They were given further secret orders to participate in what was going to be an operation in Rehe once they arrived to Manchuria. When the Shanhaiguan incident broke out, the Rehe operation was expedited rapidly. Therefore the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions west of the Liao River were immediately tossed into the operation. Given the foreign and domestic conditions, the Rehe operation was extremely dangerous. Tokyo HQ yet again sought to reign in the men, so they sent General Umezu to Manchuria to talk to the Kwantung leadership. The Kwantung leadership was adamant the operation be unleashed before the spring that, provided the operation did not extend beyond the Great Wall. To this Tokyo HQ yet again relented. On January 27th of 1933, General Muto Nobuyoshi, then commander of the Kwantung Army, issued the following general order for the Rehe operation designated, Operation Nekka “The situation in Jehol has become increasingly serious day by day and has now developed into a state of affairs necessitating intervention. To strengthen the foundations of Manchukuo, the time is close at hand, as far as military operations by the Kwantung Army are concerned, to put the finishing touch on our sublime task. First, the affairs of Jehol province are unquestionably an internal problem of Manchukuo. They neither embrace nor are accompanied by any international implications. Because subjugation of the province is designed to strike a fatal blow to anti-Manchukuo, anti-Japan elements, these elements purposely confuse the distinction between Jehol and North China. They move troops into the province and, glossing over these matters, raise a loud outcry, propagandizing that Japan harbors designs of territorial aggression. In this manner they have endeavored to draw the restraining attention of the world, and every move of the Kwantung Army in Jehol—even the slightest raising of a hand or the stretching of a leg—is now the object of worldwide surveillance” At this stage the Kwantung Army treated the Rehe Operation as an internal matter of Manchukuo and did not openly talk about extending it beyond the Great Wall into Hubei. But their gunna. On January 26th, General Muto issued Order 466, kinda funny how its almost order 66, but I digress. This order directed the IJA 6th and 8th Divisions to prepare to invade Rehe. On February 9th, Muto drafted the “Rehe Subjugation Plan” to some staff officers. It stated “without specific orders, operations are not to be carid out in Hubei”. It also stipulated they should “foster and promote a climate leading to the downfall of Zhang Xueliang in North China, which is the strategic base for the disturbance of Manchukuo”. On February 27th, Muto issued Order 473 which repeated to the men again not to move into Hubei. On the 29th, Muto issued another order “The subjugation of Jehol is purely and simply an internal problem of Manchukuo. In the light of our national policy, it must not develop into a provocation for war with China. This is why Kwantung Army Operations Order 473 stipulated that, unless specific orders are issued, operations are not to be conducted beyond the Great Wall in Hopei province. I fully expect you to issue strict orders to the various units under your command that, although our forces may act freely in Jehol, which is a part of Manchukuo, they are not, without an imperial command, allowed to take any action in Hopei province, which is separated from Jehol by the Great Wall. They should be admonished that, even in the light of local circumstances, they must never be blinded by tactical considerations and miss the main point of our national policy. (In particular, the garrison at Shanhaikuan should be doubly careful and not act beyond its authorized limits.) I have learned that His Imperial Majesty, the supreme commander, is gravely concerned about the foregoing and again issue these instructions in awe of His Majesty's concern”. Thus one can read between the lines here. Emperor Hirohito put his foot down and demanded no forces go past the great wall and to this the Kwantung Army obeyed. For Operation Nekka, the IJA 6th and 8th Division would have their own theaters of operation along a line running from Paotzu, the eastern most town in Rehe to Chaoyang. The northern zone was the IJA 6th divisions theater, the southern one was the 8th’s. Geneal Sakamoto Masemon led the 6th Division and ordered his forces on February 23rd to advance north along the rail line between Tahushan and Tungliao, then on towards Tienshan, Xiawa and Chaoyang. Afterwards they would carry out operations in the Chifeng-Linxu-Tolun region. General Nishi ordered his 8th Division, excluding one unit to advance along the border around Peipiao, towards Suichung on the 27th, then into the Lingyuan region. The other unit would secure as fast as possible the important gateways along the Great Wall of China: Qilingkou, Lenkou, Xufengkou, Lowenyukou and Manlankuan to protect their divisions flank. Afterwards they would seie Chengde and Gubeikou. However he also gave explicit orders "Without specific orders, operations must not be extended beyond the Great Wall into Hopei province,". So yeah, while they had direct orders to not advance beyond the Great Wall. . . they were going to basically capture all of the key passes of the Great Wall. Kind of playing with fire. On the other side, on January 23rd, Zhang Xueliang was meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek and our old friend Duan Qirui to discuss how to prepare for what seemed to be an impending invasion of Rehe. Chiang Kai-Shek politely said to Duan Qirui "I sincerely hope that you will come south and give me your guidance at this time of national crisis,". The real reason he sent this request was because he did not want the Japanese to enlist their former lacky against him. At the meeting, according to a Japanese intelligence report, Zhang Xueliang insisted that Chiang Kai-Shek personally come north and assume direct command of the Northern troops. Chiang Kai-Shek refused on the grounds he had to deal with the communists in Jiangxi and sent in his place Yang Que, the current president of the Army Staff College and a graduate of the Japanese Army War College. Yang would arrive to Peiping with his staff on January 30th, where he devised a plan for joint operations with Zhang Xueliang. They anticipated the Kwantung Army would cross the Great Wall at Shanhaiguan, so their basic strategy was to concentrate a large force in its region, especially east of the Luan River. That forces mission would be to defend at all costs the front line at Qinhuangdao. The Japanese intelligence indicated the Chinese had roughly 50,000 men, including 7700 men of the 25th Division ld by Kuan Lincheng and 12800 men of the 2nd Division led by Yang Que who were sent to Miyun and Gubeikou. There were also reports that ancient art objects and documents from Peiping were being transported to Nanjing, beginning on January 10th. To the Chinese public this was shocking news as one could imagine. Operation Nekka was unleashed and showcased the rapid efficiency of the Kwantung Army. By March 2nd, the IJA 6th Division routed the 41st Army of General Sun Tienying; the IJA 14th Mixed Brigade of the IJA 8th Division captured the Lengkou pass on March 4th; while the Kawahara detachment captured Chengde near the border with Hubei. General Nishi then assembld his main force at Lingyuan as the 14th Mixed Brigade withdrew to Chapeng. On March 4th, Muto issued Order 480, directing the troops "to make preparations for operations in North China, firmly seizing the major passes along the Great Wall, mopping up resistance by remnant troops and bandits, and restoring peace and order in Jehol province." One unit of the IJA 8th Division was given the task of seizing the Gubeikou Pass and advanced to such on the 7th. Within the vicinity of Changshanyu, around 40 kilometers southwest of Chengde, they encountered 5000 advancing Chinese forces. Here one of the first of many fierce battles along the Great Wall came to be. Until roughly March 20th, the Kwantung Army was met with fierce counterattacks, coming from the main gateways of the Great Wall. Initially the fighting went tremendously wall for the Japanese, yet by March 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade had taken Tungqiaku, Tiehmenkuan and Xifengkou. Two days later the IJA 8th Division began an assault upon Gubeikou. Nishi then sent the Hayakawa Brigade to seize Lowenyukou. Then on the 10th, after receiving reports the main passes were secured, General Muto took his HQ from Jinzhu to Changchun, believing everything was already won and done. However he would be very wrong, they had misjudged the Chinese strength. On the 13th, Muti and Nishi received a report, that on the night of the 10th, the 14th Mixed Brigade at Xifengkou had come under heavy attack by a Chinese force led by General Song Qeyuang. Reinforcements were rapidly sent over, but they were unable to relieve the trapped brigade. On the 14th, Muto ordered...
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3.145 Fall and Rise of China: What was Manchukuo?
04/07/2025
3.145 Fall and Rise of China: What was Manchukuo?
Last time we spoke about Operation Jinzhou and the defense of Harbin. In the tumultuous landscape of early 1930s China, Chiang Kai-shek hesitated to engage in combat, fearing internal factions and the looming threat of the CCP. Zhang Xueliang, commanding a substantial force, felt pressure from both the Japanese and his own government. As tensions escalated, the Kwantung Army launched a brutal campaign against Jinzhou, leading to its fall. Amidst chaos, resistance leaders like Ma Zhanshan and Ding Chao emerged, rallying against Japanese aggression, determined to protect their homeland despite limited support. In November, the Jilin Provincial Anti-Japanese Government formed under Cheng Yun, rallying over 3,000 troops led by Feng Zhanhai against Japanese forces. After several battles, including the retaking of Shulan, they faced fierce resistance but ultimately had to retreat. As the Japanese advanced, the Jilin Self-Defense Army was established, but after intense fighting, Harbin fell to the Japanese on February 6. Despite earlier victories, the Chinese resistance crumbled, leading to the establishment of Manchukuo and the end of organized resistance in Manchuria. #145 What was Manchukuo? Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. To start off this episode I want to turn back to our old friend Ishiwara Kanji. Ishiwara's ambition to dominate Manchuria was primarily a means to an end: to secure resources and a strategic position against America. After gaining control of Manchuria, Ishiwara shifted his focus toward another objective: fostering racial cooperation among Asian peoples. His vision for Manchukuo, or rather his interpretation of it, served as a launching pad for his idea of an East-Asian league, rooted firmly in his Final War theory. During his time in Manchuria in 1932, this Pan-Asian concept of Manchukuo distinguished him from many of his colleagues in the Kwantung Army and marked him as unconventional within the Imperial Japanese Army . As many of you may know, Manchukuo was a fraudulent puppet state designed to legitimize Japan’s takeover of Manchuria. The Japanese high command aimed to disguise their invasion of this part of China as an indigenous independence movement. To achieve this, they installed Puyi, the last Qing emperor, as the figurehead of Manchukuo while promoting ideals of racial harmony. This facade was necessary, as controlling a population that harbored resentment towards them required some effort to win their favor. Fortunately for the Japanese, there were factions in Manchuria that actually desired independence. This region was the heartland of Nurhaci’s Manchu people—yes that guy we spoke about all the way back in the beginning of this podcast. The Japanese had considerable leverage, framing their actions as a noble revival of the Qing dynasty or a restoration of power to the Manchu. Additionally, there was a significant Mongolian presence, and Inner Mongolia would soon play a role in these events. Manchuria was reluctantly drawn into the nationalist movement, and it shared Japan's apprehension towards the USSR, having faced its own struggles against it for a long time. Moreover, a large population of Japanese settlers in Manchuria welcomed the takeover, as the Zhang Xueliang regime had not been particularly accommodating to them, implementing various discriminatory measures. Zhang Xueliang's alliance with the Nationalists effectively sealed the fate of the Japanese settlers, who anticipated expulsion. As military operations progressed, Ishiwara and Itagaki convened with other prominent Kwantung officers to strategize control over Manchuria. They met with Officer Katakura, Chief of Staff Miyake, and Dohihara Kenji from the Mukden special service, reviewing a prior plan by Colonel Dohihara for a multi-ethnic autonomous nation in Manchuria. This entity was to be led by Puyi, possessing complete autonomy in internal matters, while defense and foreign relations would be managed by Japan. Ishiwara drafted the plans by September 22nd, which were sent to Tokyo on October 2nd. Although Tokyo's high command disapproved of the objectives, they collaborated with the Kwantung Army for five months to establish a new state based on two main principles: the purported indigenous movement for Manchurian independence and the administrative framework for Kwantung Army control. The Kwantung Army proceeded to utilize Manchuria's traditional structure of local self-governing bodies. Throughout 1931, they bribed, persuaded, and threatened local leaders to foster a movement for autonomy against the Kuomintang hardliners. One of their first initiatives was the establishment of the "Jichi Shidobu Self-Government Guidance Board," responsible for coordinating regional independence movements in collaboration with the Kwantung Army to, as Miyake put it, "guide Manchuria to self-government." The board was headed by Yu Ch’ung-han, a Mukden elder statesman educated in Japan and a former advisor to Zhang Zuolin. It comprised 20 Japanese and 10 Manchurian members. Such organizations attracted Japanese civilians in Manchuria, who supported the so-called multiracial political structure, as they could exploit it for their own interests. The Kwantung Army heavily promoted slogans like “racial harmony, racial equality, and the righteous way.” Their control over Manchuria was solidified by placing Japanese advisors in all governmental bodies with ultimate veto power, ensuring that everything was effectively under Japanese control. While it seemed that Ishiwara's vision was unfolding as planned, by 1933, he became a fierce critic of the very system he had helped establish. It’s quite ironic that the man who played a key role in initiating the conquest of Manchuria would be unable to exert his influence in shaping Manchukuo. While Ishiwara Kanji served as the operations officer officially responsible for planning and executing military operations to capture Manchuria, the political arrangements for the new state fell outside his control. Nevertheless, Ishiwara was very vocal about his views on the development of Manchukuo, strongly advocating for racial harmony. He persistently urged his colleagues that the economic growth of Manchukuo should embody the spirit of racial cooperation. Ishiwara believed that the economic interests of Manchukuo would naturally align with those of the Kwantung Army, as both aimed for the unity of Asia against the West. He was gravely mistaken. Ishiwara was driven by his theory of a final war, and everything he did was aimed at preparing for it; thus, his fixation on racial harmony was part of this broader strategy. In March 1932, the self-government guidance board was dissolved, transferring its functions and regional organizations to newly established bureaus within the Manchukuo government. In April, an organization called the Kyowakai (Concordia Association) was formed, led by Yamaguchi Juji and Ozawa Kaisaku, with the goal of promoting racial harmony. This initiative received support from members of the Kwantung Army, including Ishiwara, Itagaki, and Katakura. The Kwantung Army invested heavily in the organization, which quickly gained traction—at least among the Japanese. General Honjo expressed concerns about the organization’s potential political influence in Manchukuo; he preferred it to remain an educational entity rather than evolve into an official political party. By "educational role," he meant it should serve as a propaganda tool for the Kwantung Army, allowing them to exert influence over Manchukuo without significant commitment. But to Ishiwara the Concordia Association was the logical means to unify the new nation, guiding its political destiny, to be blunt Ishiwara really saw it should have much more authority than his colleagues believed it should. Ishiwara complained in August of 1932, that Manchuria was a conglomerate of conflicting power centers such as the Kwantung army, the new Manchukuo government, the Kwantung government, the Mantetsu, consular office and so on. Under so many hats he believed Manchukuo would never become a truly unified modern state, and of course he was one of the few people that actually wanted it to be so. He began arguing the Kwantung army should turn over its political authority as soon as possible so “Japanese of high resolve should hasten to the great work of the Manchurian Concordia Association, for I am sure that we Japanese will be its leaders. In this way Manchukuo will not depend on political control from Japan, but will be an independent state, based on Japanese Manchurian cooperation. Guided by Japanese, it will be a mode of Sino-Japanese friendship, an indicator of the present trends of world civilization” Needless to say the Concordia Association made little headway with the Chinese and it began to annoy Japanese leaders. The association gradually was bent into a spiritless propaganda and intelligence arm of the IJA, staffed largely by elite Japanese working in the Manchukuo government. Ishiwara started utilizing the Concordia Association to advocate for various causes, including the return of leased territories like the Railway zone, the abolition of extraterritoriality, and equal pay for different races working in Manchukuo—efforts aimed at fostering racial harmony. However, this advocacy clashed significantly with the Japanese military's interests, damaging Ishiwara's reputation. As a result, the staff of the Kwantung Army began to shift dramatically, leaving Ishiwara increasingly isolated, except for Itagaki and a few loyal supporters. The higher-ups had grown weary of the disruptive Concordia Association and gradually took control, ensuring that discussions about concessions were halted. In August 1932, Ishiwara received a new assignment, and he appeared eager to leave Manchuria. Now that finishes off our story of Ishiwara, he will return later on in future episodes. Again if you want a full sort of biography on him, check out my youtube channel or Echoes of War podcast where I have a 4 part series on him. Now I want to get more into the specifics of what exactly was this new state known as Manchukuo? During the mayhem that was the invasion of Manchuria, by October 6th of 1931, the Japanese cabinet had finally relented and decided to no longer interfere with the establishment of a new regime in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The remaining disagreement between the Japanese government, Tokyo General HQ and the Kwantung army was not whether or not to establish a new regime, but whether or not to promote the establishment of a new regime. Japan obviously did not want to break the Washington system established by the treaty of Versailles. Yet they of course wanted to expand Japanese interest in Manchuria. So it was to be a delicate game of chess balancing their interests in coordination with the western powers. This was specifically why Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro had opposed direct participation of Japanese soldiers in the establishment of a new regime, because clearly it would open Japan to condemnation from the west. Over the course of the invasion, Japan managed to occupy the 3 northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang by establishing pro-japanese regimes within each under Zhang Shiyi, Xi Qia and Ma Zhanshan respectively. On September 20, 1931, Jianchuan proposed the establishment of a Japanese-backed regime led by Puyi during a meeting with Honjo Shigeru, the commander of the Kwantung Army. Obviously Jianchuan was in league and under the influence of our old friend Doihara. Two days later, on September 22, the Kwantung Army General Staff developed the "Solution to the Manchuria-Mongolia Issue," based on Doihara's suggestion to create a Five-Nation Republic in Manchuria and Mongolia, with Japan as the "leader." The plan outlined the establishment of a new regime under Puyi, supported by Japan, to govern the 3 northeastern provinces and Mongolia. The new regime would entrust Japan with national defense and diplomacy, as well as the management of key transportation and communication infrastructure. It also proposed appointing Xi Qia, Zhang Haipeng, Tang Yulin, Yu Zhishan, and Zhang Jinghui to oversee garrisons in locations such as Jilin, Taonan, Rehe, Dongbiandao, and Harbin. To execute this plan, the Japanese Kwantung Army, led by Chief of Staff Itagaki, utilized local intelligence agencies and some mainland ronin to initiate a so-called strategic operation. To facilitate the plan's implementation, the Kwantung Army informed the commander of the Japanese Army in Tianjin that afternoon, requesting immediate "protection" for Emperor Xuantong. After the Kwantung Army took control of Jinzhou, it believed the moment was right to establish the hastily assembled puppet regime. To secure the full backing of the Japanese government and the military leadership, the Kwantung Army decided to send Itagaki back to Tokyo for negotiations. At that time, Itagaki had a fairly detailed plan to present. The proposed "Manchuria-Mongolia Central Government" aimed to create a centralized power structure that would be distinct from mainland China, effectively becoming a truly "independent" nation. They intended to appoint local collaborators as officials at all levels and were prepared to fabricate "public opinion" to obscure global perceptions of Japan's scheme to establish this regime. This of course was highly influenced by the announcement from the League of Nations that they would be investigating the entire incident in what would become known as the Lytton Commission. Thus they believed it was essential to set up the regime before the League of Nations investigation team arrived in Manchuria. They understood that if these actions were "carried out directly by Japan," they would violate both the Nine-Power Treaty and the League of Nations. However, they reasoned that if the Chinese initiated the separation themselves, it would not contradict the principles of those treaties. The Kwantung Army established puppet organizations using collaborators, starting with the "Liaoning Provincial Local Maintenance Association," which was formed on September 25, 1931. The association's chairman, Yuan Jinkai, represented the civil governance faction of the Fengtian clique. After the First Zhili-Fengtian War, he was appointed governor of Fengtian Province by the Zhili government, which led to his unpopularity with Zhang Zuolin. At the time of the incident, he was already retired. The association's vice chairman, Kan Chaoxi, had previously served as the governor of Rehe and commander of the Third Division. He fell out of favor with Zhang Zuolin due to his involvement with Guo Songling and subsequently retired. A common characteristic of the puppet organizations created by the Kwantung Army is that they always included Japanese advisors, regardless of their level. The "Liaoning Provincial Local Maintenance Association" was no exception, hiring Kanai Shoji, head of the health section of the local department of the Manchurian Railway and chairman of the Manchurian Youth League, as its top advisor. In the Japanese-occupied Fengtian, this highest advisor effectively became the leader of the maintenance association. While the association was ostensibly responsible for maintaining local order, it actually functioned as a tool for Japan to establish a puppet regime. Recruiting discontented officials and creating puppet institutions was just a minor part of the Kwantung Army's strategy to set up a puppet regime. The crucial factor in this endeavor was gaining the support of influential local warlords. To achieve this, the Japanese Kwantung Army, along with various intelligence agencies, employed a mix of soft and hard tactics, including coercion and incentives. As a result, they successfully pressured figures such as Yu Zhishan, Zhang Haipeng, Zhang Jinghui, Xi Qia, Zang Shiyi, and Ma Zhanshan to defect to the Japanese forces. Following the Mukden Incident, former Qing nobles who had hoped to restore the Qing Dynasty believed the moment had arrived. Xi Qia, a member of the former Qing royal family and the Chief of Staff of the Jilin Provincial Army at the time, took advantage of the Jilin governor's absence due to his mother's funeral to open the gates of Jilin and surrender to Japan. This made Xi Qia the first Chinese official to collaborate with the Japanese invaders since their invasion of China. He sent a secret letter to the abdicated Qing emperor Puyi, urging him to return to "the birthplace of the ancestors, restore the Qing Dynasty, and rescue the people from their suffering," with the backing of "friendly nations". Xi Qia and the former Manchu nobles, who had elevated him to acting governor of Jilin Province, proposed to the Japanese to invite Puyi to the Northeast to establish a monarchy. The Japanese Kwantung Army had already identified Puyi as a suitable puppet leader. After the 15 year war had concluded, under interrogation, Shirono Hiroshi confessed that the reason why the Japanese chose Puyi was: First, Puyi had “no connection with the Kuomintang in mainland China”; Secondly, "some old classes in the Northeast and Mongolia still have traditional yearnings for the Qing Dynasty"; Third, “the peasants in general… seemed to welcome the kingly political system implemented by the Aisin-Gioro family.” On November 8th, 1931, Doihara orchestrated the "Tianjin Incident" and covertly removed Puyi from his home in the Japanese Concession in Tianjin. They traveled through Dagukou, Yingkou, and Lushun before arriving in Fushun. By February 5th, 1932, the Japanese army had taken control of Harbin, stabilizing the situation in North Manchuria. Afterwards the Kwantung Army Headquarters organized a series of "National Construction Staff Meetings" to plan for a "National Construction Conference" involving collaborators. On February 16th, leaders from the Northeast provinces, including Zhang Jinghui, Xi Qia, Ma Zhanshan, Zang Shiyi, Xie Jieshi, Yu Chonghan, Zhao Xinbo, and Yuan Jinkai, gathered for the "Northeast Political Affairs Conference" at the Yamato Hotel in Shenyang. The meeting was led by Honjo Shigeru, the commander of the Kwantung Army. They decided to invite Puyi to rule the puppet state of "Manchukuo" and assigned government positions to the attendees. Notably, Itagaki Seishirō was appointed as the head of the Fengtian Special Agency and the chief advisor to the Military and Political Department of Manchukuo. On February 18th, the "Northeast Administrative Committee" issued a "Declaration of Independence," stating: "From now on, we declare that the regions of Manchuria and Mongolia will be separated from the Chinese central government. Based on the free choice and appeal of the residents of Manchuria and Mongolia, these regions will achieve complete independence and establish a fully independent government." On February 23rd, Itagaki met with Puyi in Fushun to inform him that he would be the "ruler" of Manchukuo. Although Puyi...
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3.144 Fall and Rise of China: First Battle of Shanghai 1932
03/31/2025
3.144 Fall and Rise of China: First Battle of Shanghai 1932
Last time we spoke about the January 28th Incident. In January of 1932, tensions escalated in Shanghai as anti-Japanese sentiments surged after Japan's invasion of Manchuria. Orchestrated by Yoshiko Kawashima, a Japanese spy, a provocation led to violence, sparking outrage among Japanese expatriates. Japan demanded apologies and compensation from China, threatening military action if their demands were unmet. As the Japanese military amassed forces in Shanghai, the Chinese 19th Route Army prepared to resist, igniting the conflict known as the January 28th Incident, marking the beginning of a fierce struggle for control. Amidst chaos, the Nanjing government struggled to respond to Japan's escalating aggression in Shanghai. Chiang Kai-Shek prioritized avoiding war, urging a diplomatic approach to protect Shanghai's economy. Despite pressure, the 19th Route Army was ordered to withdraw, but tensions flared when Japan attacked the Chinese garrison. The 19th Route Army fiercely resisted, leading to intense battles. As Japan sent reinforcements, Chiang faced mounting protests and criticism for his passive stance, questioning whether he could maintain his strategy against the encroaching enemy. #144 The First Battle of Shanghai 1932 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we covered the January 28th Incident. At 11:30 pm on January 28, Japan ordered 2,300 Japanese Marines to advance westward along every branch road on the west side of North Sichuan Road, without waiting for a response. This road, which crosses into the northern area of the International Settlement and has frequently been designated as a Japanese defense zone, includes Target Road (now known as Wujin Road in Hongkou District, Shanghai), Qiujiang Road, and Yokohama Road. Their objective was to seize the Songhu Railway defense line at Tiantong'an Station. They faced strong resistance from the 19th Route Army, further escalating the conflict. In the early hours of the 29th, Japanese aircraft launched from the Notoro seaplane carrier, which was moored on the Huangpu River, attacked the Chinese district of Zhabei. Both the Commercial Press located at No. 584 Baoshan Road and the Oriental Library, the largest private library in China with over 300,000 books, were completely destroyed. That same day the 19th Route Army sent a telegram to the entire nation concerning the situation: Do forgive me it's a rough translation “Urgent. Dear Sir and Madam, the Japanese have occupied our three northeastern provinces, changing the color of our territory and making our nation perish. Recently, they have killed and set fire in Shanghai, and vagrants are everywhere, doing the most despicable and violent things in the world. Gunboats are coming one after another, and the Marines are all landed. At 12:00 a.m. on the 28th, they openly invaded our defense line in Zhabei, Shanghai, and challenged us. Guang Nai and others are soldiers, and they only know that it is their duty to defend themselves and defend their land. They cannot give up even an inch of land or an inch of grass. They resist to save the country and protect the race. Even if they sacrifice only one person and one bullet, they will never retreat and lose the personality of the soldiers of the Republic of China. This thing and this ambition are exposed to the sun and the sun and are known to the world. The spirits of our ancestors in heaven are truly relying on it”. On the morning of January 29, Chiang Kai-shek met with He Yingqin and Zhu Peide to discuss countermeasures. Simultaneously Zhu Peide convened a meeting with He Yingqin, Gu Zhutong, Li Jishen, Deng Shizeng, Lin Wei, and others to address issues such as defense deployment, the security of Nanjing and the Yangtze River, and resistance against Japan. Chiang Kai-Shek established the principles going forward for negotiations with Japan, emphasizing the need to prepare for talks while actively resisting. He stated that negotiations must have a clear final line of defense and a maximum limit that would not compromise administrative and territorial integrity, undermine the spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty, or jeopardize national sovereignty. If these limits were exceeded and unacceptable concessions were made, a decisive battle would be fought, even at the cost of defeat and death. The defense and military strategy for Beijing and Shanghai included the 19th Route Army defending Shanghai with full strength, while the front guard army consisting of the 87th and 88th divisions would protect Nanjing. He Yingqin would remain in Nanjing, overseeing all party, government, and military personnel left behind. Chiang, along with the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Government, and Chen Mingshu, all expressed their commitment to resisting Japanese aggression. Chiang also sent a telegram to He Chengjun, director of the Hubei Province Pacification Office, and Xu Tingyao, commander of the Fourth Division, stating "Last night, the Japanese invaders attacked our 19th Route Defense Line in Zhabei, Shanghai, and the battle is ongoing. Our army is determined to fight to the death. Their naval forces in Han and Xun will likely engage in military operations. We urge you to remain vigilant and defend yourselves, never yielding to them. The Fourth Division should concentrate on strict defense in Wuhan and avoid dispersal. If military funds become scarce, local governments will need to raise them independently." The National Government Military Committee appointed Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Xueliang as members responsible for mobilizing the army and commanding the Shanghai War. Chiang Kai-Shek officially resumed power after resigning to prevent a surrender and committed to a prolonged resistance. On January 30, the Chinese Nationalist Government announced the relocation of the capital to Luoyang. Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram urging resistance against the Japanese and dispatched the elite Fifth Army to reinforce Shanghai. That night, Dai Ji, the commander of the Songhu Garrison, took charge of military operations in Shanghai, overseeing the 19th Route Army. The commander-in-chief was Jiang Guangnai, with Cai Tingkai as the army commander and division commanders Qu Shounian, Mao Weishou, and Shen Guanghan. Chiang Kai-Shek then issued a telegram to his troops across the nation and again I apologize for the rough translation. "Since the Northeast Incident began, the Central Government has been enduring humiliation and maintaining peace in order to avoid war and protect the lifeline of the country. It hopes to use justice and fairness to awaken the Japanese pirates. Unexpectedly, the more we tolerate, the more arrogant they become. When the Shanghai Incident occurred, we accepted their demands with great pain, but the Japanese pirates still brazenly pressed on, repeatedly attacking our Shanghai Defense Force, bombing civilian houses, throwing bombs on the streets, and our compatriots were ravaged. The country is about to perish. Anyone with blood in his veins would rather endure it. Since the 19th Route Army has risen up to defend itself bravely, our entire army In this time of national destruction and extinction, when the revolutionary soldiers are facing imminent danger, they should fight for the dignity of the country, strive for the survival of the nation, fulfill their responsibilities for the revolution, and be determined to die rather than live in disgrace, so as to deal with the brutal Japan that destroys peace and despises faith and integrity... Chiang Kai-shek and his comrades have shared hardships for a long time. Although I am now in the opposition, I am willing to swear to live and die with the soldiers and fulfill my bounden duty. I am here to inform you in advance with my blood and sincerity, and ask you to be determined and work hard, share the same hatred with the enemy, do not be arrogant, maintain the spirit of sacrifice, stay ready to fight, and save the country from danger." From that day on, the various ministries, commissions and committees of the National Government began to move to Luoyang, but the Military Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained in Nanjing . At the same time, the frontline troops were ordered to be jointly commanded by the Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin and the Chief of the General Staff Zhu Peide. Typically Chinese sources breakdown what is known as the First Battle of Shanghai into three phases. In the previous episode we looked through the event up until the point of the first phase. After the initial fighting, both the 19th route army and Japanese agreed to a ceasefire so they could strengthen their positions and at least allow some form of diplomacy to occur. This went into effect on the 29th. As we mentioned, immediately afterwards the Japanese rapidly began reinforcing their position in Shanghai. They first sent the Sasebo 26th Squadron on the 30th, bearing 474 troops of the Sasebo 3rd Special Marine Corps alongside supplies. The next day the aircraft carriers Kaga and Hosho came over with 30 aircraft from the 1st air fleet. Then the cruisers Naka, Yura and Abukuma alongside 4 torpedo boats came bearing another 2000 marines. On February 1st the Terukoku Maru brought over the Yokosuka 1st Special Marine corps, roughly 525 men who landed at Huishan Wharf. With all that said and done, roughly 7000 Japanese troops had been brought over. On February 1st, the IJN warships began bombarding Nanjing from the Yangtze River, prompting Yu Jishi to frantically demand Chiang Kai-Shek transfer more troops to Shanghai. That night the Japanese light cruiser Tenryu, the protected cruisers Hirado and Taima, and the seven ships of the Navy's 23rd Destroyer Squadron fired upon Nanjing using four 140mm guns, 12 152mm single-mounted rapid-fire guns, 12 120mm single-mounted guns, and 20 76mm single-mounted rapid-fire guns. The rich and officials fled the city for refuge, but the Japanese army did not land any men to follow up the attack. Simultaneously 40,000 Shanghai workers from over 20 Japanese owned cotton mills began an anti-Japanese strike, being heavily backed by Communists. The workers began aiding the 19th route army to blockade the Japanese in the factories and streets and sabotage what they could. On February 2nd, the Japanese army attacked Wusong several times, but was repelled each time. On the 3rd the Japanese expanded their attacks against Zhabei, Baziqiao and other locations, but the Chinese defenders successfully repelled these assaults as well. On the 4th, the Japanese launched their first major offensive, which extended the conflict to Jiangwan and Wusong. Following a day of intense fighting, the Wusong fort was destroyed by enemy bombardment; however, the Japanese army was unable to land due to the determined resistance of the Chinese defenders. The anti-aircraft artillery company from the 88th Division, reassigned to the 4th Regiment of the 156th Brigade of the 19th Route Army, managed to shoot down a Japanese aircraft. After the failure of the general offensive, Yukiichi Shiozawa was dismissed and sent back to Japan. Vice Admiral Yoshisaburo Nomura, the newly appointed commander of the Third Fleet, succeeded Shiozawa. After Nomura assumed his role, the Japanese army began to bolster its forces. Japan had initially planned to deploy troops when tensions escalated in Shanghai, but the navy had opposed this move. However, as the situation deteriorated, the navy was compelled to seek assistance from the army. On February 2, the Japanese cabinet officially decided to send troops. In response to the urgent circumstances in Shanghai, they resolved to dispatch the Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade, led by Brigade Commander Major General Shimomoto Kuma, along with the 9th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Ueda Kenkichi. The Shanghai Dispatch Mixed Brigade and the Second Independent Tank Squadron were prioritized for transport. Concurrently, the Japanese Navy also sent the Yokosuka 2nd Special Marine Corps to Shanghai. The 24th Mixed Brigade landed in Wusong on the afternoon of February 7. By this time, the combined forces of the Japanese navy, army, and air force had exceeded 10,000 personnel. At dawn on February 8, the Japanese Army's 24th Mixed Brigade launched an attack on Zhanghuabang, Yunzaobang, and Wusong Town along three routes, but they were repelled by our forces. Meanwhile on February 4, the National Government Military Commission sent out a telegram that divided the country into four defense zones. The first zone, which includes the area north of the Yellow River, was assigned to Zhang Xueliang as the commander-in-chief. The second zone, covering the area south of the Yellow River, was placed under the command of Chiang Kai-shek. The third zone, encompassing the area south of the Yangtze River as well as Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, was led by He Yingqin. The fourth zone, which includes Guangdong and Guangxi, was commanded by Chen Jitang. The telegram also stated that, aside from maintaining troops for local stability, all commanders were to concentrate their forces within their respective defense zones to confront the aggressive Japanese. Additionally, a directive was issued for the provinces of Sichuan, Hunan, Guizhou, Hubei, Shaanxi, and Henan to send troops to serve as a general reserve. On February 5, upon learning that the Japanese army had been redeployed from mainland China to Shanghai, Chairman of the Military Commission Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram from Luoyang to He Yingqin. He instructed that if the Japanese forces landed, the Chinese Air Force would engage in combat. Additionally, Chiang sent a message of condolence to Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and Dai Ji of the 19th Route Army, stating "Brothers, you have been fighting valiantly for a week. Each time I reflect on the tremendous sacrifices made by the soldiers and their dedication, I feel a deep sadness... If necessary, Zhong (Zheng) can come to lead in person. When the Air Force enters the fray, the Army must establish various signals in advance to communicate with it and ensure coordinated efforts..." On the same day, the 88th Division arrived in Suzhou. On February 6, Chiang ordered the 261st Brigade of the 87th Division to move from Nanjing to reinforce Kunshan. The troops reached Kunshan on February 7. On February 8, Chiang directed He Yingqin to transfer an artillery battalion to support the 19th Route Army. Then, on February 9, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized the First Division, led by Commander Hu Zongnan, and the Seventh Division, commanded by Wang Jun, to prepare for reinforcement of the 19th Route Army in Shanghai. February 8th marks the second phase of the battle. On the 10th, to ensure that the 88th Division of the Central Army complied with the orders from the 19th Route Army of the Guangdong Army, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Yu Jishi insisting that "your troops must strictly follow the commands of Commander-in-Chief Chiang and coordinate their movements with allied forces." The Japanese Marine Corps, under Yukio Shiozawa, initiated a three-pronged encirclement attack from Hongkou. The National Army mounted a determined defense and ultimately repelled the Japanese forces, pursuing and destroying them, which significantly lowered their morale. On February 11, Chen Cheng, commander of the Central Army's 18th Army, sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek from Ji'an, Jiangxi, reporting that the troops had not been paid for nearly two months and were lacking food. At that time, the National Government was planning to redeploy the National Army that had been engaged in suppressing the Communists in Jiangxi to Zhejiang and Shanghai and to relocate the capital to Luoyang. On February 12, following a battle at Caojiaqiao, the Japanese army's strategy to consolidate their forces was entirely disrupted. The next morning, February 13, the Japanese 24th Mixed Brigade crossed the Caojiaqiao Bridge in Zhuozaobang and engaged with the Nationalist army. Seizing the moment, the 19th Route Army Headquarters aimed to annihilate the Japanese forces. The Nationalist army surrounded the Japanese troops near the Yong'an Cotton Mill. Additionally, 60 members of a suicide squad launched a suicide attack, resulting in the complete destruction of 1,600 Japanese soldiers. The Japanese army faced significant losses, thwarting their attempt to swiftly capture Wusong. On February 14, Chiang ordered the 88th and 87th Divisions, which were already stationed in Nanxiang and Kunshan near Shanghai, to be reorganized into the Fifth Army. He appointed Zhang Zhizhong, a volunteer eager to fight against the Japanese, as the commander of the Fifth Army. This new army was placed under the unified command of the 19th Route Army and took over the defense line stretching from the northern end of Jiangwan through Miaoxing to the western end of Wusong. It served as the left-wing army, while the 19th Route Army acted as the right-wing, tasked with defending Jiangwan, the area south of Dachang, and the urban region of Shanghai. To replenish the 19th Route Army's losses, Chiang repeatedly ordered reinforcements from various locations. For instance, on February 15, Shangguan Yunxiang dispatched 500 active soldiers from Bengbu to the 19th Route Army; on February 17, Liang Guanying sent 500 unarmed soldiers from Qingjiangpu; and on February 19, Liu Zhi contributed 1,000 active unarmed soldiers from Henan. On February 16, Chiang Kai-shek communicated with Finance Minister Song Ziwen via telegram, stating, "Since the Japanese refuse to withdraw their troops from Shanghai, we must resist until the end. ... Food supplies in Jiangxi and Henan will dwindle, and assistance will be completely halted. Please arrange to deposit 10 million yuan in central banknotes in Nanchang and 20 million yuan in Zhengzhou. This will allow the government to continue functioning, the army to be sustained, and perhaps we can navigate this crisis and avert collapse. This is my final request. I hope you can find a way to assist." To prevent any friction between the Fifth Army and the Nineteenth Route Army over competing for military accolades, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Zhang Zhizhong and Yu Jishi on February 18. "The fight against Japan is a matter of national survival and is not a matter of honor for an individual or a certain unit. Our frontline officers and men should fully understand this. Therefore, the honor of the 19th Route Army is the honor of our entire National Revolutionary Army. There is absolutely no distinction between honor and disgrace. The Fifth Army's joining the front line is feared by the enemy and will also be slandered by the reactionaries (those who oppose the Nanjing Central Government). If we can continue to fight in the name of the 19th Route Army, it will be enough to demonstrate the strength of our National Revolutionary Army. We will share life and death, let alone honor and disgrace. I hope that this will be conveyed to the officers and men of the Fifth Army. They must...
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3.143 Fall and Rise of China: January 28th Incident
03/17/2025
3.143 Fall and Rise of China: January 28th Incident
Last time we spoke about the Jinzhou Operation and Defense of Harbin. After the Mukden Incident, Zhang Xueliang, despite commanding a large army, was pressured into non-resistance against Japan. As tensions escalated, the Japanese bombed Jinzhou to intimidate Zhang Xueliang and the Kwantung Army prepared to invade. By January 1, 1932, Zhang's forces retreated, marking a significant loss for China. Meanwhile, Ma Zhanshan emerged as a resistance hero, navigating complex alliances against Japanese aggression. In the face of Japanese aggression, Ding Chao rallied forces in Harbin, a crucial city in Northeast China. Together with Ma Zhanshan and other generals, they formed the Kirin self-defense army to resist the Japanese advance. Despite fierce battles, including victories at Shuiqu and Shulan, the Japanese ultimately launched a full-scale assault. After intense fighting, Harbin fell on February 5, 1932. The resistance crumbled, leading to Ma Zhanshan's defection and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. #143 The January 28th Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the words of Ron Burgundy, “phew, Boy, that escalated quickly... I mean, that really got out of hand fast”. Ishiwara Kanji unleashed the Mukden Incident, beginning a series of military conflicts. The Kwantung army invaded all three provinces of Manchuria, Ma Zhanshan tried to fight back at Heilongjiang, Ding Chao at Harbin and Zhang Xueliang at Jinhouz. All of this culminated in the conquest of Manchuria and the establishment of the new puppet state of Manchukuo. Yet another significant conflict also broke out in Shanghai of all places. Now before we start this one I want to point out there are a lot of bias issues with how this incident began. It is known as the January 28th Incident or the First Battle of Shanghai. There are a few arguments as to how exactly it began, but the two main narratives are as such. During the invasion of Manchuria, anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out across China, particularly in large cities like Shanghai and Guangzhou. In most Japanese sources, these demonstrations got out of hand, requiring military action to defend Japanese citizens and property in Shanghai. Now as for Chinese sources, and I will say it here, I place a lot more credibility on the Chinese side on this one, during the Invasion of Manchuria, the League of Nations passed resolutions to get the Japanese to withdraw their troops and many of the members expressed support for China. Although the United States was not a member of the League, Secretary of State Stimson issued a "non-recognition" note in response to Japan's occupation of Jinzhou, aiming to pressure Japan. This isolation in the international arena heightened anxiety within the Japanese government and military, prompting them to seek conflicts in other regions of China to divert attention from their invasion of Manchuria. Now a lot of trouble had been stirred up in Shanghai ever since the Mukden Incident broke out. Shanghai's business community initiated a boycott of Japanese trade, significantly impacting Japan's coastal and Yangtze River shipping industries. To give one example the "Nissin Steamship Company" halted all operations since the incident. Between July 1931 and the end of March 1932, Japanese merchants in Shanghai reportedly suffered losses amounting to 41,204,000 yen . To give you an idea, in 1930, Japanese goods accounted for 29% of Shanghai's average monthly imports, but by December 1931, this figure had plummeted to 3%. On October 5, 1931, the Japanese government convened a cabinet meeting, resolving that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would issue a stern warning to the National Government, with the Foreign Minister and Navy Minister overseeing the issue of ship deployment. Shanghai was the key hub for Western powers in China. It was here they made significant investments and maintained strong commercial interests in the region. The political and economic dynamics among these powers were intricate. Shanghai held the largest amount of foreign settlements and concessions. Any outbreak of war in Shanghai would inevitably capture international attention and prompt intervention from nations with vested interests, such as Britain, the United States, and France. On October 1, Tanaka Takayoshi, the assistant military attaché at the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai and head of the Shanghai Secret Service, was summoned to Shenyang by Colonel Seishirō Itagaki who told him "Our next move is to occupy Harbin and make Manchuria independent. We have sent Colonel Doihara to pick up Puyi. If we succeed, the League of Nations will have a big fight and the Tokyo government will have a headache. I want you to do something in Shanghai to divert the attention of other countries. When you cause a commotion, we will take Manchuria." Tanaka promised to complete the task and said that he was "training an excellent spy who can bribe Chinese troublemakers in Shanghai to start this fake war". Itagaki then withdrew 20,000 yen from the Kwantung Army's secret service funds and provided it to Tanaka for operational purposes. Now here it gets wild. Tanaka took the funds and paid a Japanese female spy named Kawashima Yoshiko, known also as Jin Bihui, but whose birthname was Aisin Giori Xianyu with the courtesy name of Dongzhen, meaning “eastern jewel”. Yes Manchu royalty, to be more precise the 14th daughter of Shanqi a Manchu prince of the Aisin Gioro clan of the former Qing Dynasty. Shanqi was a descendant of Hooge, the eldest son of Hong Taiji, it all comes full circle sometimes. After the Xinhai revolution, Xianyu was given up for adoption in 1915 to her fathers friend Naniwa Kawashima, a Japanese spy and adventurer. Thus here she took the name Yoshiko Kawashima. She was raised in Tokyo and excelled at judo and fencing. In 1922 he biological father Shanqi died and as Manchu royal tradition dictated, her biological mother committed suicide to join her husband in death. On November 22nd of 1925, Yoshiko stated the she “decided to cease being a woman forever”. Henceforth she stopped wearing a kimono, undid her traditional female hair style and took a final photo to commemorate “my farewell to life as a woman”. That same evening she went to a barbershop and got a crew cut and from there went to a men’s clothing store. A photo of this dramatic transformation appeared 5 days later in the Asahi Shimbun under the headline "Kawashima Yoshiko's Beautiful Black Hair Completely Cut Off - Because of Unfounded 'Rumors,' Makes Firm Decision to Become a Man - Touching Secret Tale of Her Shooting Herself". This title was in reference to a prior scandal where she allegedly shot herself in the chest with a pistol given to her by Iwata Ainosuke. Historians believe it is much more likely she chose to become a man because of the death of her parents, failed romances or possibly sexual abuse from her foster father. Kawashima would go on to explain to a new reporter two days later "I was born with what the doctors call a tendency toward the third sex, and so I cannot pursue an ordinary woman's goals in life... Since I was young I've been dying to do the things that boys do. My impossible dream is to work hard like a man for China, for Asia." She was in fact something of a tomboy in her youth, despite being quite beautiful. Now obviously the times being the times, those close to her were, lets just say not very receptive to this dramatic change. Thus in November of 1927, at the age of 20, her brother and adoptive father arranged her marriage in Port Arthur to one Ganjuurjab, the son of the Inner Mongolian Army General Babojab, who had led the Mongolian-Manchurian Independence Movement in 1911. The marriage lasted only three years, ending in divorce. Following this, she left Mongolia and began touring coastal cities of China before adopting a bohemian lifestyle back in Tokyo, where she had relationships with both men and women. She then moved to Shanghai's foreign concession, where she met the Japanese military attaché and intelligence officer Ryukichi Tanaka. This takes us back to our story at hand. On the afternoon of January 18th, 1932, Yoshiko Kawashima orchestrated an incident by enlisting two Japanese Nichiren monks and three other Japanese supporters to stir up trouble at the Sanyou Industrial Company headquarters on Mayushan Road, located near the East District of the Shanghai International Settlement. The group of five Japanese individuals watched the worker volunteer army training outside the factory and threw stones to provoke a confrontation, intentionally sparking a conflict. Prior to this, Yoshiko Kawashima had also hired thugs disguised as workers to blend in with the crowd. During the altercation, the five Japanese individuals were attacked by unknown assailants. The Japanese Consulate General later reported that one of the Japanese individuals had died and another was seriously injured. However, the police were unable to apprehend the culprits, prompting Japan to accuse the Chinese factory patrol team of being behind the attack. This event became known as the "Japanese monk incident." At 2:40 am on January 20, following orders from Yoshiko, the military police captain Chiharu Shigeto led 32 members of the Shanghai "Japanese Youth Comrades Association in China" to sneak into the Sanyou Industrial Company factory. They brought guns, bayonets, and other weapons, along with flammable materials such as saltpeter and kerosene. Dozens of members of the Japanese Youth Association set fire to the Sanyou Industrial Society at night , and hacked to death and injured two Chinese policemen from the Municipal Council who came to organize firefighting. That afternoon, Tanaka Takayoshi instigated 1,200 Japanese expatriates to gather at the Japanese Residents' Association on Wenjianshi Road, and marched along Beichuan Road to the Japanese Marine Corps Headquarters at the north end of the road, demanding that the Japanese Marine Corps intervene. When they reached Qiujiang Road, they started rioting and attacked Chinese shops. In response, Shanghai Mayor Wu Tiecheng formally protested to Japan. Japan in return demanding a formal apology from the mayor and the apprehension of the person responsible for the death of the Japanese monk. Japan also insisted that China pay compensation for medical and funeral expenses, handle the anti-Japanese protests, and immediately disband any groups hostile to Japan. China had the option to firmly reject these unreasonable demands. On the morning of January 21, Japanese Consul General Murai Kuramatsu met with Shanghai Mayor Wu Tiecheng to express regret for the Japanese arson and the killing of Chinese police officers. He promised to arrest the Japanese ronin responsible for the fire. At the same time, he presented a formal protest regarding the "Japanese monk incident" and outlined four demands: (1) The mayor must issue an apology to the Consul General; (2) The authorities should swiftly and effectively search for, arrest, and punish the perpetrators; (3) The five victims should receive medical compensation and consolation money; (4) All illegal actions against Japan should be prohibited, with the Shanghai Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association and other anti-Japanese groups disbanded promptly. Starting on January 22, Admiral Shiozawa of the Japanese Navy and Consul General Murai demanded that Shanghai Mayor Wu dissolve anti-Japanese groups and halt any boycott activities. Representatives of Japanese business conglomerates also filed complaints with the Shanghai International Settlement’s Municipal Council, calling for an official apology from China for the offensive report and attacks on monks, and demanding that the attackers be punished. As tensions rose, the Japanese Residents Association urged Japanese naval forces in Shanghai to take measures to protect their safety. That same day Yukichi Shiozawa, Commander of the 1st Japanese Expeditionary Fleet in Shanghai, made a threatening declaration, stating that if the mayor of Shanghai failed to respond adequately to the four demands presented by Matsui, the Japanese Navy would take "appropriate action." Even before this the Japanese Navy had deployed troops and sent additional warships to Shanghai under the pretext of protecting its citizens In addition to the warships that arrived in Shanghai after the Mukden incident, the Japanese Navy sent the cruiser Oi and the 15th Destroyer Squadron (comprising four destroyers) from the mainland Wu Port on January 21. They carried over 450 personnel from the 1st Special Marine Corps along with a large supply of arms and arrived in Shanghai on January 23. The following day, the Notoro special service ship (an aircraft carrier of 14,000 tons, carrying six aircraft) anchored in Port Arthur, also arrived in Shanghai. On January 22, the Japanese government convened a meeting and decided to take appropriate measures, with Navy Minister Osumi Tsuneo handling the situation as deemed necessary. By January 25, the heads of the Japanese Navy Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a joint session, where they agreed that if the Chinese side failed to demonstrate sincerity or meet Japan's demands, force would be used to ensure compliance. They also agreed on specific “emergency actions." On January 26, the Navy Ministry met again and resolved to demonstrate Japan's military strength within the next day or two. The proposed measures were as follows: (1) If the Shanghai garrison was insufficient, the Second Fleet would be deployed; (2) Japanese citizens in Shanghai would be directly protected; (3) The Japanese Navy would secure the route from Wusong to Shanghai; (4) All Chinese vessels would be detained outside Wusongkou; (5) Additional warships would be sent to ports in Nanjing, Hankou, Guangzhou, Shantou, Xiamen, and other locations, with civil unrest in those areas also being addressed. Emperor Hirohito authorized the Japanese Navy's military actions. On the 26th, Hirohito’s military meeting, led by Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in (Prince Zaihito), ordered Yukichi Shiozawa in Shanghai to "exercise the right of self-defense." That same day, the Japanese Navy Ministry urgently deployed the 1st Torpedo Squadron (flagship "Yubari" cruiser, accompanied by the 22nd, 23rd, and 30th Destroyer Squadrons, totaling 12 destroyers), with over 460 personnel from the 2nd Special Marine Corps, which arrived in Shanghai on the afternoon of January 28. By this time, the Japanese military had gathered 24 warships, over 40 aircraft, more than 1,830 marines, and between 3,000 to 4,000 armed personnel in Shanghai, stationed across the Japanese concession and along the Huangpu River. On January 28, the Japanese Navy Ministry instructed the deployment of the aircraft carriers Kaga and Hosho, the cruisers Naka, Yura, and Abukuma, and four mine carriers from the mainland to Shanghai. Back on the 24th, 1932, Japanese intelligence agents set fire to the residence of the Japanese Ambassador to China, Shigemitsu Mamoru, in Shanghai, falsely accusing the Chinese of the act. On the 27th, Murai issued an ultimatum to the Shanghai authorities, demanding a satisfactory response to four conditions by 18:00 on the 28th, threatening necessary actions if the deadline was not met. Meanwhile, with threats and rumors of a Japanese naval landing circulating in Shanghai, the nearby 19th route army units moved closer to the International Settlement’s Little Tokyo. The 19th Route Army of the Guangdong Army was in charge of defending Shanghai at the time, with Jiang Guangnai serving as the commander-in-chief and Cai Tingkai as the commander. Chen Mingshu, the leader of the 19th Route Army and commander of the Beijing-Shanghai garrison, was a strong proponent of responding to the Japanese army's provocations. The Chinese public, along with critics of the Nanjing government, called for punishment of the Manchurian warlord forces who had failed to halt the Kwantung Army’s blitzkrieg, which encouraged officers of the 19th Route army to take a firm stance. As the Nanjing government had not enacted any policies, General Cai Tingkai and his colleagues convened an emergency meeting on January 23, pledging to resist any potential Japanese naval invasion of Shanghai at all costs. Now the Nanjing government response to this crisis was quite chaotic as you can imagine. There was still a anti communist campaign going on, Manchuria was being taken over and Chiang Kai-Shek fully understood they could ill afford an all out war with Japan. There was a general feeling things were getting out of hand, the league of nations were failing to do anything. Thus Chiang Kai-Shek retained his passive stance. On January 23rd after extensive consultations with Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek, newly appointed Executive Yuan President Sun Ke urgently telegraphed Shanghai Mayor Wu Tiecheng. "Our priority should be the preservation of Shanghai as the economic center, adopting a moderate stance towards Japan's demands. We must immediately gather all sectors to diplomatically explain our position and avoid conflict to prevent Shanghai from being seized by force." That same day, Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin also sent a telegram to Wu Tiecheng, emphasizing, "Shanghai is our economic hub, and we must continue peaceful negotiations and avoid conflict." On that same day He Yingqin instructed the 19th Route Army to withdraw from Shanghai and relocate west of Nanxiang within five days. Zhang Jingjiang then invited Cai Tingkai to Du Yuesheng’s home, where he convinced the 19th Route Army to "withdraw to the Nanxiang area to avoid confrontation with the Japanese." Upon learning of the Nationalist government’s position, both Chiang Kai-shek and Cai Ying-ying were disappointed, but they expressed willingness to follow military orders and withdraw from Shanghai. As Chiang Guangnai put it, "We must simply obey the government’s orders." On the afternoon of January 27, Chief of Staff Zhu Peide and Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin deployed the 6th Military Police Regiment to assume responsibility for defending the 19th Route Army's positions in the Zhabei area of Shanghai. The regiment departed Nanjing Station at 8 pm on January 27, reaching Zhenru by noon on the 28th. The first battalion arrived at Shanghai North Station that afternoon, preparing to take over defense from the 6th Regiment of the 156th Brigade of the 78th Division of the 19th Route Army in Zhabei at dawn on January 29. Back on the 27th, after Murai issued an ultimatum to the Chinese authorities in Shanghai, Mayor Wu Tiecheng, responding to a request from both the Nanjing National Government and various sectors of Shanghai, sent a letter on the 28th at 13:45 accepting all the unreasonable demands made by the Japanese. Later, at 11:05 pm the Shanghai Public Security Bureau received a response from Murai, which was directed to both Mayor Wu Tiecheng and the head of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau. In the letter, Murai expressed "satisfaction"...
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3.142 Fall and Rise of China: Jinzhou Operation & Defense of Harbin
03/10/2025
3.142 Fall and Rise of China: Jinzhou Operation & Defense of Harbin
Last time we spoke about the first Tientsin Incident. In September 1931, as tensions rose between China and Japan, Commander Zhang Xueliang enjoyed an opera in Beiping, unaware of the impending Mukden Incident. With senior commanders absent, Japanese forces quickly gained local support. Chiang Kai-shek ordered non-resistance, fearing conflict would ruin Northeast China. Meanwhile, Japanese officials plotted to install Puyi as a puppet emperor. Covert riots erupted in Tianjin, orchestrated by the Japanese, leaving the city in chaos as Zhang's forces struggled to maintain order against the well-armed attackers. In a tense standoff at Haiguang Temple, the Japanese military issued an ultimatum to Chinese security forces, citing threats to overseas Chinese. Wang Shuchang ordered a strategic withdrawal, but the Japanese escalated with artillery fire. Despite fierce resistance, the plainclothes attackers regrouped, leading to ongoing skirmishes. Amidst the chaos, Puyi was covertly extracted by Japanese forces, paving the way for the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. Ultimately, Japan's aggression continued, deepening tensions in China. #142 the Jinzhou Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. When the Mukden Incident occurred, Zhang Xueliang was in Beiping serving in his capacity as the commander of the North China garrison. On the night of September 18, he was at the opera enjoying a performance by the famous singer Mei Lanfang. His deputies were also away from Shenyang: Wan Fulin was in Beiping, and Zhang Zuoxiang was attending his father's funeral in Jinzhou. With the absence of the senior provincial commanders during the Incident, the Japanese quickly gained cooperation from the acting commanders. In Shenyang, Yu Zhishan, the commander of the Eastern Borders Garrison, and in Changchun, acting provincial forces commander Xi Xia, both swiftly aligned themselves with the Japanese. Although the Northeastern Army had approximately 130,000 troops in the region compared to a Japanese force of 40,000 to 50,000, Chiang Kai-shek urgently issued a non-resistance order to the Northeastern troops, which Zhang Xueliang confirmed. It was actually his stance prior to September 18th, as there had been other incidents such as the Wanbaoshan Incident whereupon Zhang Xueliang sent a secret telegram to his subordinates starting on July 6, "If we go to war with Japan at this time, we will surely be defeated. If we lose, Japan will demand that we cede territory and pay compensation, and Northeast China will be ruined. We should avoid conflict as soon as possible and deal with it in the name of justice." A month after this Chiang Kai-Shek sent a telegram to Zhang Xueliang on August 16th "No matter how the Japanese army seeks trouble in Northeast China in the future, we should not resist and avoid conflict. My brother, please do not act out of anger and disregard the country and the nation. I hope you will follow my instructions." As the tensions between China and Japan increased on September 6th Zhang Xueliang sent this telegram to his subordinates "It has been found that the Japanese diplomatic situation is becoming increasingly tense. We must deal with everything and strive for stability. No matter how the Japanese try to cause trouble, we must be tolerant and not resist them to avoid causing trouble. I hope you will send a secret telegram to all your subordinates to pay close attention to this matter." Thus the Manchurian commanders were already well versed in what their stance would be. Chiang Kai-shek's hesitation to engage in combat is understandable; he was concerned about factions opposing him in South China, the potential reformation of the alliance between Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan in North China, and the threat posed by the CCP in Jiangxi, leaving him unable to confront another adversary. Zhang Xueliang's situation was also not as advantageous as it might seem. Although he commanded nearly 250,000 men, only 100,000 to 130,000 were stationed in the Northeast, with the remainder in Hebei. Both Chiang Kai-Shek and Zhang Xueliang most likely believed the League of Nations or the Wakatsuki government in Tokyo would restrain the occupiers eventually, so they were biding their time. According to Nelson Johnson, the American Minister in China, Counselor Yano of the Japanese Legation in Beiping had informal discussions with Zhang, suggesting that Jinzhou would inevitably succumb to the Japanese and that “the Tokyo Foreign Office would gain prestige and be better able to shape events to China’s advantage if the Chinese avoided a clash by withdrawing voluntarily.” It was also implied that some of Zhang's supporters might be reinstated in official roles in the new government in Shenyang. Johnson concluded, “Chang is believed to have been led to his present decision by these inducements, along with the bitter hostility toward him at Nanking and the lack of support from that quarter.” In essence, Zhang was effectively coerced into non-resistance by both sides. Certainly, in December 1931, with no hope for international intervention and the Nanjing government in turmoil following Chiang Kai-shek's temporary resignation, Zhang’s options were severely limited. The Kwantung Army received clear instructions not to move beyond the South Manchurian railway zone, which hindered the plans of Lt. Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, the architect of the Manchurian invasion. After securing the region around the South Manchurian railway, Ishiwara focused his attention on Jinzhou. Following the fall of Mukden, Jinzhou became the administrative headquarters and civil government of Zhang Xueliang, making it a focal point for Chinese forces. Jinzhou is the southernmost part of Liaoning province, directly enroute to Shanhaiguan, the critical pass that separates Manchuria from China proper. It was the furthest point Zhang Xueliang could establish an HQ while still holding foot within Manchuria and thus became the defacto “last stand” or “guanwai” outside the Shanhaiguan pass for Zhang Xueliangs Northeastern army. Japanese sources indicate that Zhang Xueliang began covertly instructing local governments in Manchuria to comply with and pay taxes to Jinzhou. He also dispatched spies to Japanese-occupied territories and was conspiring to assassinate Japanese officials and those opposed to Chiang Kai-shek. Obviously Jinzhou had to be seized to control Liaoning and thus all of Manchuria. The Japanese first tried to bully Jinzhou into submission by bombing it. On October 8th, Ishiwara commanded five captured Chinese aircraft from the 10th Independent Air Squadron, flying from Mukden to conduct a raid on Jinzhou, claiming it was merely a reconnaissance mission. They flew over Jinzhou at approximately 1:40 PM and dropped 75 bombs weighing 25 kg each, targeting the barracks of the 28th Division, government buildings, and Zhang Xueliang's residence. Additionally, they took photographs of the Chinese defensive positions. The attack served two main purposes: to intimidate Zhang Xueliang and to send a message to Tokyo HQ. The bombing of Jinzhou caused an uproar in Tokyo and shocked the League of Nations, which had previously been indifferent to the situation. Consequently, Tokyo HQ felt compelled to retroactively approve the Kwantung attacks while simultaneously demanding an end to further actions. Rumors began to circulate that Ishiwara and his associate Itagaki aimed to establish an independent Manchuria as a base for a coup d'état against the Japanese government, intending to initiate a Showa Restoration. On October 18th, War Minister Minami Jiro sent a telegram to the Kwantung Army, ordering them to halt offensives in Manchuria and dispatched Colonel Imamura Hitoshi to ensure Ishiwara and Itagaki ceased their reckless operations. However, when Hitoshi met with the two men at a restaurant in Mukden, they dismissed him. In reality, Ishiwara and Itagaki's plans were in jeopardy, but in early November, they found a pretext for action after Ma Zhanshan's forces damaged the Nenjiang railway bridge. This hostility provided them with justification to invade Heilongjiang alongside their allies, led by General Zhang Haipeng. Following the occupation of the north, a new opportunity arose in the southwest. The "first Tientsin incident" erupted on November 9th, initiated by Colonel Doihara Kenji with assistance from some Anti-Chiang Kai-shek Chinese. A small contingent launched an attack on the peace preservation corps in Tientsin. Doihara devised this plan with the intention of creating chaos to kidnap the former Manchu emperor Puyi, allowing the Kwantung army to later install him as the ruler of a new Manchurian state. Although Doihara sought reinforcements from Tokyo HQ, his request was denied, prompting him to turn to the Kwantung army for support. They agreed to coordinate an attack on Tientsin but insisted that a pretext be established first. To execute this plan, they would need to capture Jinzhou initially. A second Tientsin incident occurred on November 26th, when Chinese soldiers attacked the Japanese barracks in Tientsin at 8:20 PM, marking another false flag operation orchestrated by Doihara. Upon hearing the news, General Honjo Shigeru chose to support the Tientsin army, which they believed was in peril. The 4th Mixed Brigade and the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the 2nd Division, comprising 10,000 troops, advanced toward 13 armored vehicles stationed along the Peiping-Mukden railway. The Kwantung Army also requested assistance from the Korean Army, and Commander Hayashi organized a mixed brigade to cross the border. Of course in order to provide assistance at Tientsin meant heading through the Shanhaiguan pass and this meant going through Jinzhou. Tokyo General HQ was yet again thrown into consternation by the latest aggravation of the Manchurian crisis. Incensed by the Kwantung Army’s “lack of sincerity in submitting to the discipline of Tokyo”. The force got within 30km of Jinzhou when War Minister General Jiro Minami ordered them to immediately withdraw to a line east of the Liao river. Ironically what actually made the Kwantung Army comply was not so much Tokyo’s authority but rather the refusal or foot dragging of the Korea Army, who sent a message that they were unwilling to attack Jinzhou. The Kwantung army continued on getting into some skirmishes with Chinese defenders around the Taling River and Takushan as Tokyo HQ sent countless furious messages demanding they withdraw from the Jinzhou area and by the 28th they finally did. Facing the real possibility that the Jinzhou operation might devolve into a fiasco without reinforcements, Ishiwara relented, remarking at the time “Tokyo has collapsed before Jinzhou”. There was another factor at play as well. Some have speculated Ishiwara tossed his hand on the field initiative because he was playing for time, expecting the Japanese government to fall and the substitution of a new team at central army HQ, one perhaps more compliant to the aggressive Kwantung Army. While the Japanese forces pulled back into the SMR zone, Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro began negotiations with Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nanjing government, through the League of Nations, suggesting the Jinzhou area be declared a neutral area. The Chinese initially refused, and while the Kwantung Army declared they would not attack, they still sent aircraft to circle Jinzhou. The Chinese, British, American, and French governments were willing to withdraw their troops from Jinzhou to Shanhaiguan if the Manchurian incident was resolved and Japan committed to not infringing upon the area. Consequently, Tokyo's headquarters supported this approach and instructed the Kwantung Army to withdraw. Although Zhang Xueliang had assured that his forces would leave Jinzhou by December 7th, this did not occur. As a result, the Japanese began discussions to establish Jinzhou as a neutral zone. The Kwantung army intercepted two Chinese telegrams indicating Zhang Xueliang was strengthening the defenses at Jinzhou and that Nanjing was requesting he not pull his men out. The telegrams were sent to Tokyo HQ who agreed the Chinese were acting in a treacherous manner. The Japanese ambassador then told US Secretary Henry Stimson “it would be very difficult to withhold the army from advancing again.” Stimson replied “ such actions would convince the American public that Japan’s excuse for her incursions, namely that she was combating bandit attacks, was a ruse to destroy the last fragment of Chinese authority in Manchuria. It would be extremely difficult to ask China to withdraw her army from her own territory.” Thus began the Jinzhou Crisis. On the same day the Japanese ambassador was meeting Stimson in Washington, the Nationalist minister of finance, T.V Soong sent a telegram to Zhang Xueliang advising “any Japanese attack on Jinzhou should be offered utmost resistance.” Also the American Minister in China, Nelson Johnson publicly expressed the view that Zhang Xueliang would resist at Jinzhou if attacked “if only to reassure the students and public in general, some of whom clamor for military action, despite the attitude of his old generals of the Fengtian clique who desire his resignation to enable them to sell out to the Japanese”. It had become clear to all observers that the Japanese were intent on capturing Jinzhou, whether they were justified to do so or not. Their tactics of intimidation became even bolder as they began dropping air torpedoes on disused sections of railway track on December 10th, disrupting traffic along the Beiping-Shenyang rail route and hinting that the nearby populated areas might be next. Ishiwara’s hopes came true on December 13th, whence Prime Minister Wakatsuki resigned on December 11th, having failed to control the Kwantung Army. A new cabinet was formed under Prime Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai, whom resumed negotiations with Nanjing, but then on December 15th, Chiang Kai-Shek resigned as chairman of the Nanjing government, leading Sun Ke to lead a weak interim government. Preoccupied with its own survival, the Nanjing government had no time to deal with the Jinzhou crisis. Meanwhile War Minister Minami and Chief of staff Kanaya who had tried to moderate the Kwantung Army’s aggressive initiatives had been replaced by Araki Sadao, a significantly more aggressive leader who happened to be the leading figure of the Kodoha faction. His counterpart was Prince Kan’in. With these new appointments, the atmosphere in Tokyo general HQ had changed dramatically. The new team elected to change the framing of the situation, they were not performing offensives against Chinese forces, but rather “suppressing bandits”. On December 15th, Tokyo HQ telegraphed Mukden instructing the Kwantung Army to “synchronize an assault on Jinzhou with an attack upon bandits”. Tokyo HQ even agreed to send some reinforcements from Korea and Japan. The 20th IJA division, the 38th mixed brigade of the 19th division crossed the border from Korea and the 8th mixed brigade, 10th division came over from Japan. With this the Kwantung army had been bolstered to around 60,450men. On December 17th, the Japanese launched attacks on what they referred to as "soldier bandits" in Fak’u and Ch’angtuhsien, which was actually a precursor to their assault on Jinzhou. The following day, December 18th, Japanese aircraft bombed Daonglio, resulting in the deaths of three Chinese civilians and causing widespread panic in the city. The Japanese actions were all the more effective when concentrated with the absolute paralysis that had gripped China. Sun Ke was too preoccupied with the survival of his own government and had neither the time nor resources to spare for Manchuria. In addition, Stimson’s strong words in private to the Japanese ambassador belied the State Department’s public attitude toward interference in the conflict. On December 21st Hawkling Yen, the Chinese charge in Washington met with Stanley Hornback, the chief of the department of Far Eastern Affairs. Yen told Hornback that a Japanese attack on Jinzhou was imminent and asked the US to “protest in anticipate of it”. Hornbeck refused, stating the State Department was “already publicly on record with regard to the matter”. No other Western power was ready to advocate any strong measures against the Japanese either. On the 22nd, the Japanese HQ at Shenyang announced they would soon begin an anti-bandit advance west of the Liao River and would remove any who interfered with said operation. They also added that if any Chinese forces at Jinzhou withdrew they would be left unmolested. By December 26th, all preparations for the assault on Jinzhou were finalized. On December 28th, Honjo initiated an "anti-bandit" campaign west of the Liao River. While Honjo publicly claimed they were merely "clearing the country of bandits,”. As the Japanese forces and their collaborationist allies spread across the South Manchurian railway area to eliminate remaining pockets of resistance, the 12th Division, led by Lt. General Jiro Tamon advanced from Mukden toward Jinzhou, supported by numerous bomber squadrons. Japanese intelligence estimated that Zhang Xueliang had 84,000 troops defending the city, along with 58 artillery pieces and two distinct defensive lines. The first line, located 20 miles north of Jinzhou, consisted of trenches designed to impede the Japanese advance at the Taling River Bridge on the Peiping-Mukden Railway. The second line was a series of earthworks and fortifications completely surrounding Jinzhou. The temperature was -30 degrees, and the Imperial Japanese Army troops were dressed in white winter camouflage uniforms. IJA reconnaissance aircraft reported approximately 3,000 Honghuzi were waiting to ambush them in Panshan County. Tamon’s forces quickly overcame the alleged Honghuzi in a series of small skirmishes and continued their march toward Goubangzi, 50 km north of Jinzhou. It should be noted, many question whether the Honghuzi were real or simply local Chinese the Japanese coerced into action to justify their advance. By December 31, the Japanese vanguard had reached within 15 km of Jinzhou, along the banks of the Talin River. Tamon paused to allow the rest of the 2nd Division to catch up. Subsequently, Tamon’s troops began setting up an intricate system of microphones to broadcast the sounds of the impending battle to Tokyo. This tactic appeared to be an attempt to demoralize the defenders, which proved effective as Zhang Xueliang's forces began to withdraw. On December 30, Zhang Xueliang had issued the order to retreat from Jinzhou. Two days later, the American Minister in China, Nelson Johnson, reported the following scene: “Jinzhou Railway station resembles beehive, every possible car being pressed into service and loaded with troops, animals, baggage, to last inch space.” The last Chinese troop train departed Jingzhou at 11 am on January 1st carrying away the final remnants of Zhang...
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3.141 Fall and Rise of China: Jiangqiao Campaign: Resistance of Ma Zhanshan
03/03/2025
3.141 Fall and Rise of China: Jiangqiao Campaign: Resistance of Ma Zhanshan
Last time we spoke about the Jiangqiao Campaign and resistance of Ma Zhanshan. Ma Zhanshan, born in poverty in 1885, rose to prominence through his exceptional skills and military service. Appointed acting governor of Heilongjiang during the 1931 Mukden Incident, he defied orders to surrender to Japanese forces. Leading a spirited defense of the Nenjiang Bridge, Ma’s troops repelled repeated Japanese assaults despite heavy casualties. His resistance inspired national pride and drew global attention. Ultimately outnumbered, Ma’s forces retreated, but his bravery became a symbol of Chinese resistance to invasion. On December 7, Japanese and puppet troops attacked Sanjianfang, but Chinese forces, led by Ma Zhanshan, mounted a fierce counterattack, inflicting heavy casualties. Despite being outnumbered and lacking resources, the defenders showcased remarkable bravery, even shooting down an enemy aircraft. After intense fighting, Ma's troops withdrew to avoid further losses, facing starvation and exhaustion. Though Qiqihar fell to the Japanese, Ma's resistance inspired national pride and calls for unity against the invaders, drawing support from across China. #141 The First Tientsin Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. This episode is going to be dealing with an old friend of ours, Mr Colonel Kenji Doihara. Now I don’t think I dabbled much in the early history of Doihara, so where better to start. Doihara was born in Okayama City of Okayama prefecture in 1883. He attended military preparatory schools in his youth and would graduate 16th of his class at the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in 1904. His first assignment was to an infantry regiment as a junior officer, before he returned to school where he graduated 24th in his class at the Army Staff College in 1912. During his military and academic years he learnt how to speak Mandarin fluently, alongside picking up some other Chinese language dialects. Because of his language skills he was chosen for military intelligence, specifically targeting China. During the early 1920’s he took up various postings in Northern China. During 1921-1922 he took part in the Siberian Intervention. In 1926 he was attached to the 2nd IJA regiment, the next year the 3rd IJA regiment. In 1928 he took an official tour of China attached to the 1st IJA Division. It was that same year he was made a military adviser to Zhang Zuolin, whose death he most certainly had a heavy hand in. In 1929 he received a promotion to Colonel and was given command of the IJA 30th regiment. In 1931 he was made head of the special service section of the Kwantung Army stationed in Mukden. As we are quite now familiar with, Doihara was part of the team that engineered the Mukden incident. It was he who ordered Lt Suemori Komoto to place and detonate the bomb on the tracks. Doihara would become a key agent during the conquest of Manchuria, being one of those specialists who helped facilitate cooperation between the Manchurian officials such as Zhang Haipeng, Zhang Jinghui and Xi Qia. However Doihara also performed covert operations during this time period, quite bold in scale. Believe it or not one of these rather insane operations would be to try and restore the Qing Dynasty. Shocking I know, who would want that old corrupt thing restored? You would be surprised how many old Manchu loyalists were still kicking around and how many youth saw China to be such a pit of despair, they would rather turn the clock back to a time they assumed was better for China. The Japanese had sunk their teeth into two provinces of Manchuria and only needed to seize the last one for total conquest of China’s northeast. On September 22nd a secret meeting was held in the Kwantung Army chief of staff office. There Doihara presented a new plan to ensure the establishment of a new puppet state in Manchuria and possibly inner Mongolia. The plan was to kidnap the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty, Puyi. After the Xinhai revolution, Puyi continued to live in the forbidden city, however in 1924 he was expelled by Feng Yuxiang and took refuge in the Japanese concession in Tientsin. Puyi had met with many Japanese military and civilian leaders during his stay in Tientsin. He had a distant relative and occasional house guest named Yoshiko Kawashima who just happened to be a close confidant of Doihara. Doihara and his like minded colleagues presented Puyi with a scheme, they would seize Manchuria and restore the Qing throne over it, forming a new state with Puyi as its emperor. For Puyi it seemed like a stepping stone to restoring Qing rule over all of China, but he certainly feared becoming a puppet to the Japanese. Doihara planned to kidnap Puyi, but he had a tight timetable as it was going to be necessary to depart from the port of Yingkou, which was soon to freeze over. Therefore his operation needed to be concluded prior to November 16th. Doihara was a meticulous man in his work, but his plan was leaked. The Japanese foreign Minister Kijuro Shidehara had learnt of his scheme to kidnap Puyi and instructed the Japanese consul general at Tientsin to oppose Doihara. On November the 1st, the Consul-General contacted Doihara, but Doihara responded that if the Emperor was willing to risk his life by returning to Manchuria, it would be easy to make the entire affair seem as if it was instigated by Qing restorationists. He further added that he would talk to Puyi and if he was unwilling, he would dispatch a telegram to the military authorities at Mukden to call the entire operation off. The next day, Doihara visited Puyi and told him the time was ripe and there would never be an opportunity like such again. He stated Japan would recognize him as the Emperor of an independent Manchu state and form a military alliance with said state against China proper if they attacked. Puyi dragged his foot on the issue without giving a concrete answer. Meanwhile the consul-general continued to dissuade Doihara, and a Chinese newspaper in Tientsin called Yishie reported on November 3rd, that Doihara had secretly come to the city and was taking a residence in Tokiwa Hotel. The next day the same newspaper confirmed that Doihara had come to the city for a few days. Under stress, Doihara resorted to a very Doihara scheme. He sent Puyi a bomb in a basket of fruit with a threatening letter allegedly from the Iron Blood Group. He also planned a riot. Doihara hunted down 2000 Chinese, bandits, triads, soldiers, hooligans, drug addicts and such. He used the foreign concession as a HQ and began issuing the men weapons procured from Itagaki. They were going to be unleashed on November 8th and they would attack targets such as the Hebei Provincial Government building, the Public Security Bureau and a police station near the Jingang Bridge. Allegedly each man was paid 40 Mexican dollars by their Japanese agents. The rioters would be colloquially known as the plainclothes members, as they were dressed in civilian attire. One of their members, a man named Ma Longting who was later captured by Chinese authorities, under interrogation stated they had received arms from the “International Apartments” ie: Japanese officials at the concession and likewise received training from the Japanese. "My detachment was located at No. 5 Yuqingli in the Japanese Concession. The detachments were stationed in the International Apartments and Huazhong Apartments. We received guns from the International Apartments. The first detachment received 20 pistols; the second detachment received 25 pistols; the third and fourth detachments each received 20 pistols. Each gun had 100 bullets. The meal allowance for each person was 1 yuan, 60 cents, or 40 cents a day. I received a total of 5,000 yuan (the currency at the time). After receiving the guns, the detachments were divided into Zhongyuan Company, Weishengchi, Laojiuzhang, and Luzhuangzi to deploy defenses in order to attack the Chinese area. The Japanese followed with guns to supervise us. When we reached the Sino-Japanese border, the Japanese retreated and put up an electric fence. We were caught in a dilemma and were captured." Another captured plainclothes member, named Zhang Jinhai gave his life story and involvement during interrogations. He had lived in a small house at Taikoo Wharf in Tanggu. He made a living unloading cargo from ships, earning roughly 20 cents a day. A man had approached him to asking if he would take up a job as a plainclothes. He agreed and went through intense training under Japanese officers every day and was paid 20 cents per day. At 1pm one day, he alongside 7 other members each carrying a pistol, boarded a train for Tientsin. There they were to assemble at QianDezhuang for further information. However before he could do so he was captured at East Station near the East floating bridge. The riots were done by two separate plainclothes teams who were manipulated and supported by Japan. The first rioted from the evening of November 8th to noon of the 20th, the second from the 26th to the 30th. On the night of the 8th, the Japanese garrison HQ ordered a large number of plainclothes to depart the Japanese concession to suddenly and violently attack the Chinese government offices. This was intentionally done during a time period in which there was meeting with the League of Nations on the 12th. Therefore obviously the Japanese were eager to make it seem Chinese hooligans, such as the notorious Green or Red Gangs were creating havoc in Tientsin prior to said meeting. The Japanese hoped this would provide an excuse for not having to withdraw their troops in Manchuria as the Kwantung army at this time was attacking the Jinxi area. Many Japanese officers believed the Manchurian army would not resist and simply retreat once the riots broke out. It would mean Tientsin was within their reach and would dramatically alter the North China situation. Wang Shuchang, the chairman of Hebei’s provincial government and Zhang Xueming the Mayor of Tientsin and director of its security bureau were informed 3 days prior to the riots from the a Special Agent team of the Public security Bureau that "the Japanese military and consulate stationed in Tianjin have instigated our frustrated military personnel Zhang Bi, Li Jichun , some leaders of the Tianjin Green and Red Gang, and famous bandit leaders Cao Huayang, Xiao Yunfeng, Gao Pengjiu, etc. to organize plainclothes teams to carry out riots." After receiving said report, Wang Shuchang convened a joint meeting of provincial and municipal military, political and security officials to come up with countermeasures. He divided the security police teams into groups and placed them all on high alert, issuing out guns and ammunition. He proclaimed during the meeting "I am a soldier and have the responsibility to defend my territory. If there are riots and disturbances in Tianjin, we must adapt to the circumstances, use a combination of firmness and flexibility, think carefully, and make appropriate plans to resolve them. But I will never be like Zang Shiyi (Zang was the chairman of the Liaoning Provincial Government when Japan attacked Shenyang), a national sinner, and let the elders and brothers of Tianjin scold me for being incompetent." He then slammed the table and adjourned the meeting. Some gangsters and bandits gathered by the Japanese were familiar with the special forces of the Public Security Bureau. They reported that the uprising was initially planned for the evening of the 7th. However, due to the heightened alert and concerns for the young emperor Puyi, the Japanese military camp temporarily informed them to postpone the attack to the evening of November 8th. At that time, the alarm bell at the Japanese military camp in Haiguang Temple rang, signaling the plainclothes team to mobilize. Using Datong Apartment to the west of Zhongyuan Company in the Japanese Concession and Wanguo Apartment on Furong Street as their bases, they advanced toward Machang Road, Caochang Temple, and the fish market area, opening fire on us. Simultaneously, the Japanese Concession had arranged for security at various key intersections, with the Japanese garrison and military police also deploying together. That night, over a thousand volunteers organized by Japanese expatriates in the concession were armed and stationed at important roads. The Japanese military police, believing that the plainclothes team they had organized was merely a mob incapable of fighting, actually fired weapons in the Japanese Concession to rally them. The sounds of gunfire echoed throughout the night. Two hours prior to the plainclothes team's assault, the security team and the Public Security Bureau implemented the strategy devised by Chairman Wang. To manage the ensuing chaos, a temporary curfew was imposed, and all traffic at intersections near the Japanese concession was completely halted. The security teams set up their defenses in accordance with Chairman Wang's directives. He also instructed all officers and soldiers of the Tenth Army to prepare for the defense of Tianjin at a standard readiness level and to brace for a large-scale invasion by Japanese forces landing in Tanggu. Around 10:30, a plainclothes team of approximately 2,000 individuals emerged from the vicinity of Haiguang Temple in the Japanese Concession, following their prearranged plan. The Japanese provided cover and oversight from behind, firing into the Chinese territory. They successfully seized control of six stations in the first district of the Public Security Bureau in Nanshi, close to the Japanese Concession, as well as six stations in the second district at Haiguang Temple, while separately harassing the south gate of Dongmalu. The first captain of the security battalion, Bai Lunbi, and the third captain, Li Yinpo, led the security team and police in a courageous effort to block and repel the attackers step by step. By around noon, the six stations in the first district were reclaimed. However, the plainclothes team continued their assaults on various locations. That night, over ten rioters from the plainclothes team and numerous firearms were captured. Upon inspection, most of the weapons were Japanese-made Type 38 rifles and new guns produced by the Shenyang Arsenal in Northeast China, which had not yet been delivered to us. The riot orchestrated by the plainclothes team, under the guidance and manipulation of the Japanese garrison, transformed the once-thriving Tianjin into a ghost town overnight. Even Asahi Street, typically bustling with activity, was left deserted. Around 1:00 a.m. on November 9, plainclothes teams launched coordinated attacks from various intersections. One group targeted the Public Security Bureau from the northern gate but was unsuccessful due to heightened security. Meanwhile, another plainclothes unit disrupted the South City and assaulted the Second District Six Office, leading to a retreat of the police forces. The Japanese soldiers then took control of the office and raised their flag. In the southeast corner of the city, at Caochang Temple, a fierce battle ensued, ultimately resulting in the defeat of the plainclothes attackers. the Public Security Bureau cavalry and security team sustained some casualties. By 5:00 a.m., despite a night of disturbances and looting, the plainclothes team ultimately failed in their efforts. The Japanese military at Haiguang Temple then resorted to diplomatic tactics, issuing a verbal warning to Wang Shuchang. They claimed that the Chinese security team had attacked the plainclothes group, resulting in injuries and fatalities among Japanese soldiers due to stray bullets, which they argued endangered the lives of overseas Chinese in the Japanese concession. They demanded that the Chinese security team and police withdraw 300 meters by 6 am, threatening to take action otherwise. This unreasonable demand clearly had ulterior motives. Observing that the plainclothes team, supported and directed by the Japanese army at Haiguang Temple, lacked combat capability and that the Japanese army was not directly involved, Wang decided to avoid escalating the situation. He ordered a withdrawal of 300 meters from the blocked entrance to the Japanese concession while maintaining close surveillance. This order was issued and executed at 5:30 am on the 9th. However, the Japanese army violated their promise and fired over 30 cannon rounds at 6:40 am One shell struck an earthen shed of a store about 100 meters east of the Public Security Bureau, while another exploded at the intersection of Sanma Road in Special District 2. Fortunately, due to the cold weather in late autumn, most people were indoors, and the streets were empty, resulting in no casualties. At that moment, the plainclothes team, supported by Japanese artillery, regrouped near the gate area and launched a significant attack against us. However, due to the security team being on high alert and defending valiantly, the plainclothes team ultimately failed. By noon, the gunfire had diminished, but the Chinese area remained deserted, with no pedestrians in the Japanese concession, except for a few Japanese soldiers and residents. At 5 pm, the plainclothes team initiated another harassment operation in the Wandezhuang area outside the South Gate, leading to continued gunfire. After a fierce battle, the attackers retreated. As the evening progressed, the gunfire became less frequent. According to intelligence reports, "The plainclothes team is preparing for a general assault in Tianjin. Wang Shuchang and Mayor Zhang have visited various locations to enforce strict precautions and have also telegraphed General Zhang Xueliang in Beiping." However, it remained calm until late at night on the 9th. On the 9th, 61 plainclothes rioters were apprehended. Ten were shot at the scene, all of whom were leaders involved in looting, arson, and pillaging; 37 were sent to Beiping, and three were killed by the security team. The remaining individuals were taken to the Second Army Headquarters for strict interrogation and subsequently handed over to the military court for prosecution. It was discovered that the headquarters of the plainclothes riot were located in Datong Apartment, Wanguo Apartment, Taipingli, and other sites within the Japanese Concession. Before dawn on the 10th, the plainclothes team hurried from the Japanese concession and Haiguang Temple into the Chinese territory. The most intense fighting erupted around the first district, the six schools, and Nankai Middle School. The sounds of cannon fire and heavy gunfire echoed back and forth. Nankai and the Nanshi area were suddenly shrouded in darkness. Two fully armed Japanese tanks patrolled along the riverbank, instilling fear among the citizens of Tianjin. Early on the 10th, the security team bravely searched for gangsters in the conflict zone. By around 7 am, they had recovered five rifles and 50 rounds of ammunition near Nankai. At 7:45, 26 members of the plainclothes team, along with seven rifles, numerous gray military uniforms, and three flags, were captured in Shengcai Village. Concurrently,...
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3.140 Fall and Rise of China: Jiangqiao Campaign: Resistance of Ma Zhanshan
02/24/2025
3.140 Fall and Rise of China: Jiangqiao Campaign: Resistance of Ma Zhanshan
Last time we spoke about Gokokujo and Collaborators. In September 1931, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters aimed to contain the Mukden Incident but faced resistance from the Kwantung Command. Led by General Honjo, Japanese forces quickly overwhelmed Chinese troops, seizing key cities in Manchuria. Despite Tokyo's disapproval, military leaders acted independently, invoking the Emperor's authority. Amidst the chaos, local Chinese leaders cooperated with the invaders, leading to a swift Japanese victory. As the military expanded its power, the civilian government struggled to regain control, illustrating the complexities of Japan's political landscape. In 1931, the Kwantung Army's officers, led by Ishiwara and Itegaki, aimed for a military occupation of Manchuria, initially allowing local officials autonomy. However, Tokyo's rejection of annexation forced them to claim Manchurian independence. Amidst confusion and infighting, Komai Tokuzo emerged as a key figure, manipulating local elites to establish control. The Japanese employed violence and persuasion, swiftly occupying cities while puppet leaders maintained a facade of governance. As resistance brewed, Zhang Xueliang and others sought to reclaim their homeland from Japanese dominance. #140 The Jiangqiao Campaign: The Resistance of Ma Zhanshan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. For quite some time we have spoken about countless variables involved with the conquest of Manchuria. More or less we broke down three sorts of players in this invasion: those Chinese who chose to collaborate with the Japanese, those who tried to act neutral and sit upon the fence and then there were those who resisted. The resistance against the Japanese was not unified, often it was pockets of groups trying to hold out as long as possible. The resistance took on various forms for various reasons. One of the resistance stories I always found more interesting than the rest was the story of Ma Zhanshan. Ma Zhanshan was born in 1885 in Gongzhuling of Jilin province to a poor shepherding family. Ma was of Manchu heritage as stated by his grandson Ma Zhiwei who became a member of the Chinese Peoples’ political consultative conference. At a very young age, Ma joined a bandit group in Heihushan. This bandit group gradually was incorporated into some troops of Huaide county yamen. During the Russo-Japanese War, Ma was one of the many local soldiers who served under the Japanese. At the age of 20, as a result of his exceptional marksmanship and equestrianism, Ma was promoted to Guard Monitor of the 4th security Guard Battalion under Wu Junsheng. Wu Junsheng commanded the Tianhou Road Patrol and defense battalion for Mukden in 1908. In 1913 Ma was appointed as Major and Company commander over the 3rd company, 3rd regiment, 2nd Brigade of the Central Cavalry Army of Republic China. By 1920 he was promoted to Colonel and followed his superior Wu Junsheng who became a warlord. He gradually found himself serving Zhang Zuolin’s Northeastern Army, serving as a brigade commander of the 5th cavalry brigade, 17th cavalry division. By 1927 he was transferred to Heilongjiang where he became a garrison commander at Heihe, along the Soviet border. After Zhang Zuolins death in 1928 Ma was nominated as Heilongjiang’s Provincial Bandit Suppression Commander and the provincial cavalry commander in chief. During the Mukden Incident of September 18th, 1931, General Xie Ke, the deputy commander in chief of Qiqihar took a series of strategic measures to block the Japanese and their Chinese collaborationist troops from invading their territory. Xie Ke dispatched two battalions of infantry and an artillery regiment to defend Qiqihar under Park Bingshan; a regiment led by Zhu Fengyang from Xiaohaozi station to Tailai to guard in the direction of Taonan; the first cavalry brigade of Wu Shongli from Baiquan to Qiqihar; a guard regiment under Xu Baozhen, with a battalion of artillery, a company of engineers and a company of baggage, roughly 2000 people to take up a position north of Jiangqiao where they began building fortifications, laid minefields south of the critical Nenjiang bridge there and mounted 100 Czech made light machine guns to the front lines. Now when the Mukden Incident broke out, the Governor of Heilongjiang province, Wan Fulin was in Beiping leaving no one of real authority in the province to take charge of its defenses against the Japanese. Meanwhile Liaoning and Jilin were basically trampled upon without much incident. From Beiping Zhang Xueliang telegraphed the Nanjing government to ask for instructions as what he should do, but in the meantime he appointed Ma Zhanshan as acting Governor and Military commander in chief of Heilongjiang Province on October 10th, 1931. Now a full General, Ma Zhanshan arrived at the capital Qiqihar on the 19th and began personally inspecting the troops and defensive positions. By this point Chiang Kai-Shek had made it known the stance of Nanjing was one of passiveness, to wait for negotiations to unfold to settle the matter. Zhang Xueliang loyally followed said commands, but multiple parties within Manchuria sought to either surrender, openly collaborate or resist the Japanese. Under the circumstances, Ma Zhanshan told his troops “I am appointed as Chairman of the Province, and I have the responsibility to defend the Province and I will never be a surrendering general". Thus Ma Zhanshan chose to disobey the Kuomintang’s orders not to resist the Japanese. Meanwhile also during the month of October, General Zhang Haipeng of the 2nd Provincial Defense Brigade at Taonan had just been approached by the Japanese seeking collaboration. Zhang Haipeng had been a Honghuzi irregular cavalry commander during the first sino-japanese war. He later became a mercenary during the Russo-Japanese War and went on to study at the Northeast Military academy. After the Xinhai revolution he was assigned command of an infantry regiment, but was one of the morons who supported Zhang Xun’s attempt to restore the Qing Dynasty in 1917. After that debacle he went to work for Zhang Zuolin and in 1923 was appointed a commissioner of the Chinese Eastern Railway. When the Japanese asked him to collaborate, Zhang Haipeng immediately seized command of the local forces including the Xing’an Reclamation Army to declare the district independent from China. He did this in return for a shipment of military supplies from the IJA. Upon taking charge on October 23, Zhang Haipeng dispatched 3 regiments from Baichengzi to attack Jiangqiao led by General Xu Jinglong. Xu Jinglong’s advance guard with an engineering company was attacked by forces led by General Dou Lianfang defending the north bank around the Nenjiang Bridge. During the battle, Ma Zhanshan had his forces use dynamite to damage the Nenjiang railroad bridge. The Japanese began to repeatedly demand Ma Zhanshan allow them to repair the bridge, but he continuously refused and had his forces defend the area near Daxing preventing Zhang Haipengs men from proceeding north. By October the 15th, the Japanese provided some fighter-bomber support, but Zhang Haipengs forces suffered heavy casualties and were counterattacked until they retreated. At this time Ma Zhanshan was traveling from Heihe to Qiqihar. By the 20th Ma officially took office as the acting chairman of Heilongjiang and went to the front lines to encourage the men. He issued a reward for the head of Zhang Haipeng and announced the establishment of the Heilongjiang Army Provincial HQ. Xi Ke became his chief of staff and deputy commander. On October 22nd, Ma Zhanshan issued a declaration in response to the Japanese massing forces along the border of Heilongjiang. "In this difficult time for the country, two of the three provinces have been lost. Those who have a little conscience will all sleep on straw and taste gall, and swear to survive. Although our Heilongjiang is still a clean piece of land... From now on, anyone who invades our province will fight to the death." Ma Zhanshan then went to work, grabbing reports from his generals such as Xie Ke about the state of their defenses. He immediately began adjusting the deployment of forces: He appointed Pu Bingshan as the commander of the provincial capital garrison to enhance the defense of the area. Wang Nanping was designated as the commander of the Heihe garrison, taking over from Ma Zhanshan. Additionally, he organized three infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and one artillery battalion from the Northeast Reclamation Army into the 1st Infantry Brigade, positioning them south of Daxing. The cavalry unit was deployed to the west of Fulaerji to secure the Jingxing direction. By October 29, 1931, the establishment of three defensive positions, extending approximately 40 kilometers in depth and 10 kilometers in width from Jiangqiao to Yushutun and Ang'angxi, was largely completed, with the railway serving as the central axis. Liu Wankui, the former head of the Ning'an Public Security Bureau, led over 1,000 troops to be reorganized west of Ning'an on the 15th, forming the 5th Independent Regiment of the Self-Defense Army. Following the defeat of Zhang Haipeng's rebels, the Kwantung Army was prepared to deploy troops directly. They viewed the destruction of the Nenjiang Bridge by the Chinese army as a prime justification for action. Consequently, they decided to establish the Nenjiang Detachment, consisting of one infantry battalion, one artillery battalion, and an engineering squadron from the 16th Regiment of the 2nd Division, supported by the 8th Independent Flying Squadron. Their plan was to use military force to secure the bridge repair, incite trouble, and launch an attack. However, the Japanese Army Ministry and General Staff Headquarters were still wary of the Soviet Union at that time and did not endorse the Kwantung Army's offensive. Kanaya Nobumitsu sent a telegram to the Kwantung Army stating, "You may proceed to repair the river bridge. However, you are not permitted to deploy troops to North Manchuria, far from the Nenjiang River, without my approval, regardless of the circumstances." However, when Hirota Koki, the Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union, learned from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kajiekan on October 29 that the Soviet Union would not support either side in the conflict and would maintain a "strict non-interference policy," the stance of the Japanese Army Ministry shifted, leading them to back the Kwantung Army. On November 2, 1931, Honjo Shigeru instructed Hayashi Yoshihide, the head of the Qiqihar Japanese secret service, to deliver an ultimatum to Ma Zhanshan. The ultimatum demanded that Ma Zhanshan's troops withdraw to a location at least 10 kilometers from the Nenjiang Iron Bridge by noon on the 3rd, and refrain from entering the area until the Japanese army had completed repairs on the bridge. If these conditions were not met, the Japanese army would resort to force. On November 4th Ma Zhanshan sent subordinates to accompany Major Hayashi Yoshihide “so that the Japanese might begin work, and so that I could order my army to start to retreat”. Ma Zhanshan gave assurances the Japanese repairing operation would not be interfered with, meanwhile teelgraming his subordinates “paint all Manchuria red with the blood of Japanese troops”. A force of 800 Japanese led by Major General Shogo Hasebe with repair crews came to the area to find Daxing a warzone. Shogo found Ma Zhanshans subordinate on the ground, Xu Baozhen and demanded the fighting cease so they could repair the bridge. Xu Baozhen said he never received any orders to cease fighting. The Japanese claim the nearby 2500 Chinese forces of Ma Zhanshan began opening fire upon them using rifles and machine guns. The Japanese retaliated likewise and Japanese aircraft began strafing the Chinese forcing them to retreat towards Qiqihar. The Chinese suffered 120 casualties, the Japanese 15. That day the Japanese Nenjiang Detachment's advance squadron moved northward from Jiangqiao Station, supported by aircraft. After crossing the Nenjiang Bridge, they launched an assault on the Chinese army positions south of Daxing Station. At that time, Xu Baozhen's and Zhang Jingdu's troops from Ma Zhanshan's Guard Regiment, totaling 2,700 soldiers, rose to confront the enemy and successfully repelled them. In the afternoon, the Japanese forces, now numbering around 4,000 and led by Colonel Hamamoto, attacked Jiangqiao with the support of aircraft, tanks, and heavy artillery. They initially penetrated the left flank of Jiangqiao before launching a fierce assault on the main Daxing Line position in front of the town. Despite the Chinese defenders' resistance, the Japanese managed to breach their positions, leading to intense hand-to-hand combat. Despite this the Japanese forces were forced to retreat to the riverbank, where they were ambushed by Chinese troops concealed in the reeds. As reinforcements for the Japanese arrived, they were quickly flanked by the defending cavalry, forcing them to retreat once more. By 20:00, the Japanese forces had completely pulled out, leaving behind over 400 casualties. That night, following a sustained artillery bombardment, the Japanese attempted a surprise boat attack. As their boats neared the northern bank, the Chinese troops hidden in the reeds opened fire, resulting in many Japanese soldiers falling into the water, either killed or wounded, while the remainder retreated. On that day, the Chinese army suffered over 300 casualties, while the Japanese and their puppet forces incurred more than 1,000 losses. Despite concentrating their forces and launching continuous attacks with air and artillery support, the Japanese were ultimately repelled by the defenders. Lieutenant Shinichiro Ojin, a Japanese pilot flying low and dropping bombs, was also injured during the conflict. The Japanese sent word to Ma Zhanshan, demanding he make true on his promise, but Ma Zhanshan responded that of his 15,000 troops he could only nominally control a third. Ma Zhanshan then sent a telegram to the League of Nations reading this “I am helpless. I have exhausted all attempts to preserve peace. I have strictly instructed my commanders to act only on the defensive, and that they must not attack. But Major Hayashi has seen this behavior by the Japanese military, and not only has not stopped it but, on the contrary, wants our army to withdraw from Heilongjiang province, so that they can carve up the whole lot... Since the 4th, the Japanese army has started to attack our army . . . They are coordinating land and air attacks, carrying out utterly horrible bombings!” On the morning of the 5th, the Japanese army focused all its efforts on launching another assault. At 6 am., the Japanese forces bombarded the defenders' positions with numerous cannons. By 7 am, over 8,000 Japanese and puppet troops crossed the river via the central route, while additional puppet forces advanced from the left and right, shielded by artillery and aircraft. As the boats reached the midpoint of the river, the Chinese army mounted a vigorous counterattack. Despite suffering significant casualties, the Japanese and puppet troops persisted in their attempt to cross. By 10 am, the Japanese army had taken the frontline positions on the riverbank, forcing the defenders to retreat to the flanks. The Japanese then launched an assault on the second line of defense at Daxing, where they faced staunch resistance from the defenders. At noon, Ma Zhanshan arrived at the front lines to direct Wu Delin's and Xu Baozhen's regiments in a counteroffensive, urgently sending the Sabli Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Brigade to encircle the Japanese forces from both sides. The brutal fighting continued from 3pm until dusk. The Japanese acknowledged, "The Chinese army executed an encirclement counterattack using infantry and cavalry. The Japanese army suffered heavy losses and was compelled to retreat" . The Japanese forces were forced to shift from an offensive to a defensive stance, with many of their support units annihilated by our cavalry. In this engagement, the Chinese army incurred over 200 casualties, while the Japanese army lost 167 soldiers and sustained more than 600 injuries. That night, a battalion from the 29th Regiment of the Japanese Army arrived as reinforcements. Upon their arrival, they immediately launched an attack but were quickly surrounded by Ma Zhanshan's forces. In response, Honjo Shigeru urgently dispatched an infantry battalion and three artillery squadrons from the 16th Regiment to assist. On the morning of the 6th, Japanese reinforcements arrived and launched a vigorous assault, supported by aircraft that conducted strafing and bombing runs in an attempt to rescue the encircled Japanese forces. On that day, Ma Zhanshan personally visited the front lines to oversee the battle. Both sides incurred significant casualties. Despite the fierce resistance from Ma Zhanshan's troops, the Japanese offensive struggled to gain ground. In response, Honjo Shigeru ordered Tamon Jiro of the 2nd Division to lead the 29th Regiment, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, the Temporary Field Heavy Artillery Battalion, the Engineer Squadron, and a battalion from the 39th Mixed Brigade in the Shenyang area to rush to the vicinity of Kaijiang Bridge. Their objective was to reinforce their forces, attack the defenders, and capture the key position at Daxing. The Chinese army fought desperately, with the sounds of hand-to-hand combat echoing loudly as they repeatedly recaptured lost positions. That day, the Chinese forces suffered over 1,850 casualties, while inflicting more than 2,000 deaths on Japanese and puppet troops and shooting down one aircraft. The Japanese Hamamoto Detachment was nearly annihilated, and the Gaobo Cavalry Team sustained almost total losses. After three days and two nights of continuous fighting without reinforcements, the soldiers were extremely fatigued, and the Daxing position had been heavily damaged. General Ma Zhanshan then ordered the main forces to withdraw to the secondary position at Sanjianfang, located 18 kilometers from Daxing Station, to reorganize defenses alongside the 1st Cavalry Brigade and the 1st Infantry Brigade. On the morning of the 7th, a significant force of Japanese and puppet troops, supported by ten aircraft, launched an attack on the Nantangchi area of Sanjianfang. In response, a combined regiment from Zhang Dianjiu's Brigade and Su Bingwen's Brigade quickly mobilized to counterattack, successfully repelling the enemy by the afternoon. The Chinese forces incurred over 300 casualties, while the Japanese suffered more than 600 casualties, along with over 1,000 from the puppet troops. Notably, and take this one with a heavy grain of I am using a PRC source grain of salt quote “despite ongoing enemy air assaults and the lack of anti-aircraft artillery, the courageous soldiers displayed remarkable ingenuity by lying on the ground in groups of 20 and firing their rifles upward, ultimately managing to shoot down an enemy...
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3.139 Fall and Rise of China: Gokokujo and Collaborators
02/17/2025
3.139 Fall and Rise of China: Gokokujo and Collaborators
Last time we spoke about how Zhang Xueliang lost Manchuria. In September 1931, the Mukden Incident ignited conflict in Manchuria as Japan executed a false flag attack, prompting a swift assault on Peitaying Barracks. Zhang Xueliang, urged by Chiang Kai-shek, chose not to resist, fearing a full-scale war. The Japanese invasion revealed deep political divisions in Manchuria, with some officials defecting, others sabotaging, and a few fighting back. Amidst chaos, Zhang sought to unify his forces, but rivalries and external threats complicated his efforts, setting the stage for prolonged conflict. In post-1929 Manchuria, nationalist activists joined the KMT, including Yan Baohang and his friends, who attended a 1931 conference in Nanjing. They aimed to resist Japanese influence while navigating local elite tensions and economic struggles. As Zhang Xueliang rose to power, he sought reform but faced distrust and challenges, including high military spending and a devastating depression. By 1931, Japanese aggression loomed, culminating in a coup that threatened the fragile nationalist aspirations in the region. #139 Gokokujo and Collaborators Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters had hoped to localize the Mukden Incident and communicated their orders to Kwantung Command. However as we had seen, the Kwantung Command in chief General Shigeru Honjo, had his wrist twisted somewhat by certain culprits in the form of Ishiwara Kanji and Itageki Seishiro. Honjo thus ordered the forces to proceed with expanding operations along the South Manchuria Railway zone. On September the 19th, the 29th infantry regiment stormed Mukden, easily overwhelming the Chinese forces within the inner walled city. Simultaneously the 2nd battalion occupied Pei Ta Ying, where they were met with some fierce resistance before storming Tung Ta Ying. Afterwards the 2nd Division drove out the remaining Chinese resistance from the eastern area of Mukden. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion fought Chinese forces at Kuan Cheng Tze near Changchun. By this point Honjo’s request for assistance from the Korea Army was confirmed. General Senjuro Hayashi ordered the 20th infantry division to divide itself, forming the 39th mixed brigade who marched into Manchuria, without any authorization from Tokyo nor the Emperor to do so. By the end of the 19th, the Japanese had seized Liaoyang, Shenyang, Yingkou, Dandong, Fushun, Changchun and Jilin. On the 20th, Wan Shu Cheng, the commander of the Chinese 2nd army ordered a withdrawal of the 44th and 643rd regiments stationed at Taching to head for Tiantsin. On the 21st the Japanese took Jilin city, by the 23rd they captured Jiaohe and Dunhua, both within Jilin. On the 26th, the Governor of Jilin, Zhang Zuoxiang who was not there at the time, was overthrown by a newly formed provisional provincial government with Xi Xia as its chairman. By October 1st Zhang Haiping would surrender the area of Taonan, later in October Ji Xing surrendered the Yanbian Korean Autonomous prefecture area and on the 17th Yu Zhishan surrendered Eastern Liaoning. General HQ in Tokyo were flabbergasted at the news all of this was being done without their orders, in fact in most cases it was directly against their orders. The civilian government of Japan was in absolute disarray over what was an act of Gekokujo. Gekokujo directly translated meaning "the low overcomes the high",was when someone of a lesser position in the military or politics overthrew someone in a higher position to seize power. The term goes all the way back to the Sui Dynasty of China, for Japan during the Kamakura period, but its most prominently known for being used during the Sengoku period. It was through the chaotic political climate of the Sengoku period that Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi rose to power. During the Showa period, Gekokujo would occur often. Those of the Kodoha faction used it as a means to an end during the 1920s and 1930s, assassinating political opponents as they tried to press for a Showa restoration. Back to Manchuria, as Gokokujo ran rampant, with reports coming in after each quick victory and city taken by Japanese forces, Tokyo General HQ felt utterly powerless to stop it. There is also another facet to this, the role of Emperor Hirohito. Many of you might only have a vague idea of how much “actual power” Emperor Hirohito had during the Showa Era. The Meiji Constitution of Japan going back to 1889 remained in force until 1947. It was enacted after the Meiji restoration in 1868 and provided a form of mixed constitutional and absolute monarchy. Thus in theory the Emperor governed the empire upon the advice of his ministers. In practice this meant while the Emperor was head of state, it was still the Prime Minister who was actually heading the government. Now this was all fine and dandy, however the constitution also stated the Emperor had direct control over the military. Imagine this scenario, you work for a company and take orders from the boss of the company. The father of the boss used to run the company and is seen as the face of it, but retired long ago and has no real authority. So you do the orders your boss gives you, but what about if that father figure suddenly shows up and gives orders? Many in the company would go ahead and do what the father says, feeling this obligatory need to. Now in the case of Showa Era Japan, the entire population of Japan saw the Emperor as a divine being, maybe you can call him the spiritual leader of Japan. He wasn't expected to intervene in political or military matters, but if he did, you but your ass people would follow his orders. Now since the Japanese navy and army knew the Emperor could directly control them, they actually used this as a tool. On many occasions in order to secure further funding or specific policy adjustment, military leaders would appeal to the Emperor or do things in the name of the Emperor, completely superseding the civilian government. Basically the military used the Meiji Constitution to earn a large degree of autonomy, case and point being the Mukden Incident. As long as they made it seem like they were doing everything they believed the Emperor wanted them to do, they believed they could get away with it. If the Civilian government came after them for their actions, they could appeal to the emperor, but how did Hirohito feel about all this? Rumors had emerged even before the Mukden Incident, to which Hirohito demanded the army be reigned in. Attempts were made, but the Mukden Incident went off on September 18th. The next day the imperial palace were given a report and Hirohito was advised by chief aide de camp Nara Takeji “this incident would not spread and if the Emperor was to convene an imperial conference to take control of the situation, the virtue of his majesty might be soiled if the decisions of such a conference should prove impossible to implement”. As the Mukden incident was getting worse, the Kwantung officers began to demand reinforcements be sent from the Korea army. The current Wakatsuki cabinet met on the issue and decided the Mukden incident had to remain an incident, they needed to avoid a declaration of war. The official orders were for no reinforcements of the Korea army to mobilize, however the field commander took it upon his own authority and mobilized them. The army chief of staff Kanaya reported to Hirohito the Korea army was marching into Manchuria against orders. At 31 years of age Hirohito now had an excellent opportunity to back the current cabinet, to control the military and stop the incident from getting worse. At this time the military was greatly divided on the issue, politically still weak compared to what they would become in a few years, if Hirohito wanted to rule as a constitutional monarch instead of an autocratic monarch, well this was his chance. Hirohito said to Kanaya at 4:20pm on September 22nd “although this time it couldn’t be helped, [the army] had to be more careful in the future”. Thus Hirohito accepted the situation as fait accompli, he was not seriously opposed to seeing his army expand his empire. If it involved a brief usurpation of his authority so bit, as long as the operation was successful. It actually a lot more complicated, but to general sum it up, Emperor Hirohito cared about only one thing, the Kokutai. The Kokutai was the national essence of Japan. It was all aspects of Japanese polity, derived from history, tradition and customs all focused around the cult of the Emperor. The government run by politicians was secondary, at any given time the kokutai was the belief the Emperor could come in and directly rule. If you are confused, dont worry, its confusing. The Meiji constitution was extremely ambiguous. It dictated a form of constitutional monarchy with the kokutai sovereign emperor and the “seitai” that being the actual government. Basically on paper the government runs things, but the feeling of the Japanese people was that the wishes of the emperor should be followed. Thus the kokutai was like an extra-judicial structure built into the constitution without real legal framework, its a nightmare I know. Emperor Hirohito was indoctrinated from a young age that the most important aspect of his reign was to defend the Kokutai. This is actually why Hirohito took so long to finally intervene during WW2 and call for Japan’s surrender. I have taken far too long going down the rabbit hole of Showa Era Japan and Hirohito, if you are interested on the subject, over only my Youtube Membership or Patreon I did a two part exclusive podcast specifically on Hirohito’s responsibility for the war. The weeks following the Mukden Incident were marked by wide scale cooperation between the local Chinese leaders and Japanese invaders. In many places there was of course valiant resistance by Chinese forces, but it was not centrally coordinated and honestly amounted to little. The Kwantung army despite being vastly outnumbered was highly trained and highly mechanized in comparison to the Chinese. The Kwantung army had very few troops to conquer over 350,000 square miles, populated by over 30 million Chinese. Prior to 1931 the Kwantung Army numbered under 10,000, by late 1931 this would increase to 65,000 and by 1933 140,000. Yet during the initial invasion the army’s behavior was heavily affected by the actions of the Chinese, or in many cases their inability to act. The only way Japan was going to do what they wanted to do was to encourage co-optation amongst the Chinese elites of Manchuria, typically at the provincial and local levels. This meant showering them with extravagant new positions in the new regime, promoting a policy of nonresistance and targeting prominent members of Zhang Xueliang’s regime who were expected to oppose Kwantung rule. When the Mukden Incident broke out, Zhang Xueliang was in Beiping acting in his new capacity as the North China Garrison commander. On the night of September 18th, Zhang Xuliang was enjoying an opera performance by the famous singer Mei Lanfang. His deputies also all happened to be away from Shenyang. Wan Fulin was in Beiping and Zhang Zuoxiang was attending his fathers funeral in Jinzhou. Within their absence the most senior provincial commanders were quickly pounced upon by Kwantung operatives who secured their cooperation. Within Shenyang the Eastern Borders Garrison commander Yu Zhishan and Xi Xia the acting provincial forces commander of Changchun both immediately defected to the Japanese. Although the Northeastern Army had roughly 130,000 troops within Manchuria, compared to the Kwantung and Korea army troops who together were roughly 50,000, Chiang Kai-Shek hastily issued a nonresistance order that was confirmed by Zhang Xueliang. The troops were to not fight back and instead await a negotiated settlement. While they waited, the Japanese secured high level provincial elite cooperation within a few weeks time. On November 10th, Zhang Zuolin’s former civil affairs minister, Yuan Jinkai was made chairman of the committee in charge of Japanese controlled Liaoning. On December 16th, the formerly existing post of governor was re-established and a previous holder of this post under Zhang Xueliang, Zang Shiyi was appointed. Thus Yuan Jinkai’s post as chairman was redundant. Meanwhile Xi Xia was made governor of Jilin. Some of you might be wondering, why in the hell would Chiang Kai-Shek relay orders to not resist an invasion? Let us not forget the timeline here, during this exact time period, Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan formed an alliance in North China against the NRA; the Soviet of Jiangxi was running rampant and in the south the Old Guangxi clique was running amok. Even though Zhang Xueliang had 250,000 men on paper, only 100-130,000 of them were in Manchuria while the rest were scattered around Hebei. Chiang Kai-Shek had an expert understanding of the Japanese numbers, their training and equipment. To put it frankly, if the quote en quote “incident” escalated into a full-scale war, China would most likely lose. There was also another aspect to this, the role of the League of Nations and the current Wakatsuki government in Tokyo. Either of these bodies could potentially restrain what appeared to be renegade Japanese forces on the asia mainland. Going a bit forward in time, the last redoubt during the invasion would be at Jinzhou where Zhang Xueliang would establish his HQ. When it was about to finally fall, Zhang Xueliang ultimately decided to withdraw his forces from Manchuria. According to the US minister to CHina, Nelson Johnson, Counselor Yano of the Japanese legation tam at Beiping had conducted informal discussions with the Young Marshal, in which he stated Jinzhou would inevitably fall to the Japanese and quote “the Tokyo Foreign Office would gain prestige and be better able to shape events to the advantage of China if the Chinese avoid[ed] a clash by withdrawing voluntarily.” He also advised Zhang Xueliang, that some of his followers might be reappointed to official positions within the newly emerging government in Shenyang. Nelson tells us “Chang is believed to have been led to his present decision by these inducements, along with the bitter hostility toward him at Nanking and the lack of support from that quarter.” Thus Zhang Xueliang was being blackmailed by both sides into nonresistance. By late December of 1931 it also seemed certain international intervention was not going to happen and Chiang Kai-Shek’s resignation over Nanjing did not provide the Young Marshal with many options. Now what about the Japanese government during all of this. When the Mukden Incident boke out, the government in Tokyo, headed by premier Wakatsuki Reijiro were appalled to hear the news of what was essentially a mutiny. The Kwantung officers disagreed with Tokyo’s policies and kept Tokyo's consul in Shenyang under lock and key during the night of September 18th. If there had been more significant resistance to the invasion, Tokyo probably would have ordered the Kwantung army to withdraw. Without the co-optation of many Chinese elites, the Kwantung Army would have most likely not succeeded in taking all of Manchuria. The co-optation policy the Japanese took was also very much not an ad hoc measure. There had been elements within the IJA who had been working overtime to persuade cooperation with local power holders as part of their strategy. The Kwantung officers who launched the Mukden Incident, mostly working under Ishiwara and Itegaki had initially aimed to enact a simply military occupation in which “local Chinese officials would be granted a considerable degree of autonomy in exchange for their cooperation.” However, Tokyo HQ outright rejected annexation out of fear of Soviet reprisals and this led the mutiny leaders to “the subterfuge of Manchurian independence.” The improvised nature of the original plan led to arguments between the different sections of those Japanese forces in Manchuria. Historian Akira Iriye noted “What emerges . . . is an almost total absence of ideology as a driving force behind military action.” While this sounds clearly dysfunctional, it actually aided the occupiers, because many areas of life in Manchuria were not immediately affected by the occupation and thus were more likely to cooperate. The actual coordination of the occupation was placed in the hands of the Kwantung Army Special Affairs Unit “Tokumubu”, operating via the General Affairs Board of the Council of State under Komai Tokuzo. Komai Tokuzo had been born near Kyoto and from an early age was consumed with a desire to see China. He was trained as an agriculturalist, before he joined the SMR and worked for a company during the reign of Zhang Zuolin. He became acquainted with the Old Tiger and debated with him and other prominent leaders on questions such as Mongol land rights and the Guo Songling rebellion. During this time he befriended Yu Chonghan and Zhang Jinghui. After the Mukden Incident, he was appointed as a financial adviser to the Kwantung Army, a very senior post with direct access to Honjo Shigeru, the commander of the Northeast. As Akira Iriye also notes “in fact, [Komai] was a top-level adviser to the army on politics and economics in Manchuria.”Komai would become responsible for the strategies of co-opting local elite, and thus was essential to the power structure of the Kwantung Army going forward. The Japanese utilized a lethal combination of violence and persuasion to take over. Many power brokers refused to cooperate and were forced into exile in North China. However, plenty of collaborators were found to quickly set up structures and controls within the new regime. The bulk of the Japanese forces moved into the principal cities of the SMR region first. Robert E Lewis, the adviser to the foreign affairs ministry in Nanjing sent a telegram declaring the Japanese had sent a large number of troops into Manchuria just prior to the 18th of September “On Friday night September eighteenth the Japanese Army sent from Korea into Manchuria through Antung seven army railway trains fully loaded with soldiers. On Saturday night September ninteenth [sic] Japanese army sent four additional trains loaded with soldiers in to [sic] Manchuria at the same point . . . Japanese occupied every Chinese public office in Antung excepting the customs house which has Europeans in it, also placed guard over Chinese customs superintendent to prevent his free action. [The Japanese] arrested superintendent of schools and forbad [sic] teaching of Dr Sun Yatsen’s principles. Japanese army occupied Kirin seventy nine miles east of the south Manchuria railway zone on September ninteenth [sic] they seized and held the telegraph office telephone office wireless station provincial arsenal waterworks plant Bank of China Kirin Provincial Bank police headquarters and subdivisions Kuo Ming Tang [sic] Party headquarters and all other public offices. Search and seizure was...
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3.138 Fall and Rise of China: How Zhang Xueliang lost Manchuria
02/10/2025
3.138 Fall and Rise of China: How Zhang Xueliang lost Manchuria
Last time we spoke about the Mukden Incident. In the early 1930s, Ishiwara and Itagaki of the Kwantung Army believed Japan must seize Manchuria to secure its interests against China and the USSR. Frustrated by delays from Tokyo, they orchestrated a surprise attack, framing it as retaliation for the mysterious death of a fellow officer. On September 18, 1931, they bombed railway tracks, claiming a Chinese atrocity, and swiftly attacked, overwhelming Chinese forces despite being outnumbered. Their decisive actions sparked Japan's occupation of Manchuria, defying orders from high command. In a bid to expand Japan's influence, Ishiwara and Itagaki incited chaos in Manchuria, leading to the Mukden Incident. They manipulated local unrest to justify military action, swiftly capturing Kirin without resistance. Despite Tokyo's orders against expansion, they continued their aggressive tactics, pushing for Manchuria's independence. Ishiwara's defiance of command led to significant military successes but also sowed seeds of indiscipline within the army. Ultimately, their actions set Japan on a path toward conflict with China and the West, forever changing the region's fate. #138 How Zhang Xueliang lost Manchuria Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Little disclaimer this is not a quote en quote regular episode. In this one we are going to look more so into the reasons the Japanese had an easy time conquering Manchuria. Its honestly a very complicated subject involving numerous variables, but I thought it be important to talk about this before we get into the campaign itself. So last we left off are good friend Ishiwara Kanji had unleashed the Mukden Incident, initiating an unofficial war with China. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese executed a false flag operation by detonating explosives along the South Manchurian Railway near Mukden. This action was followed by an assault from 500 Kwantung soldiers on the Peitaying Barracks, which were defended by 7,000 troops under Zhang Xueliang. At the time, Zhang was in Beiping serving as the North China garrison commander. Those around him, including Chiang Kai-shek, urged him to instruct his men not to resist, to conceal their weapons, and to retreat westward if possible. Chiang Kai-shek recognized that the Japanese were attempting to provoke a full-scale war with China, a conflict they were not prepared to win at that moment. China needed additional time to organize and train its forces to confront such an adversary. Zhang Xueliang understood the weakness of his own forces and aimed to preserve a significant army, making these orders advantageous for him. Both men also believed that the League of Nations or the Wakatsuki cabinet might intervene to halt the illegal occupation. During the confrontation at the Peitaying Barracks, approximately 500 Chinese soldiers were killed, many surrendered, and others fled as the Japanese forces destroyed the barracks and the small air force stationed there. Now what is known as the invasion of Manchuria, is actually an extremely complicated story. For those interested over on the Pacific War Channel I have a full documentary covering it with a lot of combat footage and Chinese Drama Series footage which is always absolutely hilarious. To overly summarize, the officials in charge of various regions of Manchuria did one or more of three options when faced with Japanese aggression. 1) Most defected in return for monetary gain and new positions under the emerging puppet government. 2) They attempted to sabotage and thwart the Japanese while portraying themselves to be complicit. And 3) they actively fought back. So before we begin this story lets talk about Manchuria during this time period. After the death of his father Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Xueliang inherited an extremely chaotic Manchurian dynasty one could call it. The problems were political, social and economic and while the Young Marshal was tackling these issues, 3 years into his new reign, on September 18th of 1931 the Japanese commenced an invasion. The Japanese had been greatly concerned at Zhang Xueliang’ moves to assume control over the regional industries and railways, whose income was incredibly important to Japan after the Great Depression had hit in 1929. What ultimately happened to Zhang Xueliang echoed the fate of Yuan Shikai during his tenure of 1912-1916. Yuan Shikai had made moves to centralize China while simultaneously alienating its populace by abolishing its provincial assemblies and trying to make the militarists dissolve their armies. Both men faced enormous external threats while trying to transition their regimes. Nonetheless, Zhang Xueliang did oversee a lot of real change in manchuria in terms of political awareness, education, greater availability of foreign goods and increased the populations feeling they were part of China proper. This increased awareness alongside a sense of international crisis caused by the clashes with the USSR and Japan, spur a new sense of nationalism that would persist for the 15 year war. So lets talk about the regions of Manchuria shall we. There are 3 provinces in Manchuria, Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, altogether they encompass 380,000 square miles. The central third of Manchuria consists of plains, with the Xing’an range extending around the border areas from the west to northeast and the Changbaishan mountains following the border from east to southeast. To the west of the Xing’an Mountains lies a region that is geographically part of Mongolia and is characterized by steppe terrain. The most fertile regions include the alluvial plain extending from the Gulf of Liaodong to Changchun, as well as the areas near the Sungari and Nonni Rivers in northern Jilin and Heilongjiang. This area experiences significant seasonal climate variations, with average temperatures in July reaching approximately 24 degrees Celsius, while winter averages drop to around –12 degrees Celsius in southern Manchuria and –24 degrees Celsius in the far north. By 1931, there had been no official census conducted in the area, but the Research Bureau of the South Manchurian Railway estimated the population in 1930 to be approximately 34.4 million people. This included 15.2 million in Liaoning, 9.1 million in Jilin, and 5.3 million in Heilongjiang. Population density varied, with Liaoning having 212 people per square mile, Jilin with 89, and Heilongjiang with 23. By 1931, over 90 percent of the population was Han Chinese, while Manchus accounted for about 3 percent, Mongols around 6 percent, and the remaining population comprised Koreans, Russians, and Japanese. During the Japanese occupation, the economy of Manchuria was primarily agricultural, with soybean products accounting for 60 percent of the region's total exports in 1930. In contrast, industrial development was limited in 1931, mainly concentrated in the Japanese-controlled cities of Dairen and Harbin, as well as in areas managed by the South Manchuria Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway. However, since the early 1920s, a military-industrial complex had begun to emerge, driven by Zhang Zuolin's demand for modern weaponry. The Shenyang arsenal, established in 1919, manufactured rifles and ammunition, employing 20,000 skilled workers who operated at full capacity during the Zhili-Fengtian wars, producing up to 400,000 rounds daily at its peak in 1924-25.The population of Manchuria was overwhelmingly rural and the rivers and roads remained their principal means of transportation. The Amur, Nonni and Sungari rivers were the lifeline of trade, while the roads were in quite a terrible state of repair by 1931. There were 3 key groups of people who met the Japanese invasion, military power brokers, nationalists and civilians who were largely alienated from Zhang Xueliang’s regime. Amongst all of them was a large level of interprovincial rivalries. Local militarism in Manchuria was heavily factionalied with each clique retaining both civilian and military followers. The old comrades of Zhang Zuolin were categorized by the Japanese as “the old faction”, such men as Zhang Zuoxiang and Zhang Jinghui who had risen up alongside the Tiger of Manchuria during the 1920s. They had amassed large fortunes and although they had been subordinate to Zhang Zuolin, they were also power brokers in their own right with private armies and economic bases under their control. Some like Zhang Zuoxiang and Wan Fulin stayed loyal to the Young Marshal once he assumed power. They were often aided by the Japanese who were not keen at all with Zhang Xueliang’s enthusiasm for Chinese nationalism. Zhang Zuoxiang would become one of Zhang Xueliangs most important associates. He was born in Jinzhou and at the age of 16 fled his village to escape a family feud and became a bricklayer in Shenyang. However in 1901 he got involved in an incident ending with him stabbing another man, prompting him to flee for Xinmin where he joined forces under Zhang Zuolin. He quickly rose within the military and attended the Fengtian Military Academy. During the 1920s he remained a close ally to Zhang Zuolin, serving as a military governor of Jilin. When Zhang Zuolin was assassinated, Zhang Zuoxiang used his authority to preserve power for Zhang Xueliang who was stationed outside Manchuria at the time and needed time to return to Manchuria. Wan Fulin would become Zhang Xueliang’s other second in command. He was born in 1880 in Changling county of Jilin. Born to a poor farming family, he joined a local militia of around 50 men. His militia was gradually incorporated into the local militarist Wu Junshengs troops in 1900 and from then on Wan rose through the ranks. After Zhang Zuolin’s death Wan Fulin was appointed as the military affairs supervisor or “duban” for HEilongjiang. He then took a newly created position of provincial chairman “Zhuxi” in 1929 and held said position during the Mukden Incident. Now after the Old Tiger had died, one of his old associates Zhang Zongchang, whom I think we all know very well, proved to Zhang Xueliang he could not rely on his fathers old guard. Zhang Zongchang and Chu Yupu tossed their lot in with the Japanese and attacked from Tangshan with 60,000 troops trying to overthrow the new KMT led government. That little venture only lasted from August 2-8th, ending in a hilarious defeat for the so called rebels, but the experience taught Zhang Xueliang that his Fengtian army needed to be reformed, even though it was against the wishes of many of its senior officers. The most significant opposition to Zhang Xuliang came from his fathers former chief of staff Yang Yuting and his associate Chang Yinhuai. Yang Yuting had been born in Hebei, but his family moved to Faku county in Fengtian when he was young. He was an adept student, rising through the system and by 1909 joined the Japanese military academy “Shikkan gakko”. During the republic days, he joined the Old Tiger and slowly became a trusted ally. In 1925 as General Guo Songling rebelled, in a large part because of Yang Yuting’s advocacy of continued militarism even after the failure of the Fengtian army during the second Fengtian-Zhili War. Yang Yuting was chosen by Zhang Zuolin to lead the unsuccessful counterebellion and then became his chief of staff. By 1927 Yang Yuting began negotiations with the Japanese, some of whom thought he would make a much better replacement to the Old Tiger. Yang Yuting saw Zhang Zuolins death as an opportunity to development himself, however in 1928 he began negotiations with Nanjing as well. This led him to change his mind about Japan and adopted unification measures with Nanjing. He hoped to snuggle up to Chiang Kai-Shek, but likewise retained close connections with the Japanese. Dishing out appointments was something Yang Yuting was quite keen upon. When Zhang Xueliang sought to appoint one of his supporters as the new governor of the Eastern Special Zone, this was an area around Harbin that had been made autonomous in its role as a hub for the Chinese Eastern Railway, well Yang Yuting made Zhang Jinghui the de facto governor instead. Yet Yang Yuting’s spiderlike nature would become his downfall. One of his closest friends was Chang Yinhuai, who was appointed governor of Heilongjiang by Zhang Xueliang in 1928. Chang Yinhuai’s contempt for the Young Marshal became more and more open, until it reached the point where he would money to Yang Yuting for ordnance expenses but not the Young Marshal, oh and he was building his own private army. On the 10th of January of 1929 Chang and Yang went to meet Zhang Xueliang, demanding he create a new post of Northeastern Railway Supervisor for Chang. They both argued they wanted to take control over the Chinese Eastern Railway, currently under Soviet-Chinese dual control, but Zhang Xueliang dragged his feet during the meeting. When the two men left, Zhang Xueliang instructed his police chief Gao Jiyi to arrest and shoot them, which he did. M.S Myers, the American consul in Shenyang cabled his superiors about the execution, noting, “the elimination of the two most powerful and probably able members of the Fengtien Party[,]... although strengthening the position of the existing head of this territory for the time being, may later result in the breakup of that party through internal and external agencies.” Well Mr. Myers was quite right. Although Zhang Xueliang’s actions had the effect of stopping Yang Yutings overreach, it ultimately was more of a sign of his weakness, rather than strength. Some like Zhang Jinghui were saved by the fact they were old associates with Zhang Zuolin and had built their own power bases. However other like Zang Shiyi for example, who were close associates of Yang Yuting had to wait for Zhang Xueliang to move to Beiping to take up his position as deputy commander of the Nationalist forces before gaining office as chairman of Liaoning. Zhao Xinbo only managed to grab the office of mayor over Shenyang after the Japanese took over. Overall Zhang Xueliang did not exercise strong enough control over his local militarists any more than his father did. When Guo Songling had rebelled in 1925, Zhang Zuolin’s support had bled considerably, it was only Japanese intervention that saved him. His son would find out his rule was more tolerated rather than supported. There was also a lot of friction between those supporting the KMT vs those supporting the CCP in Manchuria. Qian Gonglai was a professor at the Shendao school in SHenyang and was arrested as a Bolshevist agitator in march of 1927. He had developed a large following amongst his students and the local intelligentsia. Qian had been involved with multiple organization such as the local YMCA and within the Shendao school, which were breeding grounds for young activities. These youthful types were inspired by the May Fourth and May Thirtieth movements, most being from Fengtian. Once Zhang Xueliang and his close followers set up a base of operations in Beiping after 1931, these types of intellectuals would become the founders and key movers of the Northeast National Salvation Society or “NNSS”, the most important propaganda organization to favor the military recapture of Manchuria in defiance of Chiang Kai-Shek's nonaggression strategy. One of their members, Yan Baohang was born in a village within Haicheng county of Fengtian. He came from a poor family, but managed to attend the village school and performed well enough to encourage a local elite to pay for his primary schooling. He went on to study at the teacher training college in Shenyang where he came under the influence of Christianity, but also nationalist ideas promoted by the May fourth movement. He attended the Shenyang YMCA and went to college where he met other young activities such as Wang Zhuoran, Du Zhongyuan and Gao Chongmin. After graduating Yan attempted his new teaching methods at various Fengtian schools, before setting up a free school in Shenyang for poor children. This school was supported by the YMCA and funds from Guo Songling’s wife. The school was widely admired, and Zhang Xueliang gave it his full support. Yan became quite famous and was sent to Beijing for further training. By 1925 Yan received a scholarship to go to Edinburgh University where he earned a certificate in Social Studies. While in Europe he traveled widely, visiting places like Denmark and Moscow. He came back to Shenyang in 1929 and alongside Lu Guangji, Gao Chongmin, Wang Huayi and Che Xiangchen formed the Liaoning Provincial Nationalist Foreign Affairs association. This organization, whose core members formed the NNSS, was supported by Zhang Xueliang. Their aim was to seek China’s freedom and equal status, which obviously stood against the Japanese. By 1931 it had 46 branches and Yan also set up within the YMCA a Liaoning anti-opium association and a Liaoning Provincial Nationalist Education Advancement Association. By 1930 the Educational Advancement Association’s speakers went out on 14 occasions to talk about “exposing various crimes and secret plans the Japanese had for invading the Northeast”. Yan would become one of the heads of the NNSS’s propaganda section after 1931. The adoption of the KMT in Manchuria post 1929 meant the nationalist activists all became party members. Yan Baohang and his friends Lu Guangji, Che Xiangchen, Du Zhongyuan,Wang Huayi, Zhao Yushi, and Wang Zhuoran were among thirteen delegates sent to Nanjing for the KMT national conference in May 1931. Lu Guanji had a similar career to that of Yan. Born in 1894 in Haicheng county, he came to Shenyang at the age of 15 and graduated from the teacher training college in 1918. He taught in a SMR-zone Chinese school. In 1922 he attended a national YMCA meeting in Shenyang and soon after was dismissed from teaching for supporting student protests. After this he went to Shenyang to see if his friend Yan Baohang could use his influence with Zhang Xueliang to obtain him a job as a schools inspector. By 1926 he left education for business, becoming a manager over a local printing firm. By 1929, he was elected deputy head of the Fengtian Chamber of Commerce where he frequently met with Zhang Xueliang who liked to make use of the chamber to organize anti-Japanese protests that would not be officially linked to himself. Chen Xianzhou was born in Huanren county to a family who were handicraft manufacturers, but they went bankrupt during the First Sino-Japanese War. Chen moved in with other relatives who paid for his education. He entered the Huanren Teacher training college in 1915, where he also learned Japanese. In 1919 he won a scholarship to Sendai Industrial College where he studied electrical engineering and became active in overseas chinese student groups protesting for the return of Port Arthur and Dairen. After graduating in 1924 he was employed by the Shenyang municipal administration to negotiate with the Japanese on the building of a new tram line. Through his efforts it was built in a year for less than 2 million yuan and for this in 1927, he was asked to...
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3.137 Fall and Rise of China: Ishiwara Kanji #2: Mukden Incident
02/04/2025
3.137 Fall and Rise of China: Ishiwara Kanji #2: Mukden Incident
Last time we spoke about the Ishiwara Kanji. Born in 1889 in Japan, Kanji Ishiwara was the son of a policeman from a samurai lineage. He entered military training at 13, rising through the ranks to become a Major and a respected lecturer. His unconventional views on military strategy and history led him to predict a prolonged conflict with the United States. Deeply influenced by Nichiren Buddhism, he envisioned Japan as a moral leader destined to guide Asia, advocating for reform in China while grappling with his nation’s imperial ambitions. In 1928, ishiwara fell ill with influenza, leading to a six-month hospitalization. During recovery, he joined an elite study group discussing war theories. His lectures on total war gained fame, culminating in a presentation to Kwantung officers. Amid rising tensions in Japan, he advocated for control over Manchuria, believing Japan had a moral duty to stabilize China. His theories on warfare, including the devastating potential of airpower, foreshadowed the horrors of future conflicts, influencing Japan's military strategies. #137 Ishiwara Kanji Part 2: The Mukden Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. For the next two and a half years, Ishiwara and Itagaki collaborated with other members of the Kwantung Army to address what they perceived as the Manchurian issue. By the mid-1930s, the belief that Manchuria needed to be forcibly seized had become the prevailing opinion among the Kwantung Army. Ishiwara was convinced that Japan could no longer remain passive in Manchuria, as each passing day meant Japan was gradually losing its rights and interests in the region to China, risking expulsion. Abandoning Manchuria would be a national catastrophe, resulting in the loss of a crucial buffer state, valuable resources, and land for Japan's growing population to settle. In essence, Manchuria was vital for Japan's survival and growth. Ishiwara would often say “manchuria provides Japan with breathing space” where have we heard that type of talk before?. To the military heads in Tokyo Ishikawa would often assert Manchuria had to be seized via force, because of the soviet threat of the USSR and communism as a whole “In view of the traditional russian policy in that area, once the soviets advanced into manchuria, it would become a base for the communization of asia. Not only would the internal stability of manchuria become impossible to maintain, but Japan would be unable to maintain its own national defense, and China’s defenses, too, would become imperialized". The Army Headquarters in Tokyo also recognized that Manchuria was a crucial defensive line against the USSR. However, unlike the Kwantung Army, which aimed to control all of Manchuria, the leaders in Tokyo focused on incorporating southern Manchuria through the South Manchurian Railway and did not pursue any territory north of it. Ishiwara, on the other hand, believed that the only way for Japan to prevent the USSR from exerting pressure on southern Manchuria was to occupy northern Manchuria and extend even further north toward the Amur River. This would allow Japan to control the mountain ranges that bordered the western and eastern frontiers of northern Manchuria. Once Japan controlled northern Manchuria, Ishiwara stated in 1931 “With the solution of our defense problems in the north, we would then be free to plan an advance in any direction: to China proper, for example, or even to Southeast Asia”. Ishiwara advanced his ideas significantly after Japan's conquest of Manchuria, recognizing the necessity of effectively administering and pacifying its diverse populations. He posited that the stability of Manchuria could be achieved through the unique skills and contributions of the various ethnic groups residing there. For instance, he believed that the Chinese would excel in developing small businesses, while the Koreans would apply their expertise in paddy farming. These racial dynamics, according to Ishiwara, would play a crucial role in the development of Manchukuo and the broader vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, it was clear that, above all, Manchuria was intended to serve Japan's interests, many of which were exploitative and economically driven. By early 1930, Ishiwara and his colleague Itagaki devised a military strategy reminiscent of the tactics employed during the Russo-Japanese War, specifically a surprise night attack. Their plan involved the Kwantung Army launching an assault on the Liaoning region, targeting key Chinese garrisons. This operation required meticulous planning, as the Kwantung Army was significantly outnumbered by the forces commanded by Zhang Xueliang. In the vicinity of Mukden alone, Zhang commanded approximately 20,000 well-equipped troops, supported by aircraft and tanks. Across Manchuria, he could mobilize around 250,000 soldiers in the event of conflict. In stark contrast, the Kwantung Army could only field about 10,000 personnel, primarily composed of garrison units stationed along the railway. They lacked substantial air support and mechanized units, and their overall equipment was inadequate. To address this stark imbalance in military strength, Ishiwara emphasized the importance of intelligence and rigorous training. He aimed to refine specific assault techniques, enabling Japanese forces to execute rapid and concentrated attacks that would overwhelm their Chinese adversaries. The overarching strategy was notably straightforward: it hinged on delivering a decisive blow to the heart of Zhang Xueliang's military stronghold at the Peitaying barracks in Mukden. Ishiwara believed that if this critical target fell, it would shatter the enemy's morale, providing the Kwantung Army with the necessary military and psychological momentum to dominate the surrounding regions. However, he acknowledged that if the Soviet Union intervened, the entire plan could unravel catastrophically. One important variable Ishiwara highlighted was the necessity to pull off the operation before any attempt to restructure the domestic order in Japan occurred. Ishiwara knew his arguments and those of his colleagues would influence the heads in Tokyo, and they had to act before they did. However the heads at Tokyo and the Kwantung army held very different perspectives on when to act. In June of 1931 the Central army HQ stated in its General Outline of a solution to the Manchurian problem “we must defer the question of military action for a whole year. During this time the foreign ministry would attempt to dampen anti japanese activities in manchuria through negotiations with the government of Nanking. In the meantime the government would launch an information campaign to try and drive acquiescence at home and aboard for military action ” Ishiwara, as you can imagine, was deeply frustrated by the prospect of delaying action for another year. He argued passionately that the current international landscape necessitated an immediate strike. At that time, the Soviet Union was still in the midst of its ambitious five-year plan, which limited its capacity for intervention. Meanwhile, the United States, Britain, and France were grappling with their own financial crises, rendering them unable to mount significant resistance in the Far East. Most notably, the Nationalist regime in China was preoccupied with its unification efforts south of the Great Wall, but this situation was expected to shift soon. Ishiwara believed that if they postponed their plans for a year, the geopolitical environment would deteriorate further, making decisive action imperative. For Ishiwara, the moment to act was now or never. In July 1931, Ishiwara and Itagaki orchestrated a crucial reconnaissance mission aimed at familiarizing the newest Kwantung officers with the northern regions of Manchuria. To disguise their true intentions, they informed high command that the mission was a survey focused on the Soviet Union. However, the real objective was to assess the strength and influence of Chinese power in northern Manchuria. During their return journey, the team received alarming news about the disappearance of Captain Nakamura Shintaro, a Kwantung staff officer. Upon reaching Port Arthur, they learned that rumors were circulating that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers under what were described as “mysterious circumstances.” In the preceding months, Manchuria had witnessed a surge in violent riots, murders, work strikes, and various other incidents, all contributing to a climate of unrest. The Nakamura affair intensified these existing tensions. In response, both the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries attempted to negotiate a resolution to the crisis. However, figures at the central army headquarters, such as Nagata Tetsuzan, who sympathized with the urgency felt by their Kwantung counterparts, felt compelled to support them. The situation was rapidly escalating, and the stakes were growing ever higher. For Ishiwara the issue was clear as he wrote “the Nakamura incident adds just one more issue to the others. What the army should do now is to ignore the foreign ministry and solve the problem by taking matters into its own hands”. And that’s exactly what he did. The Kwantung officers moved their troops beyond the railway zone, where they had been confined, and without waiting for Itagaki's approval—who was in Japan at the time—they began preparations to send an armored train along with a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to Mukden. Their goal was to enlist the help of the Chinese military in investigating Nakamura's disappearance. Upon learning of this, Tokyo sent a telegram instructing them to halt their departure from the railway and to refrain from using the Nakamura incident as a pretext for employing force to address the Manchurian issue. For Ishiwara this was the last straw. On August 20th he sent a message to Nagata condemning the current diplomatic situation and that negotiations were an utter waste of time. “There is no way to settle the matter except by placing it in the hands of the army. If central hq finds it so difficult to trust its field personnel then it had better replace them with representatives more suitable to the conditions it imagines to exist in Manchuria”. Ishiwara doubled down and pushed for a plot to provoke military conflict outside of Mukden. As he wrote in almost a messianic Nichiren conviction ‘I will be the pillar of Japan; I will be the eyes of Japan; I will be the great vessel of Japan” . “Gekokujo / ruling from below” is a Japanese historical term referring to when subordinates defy or manipulate their superiors. Ishiwara and his like minded close colleagues were about to perform Gekokujo. Ishiwara ordered the dispatch of an armored train carrying a mixed regiment of infantry and artillery to compel the Chinese military authorities in Mukden to assist in the investigation of Nakamura’s disappearance. However, central headquarters halted the train's departure at the last moment, sending a telegram from Tokyo that specifically instructed the Kwantung Army not to use the Nakamura incident to pressure a resolution to the Manchurian issue. In addition to the Nakamura situation, another issue was brewing. Colonel Dohihara Kenji was involved in a plot to enlist Warlord Yan Xishan to attack Zhang Xueliang. This scheme was attracting unwanted attention and undermining the effectiveness of the Nakamura incident, prompting Ishiwara to swiftly suppress the plans. Rumors began to circulate in Tokyo that the Kwantung Army was preparing to retaliate against the Chinese due to the Nakamura situation. In response, War Minister General Minami dispatched Major General Yoshiji Tatekawa to Mukden to caution the Kwantung officers against any such actions. Ishiwara was informed of Tatekawa's arrival and sent urgent telegrams to his followers, warning, “Plot exposed. Act before Tatekawa’s arrival.” Consequently, the launch date was moved from September 28th to the 18th. Itagaki personally intercepted Tatekawa’s train, inviting him for tea and sake, and arranged for him to spend the night with a geisha on the evening of the 18th. On September 18th of 1931, 1st Lt Suemori Kawamoto of the independent Garrison Unit of the 29th infantry regiment planted bombs along the tracks near Liutiaokou. At 10:20pm they exploded doing only minor damage to 1.5 meters of track on one site. The damage was so minor a train actually passed over the tracks without difficulty 10 minutes later. Ishiwara, Itagaki and their followers quickly announced the explosion to be a Chinese atrocity and mobilized the Kwantung Army. Itagaki ordered the Independent Garrison Force and 29th infantry regiment to storm the Peitaying Barracks. Battalion commander Shimamoto was awakened by the orders via telephone and quickly dispatched the 1st (Ono) and 4th (Takahashi) companies from Mukden; the 2nd (kawakami) company at Fushun to advance to Liutiaokou. At 10:40pm the 29th regiment commander Hirata got a call from Shimamoto who ordered him to get his regiment into emergency formation and to storm the Peiyating barracks. Two secretly hidden 24cm artillery pieces began to bombard the Peitaying barracks as 500 Japanese stormed the 7000 strong Chinese garrison. Despite being outnumbered 14 to 1, the Japanese destroyed Zhang Xueliangs small air force, routed the Chinese and occupied the Peiyating Barracks by 11pm, all at the cost of 500 Chinese lives and allegedly only 2 Japanese lives. A major reason the Japanese had ease was because Zhang Xueliang ordered his men to store away their weapons and not put up a fight if the Japanese invaded. Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek both in Beijing at the time knew they could not initiate an offensive war against such a strong foreign country. They were hoping the League of Nations would intervene as pertaining to the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928. But later on Chiang Kai-Shek would find America too wrapped up in its depression at home, Britain indifferent and other nations without enough reason to risk anything in the far east. An hour after the attack, Ishiwara began pressing General Shigeru Honjo, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, to send reinforcements to capture all of Mukden. Initially, Honjo hesitated, but Ishiwara convinced him that there was significant provocation from the enemy, prompting Honjo to order additional units into combat to secure the entire city. Historians have since struggled to determine whether Honjo was aware of the invasion plan; it seems likely he had some knowledge, but not the full details, which made him cautious in his actions over the following weeks. In the days that followed, Honjo attempted to confine the incident, but Ishiwara and Itagaki continuously urged all forces to adhere to the secret plan they had trained for. The speed and decisiveness of their actions overwhelmed the Chinese forces and left Honjo unable to change the course of events. Famously when one colleague asked Itagaki what to do in response to cease and desist orders from Honjo, Itagaki responded “Never mind Honjo, it’s Ishiwara’s war”. Official orders from Tokyo came on the next day, specifically opposing the expansion of hostilities, but Ishiwara and Itagaki had come too far to stop now. They began persuading Honjo to telegram the General Staff to ask for reinforcements and freedom of action “to pursue actively the security and order of all of Manchuria”. Ishiwara and Itagaki clearly aimed to expand their offensive through official channels first, but they also circumvented these channels. One cunning tactic they used was to incite chaos among civilians in Manchurian cities, thereby heightening the demand for improved security for Japanese residents. This strategy would enable the Kwantung Army troops to move beyond their established boundaries. Shortly after what is now known as the "Mukden Incident," military agents were sent to Kirin to stir unrest in the city. Reports of disturbances from Kirin began flooding into the Kwantung Army headquarters, with Ishiwara urging Honjo to send forces to Kirin to safeguard Japanese residents. He also pushed for reinforcements from the Korean Army, but Honjo was reluctant to take that step. It seems Ishiwara feared missing a golden opportunity and chose another course of action. On the night of the 20th, he gathered together a bunch of younger Kwantung officers such as Itagaki’s assistant, Captain Katakura Tadashi and told them “I can’t do anything more to budge the commander and so i’m giving up my responsibilities for the direction of operations. Katakura, you take over”. Well it seems this little ploy had the intended effect as all the young officers immediately began pressuring Honjo to support Ishiwara’s demands to advance to Kirin, many of them threatening to resign. After several hours of the officers nagging, Honjo related and authorized the despatch of troops. The operation against Kirin was executed with remarkable speed. Ishiwara ordered the majority of the 2nd Division, led by General Tamon Jiro, to swiftly travel to Kirin by train. They entered the city without firing a single shot and compelled the local Chinese commander to declare the province's independence from Zhang Xueliang’s regime. Within hours, the Korean army responded to an aid request from the Kwantung Army staff sent on September 21st and began advancing into Manchuria. In just 48 hours, the Japanese military had taken control of Kirin, which was outside the Kwantung operational zone, and the Korean army was invading Manchuria without Tokyo's approval, effectively undermining military discipline. Chief of Staff Kanaya Hanzo had issued specific orders to restrict the Kwantung Army’s operations and granted field commanders discretionary authority for certain emergency situations, typically of a local nature. However, the Kirin expedition did not fit within these parameters. Encouraged by their success, Ishiwara and Itagaki pushed for an advance on Harbin. As noted in the previous episode, the strategy for taking Manchuria relied on speed and precision. The Kwantung Army had limited forces compared to the immediate Chinese troops in Manchuria, yet they were constrained by directives from Tokyo HQ that prohibited the movement of Kwantung troops beyond the South Manchuria Railway, where they had previously confined their actions. Ishiwara attempted to frame the situation politically, arguing that Japan should support Manchurian independence and sent this proposal directly to Tokyo central HQ. However, on October 3rd, Tokyo HQ firmly rejected the idea of expanding hostilities. Faced with this outright refusal from Tokyo HQ, the Kwantung radicals believed their only option was to create further chaos to compel a response. Ishiwara took the lead once more, aiming to unsettle Tokyo HQ. On October 8th, he donned military pilot gear and infiltrated one of five Chinese aircraft seized at Mukden airfield. He personally led a raid, although later in life, during the Tokyo War...
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3.136 Fall and Rise of China: Ishiwara Kanji #1: The Man who Began WW2?
01/27/2025
3.136 Fall and Rise of China: Ishiwara Kanji #1: The Man who Began WW2?
Last time we spoke about the reunification of Xinjiang. In Yarkland, chaos erupted as inflation soared, forcing Chinese officials to retreat to fortified New City. As insurgents advanced, Colonel Chin's forces looted and fled, igniting violence against Uyghurs and Hindu moneylenders. By April, rebels captured Kashgar, fracturing Chinese control. Amid shifting alliances, Abdullah revealed a conflict among Muslim troops, leading to a brief Uyghur-Kirghiz unity against the Chinese. After the execution of leader Temur, Abdullah seized Yarkland, while Tawfiq Bay rallied forces, leaving the Tungans besieged amidst chaos. In the tumultuous landscape of 1930s Xinjiang, Ma Chongying's Tungan forces, alongside young Uyghur conscripts, captured Kumul and advanced toward Urumqi. Despite fierce battles, including a significant clash at Kitai, Sheng Shihtsai struggled to maintain control amid shifting loyalties and external pressures. As the TIRET emerged under Khoja Niyas Hajji, internal conflicts and Soviet interventions escalated. Ultimately, Ma Chongying retreated to Russia, leaving Sheng in power, but the region remained fraught with tension and uncertainty. #136 Ishiwara Kanji Part 1: The Man who Began WW2? Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. “The board is set, the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time.” Famously said by Gandalf the White. 1931 was the year the Japanese initiated a 15 year long war with China. For those of you who perhaps joined this podcast recently and don’t know, I am Craig and I operate the Pacific War Channel on Youtube. I have been covering the 15 year long China War forever it seems, so when we finally reached this part in our larger story I sat down and thought about how to first tackle this. One thing I really believe needs to be said at the beginning, is a lot of what happened was put into motion by one man, Ishiwara Kanji. For those of you who joined my patreon or later listened to my Ishiwara Kanji series on my channel, this one might be a bit of a refresher. But for those of you who have never heard the name of this man, well let me tell you a story about how a single man caused WW2. Kanji Ishiwara was born on January 18, 1889, in Tsuruoka, located in Yamagata Prefecture, Japan. He was the second son of a policeman who hailed from a lineage of samurai that had historically served the Shonai Domain. This domain had a notable history, particularly during the Boshin War, where Ishiwara's clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate. Following the defeat of the Shogunate, clans like Ishiwara's found themselves marginalized in the new political landscape of Meiji Era Japan. The power dynamics shifted significantly, with domains such as Choshu and Satsuma gaining the majority of influential governmental positions, while those that had aligned with the Shogunate were largely excluded from power. At the young age of 13, Ishiwara embarked on his military career by enrolling in a military preparatory school in Sendai. He continued his education for two years at the Central Military Preparatory School in Tokyo, where he honed his skills and knowledge in military affairs. In 1907, he entered the Imperial Japanese Military Academy as a member of its 21st class. After two years of rigorous training, he graduated in July 1909, receiving a commission as a Lieutenant and taking on the role of platoon commander in an infantry regiment stationed in the Tohoku region. In 1910, following Japan's annexation of Korea, Ishiwara's regiment was deployed to the Korean Peninsula, where he served in a small garrison in Ch’unch’on. His time there involved two years of occupation duty, during which he gained valuable experience in military operations and leadership. After returning to Tohoku in 1912, Ishiwara pursued further education and successfully passed the examinations required for entry into the Army Staff College in 1915. His dedication and exceptional performance were evident throughout his studies, culminating in his graduation at the top of his class in November 1918. This achievement earned him a prestigious place among the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, a distinguished group within the Japanese military, and he was honored with the imperial sword, a symbol of his status and accomplishments. In 1920, Ishiwara found himself facing a challenging assignment within the Department of Military Training. Eager for a change, he applied for service in China and was subsequently assigned to the Central China Garrison in Hankow. Over the course of a year, he traveled extensively through central China, immersing himself in the culture and landscape before returning to Tokyo in 1921. Upon his return, he took on the role of lecturer at the Army Staff College, where he shared his knowledge and experiences with aspiring military leaders. Despite his desire for another assignment in China, Ishiwara's superiors redirected him to Europe, a common practice for promising young officers at the time. He spent three years in Germany, where he dedicated himself to studying languages and military history. By 1925, at the age of 36 and having attained the rank of Major, he received a prestigious assignment to the faculty of the Army Staff College, where he lectured on the history of warfare. From the outset, Ishiwara distinguished himself as an unconventional officer. His eccentricities were well-known; he was often seen as argumentative and struggled with numerous health issues, including recurrent kidney infections, gastrointestinal problems, tympanitis, and other ailments that plagued him throughout his career. Additionally, his ancestry played a significant role in his military life, particularly in the context of the Japanese military's values during the 1930s. Officers from disgraced clans often felt compelled to demonstrate exceptional loyalty to the Emperor, striving to overcome the stigma associated with their lineage, a legacy of distrust that lingered from the early Meiji period. Ishiwara's character was marked by a certain oddity; he was a nonconformist with a fiercely independent spirit. Many biographers note that while he excelled academically, he often disregarded military decorum, particularly in terms of his dress and personal appearance. Early in his career, he voiced his concerns about perceived inequalities within the military, particularly the favoritism shown towards graduates of the staff college. Such outspoken criticism was considered reckless, yet it reflected his deep-seated beliefs. An avid reader, Ishiwara immersed himself in a wide range of subjects, including politics, religion, history, and philosophy, revealing a restless and inquisitive mind. His unconventional behavior and intellectual pursuits garnered attention from his peers, many of whom regarded him as a brilliant thinker. While military personnel are typically required to study military history, few pursue it with the same fervor as Ishiwara. He developed a profound obsession with understanding military history beyond the standard curriculum. His critical examination of the Russo-Japanese War led him to conclude that Japan's victory was largely a matter of luck. He believed that Japan had adopted the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but the sheer size of Russia made it impossible to defeat them swiftly. Ishiwara posited that had Russia been better prepared, Japan would likely have faced defeat, and it was only through a unique set of circumstances that Japan avoided a protracted conflict. This realization prompted Ishiwara to advocate for a significant shift in Japan's defense planning, emphasizing the need to adapt to the realities of modern warfare. His studies extended to World War I, where he critically analyzed the distinctions between short and prolonged conflicts. He recognized that extended wars often evolved into total wars, where political, economic, and social factors became as crucial as military strategy. This line of thinking led him to categorize wars into two types: “kessenteki senso” (decisive war) and “jizokuteki senso” (continuous war). Ishiwara viewed these categories as part of a cyclical pattern throughout history, with each type influencing the other in a dynamic interplay. During his time in Germany, Ishiwara immersed himself in the study of prominent military theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke, and Hans Delbrück. He found himself particularly captivated by Delbrück's concepts of Niederwerfungstrategie, or "strategy of annihilation," which emphasizes the importance of achieving victory through decisive battles, and Ermattungsstrategie, meaning "strategy of exhaustion," which focuses on wearing down the enemy over time. These theories resonated deeply with Ishiwara, as he recognized parallels between his own ideas and the insights presented in these influential works. This realization prompted him to analyze historical conflicts, viewing the Napoleonic Wars as the quintessential example of annihilation warfare, while interpreting the campaigns of Frederick the Great as emblematic of exhaustion warfare. As Ishiwara advanced in his studies, he became increasingly convinced, much like many of his contemporaries, that Japan and the United States were inevitably on a collision course toward war, driven by conflicting power dynamics and ideological differences. He anticipated that such a conflict would not be swift but rather a drawn-out struggle characterized by a strategy of exhaustion. However, this led him to grapple with a pressing dilemma: how could Japan effectively prepare for a prolonged war when its natural resources were evidently insufficient to sustain such an endeavor? This predicament prompted him to rethink the broader context of Asia. Ishiwara held a strong belief that Asia was a distinct entity, fundamentally different from the West, and he envisioned a future where Asian nations would liberate themselves and unite in solidarity. His enthusiasm was particularly ignited during the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, while he was a young cadet stationed in Korea. The prospect of China revitalizing itself filled him with hope. However, his later experiences in China led to a profound disillusionment. Throughout the 1920s, he encountered rampant banditry, conflicts during the warlord era, and pervasive chaos and disorder. The widespread poverty and instability he witnessed shattered his earlier optimistic vision of China’s potential for progress and reform, leaving him with a more sobering understanding of the challenges facing the region. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite his profound disappointment with the political issues plaguing China, he was equally appalled by the way his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese people. He vividly recalled feelings of shame when he witnessed fellow colleagues in Hankow disembarking from rickshaws and carelessly tossing coins at the feet of the rickshaw pullers. This behavior struck him as not only disrespectful but also indicative of a broader attitude of racial superiority that he believed needed to be addressed. He frequently expressed in his writings that the Japanese needed to abandon their feelings of racial superiority. Ironically, he often juxtaposed this belief with his conviction that Japan had a duty to guide nations like China toward their rightful destiny. While he advocated for racial equality between Japan and China, he held a markedly different view regarding China’s political landscape. Like many of his contemporaries, he believed that China required significant reform and modernization, which he felt Japan was uniquely positioned to facilitate. To Ishiwara, the pressing issue was that if Japan did not assist China in its development, Western powers would aggressively intervene, further subjugating the nation. He viewed Japan’s role as one of liberation for China, rather than domination. Additionally, Ishiwara connected the impending conflict between Japan and the United States to the broader dynamics of Japan-China relations, suggesting that the outcome of this war would significantly impact the future interactions between the two nations. Ishiwara, like many Japanese military officers of his time, subscribed to the concept of Kokutai, a complex and multifaceted cultural phenomenon that served as a spiritual driving force within the Japanese military. The Kokutai can be understood as the essence of Japan’s national character. Japan operated as a constitutional monarchy, embodying both the Kokutai (the national body or character) and Seitai (the governmental structure). This duality created a unique ideological framework: one aspect emphasized the traditional reverence for the emperor, while the other focused on the official government apparatus. To simplify this intricate relationship, one might say, “Japan is governed simultaneously by the emperor and the government.” However, this characterization is inherently confusing, as it encapsulates a significant contradiction. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution stated, “The emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet.” This provision suggests the existence of an absolute monarch who is nonetheless expected to heed the advice of democratically elected representatives, creating a paradox that would contribute to the tensions leading to the Pacific War. A critical issue that arose from this constitutional framework was that the military was explicitly stated to be under the control of the emperor, rather than the political diet. Consequently, many military leaders perceived themselves as being beholden to the Kokutai, an ideology that evolved significantly from the Meiji era into the Showa era. For instance, consider a high-ranking military officer who views the political elite as corrupt individuals who have effectively taken the emperor hostage, acting against his will and, by extension, against the will of the Japanese people. Such a perspective could lead to radical actions, including attempts to overthrow the government to restore what they believed to be the rightful authority of the emperor. This ideological conflict presents a fascinating and complex rabbit hole that merits further exploration. Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. Ishiwara grappled with a profound question: how could the concept of Kokutai—the national essence of Japan—be relevant beyond the borders of Japan? He pondered how its significance could extend beyond the specific national interests of Japan. If a Japanese soldier were to lay down his life for the Kokutai, what meaning would that sacrifice hold for individuals of different races and nationalities? Furthermore, he sought to understand how the Kokutai’s universal value could be connected to other ideologies outside Japan. In his quest for answers, Ishiwara turned to Nichiren Buddhism. This spiritual framework allowed him to weave together his thoughts on warfare, historical narratives, and the national purpose of Japan. Interestingly, Ishiwara did not come from a religious background; he had briefly explored Christianity but did not pursue it further. Similarly, Shintoism did not fully resonate with his beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism, however, presented a compelling alternative. It is characterized by a strong sense of patriotism and an apocalyptic vision, positioning itself as a holy mission intended for all of humanity, with Japan at its center. This belief system embodies a quasi-ideology of world regeneration, casting Japan as a moral leader destined to guide others. Given this context, it is easy to see how the Kokutai and Nichiren Buddhism complemented each other seamlessly. By leveraging the principles of Nichiren Buddhism, Ishiwara envisioned a way to elevate the Kokutai from a strictly nationalistic doctrine to a more universal ideology that could resonate globally. His introduction to these ideas came through Tanaka Chigaku, a prominent figure in the Kokuchukai, or "National Pillar Society," which was a nationalist organization rooted in Nichiren Buddhism and based in Tokyo. This connection provided Ishiwara with a framework to articulate a vision of Japan that transcended its geographical boundaries, linking the Kokutai to a broader, more inclusive mission. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith’s view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism. One element of Kokuchukai’s Nichirenism that strongly attracted Ishiwara was its aggressive passages. He justified much of Japan's military actions on the Asian continent by drawing parallels to Nichiren's concept of wielding the sword to uphold righteousness. He frequently quoted Nichiren's assertion that “the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law.” Ishiwara became deeply immersed in Nichiren's teachings and came to believe in its prophecy of a “Zendai mimon no dai toso,” or a titanic world conflict unprecedented in human history, akin to a global Armageddon. Following this conflict, he envisioned a period of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law.” While in Germany, Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the U.S. emerged victorious, the kokutai would be obliterated. He traveled back to Japan via the Trans-Siberian Railway, stopping in Harbin, where he met with Nichiren followers. He shared his thoughts on a “final war,” asserting that it would arise from religious prophecy and his military analysis. He cautioned that Japan must prepare for this impending conflict, declaring that “the final war is fast approaching.” Upon returning to Japan in 1925, he was filled with determination to lecture at the Army Staff College about this final war. His audience consisted of the army's promising young officers, to whom he taught about Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke, World War I, and, of course, his insights on the looming conflict. The Army Staff College repeatedly requested him to expand his lectures due to their popularity. In 1927, he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan’s Present and Future National Defense,” in which he discussed the inevitable war between the U.S. and Japan. This essay garnered significant attention from his colleagues....
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3.135 Fall and Rise of China: Kumul Rebellion #4: Reunification of Xinjiang
01/20/2025
3.135 Fall and Rise of China: Kumul Rebellion #4: Reunification of Xinjiang
Last time we continued to speak about the insane battle over Southern Xinjiang. In Yarkland, chaos erupted as inflation soared, prompting Chinese officials to retreat to fortified New City. Panic led to desperate measures, including the use of dummy figures for defense. As insurgents advanced, Colonel Chin's forces looted and fled, sparking violence against Uyghurs and Hindu moneylenders. By April, rebel forces captured Kashgar, fracturing Chinese control. Amid shifting alliances, Ma Chanzeng sought power, but internal strife among leaders like Temur culminated in further violence and betrayal, with power ultimately shifting to the Khotanlik provisional government under Muhammad Amin Bughra. Abdullah’s revelation ignited conflict among Muslim troops. The Uyghurs and Kirghiz briefly united against the Chinese, ultimately capturing the New City. As tensions rose, massacres occurred, fracturing alliances and leading to a power struggle. After the execution of Uyghur leader Temur, Abdullah seized control of Yarkland, while charismatic Tawfiq Bay rallied forces against the Tungans. Eventually, the Khotan Amirs dominated the region, achieving unity amidst chaos, leaving only the besieged Tungans at bay. #135 Kumul Rebellion part 4: The reunification of Xinjiang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Do you remember Ma Chongying, basically the guy that started most of this madness? Following him getting severely wounded at Liaotun in autumn of 1932, he had withdrawn the majority of his forces to his old domain in northwestern Gansu. He set up a HQ at Anxi and through his subordinates began expanding territory and increasing recruitment via conscription. The British missionaries Mildred Cable and Francesca French were living in Tunhuang at the time and wrote extensively about Ma Congying’s recruitment efforts “The town was robbed of everything in the nature of food, goods and money ... next to food the most coveted possessions of the oases were the young, vigorous, hardy men ... These were the men whom Ma Chung-ying wanted for gun fodder, and orders were issued to the press-gang to fetch them in from every farm of the neighborhood, and collect them in Tunhuang City. Every day we saw them being rounded up. The ropes which they themselves had twisted from desert grass were used to tie their hands behind their backs, and to noose their necks in a running-knot. Roped together in droves of twenty to thirty, according to the success of the raid, they were brought to town by captors who rode the horses levied from these boys' own stables. Thrust behind the high palings of temple courtyards, the imprisoned youths lined the barriers, looking out for some passers-by who might belong to their own group of farmsteads and would take a report home that son or husband had been captured”. After initial training at Tunhuang, the recruits were taken to Anxi for further training. Cable and French were ordered to Anxi to aid Ma Chongying with his wounds and to take care of other Tungans who reportedly had been injured by fire arrows during the siege of Kumul Old City. They did a good job as within a short amount of time Ma Chongying was able to ride again. Back in Xinjiang, following the failed Uyghur led rebellion at Kumul and facing another imminent Tungant invasion in the Turfan area Jin Shujen turned increasingly to the USSR for help. In September of 1931 he bought two biplanes for the Soviets at 40,000 Mexican silver dollars each. The planes came with two Russian pilots and on October 1st, Jin signed a secret trade deal with the USSR allowing 8 Soviet trading agencies to set up shop in Urumqi, Chuguchak, Kashgar, Kulja, Aksu, Kucha, Khotan and Yarkland. Customs duties on Soviets goods were reduced and a new Xinjiang-Soviet telegraph line and radio communications were established. Jin signed these deals illegally without notifying Nanjing and in return received economic and military assistance from the Soviets. In July of 1932 he would receive another 8 aircraft. Yet despite the Soviet assistance, Jin’s provincial forces with the exception of Peppengut’s White Russian detachment remained ill trained and ill officered. Following the relief of Kumul Old City and Ma Chongyings retreat back to Gansu, Chang Peiyuan, the provincial commander in chief and military governor of Ili went to Urumqi. It appears that Jin did not fully trust Chang Peiyuan, possibly fearing that the victory at Kumul had stirred up dangerous ambitions in Chang. This distrust seemed to be mutual, as Chang, upon receiving orders to transfer to the provincial capital, chose to defy them and returned to Ili in an act bordering on open rebellion. In response, Jin appointed Sheng Shihtsai, Chang’s Chief-of-Staff during the Kumul campaign, as the new Provincial Commander-in-Chief. This decision would have significant implications both for Jin’s future and for the future of Xinjiang. Sheng Shihtsai was born in 1895 in Liaoning Manchuria. He was the son of a small landowner. In 1917 he traveled to Japan to study political economics at Waseda University and came back to China in 1919 to participate in the May 4th movement. During that time he developed radical and anti-Japanese stances. He then joined the military training school in Guangdong and later enrolled in the northeastern military academy. He entered military service under Guo Songling, haha that old cry baby, who was deputy under Zhang Zuolin. Sheng Shihtsai rose through the ranks becoming a Lt Colonel. In 1924 Guo Songling sponsored Sheng’s admission to the Shikan Gakko military academy in Japan. Sheng returned briefly to help Guo Songlings failed coup against Zhang Zuolin, but was able to escape imprisonment with support from Feng Yuxiang and Chiang Kai-Shek. They got him a ticket back to Japan, and he returned to China in 1927 to participate in the northern expedition as a staff officer attached to Chiang Kai-Sheks HQ. After the northern expedition, he was made chief of war operations section of the General staff at Nanjing, but in 1929 resigned as he did not get along with his superiors. After all of this he took an interest in China’s border defences. At the time a delegation from Xinjiang visited Nanjing searching for financial aid. Jin Shujen had instructed one of his delegates, Kuang Lu the deputy General secretary of Xinjiang, to find an able bodied officer to help reorganize Xinjiang's military. Kuang Lu fished around and found Sheng who looked like a very promising man. Sheng then traveled via the USSR arriving to Urumqi in the winter of 1929. His initial welcome was a luke warm one as Jin was suspicious of this highly qualified overseas educated man, obviously seeing him as a potential threat. Moreover, Jin’s brother Jin Shuxin hated Sheng’s appointment because the man outshined him. Despite the jealousy, Jin was basically grasping at straws and needed the help so he made Sheng the chief of staff over the Xinjiang Frontier Army and also the instructor at the provincial military college. In the words of historian Chan Fooklam “Sheng’s appointment was like Jin burying a time bomb under his bed, he had brought upon himself his own doom”. Despite receiving aid from the Soviets and British, Jin’s grip over Xinjiang was slipping away. In May of 1932 Ma Chongying had dispatched Ma Shuming to take over the Tungan operation against Turfan. As we talked about, Ma Fuming, leading the provincial forces at Turfan simply defected. Also at this time Chang Peiyuan’s insubordination was breaking out, easing the way for Sheng to be promoted to commander in chief. Sheng was directing an unsuccessful campaign against Uyghur insurgents at Karlik Tagh. Following news of Ma Fumings defection and the Tungan capture of Turfan, Sheng advanced west from Kumul to try and prevent the combined Muslim forces from marching upon Urumqi. After a bloody two day battle he recaptured Turfan, but this has little effect over Ma Shuming who had already moved his HQ to Kara Shahr. During mid-winter, Ma Shuming’s Tungan cavalry and Ma Fumings Turkic insurgents began an advance to Urumqi. At some point a force of provincial troops sent to Urumqi by Jin, specifically to guard the Dawan Cheng Pass were ambushed and annihilated by the Tungans. Meanwhile full scale rebellions had broken out at Kucha led by Temur and at Khotan led by the Amirs. To this Jin responded by expanding Pappenguts White Russian detachment from its original strength of 250 to 1500 men. The White Russians, most of whom came from Ili Valley, had literally no choice but to enlist. Alongside threatening any White Russians with deportation to the USSR, Jin also arrested many Russian women to compel their husbands to enlist. By early January of 1933, Ma Shumings Tungans had crossed the Dawan Cheng and were now operating at will in the Chaiwupao corridor, to the immediate south of the capital. Wu Aichen the political envoy on behalf of Nanjing reported on January 29th, that the city gates were suddenly closed and a month of food shortages and communal tensions rose. Wu Aichen would witness the brutality of the war. In his reports, the Tungans advanced towards the city during the night, seizing the Great West Bridge after a heavy fight. The Provincial commander defending the city only had 700 troops under him and if it was not for 300 White Russian troops suddenly arriving, the city most likely would have fallen then. Wu Aichen described the White Russian troops as superb fighters, albeit savagely drunk as they drove back the Tungan and Uyghurs during two days of hand to hand combat. Meanwhile Tungans had captured the radio station and a nearby height called Devil’s Hill which overlooked the Urumqi suburbs. The Chinese officials feared letting in any more Muslim civilians to the Old City, thus they kept the city gates causing large numbers of refugees from the suburbs to gather outside the walls. This was particularly evident at the west gate which became the focal point of the fighting. Wu Aichen witnessed much of it and had this to say. “In times of peace this street was one of the most prosperous in the city, but now it was crowded With innocent fugitives, whose plight was terrible indeed. There was was worse to come, however, for now the advancing rebels came to this quarter and seizing the houses made loop-holes in the walls. In the flat roofs they set up machine-gun posts which could enfilade Government positions on either side of them. I could see for myself that the situation was desperate and that our troops would be pinned against the walls. General Pai, who was in command, did not hesitate. He gave the order that the street of the small religion should be set on fire. Then followed a scene so frightful that the reader's imagination must suffice. As the flames swept down the long lane of wooden structures they became an inferno of horror, for the roar of the conflagration was added to the rattle of gunfire, .and the hideous shrieks of those who were trapped. The rebels sought safety in flight, and as they crossed the open were machine-gunned from the Red Mountain; but the fugitives had nowhere to fly to and perished to the last man, woman and child. Nevertheless the city was saved, and when at last the flames died down the approach to the West Bridge was strewn with the bodies of our assailants. On the evening of the second day I had completed ten thousand words of copying. I asked how many were dead. I was told at least two thousand. Once again I returned to my task, reflecting that a human life had been taken at every fifth word”. Following the defeat, the Muslim forces had to pull back from the West Gate area, however, they still held control over the West Bridge, a mere half mile northwest. This gave them a great launchpad for night raids and many would be killed trying to scale the walls under the mouths of guns. The White Russian troops emerged as the backbone of the defenses, holding the city walls and making occasional sorties. Urumqi would have fallen if it was not for Sheng Shihtsai who came to her aid with his troops from Turfan. Upon seeing his relief forces the Muslim insurgents broke off their attack and withdrew into the surrounding countryside. With winter coming to an end, with fear of a cholera outbreak looming the Chinese went to work burying the dead. Wu Aichen was one of those who helped with the burials and wrote a horrifying description about the conditions of the city. Over 1000 bodies were buried in a single mass grave within the suburbs and the final death toll was estimated to exceed 6000. Following the relief of Urumqi, the Muslim insurgents seized all they could in the countryside such as Dawan Cheng, the districts of Fukang and parts of Santopao where an estimated 900 Han Chinese were killed. The insurgents burned the stocks of rice that usually fed the capital and on March 1st a detachment of 100 provincial troops were ambushed and annihilated at Chitaowan. The situation throughout the province deteriorated; to the south Ma Shaowu had isolated Kashgar and in the north a Kazakh rebellion broke out in the Sahara Sume region under Sharif Khan. The Kazakh uprising convinced the Soviets that Jin Sujen was going to inevitably lose Xinjiang. They acted without any notice to Nanjing by dispatching forces to help hold up Urumqi. Fate would have it, 2000 battle hardened Chinese troops had recently been driven over the Heilongjiang border into Siberia by the Japanese during the invasion of Manchuria. So Stalin signed off on sending them over the trans-siberian and Turk-sib railways to the Xinjiang frontier of Chuguchak. This force designated the Northeast National Salvation Army consisted of regular soldiers who were well trained and held good morale. They arrived to Urumqi on March 27th of 1933, substantially bolstering the provincial military, more particularly that of the new Provincial commander in chief, Sheng Shihtsai who just so happened to also be a Manchurian. Sheng led the new forces to push back the invading Tungans of Ma Shuming who was forced over the Dawan Cheng back to his HQ at Kara Shahr. The Uyghur insurgents were demoralized and Khoja Niyas Hajji who controlled a belt around the Xinjiang-Gansu frontier began begining for assistance from Ma Chongying. Meanwhile Jin basically was undermined by Sheng and was seeing further unrest in Urumqi. The White Russians who had bore the brunt of the fighting to defend Urumqi were royally pissed off as they had not all been paid and were provided the worst horses and ammunition of all the defenders. Moreover Jin’s popularity with all nationalities, even Han Chinese had fallen dramatically because his brother Jin Shuxin had reportedly exorted the granaries during the siege. Following the relief of Urumqi, Pappengut and the other White Russians approached the leaders of the northeast national salvation army with grievances against Jin Shujen and were given assurances of support to mount a coup against him. On April 12th, around 400 White Russians stormed the capital with 200 of them seizing the city gates and yamen. Jin managed to escape over the city walls and fled to the USSR via Chuguchak. From there he returned to China via the Turk-Sib and Trans-Siberian. Meanwhile his younger brother Jin Shuxin was captured and executed. Sheng Shihtsai was encamped at Uruba at the time of the coup and insisted in his future memoirs he had nothing to do with the coup and that it was all the USSR’s doing. Regardless after the coup Sheng was urged to go to Urumqi where negotiations began with Liu Wenlung who was appointed Provincial Chairman while Sheng was made Tupan or “border defense commissioner”. Ie; Sheng was made the de facto ruler of Xinjiang. After Ma Shumings failure to take Urumqi and Khoja Niyas Hajji’s pleas for help, Ma Chongying determined to reenter the fray in person. Despite the setbacks, the Tungans had crossed the Dawan Cheng and nearly taken the capital, coupled with the seizure of Kashgar, Ma Chongying most likely believed there was still a great chance to take it all. He had spent 18 months rebuilding his army and better yet, because of the USSR’s illegal move to save Urumqi, Nanjing officially recognizing his Tungan forces as the 36th division of the NRA. Ma Chongying moved his HQ from Anxi to Suzhou and really improved his military. A German engineer named Vasel working with him described him as a man who admired Napoleon, Bismarck and Hindenburg and who “was frequently to be seen running at the head of his troops during training, even in sub-zero temperature. Military training was pursued with a spartan rigour, pushed to the verge of utter ruthlessness. Desertion was punishable by death, and on one occasion I saw Ma personally behead five such offenders. In one of those sudden fits of exuberance that were typical of him, snatching up casually some hand grenades, which he had made himself, and hurling them, one by one, against the lofty clay-coloured walls of the city. And then he laughed heartily when he saw his men fling themselves flat on the ground as splinters of steel hurtled in all directions. He scorned to seek safety by throwing himself on the ground, and was quite delighted when he saw that I too did not seek cover”. During spring of 1933, Ma Chongying prepared to reinvade Xinjiang. A Swedish man named Bexeill was working along the Gansu-Qinghai border and noted Ma Chongying heavily taxed his territory in northwestern Gansu to the limits of the peasants endurance. He apparently even sent troops into Qinghai to illegally tax them. By May of 1933 his army departed Suhou for Yumen and Vasel gives us this description of them. “A dark mass of human beings, camels and oxen, was pouring out of the city gate towards the west amid clouds of dust. There were hundreds of heavily-laden camels, the bells on their necks clanging monotonously, their drivers easily discernible by their gaudy headgear. In the rear followed high-wheeled ox-carts, flanked on either side by infantry. Behind them again came a company of cavalry, which presently galloped past the lumbering camels and oxen along the track through the desert ... and now I had an opportunity of seeing at close range General Ma's famous cavalry riding past me and keeping its post at the head of the marching columns. This was the famous white cavalry regiment of which General Ma was especially proud. The broad iron swords of the dragoons clanked as they rode along on their magnificent white horses, while on their shoulders they carried carbines of the most varied and antiquated patterns. Next came the brown regiment, while in the rear followed the black regiment, comprising some two thousand horsemen. A short distance behind the cavalry came the infantry - regiment after regiment, headed by the Chinese (Kuomintang) standard. On they swept, platoon after platoon, followed by their officers, with their mausers at the ready. The columns strode along, keeping perfect time with their shrill, high-pitched, mournful, Asiatic marching songs. Sandwiched between some of these trained and trustworthy...
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3.134 Fall and Rise of China: Kumul Rebellion #3: Game of Thrones in Southern Xinjiang
01/13/2025
3.134 Fall and Rise of China: Kumul Rebellion #3: Game of Thrones in Southern Xinjiang
Last time we continued to speak about the Kumul Rebellion.. Ma Shaowu, appointed as Taoyin, executed rival Ma Fuxing and tightened anti-Soviet policies, responding to growing Soviet influence following Yang Zengxin's assassination in 1928. Kashgar became a refuge for conservative Turkic Muslims opposing Chinese authority, amidst a backdrop of rising tension with Tungan troops, perceived as oppressors. By 1931, as news of the Kumul Rebellion spread, resistance against the Han Chinese intensified, emboldening local insurgents to unite against their enemies. In May 1932, Jin sought vengeance against Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen, the Torgut Mongol regent, hosting him under the guise of an investigation. At a banquet, Tsetsen was executed, igniting fury among the Turkic peoples. As the Kumul Rebellion grew, rebel leaders Ma Fuming and Ma Shihming united forces, launching assaults that devastated Chinese control. By March 1933, Ma Shaowu found his authority diminished, desperately appealing for British aid as rebellion spread, leaving Xinjiang in chaos. #134 Kumul Rebellion part 3: A Game of Thrones in Southern Xinjiang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we last left off in mid March, where Ma Shaowu’s control over southern Xinjiang had diminished to just a wedge of territory around Kashgar, Maral Bashi and Yarkland. Morale was so low, Ma Shaowu asked the British Indian government for military assistance as it seemed apparent no help would come from Urumqi. Ma Shaowu had received 3 telegrams from Jin via the USSR lines; the first confirmed his position as Commander in Chief; the second relayed Jin’s brother's death and the third directed Jin Kashgar representatives to remit a large sum of money to his personal bank account in Tientsin. That last signal must have been a banger to read. Despite reinforcements sent to Yarkland under Colonel Chin, rampant inflation went unchecked and a sense of panic spread amongst the Chinese officials stationed in the region. In response the Chinese officials began withdrawing into Yarkland New City which was fortified with walls being hurriedly repaired and reinforced. Apparently heavy stones were placed all atop the walls to be thrown upon the rebels and 500 dummy figures were placed on the walls to “give the impression of a well-manned rampart”. When you start making dummy’s for a wall defense, you know you are going to die. On March 21st, insurgent forces at Tokhta Langar advanced upon Yarkland. Colonel Chin’s men made no attempt to resist the rebels and instead looted Guma and fell back using little known hill track by passing Karghalik and Posgam, killing large numbers of Uyghur civilians for good measure in the process. The rebels advanced straight to Yarkland unnopposed seizing Karghalik and Posgam in the process. Within both places a number of Hindu moneylenders of British Indian nationality were slaughtered. Back in Yarkland New City the provincial forces continued to bolster their defenses. By late March a group of 150 Chinese troops who had fled the rebels at Khotan arrived with a further 300 showing up to the oasis on April 2nd. During this period Muslim insurgents had massed up along the east bank of Yarkland River. They looked ill-armed and untrained as they forced the river during the first week of April. On the 11th of April Yarkland Old City fell to a mixed rebel force from Khotan, Karghalik and Posgam, seeing roughly 100 Chinese who were still outside the fortified New City massacred. In the afternoon, the bazaar connecting the Old and New Cities of Yarkand was set ablaze and completely destroyed. The shops belonging to Chinese moneylenders were ravaged, and their belongings were looted, leading to a siege of Yarkand New City. On the 12, rebel forces moved beyond Yarkand towards Kok Rabat, a key point on the route to Kashgar. At the same time, additional insurgent reinforcements from Khotan began to pour into the Yarkand Oasis. So by April, Ma Shaowu’s position was simply done for, his only hope was to reach an agreement with the incoming force led by Ma Chanzeng. He opened up negotiations with Ma Chanzeng through the British Consul General at Kashgar, Fitzmaurice. However Ma Chanzeng could not speak for his Uyghur ally Temur, whom he was having issues with. To make matters worse, the Kirghiz levies began to mutiny on April 5th at Sughun Karaul, a Chinese fortified post roughly 65 miles northwest of Kashgar. This was followed by peasant uprisings amongst the Uyghurs at Artush and Fayzabad. Facing this Ma Shaowu ordered Brigadier Yang and the troops at Maral Bashi to fall back to Kashgar. Before departing Maral Bashi Yans troops burned and looted the town after which “They set out on their way to Kashgar with a large number of carts laden with refugees or loot or both; but this proved to be the last straw. The troops made slow progress, and in the meantime the whole countryside, incensed beyond endurance, rose against the Chinese. A bridge was broken at Kara Yulgun and, while the column was halted, it was set upon by a vast horde of rebels”. Karma is a bitch as they say. Brigadier Yang was wounded during the ambush and taken prisoner by rebels. Of his original force of around 1000, its estimated only 65 men limped back to Kashgar by the 27th of april. Meanwhile the main bulk of the Kirghiz mutineers advanced to Artush by April 15th from whence they menaced Kashgar as other Kirghiz groups attacked Kizil Oi and Ulugh Chat and demolish Chinese pots at Bulun Kul. With the dissolvement of Brigadier Yangs forces from Maral Bashi, Kashgar was completely vulnerable and isolated. Ma Shaowu, was probably very anxious to reach an agreement with Ma Chanzeng, but still took the precaution of preparing for a siege. As the Chinese were soiling themselves awaiting the rebel attacks, suddenly a divide emerged between the Tungan and Turkic factions. It appeared Ma Chanzeng had become concerned over reports of Uyghur insurgents rising up in Khotan, who owed him no loyalty. So he decided to reach an agreement with Ma Shaowu. Ma Shaowu agreed to allow Tungan power to be established at Kashgar, the military and economic key to southern Xinjiang. Ma Chanzeng dispatched a message via the British Consul general at Kashgar offering assurance that the sole objective of the Tungan forces in Xinjiang was to overthrow the tyrannical Jin Shujen and his reforms. Thus having seemingly distanced himself from the Turkic speaking Muslims of the south, whose apparent goal was to fully succeed from the Chinese Republic, Ma Chanzeng and Temur advanced to Kashgar. Back over in Kashgar Old City, Turkic speaking nationalists calling themselves the Young Kashgar Party or “YKP” had become suspicious of Ma Chanzeng’s motives and believed perhaps there was collusion between Gansu Tungans and Ma Shaowu. The Uyghurs feared this would lead to Tungan domination of Kashgar and the replacement of Han Chinese tyrants for Tungan tyrants. 7 leading members of the YKP set out from Kashgar to persuade Ma Chanzeng that Ma Shaowu would betray him. They met at Fayzabad with Uthman Ali, the leader of the Kirghiz mutineers present. Upon hearing their plea, Ma Chanzeng asked Uthman Ali to lead the Kirghiz to attack Kashgar Old City. Early on May 2nd, Uthman Ali led a large Kirghiz force against the Old city and according to the eye witness account of the British Consul General “They took up positions opposite each of the four gates of the city and at the same time sent parties to call up the country people Uyghurs. These appeared from all sides in thousands, armed with clubs and sticks, and there was a great display of enthusiasm ... Firing continued until about two in the afternoon, when the Kirghiz either forced an entry or were admitted by the Tushik Gate’. Most of the non-Chinese garrison simply joined the rebels. At the yamen, Ma Shaowu and his personal bodyguard continued to hold out as the Kirghiz secured the Old City, but notably prevented the Uyghurs from looting and ordered them back to their villages. The reason for this unexpected restraint became clear the next day, when the Kirghiz were left in sole possession of the Old City, and who proceeded to sack it themselves. The British Consul General estimated 100 Chinese were killed and their looted property was carried off or auctioned on the street. During the afternoon around 300 Uyghurs led by Temur arrived at Kashgar and were admitted into the Old City without any question by the Kirghiz, followed by the Tungans with Ma Chanzeng. Both forces marched to the walls of Kashgar New City, roughly 2.5 miles distant and after negotiations with the Chinese defenders were allowed entrance. The British Consul General had this to say of the moment “It was probably better to surrender to the Tungans than to be slaughtered by the Kirghiz”. With the fall of Kashgar New City, Han Chinese power in southern Xinjiang, excluding the besieged garrison of Yarkland New City was effectively brought to an end. On May 7th, Ma Chanzeng realized the YKP had misled him and that Temur was under their influence and thus no longer a reliable ally. After the capture of Kashgar Old City, it seems the Kirghiz began negotiating with Temur over the spoils of their victory and made zero attempt to loot the Old City Yamen where Ma Shaowu was holding out. Ma Shaowu would make a invaluable ally against the Turkic nationalists who controlled Old city and much of southern Xinjiang. Thus Ma Chanzeng began secretly negotiating with Ma Shaowu. As a result the next day, Ma Chanzengs men put up notices announcing that the Taoyin and other officials of the former regime should retain their official posts. This obviously pissed off the Turkic Muslims who did now share the same loyalty to the Chinese Republic as the Tungans. The Kirghiz immediately manned the walls and closed the gates of the Old City, preparing to face the Tungans. At this point Ma Shaowu defused the situation temporarily by resigning as Taoyin and handed the officials seals over to Ma Chanzeng. Ma Chanzeng did not take the title of Taoyin, but certainly controlled the Old City Yamen and New City, keeping Ma Shaowu close and protected. It seems Ma Chanzengs strategy was to try and drive a wedge between Uthman Ali’s Kirghiz and Temurs Uyghurs before a unified Turkic alliance could form, perhaps one that even incorporated Khotan forces. He was of course concerned with limiting the influence of the YKP who seemed to be as anti-Tungan as they were anti-Chinese. On the 10th he ordered the arrest of the most prominent YKP leader, Abd al-Rahim Bay Bachcha, who was released only after agreeing to supply the Tungan forces with 1000 uniforms at his own expense. Following this, Ma Chanzeng seized Temur who had just been proclaimed commander in chief of the combined Muslim armies at Kashgar. Temuar was invited to a meeting at the Old City Yamen on the 17th where he was placed under arrest. Had Ma Chanzeng managed to transfer his captive into the New City, he may have succeeded in his plans. But he did not have enough men to man both the Old and New Cities and when he tried to block the Uyghurs and Kirghiz from rescuing Temur they simply stormed the city walls. With the failure to secure Temur, Ma Chanzeng had basically revealed to the Turkic Muslims and confirmed the claims of the YKP that he intended to set up a Tungan regime in Kashgar. On May 18th the pissed of Kirghiz mounted a surprise attack on the Old City. They avoided the yamen where Ma Chanzeng and Ma Shaowu remained, as Tungan forces there were heavily armed with artillery and machine guns, but murdered any other Tungans they found in the Old City. Fighting went on throughout the day and night. As a result of the Kirghiz attack, Ma Chanzeng agreed to hand control over Kashgar to Temur and Uthman Ali. On the 19th a very inconclusive treaty was signed seeing Temur confirmed as the Commander in Chief and Uthman Ali promoted to General in command of Kirghiz forces. Ma Chanzeng was given no official position, but retained control of the TUngan troops and on the 22nd accompanied by all of them withdrew from the yamen to Kashgar New City. Meanwhile Ma Chanzengs Tungan chief of staff, Su Qinzhou and Yunus Beg, a Uyghur of Kumul were appointed joint Taoyin of Kashgar and Ma Shaowu was permitted to take up residence in a nearby country house under protection from both Temur and Chanzeng. The truce was followed awkward and uneasy peace with the Tungans controlling New City and the Turking speaking Muslims the Old City and Taoyins yamen. Fitzmaurice went on to state “that 'Ma Chanzeng, Temur and Uthman Ali all settled down to the congenial business of accumulating wealth and wives, whilst the YKP continued its intrigues against the Tungans, organized a 'parliament' of forty members, subsequently greatly expanded, and sent two delegates to Khoja Niyas Hajji, the leader of the Uighur rebels at Kumul”. By this point it seemed Temur had fallen completely under the influence of the YKP and began issuing passports styling himself as “Temur Shah”. These documents also employed the Islamic Hijri date and not the Chinese Republic date, thwarting Nanjing’s authority. Over in the southern rim of the Tarim Basin, an are untroubled by the Tungan invasion and free from the Kirghiz movement, Khotan had emerged as a center of exclusive Uyghur control. Ismail Khan Khoja, the leader of the gold miner rebels of Karakash was soon eclipsed by the Uyghur nationalist committee for national revolution, known as the CNR, who was founded in Khotan in early 1932 by Muhammad Amin Bughra. Muhammad Amin Bughra was a scholar in his 30’s and alongside his two younger brothers, Abdullah and Nur Ahmad, with some friends and fellow students began the movement. In early 1933 this group was joined by Abd al-Baqi Sabit Damullah, a teacher and former Qadi, that being an islamic judge from Kulja who had traveled extensively through the USSR, Turkey, Egypt and India. According to Muhammad Amin Bughra, “Sabit Damullah brought political information and experience to the Khotanlik Committee for National Revolution”. They were only 300 members who possessed nothing more than 50 antiquated rifles. Their political philosophy, like that of the YKP was uncompromising, they were nationalists who were extremely anti-communist, anti-christian, anti-tungan and anti-Han. The CNR favored the establishment of an Islamic theocracy in Xinjiang, with Muhammad AMin Bughra as its head of state. Muhammad Amin Bughra was working in Khotan as a mudarris, or teacher at Quranic college when an uprising began in February of 1933 in Karakash and Surghak. On the 20th of February the CNR leadership met and formed a provisional government with Muhammad Niyas Alam as president, Sabit Damullah as Prime Minister and Muhammad Amin Bughra as commander of the armed forces. Muhammad Amin Bughra also took the title “Amir al-islam” while his younger brothers took “Amir Abdullah khan” and “Amir Nur Ahmad Jan”. In most sources the rise of the CNR provisional government is referred to as the Government of the Khotan Amirs. Their new government was religiously intolerant, as a result when Khotan New City was captured on March 16th, the 266 or so Han Chinese there were forcibly converted to Islam. Following that, the Hindu moneylenders were murdered and the Swedish missionaries were exiled. Shari a law was implemented under the CNR with strict application of hadd criminal legislation. Between March and April the regime was reinforced by Janib Beg, a well known Basmachi leader who fled the USSR to reside in the Keriya Oasis under Ma Shaowu’s control. Janib Beg made common cause with the Amirs and given his extensive military experience during the Basmachi struggle was placed in charge of a large body of Khotanlik rebel forces. After they secured the Khotan Oasis, the Amirs began expanding their influence east towards Lop Nor and west towards Kashgar. In response to a appeal from the Uyghurs of Charchan who were resisting their Tungan liberators, a force of 100 Khotanliks came to guard against the Kara Shahr Tungan who were occupying the Charkhlik Oasis. Meanwhile in the west, Khotanlik forces captured Guma, Karghalik, Posgam and Yarkland Old City by early April. During the fight for Yarkland New City, over 2000 Han Chinese and Tungans were besieged by their forces. On the 24th, Amir Badullah Khan arrived to Yarkland to personally oversee the siege of its New City. According to Fitzmaurice, the Khotanlik forces had organized a military band, were doning red uniforms in stark contrast to the Tungan troops of Ma Chanzeng who wore green. Amir Badullah was greeted with a large ceremony as Turking speaking officials who had previously served under the Han Chinese were dragged through the streets in chains. On the 27th Amir Abdullah ordered the Swedish missionaries in Yarkland to be arrested and brought to him. We are told “Abdullah kicked and beat them himself, announcing that by their teaching the missionaries had destroyed the religion of Islam, and that it was therefore his duty to kill them’. The poor Swe’s were only saved from a firing squad by the intervention of some British officials, instead they were exiled. Afterwards Abdullah focused his attention upon the siege of Yarkland New City. He ordered the water supply cut and for tunnels to be made to breach the walls. On the 27th three delegates from Ma Shaowu came to Yarkland and attempted to negotiate with Abdullah. Abdullahs response was to shoot a prisoner in their presence in what he called “a method of bringing them to a proper state of mind”. Then Abdullah sent them into the besieged New City to inform its defenders that their lives and property would be spared if they simply agreed to convert to Islam and lay down their arms. The besieged Han Chinese led by Colonel Qin, hastily agreed to the terms and on May 12th prepared to surrender. Shortly before this date however, the first Tungan and Turkic speaking troops, fresh from their victory at Kashgar arrived. Believing victory was well within his grasp, Abdullah became openly hostile with the Tungans and made it clear the newcomers were not appreciated. Faced with Khotanlik hostility, the small but well armed Tungans who owed their allegiance to Ma Chanzeng, and through him to Ma Chongying, entered the New City and strengthened its Tungan elements against the Khotanliks. Abdullah was shocked by this revelation and his hostility also had the effect of hardening the Chinese Muslim troops. They even sortied on May 18th briefly attacking and capturing the Altin and Khanqah gates of Yarkland Old City, setting fire to the surrounding areas before pulling back to New City. The Uyghur troops of Aksu and Kashgar led by Hafiz, a subordinate of Temur seemed to be keeping a neutral stance until the 22nd when news of the Tungan-Turkic conflict at Kashgar reached them. Following this, the two Turkic speaking armies at Yarkland cooperated in the siege of the New City. Despite the cooperation, Hafiz and Abdullah remained...
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3.133 Fall and Rise of China: Kumul Rebellion #2: Uprisings in southern Xinjiang
01/06/2025
3.133 Fall and Rise of China: Kumul Rebellion #2: Uprisings in southern Xinjiang
Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Kumul Rebellion. In 1931, tensions in Kumul escalated after a Muslim girl spurned Han tax collector Chang Mu, leading to his violent death at a family dinner. Enraged, Uyghurs retaliated against Chinese officials, igniting a rebellion. Chaos ensued as rebels targeted Han settlers, ultimately capturing Kumul with little resistance. Amidst the unrest, Yulbars Khan sought support from military leader Ma Chongying, who planned to mobilize his forces to help the Uyghurs. What began as a local incident spiraled into an all-out revolt against oppressive rule. In 1931, young warlord Ma Chongying sought to establish a Muslim empire in Central Asia, leading a small force of Tungan cavalry. As his army attempted to besiege Kumul Old City, they faced fierce resistance from Chinese troops. Despite several assaults, the lack of heavy artillery hampered Ma's progress. Eventually, Ma faced defeat due to a serious injury. After his recuperation, his forces joined with Uyghur insurgents, sparking a guerrilla war against oppressive provincial troops, leading to increasing unrest and rebellion. #133 Kumul Rebellion part 2: Uprisings in southern Xinjiang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So in the last episode we spoke about the beginning of the Kumul Rebellion. Now the Kumul Rebellion is actually a series of other rebellions all interlaced into this larger blanket known as the Xinjiang Wars. To be blunt, Xinjiang was the wild west from the 1930s until basically the formation of the PRC. We briefly went over the various groups that inhabit northwestern China, they all had their own interests. I want to start off by looking at the situation of southern Xinjiang. Back in June of 1924, Ma Fuxing, the T’ai of Kashgar was executed. His executioner was Ma Shaowu who had just received the post of Taoyin over the oasis city of Khotan. There was of course always tension, but southern Xinjiang was relatively peaceful in the 1920s. Then Governor Yang Zengxin was assassinated in July of 1928. During the last years of his rule, southern Xinjiang often referred to as Kashgaria, remained entrenched in the British sphere of influence after the collapse of Tsarist Russia and the subsequent closure of the Imperial Russian consulate-General at Kashgar. Going further back in time, in August of 1918, Sir Geoerge Macartney, the long standing British Consul General to Kashar had retired. His successor was Colonel P. T Etherton, a hardcore anti-communist who actively was cooperating with anti-Soviet Basmachi guerillas in the western portion of Turkestan. One of his missions was to curb Soviet influence in southern Xinjiang. Yang Zengxin understood the British policy towards Xinjiang was to push the Soviets out via enabling the survival of his independent Han led regime. Thus Yang Zengxin was very friendly to the British and allowed them to exercise considerable political influence in Tien Shan. Despite this Soviet influence spread in Ili and Zungharia. This prompted Yang Zengxin to secretly cooperate with the British in Kashgar to counter the looming red growth north of his province. Now by 1924, through a combination of military necessities and the re-emergence of Soviet Russia as Xinjiang’s largest trading partner, this forced Yang Zengxin to push away the British. Following the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924 which effectively saw the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Beijing, the Soviet government at Omsk dispatched an envoy to Xinjiang to discuss mutual consular representation. Both sides reached an agreement on October 6th, providing for an exchange of consulate-generals between Tashkent and Urumqi and for Soviet consulates in Chuguchak, Kulja, Shara Sume and Kashgar. The new Soviet presence in Kashgar was quite upsetting for the British. It also allowed the Soviets direct access to the densely populated oases of Tarim Basin, the source of nearly all Xinjiang’s revenue. Shortly after the Soviet Consulate in Kashgar officially opened on October 10, 1925, a local power struggle emerged involving Max Doumpiss, the Soviet Consul, of Latvian origin, Major Gillan, the British Consul-General at that time, and the Taoyin of Kashgar. Sino-Soviet relations in southern Xinjiang took a troubled turn in November 1925 when large quantities of silver bullion were discovered hidden in thirty-four boxes labeled as Soviet 'diplomatic bags,' intended for the Kashgar consulate. The Kashgar Taoyin, who was reportedly offended by the 'subtle spread of Soviet propaganda' in the southern oases, retaliated by expelling several suspected Russian agents. In March 1926, significant riots erupted in Kashgar, which the Chinese authorities attributed to an interpreter at the Soviet Consulate named Akbar 'Ali. The unrest was quelled by a force of 400 local Tungan troops, and Akbar 'Ali was imprisoned; the Taoyin ignored subsequent Soviet demands for his release. The rapid increase in the number of European consular staff from around fifteen in 1925 to between thirty and forty by 1927 also alarmed Chinese officials. All these developments were likely reported to Governor Yang Tseng-hsin in Urumchi, who was likely dealing with similar situations at the newly established Soviet Consulates in Kulja, Chuguchak, and Shara Sume. It appears that, with discreet British support, Yang decided to take actions to curb the expansion of Soviet influence in Kashgar. The Kashgar Taoyin then took up a strong anti-soviet stance. Alongside this Yang Zengxin’s nephew, the officer in command of Chinese troops along the Kashgar northern frontier, suddenly became a frequent visitor to the British consulate General at Chini Bagh. After the death of the old Taoyin in 1927, Ma Shaowu came over from Khotan to replace him and with this came heightened anti-soviet policies in southern Xinjiang. Ma Shaowu first began by imprisoning 60 alleged local communists and tightened Chinese control over Kashgars northern frontier. The freedom of the Soviet Consul team to travel within southern Xinjiang was tightened to the extreme and all Kashgar citizens suspected of pro-soviet sympathies became targets for confiscation of their property or deportation to other oases. Yang Zengxin backed Ma Shaowu’s attempts to limit Soviet influence in Tarim Basin by imposing severe tax on Muslims leaving southern Xinjiang to go on Hajj via the USSR. Similarly, new legislative was unleashed requiring merchants going into the USSR to deposit large sums of money to the Chinese authorities in Kashgar who would forfeit if the depositor failed to return to Xinjiang within 60 days. These policies did not completely insulate southern Xinjiang from Soviet influence; however, they did ensure that at the time of Yang Zengxin’s assassination in 1928, the southern region of the province—especially Ma Shao-wu's domain around Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan—maintained a significant degree of independence from the Soviet Union. This stood in stark contrast to areas like the Ili Valley, Chuguchak, and Shara Sume, where Soviet influence became dominant shortly after 1925, and even to the provincial capital of Urumqi, where, by the spring of 1928, the Soviet Consul-General had considerable sway. It was likely due to Ma Shaowu's anti-Soviet position and the persistent dominance of British influence in southern Xinjiang during the final years of Yang Zengxin's administration that Kashgar emerged as a hub of conservative Muslim opposition to Chinese governance in the 1930s. Yang Zengxins intentional efforts to sever southern Xinjiang from Soviet influence resulted in the Uighurs and, to a lesser extent, the Kirghiz of the Tarim Basin being less influenced by the 'progressive' nationalist propaganda from Soviet-controlled Western Turkestan compared to the Turkic-speaking Muslims of the Ili Valley and Zungharia. This is not to imply that the socialist nationalism promoted by the Jadidists after 1917 was entirely ineffective south of the Tien Shan; however, Kashgar, situated outside the Soviet zone in northwestern Sinkiang, became a natural refuge for right-wing Turkic nationalists and Islamic traditionalists who opposed Chinese authority yet were even more fiercely against the encroachment of 'atheistic communism' and its Soviet supporters in Central Asia. Many of these right-wing Turkic-speaking nationalists were former Basmachi guerrillas, primarily of Uzbek, Kazakh, and Kirghiz descent, but also included several Ottoman Turks and, according to Caroe, "old men who had fought against the Chinese at Kashgar." Among the most notable Basmachi leaders who sought refuge in Kashgar was Janib Beg, a Kirghiz who would play a significant role in the politics of southern xinjiang during the early 1930s. Following Yang Zengxin's assassination in July 1928, Soviet influence in southern Xinjiang began to grow rapidly; nevertheless, at the onset of the Kumul Rebellion in 1931, reports of forced collectivization and the suppression of nomadic lifestyles in Western Turkestan led many Turkic Muslims in southern Xinjiang to be wary of Soviet intentions. If, during the late 1920s and early 1930’s, the Turkic Muslims of southern Xinjiang were divided in their approach towards the Soviets and the newly formed Turkic-Tajik SSR’s in western Turkestan, they all were united in their attitude towards their Tungan brethren to the east. Unlike the Turkic Muslim rebels of Kumul, the Uyghurs and Kirghiz of southern Xinjiang were far too distant from Gansu to appeal for assistance from the Tungan warlords, such as the 5 Ma Clique. Besides the Han Chinese officials, rule over the oases of Tarim Basin had long been held by Tungans. Ma Fuxing, the Titai of Kashgar had ruthlessly exploited his Turkic Muslim subjects between 1916-1924. He himself was a Hui Muslim from Yunnan, as was Ma Shaowu. The Turkic Muslims of southern Xinjiang therefore had zero illusions of any “muslim brotherhood” with their Tungan brethren. It was Tungan troops who intervened to suppress any demonstration against Chinese rule. The Tungans of Tarim Basin were allies to the Han Chinese administration and thus enemies to the Turkic Muslim peoples. The western rim of Tarim Basin was in a unique political situation during the later half of Yang Zengxins rule as a large part of its Turkic Muslim population looked neither to the progressive Muslim leadership of western Turkestan nor the Tungan warlords of Gansu. Instead they looked at the regimes in Turkey and Afghanistans, both quite conservative. Contacts in these places were sparse ever since the Qing reconquest of Xinjiang. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in WW1, contact ceased to exist at all. Emotional links to what once was however lingerd, and the nationalist revolution of Ataturk sprang something of a Turkish renaissance inspiring Turkic peoples from Crimea to Kumul. As for Afghanistan, there existed more concrete religious and political contacts with southern Xinjiang. In 1919, Amir Aman Allah, the last Muhammadzay ruler of Afghanistan had taken the throne after the death of his father. He became an impetuous ruler who brought forth his own downfall through a series of radical reforms that caused a revolution by 1928. Yet in his first years of rule he had widespread support of Muslim peoples in central asia, especially after he began the Third Afghan war against Britain, combined with a Jihad for Afghan independence. Because of this the British were forced to recognize Afghanistan's right to independent foreign policy. During this period, it is rumored Amir Aman Allah had toyed with the idea of forming an Islamic Confederacy which would have included Afghanistan, Bukhara, Khiva and Khokand. He would have also been interested in influence over Xinjiang where numerous Afghan merchants resided under British protection. Following Britains recognition of Afghanistan's right to independent foreign policy, with the 1919 treaty of Peshawar, British diplomatic protection for Afghan citizens in Xinjiang was lifted. Amir Aman Allah then established independent diplomatic links between Kabul and Urumqi, sending a delegation in 1922 led by Muhammad Sharif Khan. The Chinese officials regarded the Afghan mission as a trade delegation, but Muhammad Sharif Khan carried with him printed visiting cards styling himself as Afghanistan's Consul-General in Xinjiang. Alongside this he brought draft agreements demanding full extraterritorial rights and other privileges for Afghan subjects in Xinjiang and the right to import opium freely into the province. It is to no surprise Yang Zengxin refused to recognize the mission causing a dispute that would drag on for years. It became a long standing issue for th Turkic speaking Muslims of southern Xinjiang. There were many who looked to Afghanistan to help them against Chinese oppression. Now getting back to our timeline, with the initial outbreak of the Kumul Rebellion and the Tungan invasion, Jin Shujen had made every effort to prevent news of these events occurring mostly in the northeast from getting into the south. But of course one cannot stop the flow of information completely. Rumors and reports of the rebellious activities northeast flooded into the oases of Tarim Basin, invigorating anti-Chinese zeal, from peoples already suffering from increased taxation and inflation caused by unbacked paper currency paying for Jin’s war efforts. Jin was well aware of the discontent south in his province, but he was emboldened by his victory of Ma Chongying as well as the recent delivery of 4000 rifles and 4 million rounds of ammunition from British held India. Thus he determined to maintain his current stance. It would prove to be a very fateful decision. The Kumul Rebellion was not crushed by any means. In fact the brutality following the relief of Kumul Old City caused outrage amongst the Turkic speaking peoples and sent refugees westwards towards Turfan. By May of 1932, Ma Chongying had dispatched a young Tungan Lt, Ma Shihming to take command over his Tungan forces remaining in Xinjiang. Ma Shihming quickly established his HQ in Turfan and began to cooperate with the Turkic speaking Muslim insurgents who owed their allegiance to Yulbars Khan and Khoja Niyas Haiji. It's also believed he made contact with Ma Fuming, a Tungan officer in command of the Xinjiang provincial forces at Turfan. By mere coincidence, in May of 1932, Jin had also elected to seek revenge against Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen, the Torgut Mongol regent inhabiting Tien Shan. That same guy he had asked for military aid from who simply took his army away. Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen was invited to come back to Urumqi where he was to attend an investigation into the assassination plot laid against him. On May 21st, shortly after his arrival, he alongside two Torgut officers and the young Torgut Prince were all invited to an official banquet at Jin Shujens yamen. Now you might be thinking, who in their right mind would fall for that shit? Especially given the Yang Zengxin banquet story. Well according to R.P Watts, the British Vice Consul General at Kashgar who happened to be in Urumqi at the time. “While drinking the usual preliminary cup of tea the regent and the two military officers were led out into a courtyard and executed. According to Chinese custom in such matters proper observance was accorded to the high rank of regent even at the moment of execution. A red carpet was spread on the ground on which he was invited to seat himself. He was then killed by being shot through the head from behind by one of the governor's special executioners. His two companions being men of inferior rank were not given the privilege of a red carpet to sit on whilst being executed.” The young Torgut prince was allowed to return to Kara Shahr, man that must have been an awkward desert. So Jin hoped the harsh action would terrify the young prince into submission. As you may have guessed, Jin actions were quite toxic for the Torgut Mongols. Might I add the Torgut Mongols were probably the only non Chinese group in Xinjiang that may have sided with Jin against the Turkic peoples? So to tally up things a bit here. Jin pissed off the Uyghurs and Tungans of Turfan, the Kirghiz of Tian Shan and now the Torguts. In early 1932, Turkic Muslim opposition to forced collectivization and suppression of nomadism by Stalin in the Kazakh and Kirghiz regions of Soviet Central Asia, saw many spill over into Xinjiang. By March of 1932, large numbers of Kirghiz fled the border and were pursued by Soviet forces. A series of skirmishes and raids broke out in the border region. The Soviet Kirghiz naturally received aid from the Xinjiang Kirghiz and in June a Chinese official was killed by Kirghiz insurgents in Tien Shan. The Chinese were outraged, prompting Ma Shaowu to unleash 300 troops from Kashgar New City and 200 troops from Kashgar Old City to defend the frontier area. These units were soon joined by another 100 troops from Opal and 200 from Uch Turfan all under the leadership of Brigadier Yang, the nephew to the late Yang Zengxin. In July Yang’s men began joint operations with the Soviets against the Kirghiz insurgents who were led by Id Mirab. The Chinese forces were said to quote “The Chinese forces had been suffering badly from want of opium', and reportedly behaved very badly towards Kirghiz, a number of whom were driven to take refuge in Russian territory”. To try a force the submission of the Kirghiz, Yang’s forces took 70 hostages from Kirghiz families and brought them to imprisoned them the oases of Khotan, Keriya and Charchan. Thus Jin and Ma Shaowu had succeeded within a few months of Ma Chongyings withdrawal back into Gansu in both alienating the Turkic speaking and Mongol nomads of Tien Shan. The Sino-Soviet cooperation against the Kirghiz had also not gone unnoticed by other Muslim groups. Meanwhile the Kumul Rebellion had spread westwards. By Autumn of 1932, months after the arrival of Ma Shihming to Turfan, Ma Fuming joined the rebels cause. Wu Aichen wrote it was his belief that Ma Fuming’s decision was based on the continuing flow of Muslim refugees from Kumul to Turfan combined with reports of mass executions being carried out by Xing Fayu. But like I had mentioned, there is also strong evidence Ma Shihming probably negotiated an alliance with Ma Fuming. Wu Aichen wrote Ma Fumings first rebellious action was to send a telegram to Jin requesting he dispatch reinforcements while he also sent a letter to Xing Fayu over in Kumul to come quickly to Turfan. The reinforcements arrived at the oasis without suspecting a thing and were “shot down to the last man” by Ma Fumings forces as they passed the city gates. A few days later another detachment of 100 men led by Xing Fayu reached Turfan only to suffer the same fate. Xing Fayu was taken captive and “tortured to death in public with every refinement of cruelty and vileness of method”. Following Ma Fumings official defection, the Turfan Depression quickly emerged as the main center of Muslim rebellion in northeastern Xinjiang. Kumul...
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3.132 Fall and Rise of China: Beginning of the Kumul Rebellion
12/30/2024
3.132 Fall and Rise of China: Beginning of the Kumul Rebellion
Last time we spoke about the complicated story of Xinjiang. Xinjiang, though part of China since the Han dynasty, has a distinct cultural and geographic identity aligned more with Central Asia than China’s east. Its remote, mountainous landscapes divide its regions and isolate its ethnic groups, which include Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Hui Muslims. Yang Zengxin, Xinjiang's Republican governor, ruled with shrewd, divisive tactics, maintaining peace by balancing loyalties but alienating many. His rule ended in 1928, when an ambitious subordinate, Fan Yaonan, assassinated him, marking a turning point. Yang attended a banquet hosted by Fan, where disguised soldiers fired on him, mortally wounding him. Fan seized power but was soon defeated and executed by Jin, who succeeded Yang as ruler of Xinjiang. Jin enforced strict policies, favoring Han Chinese officials and worsening the economy. He raised taxes, restricted Muslim customs, and monopolized industries. His annexation of the Kumul Khanate in 1931 incited unrest among the local Uyghurs, setting the stage for rebellion. #132 The Beginning of the Kumul Rebellion Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So last we left off, things had reached a boiling point in Kumul. The explosion at Kumul would begin mostly as a result of a religious and cultural slight against the Muslim population both Turkic speaking and Tungan. They became offended and banded together against the Chinese officials. As a result of the new administration and annexation of the Kumul Khanate, a young Han named Chang Mu from Gansu, was appointed tax collector and chief of police over the small village of Xiaopu, lying due north of Kumul. According to the Nanjing official Wu Aichen “this Chang Mu was a 'wastrel' whose conduct soon became a public scandal”. In early 1931, Chang Mu met a pretty Turkic Muslim girl in Xiaopu and tried to force her father, a Uyghur called Salih, to give him her hand in marriage. Now for those unaware shari law specifically prohibits marriage between Muslim women and men of other religions. What followed is described in two differing accounts. The first account has it that on April 4th of 1931, Chang Mu was invited to eat at the girls house, allegedly in honor of the forthcoming wedding. During the dinner, Chang Mu was attacked by Uyghur’s and slaughtered alongside 32 members of his personal bodyguard. It was further implied by our friend Wu Aichen, Chang Mu had already seduced the girl and that the ulama, those being islamic scholars who act as a sort of authority under shari law, upon discovering so, took it upon themselves to correct the situation. On the night of the proposed ceremony a mob appeared in the streets of Xiaopu. Chang Mu and his guard detail were already thoroughly drunk and easily overcome by the pissed off Uyghurs. All were killed, including the poor Uyghur girl. The Uyghurs then took 30 rifles from the dead and turned their attention towards the Gansu Chinese who were said to number in about a hundred families in the area. All of them were massacred and “had their heads buried in the soil of their farms”. Following this the Uyghurs marched upon the Chinese outposts at Tuluhu and Laimahe killing their garrisons and tax collectors while acquiring even more weapons. Better armed, the Uyghurs elected to make a move against Kumul. Kumul held an overwhelming Uyghur majority and easily fell into the hands of the rebels with little to no fighting. Most of the Han fled into the fortified Old City barring its gates. The Han caught outside the Old City were massacred brutally. Soon the rebel forces controlled Kumul’s Muslim part of the city and the surrounding countryside, but the provincial forces remained secure within the Old city and its key arsenal. It is unclear whether the Xiaopu incident was carefully planned prior or simply just came into being. Regardless it was a spark that ignited a much larger rebellion. According to Mildred Cable and Francesca French, two members of the China inland Mission, who resided in Xiaopu at the time, it was indeed a systematically planned rebellion. “While officials surreptitiously transferred their wealth to a place of safety, the instigators of trouble were equally persistent in their secret preparations for war. Camels and mules were requisitioned to transport weapons, ammunition and stocks of food over little-known tracks, that they might be stored in mountain caves known only to the few. Steady streams ofsmall caravans carrying ammunition to the mountains came from the South Road, from Tunhwang and across the most lonely tracks of the desert connecting Kansu with Barku!. All these converged on the Khan's summer palace grounds in AraHim, and the stronghold of Bardash was stocked with huge supplies of food and firearms”. Yulbars Khan, the former chancellor of Maqsud Shah claimed he was in the Tien Shah escaping heat when the fighting began. Many speculate he had a hand in planning the uprising. Cable and French argued the Tungan population of Kumul also joined the rebellion early on. The insurgents of Kumul were quickly joined by neighboring Kirhiz of the Karlik Tagh who also held grievances against Jin as he had imposed Chinese officials upon them in 1929. According to Wu Aichen the Barkul and Kazakhs in the area also joined the rebellion. Thus Jin had succeeded in alienating the Turkic speaking peoples of northeastern Xinjiang now had a full scale Muslim rising on his hands. Jin reacted with a strong show of force despite his Commissioner of Education Liu Wenlung and Commissioner for Reconstruction Yen Yushan both arguing for a policy of conciliation. Jin ordered troops to crack down on the rebels without mercy. Meanwhile back in Kumul the rebels were unable to breach the Old City so they fanned out into the countryside hunting Han settlers and soldiers down. According to the British Vice Consul General at Kashgar, R.P Watts, an initial detachment of 300 troops sent by Jin relieved Kumul Old City were ambushed and killed nearly to a man. Its also implied they had lost so easily because many of them were sleeping off the effects of opium. Despite the initial success, the rebels were unable to prevent provincial forces led by Zhu Juiqi, the Taoyin of Aksu from relieving the Old City. By late April the siege was lifted, Zhu Juiqi occupied the Old City and ordered his second in command Xiong Fayu to occupy Kumul’s Muslim quarters. The rebels still controlled the countryside and were harassing Zhu’s forces whenever they strayed a bit too far from their forts, but overall were not much of a match. Meanwhile Chinese troops under the leadership of Xiong Fayu began a series of reprisal massacres against Muslim civilians in Kumul and the surrounding villages. The Uyghur leaders quickly determined they needed external help in their rebellion against Jin. According to testimony from Yulbars Khan, they sent an appeal to the KMT government in Nanjing. Then in June of 1931 Yulbars was chosen, most likely because he was fluent in Mandarin, to head out secretly to Nanjing to carry the appeal. Along the way, Yulbars went to Suzhou to meet with Ma Chongying, known as the youngest and most extreme of the 5 Ma Tungan warlords. Ma Chongying was a Gansu native. Very little is known about his early years nor about his father, but he shared the same paternal grandfather of the Gansu/Qinghai warlords Ma Puqing and Ma Pufang. He was also distantly related to the Gansu/Ningxia warlords Ma Hongkuei and Ma Hungpin. Altogether the 5 were known as the 5 Ma warlord clique. Ma Congying entered military service in 1924 at the age of 14 when he joined a local Muslim militia. A year later the Guominjun forces of Feng Yuxiang invaded Gansu, but the Tungan warlords of western Gansu remained for the most part untouched. Ma Chongying became an officer for the forces of his uncle Ma Kechong and laid a siege and captured the important city of Huzhou on his own initiative. His troops easily defeated reinforcements sent to relieve the city under the command of Ma Lin. With this great victory, at the age of 16, Ma Chongying earned the reputation of a military genius and the nickname Ga Ssuling or “little commander”. His triumph would be short lived however for his superior Ma Kuchung had not ordered the seizure of Huzhou and dismissed his nephew for insubordination. Thus Ma Chongying took his men to Xining in Qinghai and there began building a private army. The Guominjun eventually left Gansu after devastating it. In 1927 the northwestern parts of Gansu was hit by a massive earthquake and this combined with Feng Yuxiang’s regional commander Liu Yufen using much of its land for opium cultivation led to a mass famine. In the spring of 1928, the northwestern Tungans began a revolt against the Guominjun led by the Muslim General Ma Tingxiang. Ma Chongying tossed his lot into the fighting leading to three successive attacks against the Guominjun at Huzhou. According to Robert Ekvall, an American traveler in the region “The revolt had by this time assumed all the aspects of a holy war. Chanting prayers, forty or fifty thousand fighters went into battle with fanatical zeal ... the young rebel leader Ma Chong-ing [sic] seemed to bear a charmed life and by his reckless courage gained the utmost in obedience and devotion from his ruffian troops. The Chinese were panic-stricken at the desperate courage of the Moslems, but eventually, by machine gun fire and light artillery, proved superior”. Alongside this American diplomats reported that the famine and war in Gansu had reduced many to cannibalism with a possible two million people dying between 1926-1929. One of the many to die was Ma Chongyings father who was executed by Liu Yufen as a reprisal against him for his actions in 1929. That year Ma Chongying had strengthened his position by defeating several Guominjun forces. He traveled to Nanjing where he enrolled briefly at the military academy there. Rumors had it there he offered his services to the KMT on the understanding that if he could win control over Xinjiang that they recognize him. After departing Nanjing he traveled to Chongwei along the Yellow River where he joined his army before marching across the southern friends of the Ala Shan desert to head into northwestern Gansu. There he seized control over 4 districts; Kanzhou, Suzhou, Anxi and Tunhuang. Thus by the time of the Kumul uprising in April of 1931, Ma Chongying had established himself the Tungan warlord over northwestern Gansu. In June of that year, Yulbars Khan visited him at Suzhou while enroute to Nanjing. After a dinner, Ma Chongying asked Yulbars what was going on with the Kumul rebellion and the state of Kumul. Ma Congying then proceeded to criticize Jin Shujen whom he thought was unfit to govern Xinjiang. Upon hearing this Yulbars disclosed why he was going to Nanjing. Yulbars told him that many in Gansu did not support Jin and that he was appealing to Nanjing to see if Jin could be replaced with a new governor. Ma Chongying sat silently for some time before asking if Yulbar’s had any personal contacts in Nanjing, to which he replied he did not. He then advised Yulbars to not go to Nanjing because of three reasons: 1) The Kuomintang had just completed its Northern Expedition and was in need of stability, so it was not in a position to replace its frontier governors, despite any shortcomings they had.2) Even if the Nanking government agreed to remove Chin Shu-jen, implementing the decision would likely take two or three years due to the vast distances involved. 3) Furthermore, Chin’s greed would likely make him unwilling to step down, and he might even seek support from a foreign power to secure his position. Under these conditions, Sinkiang could potentially come under foreign control. The points were sound, however Yulbars stated the people had sent him to Nanjing, what should he do if he failed? Ma Congying replied “I have a way ... I can meet the needs of the Uighurs of Ha-mi ... In the name of Muslim brotherhood, I shall take my army into Sinkiang. First I shall alleviate the suffering of the Uighurs of Ha-mi, then I shall drive Chin Shu-jen from the stage by force of arms.” A lot of this is conjecture, as it would seem impossible Ma Chongying spontaneously decided to invade Xinjiang over dinner. Ma Chongying was interested in the Kumul uprising long before the arrival of Yulbars in Suzhou and based on other sources it seems Yulbars was well aware of this prior to his visit. Ma Chongying most likely had decent information on the political ongoings of Xinjiang as two Muslim Turks from Istanbul had traveled to northwestern Gansu from Urumqi in early 1931 and entered Ma Chongying’s military HQ. One was Kamal Kaya Efendi who went on to become his chief of staff. Ma Chongying was also gun running to places like Kumul, meaning he would have a lot of intel. Ma Chongyings powerbase in Kanzhou was also temporary. As pointing out by Mildred Cable and Francesca French “based on the assumption of the paralysing effect of frightfulness in action, and as a method of temporary invasion it answered his purpose well, but it never served him as a basis of true conquest, nor did he ever establish rule over one single acre of the land which he invaded. His was the method of the locust. . . and his army was always viewed as a plague. It came, it devoured, and when it had passed over, the patient, constructively minded peasants instantly began to repair the damage done to their fields, and to begetsons to replace those who had been swept away in his train” In 1931 Ma Chongyings private army was not a large one, it was perhaps no more than 1000 men and given the account of Mildred Cable and Francesca French, his army had to roam around like locusts to survive. Ma Chongying was a very ambitious and young warlord who like many in this part of China dreamed of carving out a Muslim empire in central asia. In the spring of 1931, Ma Chongying had only two possible directions to take. One was through China proper where he would most likely face his uncle Ma Pufang, whom at the time he was in this sort of propaganda war with. The other was to go through Xinjiang, where it seemed he could receive aid from other Muslim groups seeking to be rid of Jin Shujen. Ma Chongying assembled a force of 500 Tungan cavalry and swiftly crossed the desert between Anxi and Kumul during the full heat of midsummer, arriving in the oasis on the 28th of June, at around the same time as the French Citroen expedition. The French Citroen expedition got to see an encounter between Ma Chongyings Tungan Cavalry and some Chinese machine gun detachment outside of the village of Yikoshu. The French account indicated the Chinese forces also had some Mongol soldiers with them decisively beating back the Tungan riders. After witnessing this the French headed for Kumul’s Old City which they found in a state of chaos. Everyone within the city was busy organizing defenses. The French were taken immediately to the local Chinese commander, Zhu Juichih. As they made their way they could see anxious Muslims peering out of their windows and on telegraph poles were heads, hearts and livers, most likely from captured insurgents. Commander Zhu gave the French permission to continue to Urumqi, stating they could do so at their own risk. Most of the French departed on July 1st, leaving behind 3 members at the Old City who would become eyewitnesses to Ma Chongyings attack. On July 3rd, Ma Chongying dispatched two messangers to Zhu Juichich baring the following message. “By order of the National Government of China I have been appointed commander-in-chief of all military forces of Kansu and Sinkiang. Having assumed my new occasional pistol shot could be heard as hand-to-hand fighting began on the wall Its self ... Just when the place seemed to be doomed a machine gun, which up to this had been silent ... suddenly came to life. Emplaced in a blockhouse flanking the wall, It opened fire, mowing down the assault, and the glacis was soon cleared except for heaps of corpses”. Ma Chongyings Tungan cavalry force lacked heavy artillery necessary to breach the Old city walls. Three separate attacks were made on the night of the 3rd, all beaten back. Zhu Juichih, a military veteran had zero intention of surrendering to the so called “little commander” whom he dismissed as a “thieving cub”. Ma Chongying seemed to have little stomach for siege warfare so on the 5th he led a large portion of his Tungan cavalry away from Kumul Old City. By doing so he had left roughly 1000 Uyghur insurgents with a handful of Tungans to continue a siege against the Kumul Old City who had 2000 provincial troops. Zhu Juichih was unaware of Ma Chongyings true purpose so he elected not to sortie fearing a trap. Meanwhile Ma Congying led his riders over the Karlik Tagh to Barkul surprising its defenders. Barkul would end up surrendering without much of a struggle. The commander at Barkul named Hedin handed over 2000 rifles and opened the Barkul arsenal to Ma Chongying. Ma Chongying left a hundred man garrison to capture the town as he turned south. According to Wu Aichen, the sudden small victories of the young commander emboldened other groups to join his cause such as the Kazakhs and Tungans north of Karlik Tagh. By mid-July Muslim insurgents were effectively controlling the entire territory of the Old Kumul Khanate, from Xingxingxia to Iwanquan. Groups of invading Tungans from Gansu formed an alliance with the Muslims of Xinjiang, notably from Xingxingxia and Barkul to hold the siege of Kumul Old City. Ma Chongying seemed to also hold the full support of indigenous Muslims of the area whether it be Hazakh, Kirghiz, Uyghur or Xinjiang Tungans. Jin Shujen’s received word of the young commander leading a force of Tungan cavalry attacking various places. It seemed his next target was to be Qiqiaoqing. Jin appointed his chief secretary, Lu Xiaozu to be his commander in chief of the provincial forces; Tu Qikuo and Sheng Shihtsai were to be his joint chiefs of staff. Lu Xiaozu was a younger brother to Jin Shujen, a civilian with little to no military experience and was the bitter rival of the current commissioner for military affairs at Urumqi, Jin Shuxin. Lu Xiaozu mustered a force roughly 1000 strong of men almost all lacking any military training or experience. They were immediately tossed over to Qiqiaoqing with orders to halt the Tungan advance pending further reinforcements. Shortly after their arrival, the troops were met by a surprise night attack and killed nearly to a man. Their commander Tu Qikuo committed suicide in disgrace. According to Kamal Kaya Efendi, the Tungans were led personally by Ma CHongying during the daring attack. He had taken his forces into the oasis through little known trails in Karlik Tagh and Bogdo Ula after his capture of Barkul. Following this victory, Ma Chongying returned to Kumul Old City to see if the siege was providing any results. This was a rather bizarre decision as Jin Shujens capital of Urumqi was...
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3.131 Fall and Rise of China: Complicated Story about Xinjiang
12/23/2024
3.131 Fall and Rise of China: Complicated Story about Xinjiang
Last time we spoke about the Long March. Amidst escalating conflicts, the Red Army, led by the newly empowered Mao Zedong, faced immense pressures from the Nationalist Army. Struggling through defeats and dwindling forces, they devised a bold retreat known as the Long March. Starting in October 1934, they evaded encirclement and crossed treacherous terrain, enduring heavy losses. Despite dire circumstances, their resilience allowed them to regroup, learn from past missteps, and ultimately strengthen their strategy, securing Mao’s leadership and setting the stage for future successes against the KMT. During the Long March (1934-1936), the Red Army skillfully maneuvered through treacherous terrain, evading the pursuing National Revolutionary Army. Despite harsh conditions and dwindling numbers, advances and strategic ploys allowed them to cross critical rivers and unite with reinforcements. Under Mao Zedong's leadership, they faced internal struggles but ultimately preserved their unity. By journey's end, they had transformed into a formidable force, setting the stage for future victories against their adversaries and solidifying their influence in China. #131 The Complicated Story about Xinjiang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. I’ve said probably too many times, but theres one last major series of events I’d like to cover before we jump into the beginning of the 15 year war between China and Japan. When I say Xinjiang I imagine there are two responses from you in the audience, 1) what the hell is Xinjiang or number 2) oh what about that place in northwest China. That pretty much sums it up, the history of this province, or region if you want to call it that is almost never spoken about. It was a place as we have seen multiple times in the series, where conflicts come and go like the weather. But in the 1930’s things really heated up. What I want to talk about is collectively part of the Xinjiang Wars, but more specifically I want to talk about the Kumul Rebellion. There’s really no way to jump right into this one so I am going to have to explain a bit about the history of Xinjiang. Xinjiang in a political sense is part of China and has been the cornerstone of China’s strength and prestige going back to the Han dynasty over 2000 years ago. In a cultural sense however, Xinjiang is more inline with the Muslim dominated middle-east. It's closer to th Turkic and Iranian speaking peoples of Central Asia. From a geographical point of view Xinjiang is very much on the periphery. It is very isolated from western asia by the massed ranks of the Hindu Kush, the Pamirs, the Tien Shan, the Indian Subcontinent of Karakoram, Kunlun, the Himalaya ranges and of course by the Gobi desert. It neither belongs to the east or west. As a province of China its the largest and most sparsely populated. It can be divided into two main regions, the Tarim Basin and Zungharia and then into two lesser but economically significant regions, the Ili Valley and Turgan Depression. The Tien Shan mountain range extends roughly eastward from the Pamir Massif, creating a formidable barrier between Zungharia and the Tarim Basin. This natural obstacle complicates direct communication between the two regions, particularly during winter. The Ili Valley, separated from Zungharia by a northern extension of the Tien Shan, is physically isolated from the rest of the province and can only be easily accessed from the west. This western area came under Russian control in the mid-nineteenth century and now forms part of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. Now it has to be acknowledged, since the formation of the PRC in 1949, Xinjiang changed in size and ethnic composition. The CCP drove a massive Han migrant wave over. Regardless, Han’s make up a minority and according to some population statistics taken during the 1940s, Xinjiang was dominated by 7 Muslim nationalities, roughly 3.5 million people out of a total population of 3.7 million. 200,000 of these were Han settlers, while 75,000-100,000 were Mongols, Russians, Tunguzic peoples (those being Sibo, Solon and Manchu), a few Tibetans, Afghans and Indians. Among the various indigenous Muslim nationalities of Xinjiang, the Uighurs stand out as the most numerous and politically important. This Turkic-speaking group primarily consists of sedentary agriculturalists who reside in the oases of the Tarim Basin, Turfan, Kumul, and the fertile lowlands of the Hi Valley. In the late 1940s, the Uyghur population in Xinjiang was estimated to be approximately 2,941,000. Following the Uyghurs, the second-largest Muslim nationality in the region is the Kazakhs, with an estimated population of around 319,000 during the late Republican Period. Kirghiz come in third, with an estimated population of about 65,000 at the same time. Both the Kazakhs and Kirghiz in Xinjiang are nomadic Turkic-speaking peoples, with the Kazakhs primarily found in the highland areas of Zungharia and the Hi Valley, while the Kirghiz inhabit the upland pastures of the Tien Shan and Pamirs. There also exist a small group of Iranian-speaking 'Mountain' Tajiks living in the upland Sarikol region in the far southwest, with an estimated population of 9,000 in the mid-1940s; a primarily urban group of Uzbeks residing in larger oasis towns and cities of the Tarim Basin, numbering approximately 8,000 in the mid-1940s; and a smaller group of Tatars settled mainly in Urumqi and the townships near the Xinjiang-Soviet border, estimated at 5,000 during the same period. Lastly, it is important to mention the Hui, a group of Chinese-speaking Muslims dispersed throughout China, particularly in Zungharia and Kumul within Xinjiang, as well as in the neighboring northwestern provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia. Known as 'Tungan' in Xinjiang, the Hui population was estimated at around 92,000 in the mid-1940s and held significant political and military influence during the Republican Period. Excluding the Ismaili Tajik’s of Sarikol, the Muslim population of Xinjiang, whether Turkic or Chinese speaking, are Sunni following the orthodox of Hanafi Madhhab. As for the non Muslim population, excluding the Mongols who numbered roughly 63,000 and inhabit a narrow strip of land along the northeastern frontier between Xinjiang and the Mongolian People’s Republic, Tien Shan, Ili Vally and Chuguchak, most were newcomers, migrants from the mid 18th century while the region was being conquered. Again according to the same statistics from the 1940s I mentioned, Hans represented 3-4 % of the population. Although the Han population disproportionately held power with the main administrative areas, they had no sizable territorial enclaves. The Han population can basically be divided into 5 groups; descendants of exiled criminals and political offenders; Hunanese settlers who came over after Zuo Zungtang’s conquests; Tientsin merchants who were supplying Zuo’s army; Shanxi caravaneers who came to trade and Gansu colonists. Lastly there were the Tunguzic Peoples and Russians. The Tunguzic speaking Sibo, Solon and Manchu settled mostly in the Ili region. The Russians also tended to live in the Ili region. These were mostly White Russian refugees from the civil war. Xinjiang's first Republican governor was Yang Zengxin, a Yunnanese native. He had previously worked as the district magistrate in Gansu and Ningxia earning a reputation as a good manager of the local Tungan Muslim population. In 1908 he was transferred to Xinjiang and quickly found himself promoted to by the last Qing governor of Xinjiang. He held out his post after the Xinhai revolution and quelled a Urumqi rebellion soon after. Yang Zengxin’s survived politically by always siding with whichever faction he thought was winning. For example in 1917, President Li Yuanghong dispatched Fan Yaonan to watch over Yang and try to replace him if possible. Yang recognized quickly whichever Warlord faction held power over the Beiyang government should be courted. Thus Yang held out for a long time and his province was comparably peaceful compared to most of warlord era China. To maintain his power, Yang enacted a divide and rule style, trying to placate the conflicts between certain groups within Xinjiang, but made sure to exclude Russian influence. Basically Yang tried his best to keep groups who could come into conflict away from each other, keeping the Uyghurs of southern Xinjiang away from the pastoral nomads of Zungharia and Tien Shan. Above all Yang considered the Bolshevik Russians to be the greatest threat to his regime, in his words “The Russians ... aimed at ... isolating the country from all outside influence, and at maintaining it in a state of medieval stagnation, thus removing any possibility of conscious and organised national resistance. As their religious and educational policy, the Russian administrators sought to preserve the archaic form of Islam and Islamic culture. . . Quranic schools of the most conservative type were favoured and protected against any modernist influence”. During his 16 year of power, Yang established himself as a competent autocrat, a mandarin of the old school and quite the capable administrator. Yet his economic policies were long term exploitative causing hardship and exhausting the province. Yang realized he was reached the threshold of what the population was willing to endure and endeavored to allow corruption to emerge within his administration provided it remained within acceptable limits. IE: did not spring forward a Muslim revolution. He opened junior positions in the administration to Muslims which had a duel effect. It made the Muslim community feel like they were part of greater things, but placed said officials in the path of the populations anger, insulating senior Han officials. Ironically it would be his fellow Han Chinese officials who would become angry with him. Some were simply ambitious of his power, others felt that Xinjiang should be more closely inline with China proper. Rumors have it that after a dinnr party, Yang deliberately surrounded himself with opium addicts, stating to his subordinates “the inveterate opium smoker thinks more of his own comfort and convenience than of stirring up unrest among his subordinates”. Needless to say, Yang later years saw him seriously alienating senior officials. By 1926 he claimed “to have created an earthly paradise in a remote region” so he seemed to be quite full of himself. That same year he turned against his Tungan subordinates. He accused many of conspiring with Ma Qi, a Tungan warlord of Xuning in Qinghai, whom he also thought were driven by Urumqi. Deprived of his formerly loyal Tungans, Yang found himself increasingly isolated. A expedition was sent to Urumqi in 1926, whr G. N Roerich noted “The Governor's residence consisted of several well-isolated buildings and enclosed courtyards. The gates were carefully guarded by patrols of heavily armed men ... The Governor's yamen seemed to us to be in a very dilapidated condition. The glass in many of the windows on the ground floor was broken and dirty papers and rags had been pasted on the window frames. Numerous retainers roamed about the courtyards and villainous bodyguards, armed with mauser pistols, were on duty at the entrance to the yamen.” It seems likely Yang had decided to leave Xinjiang at that point. He had amassed a immense personal fortune and sent much of it to his family in China proper and also to Manila where he had a bank account. Further evidence of this was provided by Mildred Cable and Francesca French, two members of the China inland Mission who reported 'Wise old Governor Yang ... as early as 1926 ... quietly arranged a way of escape for his family and for the transference of his wealth to the security of the British Concession in Tientsin. Later in the same year, accompanied by several 'luggage cases of valuables', Yang's eldest son was sent out of Sinkiang, travelling incognito, in the company of these missionaries”. It was also at this time Yang erectd a statue of himself in th public gardens at Urumqi. According to Nicholas Roerich, this memorial was paid for with forced contributions 'from the grateful population'; by all accounts the statue was in execrable taste . While the NRA was marching upon Beijing in June of 1928, Yang ordered the KMT flag to be raised in Xinjiang. This gesture indicated to all, Yang was about to depart the province. One of Yang’s most dissident subordinates, a Han named Fan Yaonan decided to act. Fan Yaonan was an ambitious modernist who received his education in Japan and someone Yang distruste from day one. Fan was appointed the post of Taoyin of Aksu by the Beijing government, an appointment Yang could have easily ingored, but was grudgingly impressd by Fans abilities. Fan proved himself very useful to Yang and was soon promoted to the Taoyin of Urumqi alongside becoming the Xinjiang Provincial Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. It seems Fan and Yang mutually disliked each other. At some point in 1926 Fan got together with a small group of like minded officials, such as the engineer at Urumqi’s telegraph station and the Dean of the local school of Law, and Fan told them he wanted to assasinate Yang. Some believe Fan sought to gain favor with the KMT as motivation. Regardless on July 7th of 1928, 6 days after Yang took the post of Chairman of the Xinjiang Provincial Government under the KMT, Fan attacked. On that day, Yang was invited to a banquet to celebrate a graduation ceremony at the Urumqi law school. Fan had arranged the banquet, with 18 soldiers present, disguised as waiters wearing “red bands around their arms and Browning pistols in their sleeves”. During the meal, Fan proposed a toast to the health of Yang at which time “shots rang outsimultaneously, all aimed at the Governor. Seven bulletsin all were fired, and all reached their mark. Yang, mortally wounded, but superb in death, glared an angry defiance at his foes, 'who dares do this?' he questioned in the loud voice which had commanded instant obedience for so many years. Then he fell slowly forward, his last glance resting upon the face of the trusted Yen, as though to ask forgiveness that he had not listened to the advice so often given to him”. According to Yan Tingshan who was also wounded, Fan Yaonan finished Yang Zengxin off with two shots personally. After the assassination, whereupon 16 people were killed or wounded, Fan went to Yang official residence and seized the seals of office. He then sent a letter summonig Jin Shujen, the Commissioner for Civil Affairs in Xinjiang and Yang’s second in command. Jin called Fan’s bluff and refusing to come, instead sending soldiers to arrest the assassin. It seems Fan greatly miscalculated his personal support as a short gun battle broke out and he was arrested by Jin and shortly thereafter executed with his complices on July 8th. And thus, Jin Shujen found himself succeeding Yang, a less able man to the job. Jin Shujen was a Han Chinese from Gansu. He graduated from the Gansu provincial academy and served for a time as the Principal of a Provincial normal school. He then entered the Imperial Civil Service, where he came to the attention of Yang, then working as the district Magistrate at Hozhou. Yang took him on as district magistrate and Jin rose through the ranks. By 1927 Jin became the Provincial Commissioner for Civil Affairs at Urumqi. After executing Fan, Jin sent a telegram to Nanjing seeking the KMT’s official recognition of his new role. Nanjing had no real options, it was fait accompli, they confirmed Jin into office and under the new KMT terminology he was appointed Provincial Chairman and commander-in-chief. In other words an official warlord. Following his seizure of power, Jin immediately took steps to secure his newfound power. His first step was to double the salaries of the secret police and army. He also expanded the military and acquired new weaponry for them. Politically, Jin maintained the same old Qing policies Yang did, pretty much unchanged. Jin did however replace many of the Yunnanese followers under Yang with Han CHinese from Gansu. Jins younger brother, Jin Shuxin was appointed Provincial Commissioner for military affairs at Urumqi and his other brother Jin Shuqi was given the senior military post at Kashgar. His personal bodyguard member Zu Chaoqi was promoted to Brigade Commander at Urumqi. Jin maintained and expanded upon Yang’s system of internal surveillance and censorship, like any good dictator would. According to H. French Ridley of the China Inland Mission at Urumqi “people were executed for 'merely making indiscreet remarks in the street during ordinary conversation”. Jin also introduced a system of internal passports so that any journey performing with Xinjiang required an official passport validation by the Provincial Chairman's personal seal, tightening his security grip and of course increasing his official revenue. Travel outside Xinjiang became nearly impossible, especially for Han officials and merchants seeking trade with China proper. Under Jin Xinjiang's economy deteriorated while his fortune accumulated. Yang had introduced an unbacked paper currency that obviously fell victim to inflation and Jin upted the anty. Within a process of several stages, he expanded the currency, causing further inflation. Under Yang the land taxes had been a serious source of the provincial revenue, but Yang was not foolish enough to squeeze the Turkic peasantry too hard, he certainly was intelligent enough to thwart peasant revolts. Jin however, not so smart, he tossed caution to the win and doubled the land taxes, way past what would be considered the legal amount. Jin also emulated Ma Fuxiang, by establishing government monopolies over various profitable enterprises, notably the gold mine at Keriya and Jade mine at Khotan. He also monopolized the wool and pelt industry, using his police and army to force the sale of lambskins at a mere 10% of their market value. Just as with Yang’s regime, wealth flowed out of the province in a continuous stream, straight into banks within China proper. According to George Vasel, a German engineer and Nazi agent hired to construct airfields in Gansu during the early 1930s, he knew a German pilot named Rathje who was secretly employed by Jin to fly a million dollars worth of gold bullion from Urumqi to Beijing. Jin did his best to keep all foreign influence out of Xinjiang and this extended also to KMT officials from China proper. Jin also of course did his best to conceal his corrupt regime from Nanjing. For all intensive purposes Jin treated Xinjiang like a feudal, medieval society. He tried to limit external trade to only be through long distance caravans. All was fine and dandy until Feng Yuxiang occupied Gansu and thus disrupted the traditional trade routes. Alongside this the Soviets had just constructed a new railroad linking Frunze, the capital of Kirghiz with Semipalatinsk in western siberia. This railroad known as the Turksib was aimed primarily to develop western...
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3.130 Fall and Rise of China: Long March
12/16/2024
3.130 Fall and Rise of China: Long March
Last time we spoke about the Fujian Rebellion of 1933. In the midst of political turmoil, the 19th Route Army, once vital in campaigns for Chiang Kai-shek, found itself at odds with his leadership during Japan’s invasion of Shanghai in 1932. Facing internal rebellion and external threats, Chiang Kai-Shek prioritized fighting the Communists over the Japanese. The 19th Route Army, disillusioned, resisted both Japan and the CCP but ultimately faced betrayal when Chiang Kai-Shek forced them into civil conflict in Fujian, deepening divisions within China. In 1933, Chiang Kai-shek faced opposition for his appeasement of Japan, leading the 19th Route Army, frustrated by his inaction, to plot a coup. Under Chen Mingshu’s leadership, they sought alliances against Chiang Kai-Shek but struggled amid civil war pressures and Red Army conflicts. On November 20, they declared the People's Revolutionary Government in Fuzhou, aiming to unify against Japanese aggression. However, lack of support led to rapid failure; by January 1934, Chiang's forces crushed the rebellion, and its leaders fled, marking the end of the Fujian Revolution. #130 The Long March Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As we saw 2 episodes ago, the CCP had been taken over by the 28 Bolsheviks and Otto Braun who initiated a dramatic offensive strategy for the Red Army. Unfortunately this also came during the 5th encirclement campaign. This resulted in repeated defeats for the Red Army and the gradual shrinking of the Soviet area. In April 1934, the Central Red Army engaged in a decisive battle against the Nationalist Army in Guangchang, Jiangxi Province, suffering severe losses and now faced a critical situation. As the NRA’s grip tightened, the Red Army and the Central Committee of the CCP sought new strategies. With offensive tactics no longer feasible, the Red Army considered alternative approaches to navigate its current challenges. One overarching strategy involved co-opting the NRA by harnessing nationalistic sentiment to form a united front against the Japanese. The leadership of the Red Army hoped that by identifying a common enemy, they could temporarily alleviate the conflict with the KMT. In July 1934, they attempted to implement this strategy by deploying the Seventh Red Army Corps to western Fujian to join the 10th Red Army, commanded by Su Yu. This combined force was labeled the Anti-Japanese Vanguard Column to attract Nationalist support; however, the propaganda effort failed. The NRA subsequently obliterated the Red Army Column, resulting in the death or execution of most of its members. Approximately 800 survivors escaped and regrouped as a guerrilla unit under Su Yu, continuing to fight independently until the establishment of the Second United Front in 1937. Another breakout occurred on July 23, 1934, when the 6th Red Army Corps, operating from the Hunan-Guangdong border, traversed Hunan and joined forces with the Third Red Army, forming the Second Front Red Army, led by He Long, on October 22, 1934. It is uncertain whether either operation impacted the KMT. The escalating costs and ongoing casualties placed a heavy burden on the Red Army, complicating its ability to maintain its position. A secure new location was essential for the Red Army to reorganize, resupply, and recruit personnel. In August 1934, Bo Gu and Otto Braun secretly decided to abandon the Jiangxi Soviet. Their initial plan was to head southwest towards Hunan, seeking friendlier territory and aiming to connect with the 2nd Front Red Army. While the precise whereabouts of the 2nd Front Red Army were unclear, the leadership considered Hunan the most probable destination and devised a route to reach it. Meanwhile, the rest of the Red Army intensified its recruitment efforts, raised funds, and gathered supplies. On the night of October 10, 1934, the leadership of the Red Army issued marching orders to the 1st Front Red Army, which advanced southwest in two columns, consisting of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 8th, and 9th Red Army Corps. The total strength of this force was about 87,000 soldiers. Many of these soldiers were unaware that it would be their final sight of the Jiangxi Soviet, as most believed they were simply executing another maneuver to outflank the KMT and strike at its rear. A contingent of 16,000 troops, including several wounded soldiers like their leader Chen Yi, remained in Ruijin to defend against and delay the KMT forces, providing the First Front Red Army with the necessary time to depart unnoticed. Thus, began what has famously been called the Long March. The first few days of the Long March were relatively calm. The Red Army steered clear of significant confrontations with the NRA forces and easily maneuvered through a gap in the encirclement. Previously, Zhou Enlai had brokered a truce with the Guangdong and Guangxi warlords involved in the Extermination campaign, allowing the Red Army safe passage through the region. Meanwhile, the Red Army troops remaining in Ruijin fiercely resisted the NRA, effectively masking the fact that the main force had already departed. Until November 8, Nationalist newspapers claimed that the Red Army was nearly annihilated. The 1st Front Red Army traveled at night, using small trails to evade detection and attacks from the air. The troop formation included the 1st and 9th Red Army Corps on the left flank, the 3rd and 8th Red Army Corps on the right, with leadership and logistical units positioned in the center, while the 5th Red Army Corps provided rear guard support. The Red Army employed porters to transport heavy equipment, such as printing presses, X-ray machines, and currency. Additional porters carried litters for the wounded and key leaders. During this period, several Red Army leaders, including Zhou Enlai, were unwell or injured, while others, like Mao Zedong, rested in litters during the day after long nights of planning. By mid-November 1934, the NRA learned that the Red Army had broken free from their encirclement and was heading westward, prompting them to pursue. Observing the Red Army's movements, Chiang Kai-shek and the NRA leadership inferred that southern Hunan was likely their destination, so they deployed troops accordingly. The Red Army advanced rapidly to the west, aiming to cross the Xiang River before the NRA could catch up. On November 27, 1934, the Red Army reached Daoxian and launched an assault on the NRA blockhouses guarding the Xiang River crossings. They quickly overran these defenses and began moving troops across the river. However, the central column of the Red Army, hindered by heavy equipment and injured soldiers, fell behind the main force. On November 28, the NRA struck the rear elements of the Red Army before they could reach the river. For 5 days, the Red Army engaged in a fierce rear guard action, trying to disengage from the NRA and successfully cross the river. By December 2, 1934, all Red Army units had successfully crossed the Xiang River, albeit at a significant cost. The Red Army lost over two divisions from the 3rd and 5th Red Army Corps, leaving just over 30,000 soldiers remaining in their ranks. Furthermore, much of the Army's heavy equipment and supplies were abandoned along the way to lighten their load. After the Red Army crossed the Xiang River, it continued to evade direct confrontations with the NRA. The challenging battle at the Xiang River had a profound impact on the Red Army, leading to a rise in desertions as soldiers recognized that the movement had turned into an exodus from Jiangxi. Many porters responsible for transporting heavy equipment also began to leave during the night, especially while navigating the difficult, muddy trails in the mountains. The Red Army made several attempts to head north to join He Long and the 2nd Front Red Army, but each time, they found their routes blocked by the NRA. As a result, they altered their plans and headed west toward Guizhou, aiming to reach Sichuan and connect with the 4th Front Red Army to establish a new Soviet. Upon arriving in Liping, Guizhou province, the Red Army leadership decided on December 18th to advance north toward Zunyi in pursuit of their goal in Sichuan. Initially, Guiyang, the provincial capital, was the intended destination, but it had been fortified with seven NRA divisions. In contrast, Zunyi appeared to be a more feasible target as the second-largest city in the province, defended only by local Guizhou forces. On January 1st, 1935, the Red Army began its march toward Zunyi, crossing the Wu River under heavy fire from Guizhou provincial troops. Within three days, they successfully crossed the river and continued toward Zunyi. On January 7, the Red Army launched an attack on Zunyi, which fell two days later. Following the capture of the city, the Red Army initiated a recruitment drive, adding 30,000 new recruits to its ranks. To enhance its mobility, they buried or abandoned much of their heavy equipment. The Red Army had originally planned to remain in the area for an extended period to refit, reorganize, and bolster their forces. The staff of the Central Cadre Unit’s Red Army Medical School seized the opportunity to conduct a week-long course on basic first aid for soldiers. However, local conditions hindered any long-term presence. The area's primary crop was opium, useful for barter but inadequate for sustaining the Red Army. Additionally, the city's position along a river bend restricted the Red Army's escape routes in the event of an NRA attack. Given these challenges, Communist leadership convened a conference to deliberate on their military strategy. The conference held on January 15th, 1935, marked a pivotal moment in Communist history. In attendance were Politburo members, including Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Zhou Enlai, Luo Fu, and Bo Gu, along with Liu Bocheng, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Dehuai, and Otto Braun. The primary focus of the meeting was the unsuccessful military strategy employed during the 5th Extermination Campaign. Bo Gu and Zhou Enlai opened the discussion, both acknowledging their mistakes and accepting responsibility for the failures. Mao Zedong followed with a sharp critique of the strategy's use of "short, swift thrusts" and the lack of cooperation with the Fujian 19th route NRA Army. The conference continued for three more days, during which much of the Red Army leadership criticized Bo Gu and Otto Braun's approach, aligning themselves with Mao. By the end of the meeting, key leaders of the CCP and Red Army had distanced themselves from the 28 Bolsheviks, effectively making Mao Zedong the de facto leader of the CCP, despite not being formally elected to any new position at Zunyi. A significant change was the disbanding of the triumvirate leadership of Bo Gu, Otto Braun, and Zhou Enlai. Zhu De and Zhou Enlai were assigned to lead the Red Army, which then moved towards Sichuan to connect with the 4th Front Red Army. Departing Zunyi, the Red Army comprised four army corps: the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 9th Red Army Corps, although all were considerably smaller than before. The total strength of the 1st Front Red Army was approximately 35,000 soldiers. The army advanced north through Tongzi, gathering gold and opium to procure food and supplies for the journey. The 1st Army Corps, led by Lin Biao, took the lead in searching for a route to cross the Yangtze River. While attempting to secure a crossing near Chishui, the remainder of the Red Army engaged in a fierce battle with a Sichuan NRA force near Tucheng. The fighting escalated to such a degree that Mao Zedong ordered Lin Biao and his corps to return and assist. Ultimately, on January 29th, 1935, the Red Army lost contact with the enemy and abandoned its plan to cross the Yangtze River, instead retreating west to Zhaxi in Yunnan province to evade NRA forces. However, this provided only a temporary reprieve, as more NRA troops moved west into Sichuan, covering all potential crossing points along the Yangtze. Faced with limited options, Mao proposed an audacious plan on February 7th: the Red Army would split into separate columns and head back east into Guizhou to mislead the NRA, then reunite and proceed southwest into Yunnan to find a safer crossing point over the Yangtze. Executing this plan, the Red Army conducted a series of feints, diversionary attacks, and deception operations to confuse NRA leadership, as well as some of its own ranks. Mao Zedong aimed to create an opening for the Red Army to escape into Yunnan and cross the Yangtze in the Jinsha River area. The Red Army began moving east, achieving victories over the NRA, such as at Loushan Pass, where they captured about a division's worth of personnel and equipment. They continued eastward, seizing the city of Maotai and acquiring additional gold and opium for trade. In March 1935, Mao was appointed as the political commissar of the Red Army, with Zhu De serving as the commander-in-chief. His leadership role was further solidified when he was included in the triumvirate Military Council alongside Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang. Mao Zedong then initiated a deception operation, sending the 9th Red Army Corps north as a feint toward the Yangtze River, intending to reinforce NRA intelligence assessments. Chiang believed that these erratic movements indicated the Red Army was preparing for a decisive battle. Consequently, he relocated his NRA headquarters to Guiyang and deployed nearly all of Guizhou's NRA forces to the Yangtze area to encircle and eliminate the Red Army. This deployment inadvertently opened a north-south corridor in Guizhou, allowing the Red Army to move south towards Guiyang, which was now vulnerable due to the concentration of NRA forces along the Yangtze. Capitalizing on these fears, Mao sent additional Red Army units toward the provincial capital. In response, Chiang hurriedly redirected NRA forces from Yunnan to bolster defenses in Guiyang, thus creating yet another escape route for the Red Army. The Red Army swiftly exploited this corridor and advanced into Yunnan. They employed a similar feint tactic as used in Guiyang, deploying units from the 1st Red Army Corps to threaten Kunming. With the main Yunnan forces still occupied in Guiyang, the Yunnan government was forced to reallocate its frontier and militia troops to defend the capital, thus opening one final corridor for the Red Army to escape through a crossing at the Jinsha River. By April 1935, the Red Army had executed one of its most daring maneuvers, evading the NRA forces by making a sweeping maneuver into Yunnan. Despite this strategy, the Red Army still needed to cross the Yangtze River. One section of the river, known as the Jinsha River, flows from Tibet through Yunnan to Sichuan and offered excellent crossing points for the Red Army. On April 29th, Mao Zedong identified three crossing locations. The 1st Red Army Corps was assigned to cross in the north at Longjie, while the 3rd Red Army Corps would cross in the center at Hongmen. The Central Cadre Unit was designated to use the southern crossing point at Jiaopingdu. Meanwhile, the Fifth and Ninth Army Corps were tasked with rear guard operations and would cross at the nearest crossing point. Although the 1st and 3rd Red Army Corps struggled to secure their crossing locations, the Central Cadre Unit successfully acquired seven boats, established security on both riverbanks, and commenced a ferrying operation that would last nine days. Consequently, the 1st and 3rd Red Army Corps abandoned their original crossing points and moved to Jiaopingdu. The 3rd Red Army Corps crossed on May 7th, followed by the 1st Red Army Corps the next day. The 5th Red Army Corps maintained its rear guard before quickly crossing at Jiaopingdu on May 9th. Upon reaching Sichuan, the weary Red Army troops began to contemplate their next steps. After nearly nine months of travel, with minimal rest and significant losses, the Red Army's numbers had dwindled to around 25,000 soldiers, with much of their heavy equipment abandoned along their retreat route. They attempted to seize Huili but were met with fierce resistance from the 24th NRA Division. Outside the city, Red Army leaders held a conference on May 12th and resolved to continue north through Sichuan, aiming to cross the Dadu River to join forces with the 4th Front Red Army. As the Red Army advanced through the territory of the Yi minority, they faced hostility from the Yi people, who harbored animosity toward the Han and attacked straggling Red Army soldiers, stealing their weapons and clothing and leaving many to perish. Fortunately, Liu Bocheng and his vanguard unit from the 1st Red Army Corps negotiated a truce with the Yi, securing safe passage in exchange for promises of equal land rights and treatment after the war. On May 23rd, the Red Army reached Anshunchang along the Dadu River. Their initial attempts to cross by ferry were thwarted by strong NRA defenses on the opposite bank, and they only managed to secure three boats, which were insufficient for a crossing. On May 27th, Red Army leaders decided to take a calculated risk and dispatched troops northward to seize Luding Bridge. This iron-chain suspension bridge, located along a challenging trail through the mountain passes, crossed the Dadu River. In a remarkable act of bravery, the 4th Regiment of the 2nd Division, 1st Red Army Corps, led by Yang Chengwu, marched nearly 100 miles in under 3 days to secure the bridge. Despite facing a defending NRA brigade on sheer cliffs, the 4 Regiment acted swiftly and captured the bridge amid constant gunfire, with only 18 of the 22 men who launched the final assault surviving. Their sacrifice allowed the Red Army to evade the main KMT force and successfully cross the Dadu River, ultimately establishing themselves in Hualingping for refitting operations. However, the challenges for the Red Army persisted even after crossing the Dadu. They were still unaware of the 4th Front Red Army's location, with one possible area being directly north behind the Jiajin Mountains. To avoid detection from NRA forces or ambushes by Tibetans, Mao opted for a central walking trail through the Jiajin Mountains rather than the more accessible eastern and western routes. For many survivors of the Long March, the leg through the Jiajin Mountains proved to be the most arduous and challenging segment. The Red Army soldiers faced hunger, cold, thirst, avalanches, and the high altitude as they attempted to traverse the snow-capped peaks with little more than the clothes on their backs. On June 12th, the first units of the Red Army arrived at Danwei, located at the northern foot of the Jiajin Mountains. By June 14th, the remaining soldiers descended from the mountains and linked up with Li Xiannian, a liaison officer from the 4th Front Red Army. Approximately 10,000 soldiers endured the harsh conditions and made it down the mountain. Thankfully, they rejoined their fellow Red Army comrades, allowing them to take a much-needed rest. On June 18, 1935, the 1st and 4th Front Red Armies finally connected at Lianghekou. The Fourth Front Red Army fared...
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3.129 Fall and Rise of China: Fujian Rebellion of 1933
12/09/2024
3.129 Fall and Rise of China: Fujian Rebellion of 1933
Last time we spoke about the fifth encirclement campaign against the CCP. After surviving four encirclement campaigns by the NRA, the CCP faced an intensified fifth campaign in 1933, as the Japanese invaded Manchuria and North China. Despite growing in numbers, the CCP struggled against the KMT’s modernized army, equipped with German weapons and strategies. A combination of blockades, fortified positions, and superior tactics eroded Red Army strength. By 1934, after significant losses, the Red Army retreated, marking the campaign's end and signaling the start of the CCP's eventual Long March. In the battle between the NRA and the Red Army, the NRA employed strategic counterinsurgency techniques to block Red infiltration and gained local support through loyalty and economic pressure. Meanwhile, the Red Army, hampered by internal issues and a shift in leadership towards the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks, struggled with morale and mass recruitment of untrained peasants. As the Red Army attempted aggressive tactics and reforms, they ultimately faced defeat, leading to their strategic retreat in the historic Long March. #129 The Fujian Rebellion of 1933 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the previous episode, during the fifth encirclement campaign, I briefly mentioned a rebellion that took place in Fujian province. Now this story actually crosses over a few we will be covering, such as the fifth encirclement campaign, already mentioned but also the Japanese invasion of Shanghai in 1931, part of the Mukden incident. So its a bit tricky for me to cover this one without giving away too much of what we will be speaking about later, but I will try my best to be mysterious. Now the key player I guess you can say to this story is the 19th Route Army. The 19th Route Army’s history can be traced back to the 1st division of the Guangdong Army. In 1926, this division underwent a significant transformation, becoming the 4th Army of the NRA. At that time, Li Jishen was appointed as the commander, with Chen Mingshu serving as the commander of the newly formed 10th Division. Other notable figures included Jiang Guangnai as the deputy commander and Cai Tingkai leading a subordinate regiment. All of these men will be key players in the Rebellion. During the Northern Expedition, the 4th NRA Army distinguished itself with numerous successful campaigns. The 10th Division was subsequently expanded into the 11th Army. This new formation went on to play a pivotal role in during the Central Plains War of 1930, assisting Chiang Kai-shek in his struggle against warlords' anti-chiang coalition. As a result of this success, the 11th Army was reorganized into the 19th Route Army, with Jiang Guangnai assuming the role of overall commander and Cai Tingkai becoming the army commander. Following these developments, the 19th Route Army then went on to be part of the third encirclement campaign. Now again not to give away too much, but in 1931 the Mukden incident broke out initiating a 15 year war between China and Japan. Most of the action took place in Manchuria, pouring slightly into Northern China and Inner Mongolia, but there was an expedition performed in Shanghai. In many ways it was like a dress rehearsal for what would go down in 1937 during the battle of Shanghai. During the crisis, known then as the September 18th Incident, the 19th Route Army was redeployed to Shanghai.This transition occurred during a tumultuous period when Chiang Kai-shek faced significant political pressure and was forced to resign. The Nanjing National Government, dominated by the Guangdong faction, saw Chen Mingshu appointed as the commander of the garrison responsible for defending Beijing and Shanghai. Now this was a hyper chaotic time for China, and a particularly rough time for Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang Kai-Shek was dealing with multiple external and internal threats to China and his position as Generalissimo. First off, his encirclement campaigns against the Reds were not going well at all. His men were not accustomed nor trained properly to face guerilla warfare. When they assaulted the Jiangxi Soviet they were entering strange territory and were greeted by the countryfolk as enemies. The Reds, in contrast, felt at home among the villages. For years, they had lived alongside the people and built friendships; forging connections was a key aspect of Communist strategy. Whenever Chiang Kai-Sheks forces came too close for comfort, the guerrillas seamlessly blended into the local population. They established their own Soviets, spread their ideology at will, and disappeared when soldiers approached. They were like a fluid army. Over time, the Chinese public became less concerned about the ongoing presence of the Red Army and more weary of the topic. Those not living in areas affected by Communist infiltration struggled to grasp the urgency of this endless conflict and began to question whether the costs outweighed the benefits. Very little news was reported on the situation, and what was published came primarily from government sources, portraying it as a series of victories for the Nationalists—this battle was a success for the Nationalists, that one ended in a glorious triumph; the KMT troops had the Reds on the run. A few days later, another dispatch would reiterate the same points, as if the earlier battles had never occurred. The front lines never seemed to shift significantly. Chiang Kai-Shek maintained his position as Generalissimo like any other politician, through alliances. One of his key friends was Hu Hanmin. The relationship between Chiang Kai-Shek and Hu Hanmin was never straightforward. Their shared history was marked by significant jealousy, and in February 1931, they faced another separation. During a KMT conference, Hu Hanmin challenged the provisional constitution proposed by Chiang Kai-Shek, arguing that it was prematurely defining various governmental functions. He claimed that Chiang Kai-Shek was consolidating too much power for himself. Chiang Kai-Shek countered that Hu Hanmins concerns were mainly about party authority. This situation echoed their earlier disputes in Canton, where they had debated theories under Dr Sun Yat-sen's influence, but now their conflicts held more weight and didn't end in mere discussion. Hu Hanmin, overwhelmed by his anger, resigned from the presidency of the Legislative Yuan, a significant position at the time. In response, a similarly agitated Chiang Kai-Shek placed him under house arrest, or as the Chinese more delicately termed it, “in soft detainment.” Initially, this fact was not disclosed; Hu Hanmin simply vanished. This was quite an extreme action for someone who advocated democratic processes, leading to a barrage of inquiries from curious Europeans directed at Chiang Kai-Shek. What had happened? Where was Hu? Why had the innocuous Lin Sen been appointed as president of the Legislative Yuan? For a considerable time, the Generalissimo remained silent, but eventually, he reluctantly stated that Hu was fine—indeed, quite fine; it was simply that his personal freedom was temporarily restricted. This was all for his own benefit and that of the KMT. Without this restriction, the misguided individual might attempt to flee to Shanghai, which would only incite dissenting factions and provoke disorder. He was perfectly fine. The incident was added to the ever-growing list of accusations made by Chiang Kai-Sheks opponents, who claimed he was becoming a dictator. They argued that he was squandering the nation's resources to maintain his army while pursuing insignificant Communists, who, if left alone, might actually become good citizens. Rumors circulated that he was nurturing a group of young bullies reminiscent of the Italian "Blue Shirts." Additionally, there were concerns about the shady Chen brothers. Furthermore, it was alleged that Chiang Kai-Shek was in close contact with gangster Tu Yueh-sen in Shanghai, profiting immensely from the opium trade through this connection. In fact, Chiang had recently declared that opium would now be a government monopoly, similar to that of the British in Hong Kong, as he needed the funds. And now, this latest scandal! Criticism of the Generalissimo was rampant, especially among students. April passed, and the uproar over Hu Hanmin faded into discontented whispers, as the People’s Congress approached, providing an opportunity for open discussion about the provisional constitution. However, by May 5, people were preoccupied with other concerns. The South was once again causing unrest, led by Wang Jingwei, with Eugene Chen involved as well. It began with the typical manifesto or circular telegram, signed by Wang Jingwei and the Jiangxi generals, who "impeached" Chiang Kai-Shek for his wrongdoings. Another telegram soon followed from the warlord in Canton, accusing the Generalissimo of assuming dictatorial powers. In response, Chiang Kai-Shek convened an urgent meeting of KMT leaders, asserting that the allegations must be openly discussed and investigated. He should have been able to rely on the Party’s support during such a crisis, but the situation was unusual due to Hu Hanmin’s detention. Some members of his own faction seized the moment to betray him. Sun Fo and Wang Chunghui retreated to Shanghai before moving on to Canton. Shortly after, the Canton warlord declared an alliance between Jiangxi and Guangdong, united in their fight, this was the Chiang-Gui War. On May 25, the southerners issued an ultimatum: Chiang Kai-Shek had to resign within forty-eight hours or face the consequences. A few days later, they established a new national government in Canton. Chiang Kai-Shek announced his intention to suppress the rebels but did not rush into action. Instead, there were discussions—more discussions—in the neutral setting of Shanghai. Throughout June and most of July, these negotiations continued, with Chiang Kai-Shek hoping to prevent a conflict that the nation could ill afford. The southerners persisted with their demands, and their appeal to Japan for support would haunt them for a long time. Their determination ultimately prevailed, and on July 21, it was announced in Canton that a punitive expedition was underway. By mid-August, Bai Chongxi’s army was advancing through Hunan on the old route to Nanking. Chiang Kai-Shek prepared for the confrontation, and the capital was on high alert. Meanwhile, in the North, the Mukden Incident broke out. In the South, the generals and their associates held back, anticipating that war could be declared at any moment. However, Chiang Kai-Shek and his advisers understood that he was even less equipped than Zhang Xueliang to initiate an offensive against a powerful foreign nation. There was the League of Nations, established presumably to address crises like this, as well as the Kellogg Pact. Chiang Kai-Shek decided to refer the matter to the League, though his chances of a favorable outcome were slim: America, which might have otherwise been involved, was preoccupied with its own economic depression, and Britain remained indifferent. The more impulsive factions in China believed this response was insufficient, and the dissidents in the South demanded a stronger approach. The students were the most incensed. On September 28, hundreds of students in Shanghai took matters into their own hands. They seized control of a train at the railway station and traveled to Nanking, where they joined forces with fellow students from the capital's university. Together, they marched—five thousand strong—toward the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They pushed past the guards, stormed the Minister's office, forcibly dragged him outside, and assaulted him. After recovering from his injuries in the hospital, the Minister chose to resign. The students then initiated a sit-in strike, declaring they would remain in Nanking until they received tangible action rather than mere diplomatic efforts. Authorities were unsure how to respond to them, as more pressing issues demanded the government’s attention. It was clear that the South and Nanking needed to resolve their differences, as public opinion strongly supported this. Despite the ungracious criticisms emanating from Canton, where Eugene Chen was vocally denouncing Chiang Kai-shek for his diplomatic failures, Nanking sought to negotiate. In October, Chiang Kai-Shek released Hu Hanmin from his mild detention, and he appeared none the worse for the unexpected break. Along with three others, he traveled to Shanghai for a peace conference with the southern leaders. Hu urged the southerners to be reasonable and to cease calls for Chiang Kai-Shek’s resignation. Chiang Kai-Shek remarked, “Regardless of the right or wrong of the situation, if desired, all blame can be placed squarely on me.” However, this uplifting scene was short-lived. As the Canton faction continued to insist on Chiang’s resignation, Hu abruptly changed his stance and escalated the demands. He suggested that not only should Chiang resign, but he should also be exiled from China entirely. The conference ended in chaos. Various proposals were discussed and quickly dismissed. The South remained resolute; Chiang had to go. The sit-in students, frustrated with just sitting idle, started to escalate their actions. Their numbers had been steadily increasing since the initial demonstration, with boys traveling to Nanking from distant places; by the end of November, there were twelve thousand of them. They marched again to the new government buildings, demanding that Chiang Kai-Shek come out to engage in a discussion. “War on Japan!” they shouted. Chiang Kai-Shek made them wait in the cold winter weather for a full twenty-four hours before he finally appeared. He reprimanded them harshly and ordered them to return to school, leading to a subdued dispersal of the crowd. On December 15th, Chiang Kai-Shek capitulated to public pressure and resigned. Chiang Kai-Shek yet again nonchalantly got up and left heading home into the mountains. This left an extremely uneasy Sun Fo in the presidential chair facing what looked like a full blown Japanese invasion. The Japanese kept reiterating they were merely defending their citizens after the Chinese had attacked the South Manchurian Railway…but yeah they were certainly conquering. Sun Fo desperately looked to any veteran figures for help, but Hu Hanmin fled to Hong Kong, Wang Jingwei, arguably the man responsible for forcing Chiang Kai-Shek yet again to step down was suddenly far too ill to do anything and retired to the Shanghai Hospital. Meanwhile, all of the bankers had lost interest in the Nanjing government since Chiang Kai-Shek had departed, the government literally lost its coffers. The government had no means to properly pay its armies. Now the entire time the government had been tossing offers to Chiang Kai-Shek to come back, but he bided his time. Meanwhile Eugene Chen demanded China break off diplomatic relations with Japan, was told no so he resigned, followed soon after by Sun Fo. Wang Jingwei was tossed into the presidency position, which he must have relished, however it was just then when Shanghai was invaded. Chiang Kai-Shek still held his honorary position as CEC over the special committee so he simply waited and watched. Yet no one could manage the military like the generalissimo nor open the coin purses to fund it. Thus Chiang Kai-Shek was brought back, but not really as Generalissimo, now he had to work collaboratively with others, such as Wang Jingwei. In 1932, the January 28 Incident unfolded, basically the Japanese performed another false flag operation trying to legitimize an expedition into Shanghai. Japanese marines began to land and on January 28th they were attacking in full force. The 19th Route Army met the enemy in what became a month-long resistance against great odds. Chiang Kai-Shek was being labeled a coward for not doing more against the Japanese, but he was keeping in touch with the commanders of the 19th Rout Army by telegraph. He advised them to guard Liuho, a village just across the Yangtze, believing the Japanese would make other landings to cut them off there. General Tsai neglected to take the advice, and low and behold the Japanese made the landing forcing the 19th Route Army to pull out. The entire situation looked incredibly bad for China. Fingers were pointed at the inept Nanjing government. Yet Chiang Kai-Shek was much more focused on the encirclement campaigns against the Reds. The people angrily accused him of “making war on his own people instead of attending to the real threat, Japan”. To this Chiang Kai-Shek replied “It is useless for China to talk of resisting Japan. When it has not yet stamped out the enemy in its midst. If China ventures to fight the Japanese, the Communists will attack from the rear and chaos will quickly overtake the whole country.” The 19th Route Army were hailed as heroes, receiving a lot of recognition as a prominent anti-Japanese force. Despite Japan’s attempts to reinforce its troops, Chiang Kai-shek’s return to leadership saw further NRA forces dispatched to join the fight. Eventually, the conflict reached a resolution through diplomatic negotiations, resulting in the withdrawal of the 19th Route Army from Shanghai. With the Japanese threat averted for the time being Chiang Kai-Shek redirected his efforts against the Reds. On May 21, 1932, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the 19th Route Army to enter Fujian and forced the army to engage in a civil war against the Communists in Fujian. On December 6 of the same year, Jiang Guangnai took over as the chairman of Fujian Province, and Cai Tingkai was appointed as the director of the Fujian Pacification Office and commander of the 19th Route Army. At this point the leadership of the 19th Route Army were not at all happy with Chiang Kai-Shek, who to them seemed to have done little to help face the Japanese. They were not friendly to the CCP by any means and were actively suppressing Communist organizations while fighting the Japanese. When they came to Fujian they continued to suppress communists and supported people’s anti-Japanese patriotic movements. On August 18, 1932, the 61st Division of the 19th Route Army collectively executed 69 CCP members and suspected individuals outside the East Gate of Quanzhou, and they also carried out mass killings of government workers from the Soviet area during their offensive against it. Despite this the CCP and 19th Route Army did agree on one thing, the Japanese were a problem. After November 22, 1933, as Japanese imperialism intensified its invasion of China, the people across the nation once again launched a wave of anti-Japanese salvation movements. On January 17 of the same year, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army issued a "Joint Anti-Japanese Declaration," proposing three conditions for cooperation with any armed forces to resist Japan: an immediate halt to attacks on the Soviet areas, immediate...
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3.128 Fall and Rise of China: The Fourth encirclement campaign
12/03/2024
3.128 Fall and Rise of China: The Fourth encirclement campaign
Last time we spoke about the fourth encirclement campaign against the CCP. In 1931, the CCP survived brutal encirclement campaigns while the threat of Japanese invasion in Manchuria shifted focus in China. The new leadership, known as the 28 Bolsheviks, seized control after the downfall of Li Lisan, leading to infighting within the CCP. Despite initial successes, Mao Zedong opposed the aggressive military strategies favored by the Bolsheviks. As the Red Army expanded, Mao's calls for caution clashed with the Central Committee's ambitions, highlighting the struggle for power and differing strategies within the party during a time of upheaval. As the 28th Bolsheviks gained power, they stripped Mao Zedong of key positions, deeming his strategies outdated. The Red Army, while suffering losses, adapted tactics and launched further offensives. Political tensions rose, leading to purges and reorganization under more orthodox leadership. Ultimately, despite setbacks, the CCP’s resilience and guerrilla tactics allowed them to persist against KMT forces. #128 the fifth encirclement campaign Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So the CCP had just survived 4 encirclement campaigns. Now each time an encirclement campaign was unleashed, it was done so during a very tumultuous time to say the least. The first three were done between 1930-1931 where the Central Plains War and multiple large scale rebellions were kicking off. It was also on the cusp of the re-unification of China, thus Chiang Kai-Shek arguably had bigger fish to fry. During the fourth encirclement campaign Chiang Kai-Shek was very much taking notice of the red menace in his interior, however a rather earth shattering moment occurred, the Japanese had invaded Manchuria. And yes, we will get to the 15 year war in good time no worries folks your boy has a lot of goodies coming. So one can understand Chiang Kai-Shek could not very well fully go after the Reds when the Japanese had invaded northeast China and there was absolutely no telling where or when they would stop. Well the fourth encirclement campaign did not provide the results the KMT needed, so obviously there was to be a fifth…and guess what, the Japanese began an invasion of North China that same year of 1933. Now if you really are itching to hear more about these events we will tackle in a few episodes, over at the Pacific War Channel on Youtube or on all major podcast platforms might I suggest the following: my Kanji Ishiwara series covering his entire involvement in these events and during WW2, my full documentary/podcast on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and lastly my full podcast on the Japanese invasion of North China. I am a very busy boy over there as you can see. In the late winter and early spring of 1933, the Kwantung Army had begun an invasion of North China. They specifically began by invading the province of Rehe, modern day Jehol. After this they attacked the Great Wall of China, a pretty insane story to be honest, and descended further into north china. Understandably Chiang Kai-Shek shifted his focus from the Red menace to the Japanese at his front door. Beginning in July, the KMT established a review team to examine why the encirclement campaigns were failing to provide real results and what improvements could be made. They also established division level training units to retrain the forces with the lessons learned against the Reds. There was also a lot of integration of foreign military advisers, particularly Germans who helped develop better tactics and strategies. The Germans immediately proposed a more deliberate strategy against the Soviets. The first step they argued was to establish an economic blockade. Raw materials and durable goods could not be allowed to enter or leave the Soviet areas. Foods like rice and salt were especially targeted, there was to be an absolute ban on them going in or out. The second step was to establish a series of fortifications, basically blockhouses made out of concrete to provide fire support to offensive operations in nearby cities. As NRA forces advanced into areas to clear them, the previous blockhouses would be abandoned as new ones were built. There also needed to be lines of operation, requiring road development in rear areas to expedite logistical needs to the front. Now none of this sounds new compared to what we spoke about in the previous campaigns, but what was the issue was that it was not being done by all units prior. The KMT was also going to introduce political reforms that complemented the new standardized military strategies. New slogans arose such as “Thirty Percent Military, Seventy Percent Political,”. They were going to revive the baojia system. The Baojia system was an administrative structure that emerged during the Song Dynasty 960–1279 AD and was prevalent in various forms throughout subsequent dynasties. Its primary purpose was to enhance local governance, community responsibility, and social stability. The system was based on the grouping of households into units known as "bao" and "jia". Each bao typically consisted of ten households, while a jia consisted of ten baos, totaling about one hundred households. This hierarchical structure allowed for more manageable governance and oversight, facilitating communication and administration at the local level. Under the Baojia system, each household was assigned to a bao, and the head of the bao was responsible for maintaining order, collecting taxes, and ensuring the compliance of families with local laws and regulations. The heads of the baojia units worked in conjunction with local officials to enforce state policies and maintain social harmony. This system not only provided a means for effective local governance but also fostered a sense of community among families. Neighbors were encouraged to cooperate and support one another, creating a network of mutual responsibility. In addition to its administrative functions, the Baojia system played a significant role in maintaining social order. By organizing families into these small units, it facilitated surveillance and mutual accountability among community members. Residents were motivated to monitor each other's behavior, discouraging misconduct and promoting adherence to social norms. As a result, the system contributed to the overall stability and cohesion of society, particularly in rural areas where government presence was often limited. Now to get all of this done, the KMT increased the NRA forces deployed to Jiangxi to nearly 700,000 who were broken down into 4 area armies and 5 air corps. They deployed the Northern Route NRA Army consisting of 33 divisions in Jinzhi, Jishui, Nangeng and the Le’an front; and the Southern Route NRA Army, consisting of eleven Guangdong divisions and one independent regiment, established a blocking position along a line connecting the cities of Wuping, Anyuan, Shangyou and Ganxian. The Southern Route NRA army would move to the blocking positions north in coordination with the other NRA forces to try and squeeze the Reds. The Western Route NRA army consisting of 9 Hunanese divisions and 3 independent regiments were responsible for blocking the Reds from advancing west of the Gan River. The Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi area army HQ was assigned 11 divisions and 4 security regiments to block any Reds from escaping through northeast Jiangxi. All of this encompassed the fifth encirclement campaign. When the NRA was ready to commence the campaign, it was too late for the Reds to properly mount a counter encirclement campaign. The only thing the Reds had going for them was their recruitment efforts that saw them grow perhaps 100,000 strong. The Red Army even began touting a slogan “Million Man Army” to further recruit. By late October 1933, the Reds were certainly numerous, but this also meant they needed more supplies and equipment. With their Eastern Front Army now in Fujian, the Central Front Army and local populace should have been raising revenues and stockpiling supplies, especially rice and salt, but that is of course if they knew a fifth encirclement campaign was coming. On September 25th, the NRA deployed 3 divisions south from Nanchang to attack Lichuan. Within 3 days of battle, the city fell, which greatly shocked the CCP. The Central Front Red Army fell back, waiting for the Eastern Front Red Army to rush back over from Fujian to meet the threat. By October 6th both front Red armies consolidated to perform a counterattack. They first attacked Xunkou, where they annihilated 3 NRA brigades. However the success was to be short lived. For the proceeding two months, the Red Army attacked multiple NRA blockhouses in Zixi, Huwan Bajiaoting, Xiaoshi, Daxiongguan and Yuangai Mountain. Yet they were unsuccessful at breaching the defensive line. The concrete block houses were acting as pillboxes allowing the NRA to concentrate fire using brand new German made machine guns. They also were utilizing new Krupp artillery pieces and German made aerial bombs against the Red army formations whenever they assaulted the blockhouse line. By November the KMT’s attention was slightly diverted as Fujian had just seen a full blown rebellion, more about that in the next episode, but to summarize a bit. On November 30th, the KMT 19th route army in conjunction with the Fujian provincial government rebelled against the KMT and set up an independent government. As you might be guessing, they were also working with the CCP. Back in October they had formed a military alliance, better said cease fire. This little arrangement did not last long and there even emerged hostilities. During this chaos the revolutionary military council held an emergency meeting to figure out a course of action. Otto Braun advocated for a strong offensive to decisively defeat the KMT. He argued the golden age of guerrilla warfare in China was over and now the Red Army must conduct convention warfare against NRA positions. Thus Mao Zedong’s “lure the enemy in deep” strategy was replaced by “defending against the enemy outside the Soviet”. In January of 1934 the second soviet congress was held where a series of resolutions were passed to focus the Red Army against the fifth encirclement campaign. The resolutions reiterated Otto Braun’s offensive strategy and repeatedly attacked Mao Zedong's strategies. Building upon the strategy of defending against the enemy outside the Soviets, Otto Braun also proposed using “short, swift thrusts”. This would see the employment of repeated infantry assaults to overwhelm the NRA blockhouse lines. Otto Braun also advocated for continuing the mass recruitment efforts and brought up perhaps beginning a system of conscription to fill the ranks. After the Fujian rebellion situation simmered down, the NRA refocused their attention against the Reds. The NRA established a line of blockhouses going from Lichuan to Le’an and began clearing out the area south of Ruijin using 35 divisions. The NRA forces first targeted Guangchang, lying about halfway between Nanchang and Ruijin. The NRA’s Eastern Front also began advancing west, totaling some 14 divisions. By March of 1934 the NRA Northern and Eastern Fronts linked up at Deshengguan where they began coordinated efforts towards Guangchang. In response to the NRA advances towards Guangchang, the Red Army built a series of fortifications and trenchworks to defend the area. On April 9th, the NRA began its attack on Guangchang, deploying the 3rd Route army’s 10 divisions from Nanfeng with heavy artillery and aircraft support. The NRA forces advanced south along both sides of the Xu River leading towards Guangchang. The Northern Route NRA Army established new blockhouses on one side of the river before clearing the other side. It took the NRA forces roughly 2 weeks to advance down the riverway to Guangchang. By April 23rd, they breached the Red Army’s defensive lines and seized control over some high ground surrounding the area. The Reds were forced to pull back into the city where they continued to build fortifications and trench lines. On the 27th the NRA began to artillery and aerially bomb the city, easily destroying the wooden fortifications and trench lines constructed by the Reds. On the 28th, the NRA stormed the city forcing the Reds to retreat south. The Reds had suffered 5093 casualties, roughly 20% of their defending force at Guangcheng whereas the NRA suffered 2000 casualties. It was very evident, the NRA were wielding superior equipment, notably the heavy artillery and aircrafts that the Red’s had no real answer for. After Guangchang the NRA advanced in all four directions. By May 1, NRA forces from the Western Front had taken control of both Shaxi and Longgang. Meanwhile, the Eastern Route NRA forces advanced and captured Jianning by May 16. By June, the CCP began feeling the strain from these assaults. A combination of the blockade and the baojia system was gradually eroded local support for the CCP. The attrition warfare strategy also took a toll on the quality of leadership and experience in the Red Army, as more inexperienced soldiers filled the ranks. Under pressure, many of these recruits deserted, further weakening the Red Army's effectiveness. Additionally, the shortage of supplies and food lowered morale and diminished public support for the Red Army's offensive. Even military and party publications gradually withdrew their support for the offensive, shifting focus to the promotion of guerrilla warfare to conserve resources. Recruitment efforts to replenish losses had little impact as the NRA’s superior strategy continued to stifle the Soviet, reducing its control from seventeen counties to ten. In the summer of 1934, the Red Army began exploring new strategies, establishing a defensive perimeter stretching from Ninghua to Ningdu and Xingguo. By May, the Central Committee convened and concluded that the current offensive strategy was ineffective, likely necessitating the Red Army’s evacuation from the Soviet area. They sought approval from the COMINTERN to change their approach, which was granted a few days later, stressing that the CCP's priority should be preserving the Red Army's combat strength. However, Braun and Bo Gu proposed a different method. Instead of immediately preparing to withdraw from the Soviet, they advocated for a final stand, urging everyone to give their all to defend the territory and secure victory. Alongside this shift in rhetoric, the Red Army maintained its defensive posture, constructing wooden blockhouses and trenches. Additionally, the CCP approved an expansion of guerrilla warfare across multiple fronts to defeat the NRA. In July, the NRA launched another offensive, focusing this time on the city of Shicheng, positioned between Ninghua and Ningdu as their entry point. The two forces clashed fiercely along this final line of defense for nearly a month. In early August, the Red Army mounted a strong counteroffensive during the battle of Gaohunao, inflicting over 4,000 casualties on the NRA. However, the Red Army also suffered heavy losses and was forced to retreat to the last defensive line just north of Shicheng. At Shicheng, the Red Army managed to hold the NRA in a stalemate. Ultimately, the NRA deployed twelve large howitzers, breaking through the defensive line in August. Shicheng eventually fell in October. The defense cost the Red Army 5,000 casualties, leaving it severely weakened and forcing its leaders to consider drastic actions. By this point, the Jiangxi Soviet had been reduced to a small area around Ruijin and Xingguo. With mounting casualties and the imminent threat of an NRA assault on Ruijin, the Red Army made a bold decision to retreat from Jiangxi on October 10, 1934, ending the Fifth Extermination Campaign. There has been a lot of thorough investigative work into why the CCP failed during the fifth encirclement campaign. This episode will be a bit different then previous ones as I thought it might be interesting to tell the overall story and then explain the finer details as to why it went down this way. Going back to when I discussed the NRA analyzing why their fourth encirclement campaign had failed. The analytics from that were incorporated into plans formed by the German advisers such as Hans von Seeckt and Alexander von Faulkenhausen. The Germans dramatically improved the NRA’s performance across the board. This was seen in terms of training, the employment of more modern military tactics and of course the Germans sold the NRA some really good toys. Now again this was done in the vacuum of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and Northern China. The real aim of the Germans' assistance was directed against the Japanese, but the advisers acknowledged how China must combat the external aggressor while not succumbing to internal threats. Ironically it was that exact situation that had toppled multiple Chinese dynasties in the past, take the Ming for example. The NRA also employed effective counterinsurgent strategies that complimented their conventional warfare strategies. Beginning back in 1928 the KMT gradually re-instituted the baojia system. The NRA first cleared out Red areas and then established local administrators who were loyal to the KMT, protected by local militias. Through this the NRA was able to hold cleared areas and block any Red infiltration. Many residents in these areas actively began providing intel to the NRA. The Baojia system also supported the economic blockade, providing a system of sentries at the entrance of villages placing a lot of pressure on the Red Army and local populations. Chiang Kai-Shek’s political reform “70% political, 30% military” also helped incorporate many disenfranchised Chinese, taking their support away from the Reds. The NRA also adopted a methodical, patient approach to tackle the Reds. The NRA quickly found out the Reds did not have the necessary weaponry to take out their concrete blockhouses, thus a war of attrition was on the table. Electing for a long campaign rather than a short one severely hurt the Reds who were incapable of conducting prolonged operations. The NRA also had learnt from the Red’s usage of diversionary and feint attacks, not falling for them this time around. There was also obviously their NRA enormous advantage in numbers, they did toss nearly a million men at the Soviets. On the other side the Red Army suffered from numerous internal problems. The Red Army had undergone numerous measures to reform and professionalize the army, under the leadership of the 28 bolsheviks whom dominated the Central Committee. The mass recruitment efforts were directly primarily on uneducated peasants who required intensive training. Meanwhile the offensive strategy was decimating Red Army forces, many new recruits were tossed straight into the front lines without any training. The lack of training and political guidance, accompanied with low morale led to mass desertions. By the end of the fifth encirclement campaign the Red Army could not generate the proper forces to fill its demand and simply...
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3.127 Fall and Rise of China: The Fourth encirclement campaign
11/25/2024
3.127 Fall and Rise of China: The Fourth encirclement campaign
Last time we spoke about the first encirclement campaign against the CCP. The Jiangxi Soviet expanded despite opposition, but urban uprisings struggled, with labor union support declining. Li Lisan pushed for urban revolts, while Mao Zedong favored rural expansion. In 1930, failed attacks on Nanchang and Changsha deepened the divide between their strategies. Mao's forces later captured Ji’an, but tensions led to purges, including the Futian Incident. Meanwhile, the Nationalist Army launched an encirclement campaign. Mao’s strategy of “luring the enemy in deep” ultimately positioned the CCP for survival and future success. The NRA exploited internal conflict among the Reds, launching attacks on Donggu. Miscommunication led to friendly fire between NRA divisions. Despite capturing towns, overextension weakened the NRA, allowing the Red Army to counterattack. Through guerrilla tactics and local support, the Reds encircled and decimated multiple NRA divisions, capturing thousands of prisoners and weapons. Mao Zedong's strategies proved effective, bolstering Red Army morale and influence. By the end of the third campaign, the Jiangxi Soviet had expanded significantly. #127 The fourth encirclement campaign Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The CCP had just survived 3 brutal encirclement campaigns in 1931, collectively known as the First Encirclement Campaign. The Reds were quite lucky in 1931, for China had major problems requiring Chiang Kai-Sheks attention. Understandably one of those major problems was a full blown Japanese invasion of Manchuria, that rest assured we will tackle in depth in future episodes, but for coherency sake I thought it best to try and get through all the other events before we start talking about the beginning of the 15 year war. The Japanese invasion immediately began influencing the KMT-CCP conflict. The Japanese invasion directly threatened Soviet interests and Moscow looked at the CCP as a potential bulwark against the Japanese. From 1930-1931, the CCP’s Red Army was successful in defending their territory against the NRA extermination campaigns, however they still suffered from a lack of discipline, supplies and professionalism. New leadership came from the new Central Committee, now led by the 28 Bolsheviks and a new comintern representative, Otto Braun. The Red Army began adopting a series of initiatives in 1932 to improve. All Red Army units were standardized to establish better command and control. Political indoctrination and military training also became standardized with waves upon waves of manuals distributed to the forces. The Red Army expanded the Red Academy by establishing the Red Army War College for mid-grade and senior officers. Branch schools and speciality schools to increase competency and training. Political mobilization remained cornerstone to the Red Army. Recruitment of new troops also began to see a renewed emphasis on urban proletariats. A large change to the operations for the Red Army was the adoption of Soviet offensive tactics to seek out decisive battles. CCP leaders were under the misbelief that revolutionary fervor would simply have the Red Army victory. What they lacked initially was professionalism, alongside good weaponry and equipment. Couple this with the NRA’s adoption of more and more effective counterinsurgency tactics, the Red Army really began to suffer terrible casualties. Now as the Red Army defeated the NRA in the third extermination campaign of 1931 not to be mistaken for the large third extermination campaign later, another intraparty power struggle was brewing in the CCP. After the fall of Li Lisan, a group of students returning from studies in the USSR began a systematic operation to gain control over the CCP. This group became known as the 28 Bolsheviks. 20 or some of them returned to China with the new Comintern adviser, Pavel Mif in 1931. Two key members of the group, Qin Bangxian known colloquially as Bo Gu, and Chen Shaoyu as Wang Ming would seize key positions at the top brass of the CCP. Many of these students attended Moscow’s Sun Yat-Sen University, where they became acquainted with Mif, the head rector of said university. This university was a breeding ground for ultra-orthodox Stalinist communist doctrine. It goes without saying the students were indoctrinated with a very Moscow perspective. Mif regarded them as a very well disciplined force and used them to purge out divergent groups within the university. During the third Plenum in September of 1930, Mif attempted to use the forum to denounce Li Lisans plan, but had failed to convince the majority of the Central Committee. After Li Lisan was condemned and recalled to Moscow, Mif saw a major opportunity. At the fourth Plenum in January of 1931, Li Lisan and 11 of his supported were ousted from the Central Committee, with their best positions seized by Moscow aligned CCP members. The next year, the 28 Bolsheviks unleashed a brutal intraparty war with other factions. By late September the Bolsheviks effectively destroyed most of the opposition and incorporated the surviving members into a the Central Committee loyal to Moscow. Bo Gu was appointed head of the Central Committee from Wang Ming who returned to Moscow. Once the 28 Bolsheviks were in control of the CCP at Shanghai, they then set their eyes upon Mao Zedong and the Red Army Soviet areas. During the first All-China Soviet Congress of November 1931, they launched their first attack. Mao Zedong received prior word of their intentions from loyal followers in Shanghai and prepared to face them. Before the Central Committee arrived at Ruijin, Mao had just emerged victorious from the encirclement campaigns, had suppressed dissension amongst his ranks and established a delegation of loyalists within the Soviet Congress. The Bolsheviks failed to gain a majority within the Congress, taking only 2 seats in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet. Meanwhile Zhu De was appointed Commissar of War and other Mao loyalists took high ranking positions. To try to break Mao Zedongs monopolistic control over the Red Army, the Bolsehviks employed Zhou Enlai. In early 1932, the CCP urged the Red Army to expand Soviet territory as its forces grew. Successful defenses against encirclement Campaigns brought many NRA soldiers into the Red Army, some willingly, others by force. A key boost came on December 14, 1931, when the NRA’s Twenty-sixth Route Army rebelled and joined, forming the Fifth Red Army Corps. With this and other recruits, the First Front Red Army grew to about 70,000, requiring more territory to sustain itself and the revolution. On January 9th of 1932, the CCP Central Committee issued a resolution outlining a new strategy for the party and the Red Army. The resolution assessed the current situation in China, that of a major depression, the effects of the Mukden Incident and the string of CCP successes against the encirclement campaigns. The resolution reasserted the renewed commitment to recruit urban proletariats for the revolution and “expand the territory, link up the separated Soviet areas to form an integrated Soviet area, and take advantage of the present favorable political and military conditions to seize one or two important central cities so as to win an initial victory of the revolution in one or more provinces.” The Red Army would conduct a series of offensive to expand their Soviets and connect them starting in early 1932. They would target southern Jiangxi, such places as Ganzhou, Jiujiang, Nanchang and also Fujian’s Fuzhou, Xiamen and Zhangzhou. The resolution also pushed for a “positive and offensive line, rather than the luring of the enemy into the deep strategy, as it was no longer viable”. Furthermore the resolution directly attacked Mao Zedong's strategy as “being right opportunism that underestimated the situation and maintained a pessimistic attitude, and all party and army members should actively guard against its incorrect mindset”. This cemented the divide between the Bolshevik groups adoption of offensive strategy vs Mao Zedong’s defensive lure the enemy in deep strategy. The next operation would be against Ganzhou in Jiangxi. The city linked the Hunan-Jiangxi border areas with the Fujian-Jiangxi border areas and provided a nice launching point against Ji’an in the north. During another meeting in 1932 at Ruijin, Mao Zedong expressed his reservations about the operation, stating the Red Army did not have the necessary weapons or supplies to seize a major city. Zhu De backed him up, but the Central Military Committee vetoed them and continued planning the Ganzhou operation. On January 10th orders were handed out for the 1st, 3rd and 5th Red Army corps, along with the Jiangxi Soviet military regional forces to conduct the operation by February. On the other side, the KMT were well prepared to meet an attack against Ganzhou, they were also most likely tipped off. On February 3rd of 1932 the Red Army arrived at Ganzhou quickly encircling the city. The next day the 5th Red Army Corps, roughly 20,000 men were the first to attack the city. They struck the East Gate, breaching the defenses slightly before being repelled. On the 17th and 23rd the Red Army forces conducted two major assaults, expanding the attacks to the West and South gates, but failed to gain a foothold. During the siege, two NRA brigades reinforced the Ganzhou garrison. Then on March 4th, the Red Army conducted a fourth major attack and was likewise repelled. Three days later the Red army retired to Jiangkou to reorganize after they had suffered 3000 casualties. Despite this the CCP leadership remained undeterred, believing the offensive strategy was still optimal. When Japan began rooting itself permanently in Manchuria, the CCP saw this as the perfect condition for a real revolution to take place. At a meeting on March 18th, Mao Zedong again argued his strategy fit the current conditions much more and that the offensive strategy was too ambiguous. Yet his arguments fell on deaf ears and the CCP leadership had the Red Army reorganized into two route armies. The west route army consisted of the 3rd army corps and was made responsible for expanding the Soviet areas west of the Gan River in Hunan-Jiangxi with a focus built around Zhuchuan, Taihe and Wan’an. The Central Route army consisted of the 1st and 5th Red army corps and would take Mao Zedong’s recommendations to perform expansion operations in south Fujian with Xiamen being the final target. On March 26th, the Central route red army occupied Changtin under Mao Zedongs guidance. There they conducted political mobilization of the local populace. Yet seeing little military action taking place, Zhou Enlai pushed Mao Zedong to stop the political mobilization and instead engage the enemy in the direction of Zhangzhou. Thus the Reds headed south and attacked the 49th NRA division. On April 10th the Reds managed to seize Longyan where they annihilated a single brigade of the 49th NRA division. The 5th NRA corps attempted to reinforce the 49th NRA division, but lost two brigades in the process. The Reds then continued marching south and on April 20th seized Zhangzhou where they defeated the 49th NRA division. At Zhangzhou they seized 1675 prisoners, 2000 rifles, some artillery pieces, 13,00 rounds of ammunition, two aircraft and over a million yuan. Alongside that came a lot of provisions, salt, oil and other goods needed to keep their men moving. After the success Mao Zedong telegrammed Zhou Enlai, requesting the Red army move back to Jiangxi with their booty to improve operations in the soviet area. It was Mao Zedong’s belief the Reds had made great gains at Zhangzhou but could not hold onto the area. Instead he wanted to expand operations in Fujian using smaller local militia and guerilla groups. The CCP yet again overruled Mao Zedong and on June 5th ordered him to keep up the offensive, now turning towards Guangdong military forces currently occupying southern Jiangxi. Once that was completed they were to advance north up the Gan River Valley and attack Ganzhou, Zhangshu, Ji’an and Nanchang so as to foster a revolution in Jiangxi. The Red army then reorganized its forces placing the 1st, 3rd and 5th red army corps under the First Front Red Army who advanced into Guangdong. From late june into early July the Reds seized Shuikou, Nanxiong and defeated 15 Guangdong based NRA brigades and expanded the Soviet into the province. Yet even with the string of offensive victories, Mao Zedong still remained vocally in opposition towards the strategy, constantly submitting his recommendation to adjust their footing. On July 25th, Mao Zedong and Zhu De sent a joint communique to the CCP leadership requesting a change of strategy. They argued instead of immediately attacking Ji’an and Zhangshu they could perform clearing operation on the eastern part of the valley, focusing on Yihaung and Le’an. The CCP central committee was initially against the proposals, however Zhou Enlai intervened and gave his support to them. In August the 1st front red army held a conference and confirmed they would attack Yihaung and Le’an. They took Le’an shortly after, defeating the 27th NRA division. With that victory they gained 5000 prisoners, 4000 rifles, 20 machine guns, 20 artillery pieces and 3 wireless communication sets. Afterwards the Reds contemplated attacking Ji’an, however after consideration Mao Zedong argued on September 25th, the NRA presence at Ji’an was too strong. He instead recommended they conduct political mobilization operations around the Le’an Yihuang area. By this point the CCP Central Committee was really pissed off with what they considered insubordination from Mao Zedong. By this time the 28th Bolsheviks had gained enough power and began striping Mao Zedong of key positions with the Red Army. First he was removed from the Military Committee of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas. Have I mentioned how much communists love making endless committees? Later in October of 1933 an emergency conference was held at Ningdu to plan future operations on the eve of an impending KMT campaign. Participants included Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen yi, Liu Bocheng and Peng Dehuai who all agreed they should take up offensive actions outside the Soviet. Alongside this the party condemned Mao Zedongs strategy called it inadequate and outdated. Zhou Enlai then argued for “expanding Soviet territory swiftly, engaging the enemy on KMT territory, bringing Jiangxi and its neighboring Soviet areas together by force, taking key cities in the Gan valley, including Nanchang, Ji’an, Ganzhou, and Pingxiang, so as to achieve preliminary successes in one or more provinces.” After the Ningdu conference, the Red Army continued with the offensive operation, now attacking Jianning, Lichuan and Taining in October. By November the 1st front army took the Jiangxi county seats of Zixi and Jinxi. This helped the CCP expand the Soviet in the eastern Gan valley, but it also placed them on a vulnerable footing, just in time for the KMT’s 4th major encirclement campaign. During the CCP’s expansion activities, the KMT had been performing a communist suppression campaign in Shanghai, driving out the Bolsheviks and other CCP members towards the Jiangxi Soviet by late 1932. Their arrival to the Jiangxi Soviet added further tension to the Red Army who were facing a new encirclement campaign. The presence of high ranking Central Committee members also changed their politics. The Mao Zedong adapted Marxist-Leninist theory was replaced by more orthodox and Moscow leaning theory. Many of 28 Bolsheviks moved to many Soviets sparking a new phase. Before the start of the 4th major encirclement campaign, the Red Army from the Jiangxi Soviet conducted expansion operations into Fujian and Guangdong. Other Red army units performed similar operations in Hunan, Hubei and Sichuan. All of this red activity was enough to push Chiang Kai-Shek to refocus his military operations against them. On April 9th, 1932, Chiang Kai-Shek created the Bandit Suppression Headquarters in Wuhan with He Yingqin as its commander. Beginning in June 1932 He Yingqin had a force of 500,000 soldiers who unleashed a brutal encirclement and suppression campaign against the Hubei-Henan-Anhui and western Hubei-Hunan Soviet areas. By November of 1932, both soviets collapsed. After this Chiang Kai-Shek ordered He Yingqin to direct his efforts against the Jiangxi Soviet. In December Chiang Kai-Shek shifted over 400,000 troops and 30 divisions to the Central Soviet Operation. He even personally moved down to Nanchang to supervise the operation. The main forces consisted of 3 columns, roughly 150,000 troops in 12 divisions led by Chen Cheng. The KMT plan was to build a series of blockhouses as a means of economically blockading the Soviet. Around 240,000 troops were allocated for the blockade, in addition to the main force which brought the entire figure to 400,000 men. Each flank of the blockade had 70,000 troops, roughly 6 divisions who would conduct blocking operations in the Jiangxi-Guangdong border area and the Fujian-Jiangxi border area. Around 100,000 would be used to conduct anti-guerilla operations in the northwest and northeast of Jiangxi as well as in southeast Hunan and southwest Jiangxi. Was the blockade was set, the NRA would deploy 3 columns along separate routes converging upon the Red Army's rear for a concentrated attack. Over on the other side, the Red Army based near Lichuan had roughly 70,000 men from the 1st, 3rd and 5th Red army corps and the 11th,12th, 21st and 22nd Red Armies. The 4th encirclement campaign coincided with the Red Army’s urban offensives. By December of 1932 the Reds had targeted Nancheng. The Central Committee issued the attack orders but due to the large NRA reinforcement efforts had to order the Red Army to withdraw from the outskirts of Nancheng. The next potential target was Nanfeng. The Central Committee again pushed for urban offensive as Nanfeng was attacked beginning in February of 1933. On February 7th the Red Army besieged the city. The NRA quickly dispatched the Central Route Army to reinforce the city and conduct a counterattack. Seeing the large concentration of NRA in the area, on February 13th Zhou Enlai ordered the forces to pull out and head over to Luokou. The Red Army set up a diversion to cover their withdrawal. Using similar tactics employed during the third encirclement campaign, the 11th Red Army pretended to be the main force and suddenly attacked Lichuan. The NRA took the bait immediately sending 3 columns to Lichuan. While marching the 1st NRA column’s 52nd and 59th NRA division became separated. On February 25th the two divisions moved west towards Huangpi along two routes separated by a mountain ridge. As they did so, their distance from the NRA 2nd and 3rd columns increased making mutual support efforts impossible. On the 27th the 1st and 3rd Red Army corps and 21st Red army unleashed a surprise attack against the 52nd NRA division. The next day the 5th Red...
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3.126 Fall and Rise of China: The first Encirclement Campaign
11/18/2024
3.126 Fall and Rise of China: The first Encirclement Campaign
Last time we spoke about the establishment of the Jiangxi Soviet. After the CCP's failed uprisings, Mao Zedong and Zhu De fled to rural China, determined to build a strong, agrarian-based Red Army. Mao narrowly escaped capture and regrouped with fewer than 1,000 soldiers, facing morale and loyalty issues. To rebuild, he implemented reforms, creating political structures within the army to strengthen revolutionary spirit and establish troop soviets for democratic centralism. Seeking refuge, Mao negotiated with local bandit leaders Yuan Weicai and Wang Zuo to secure Jinggangshan, a defensible mountain area. The Red Army began guerrilla operations, seizing nearby villages and towns, rapidly expanding territory. Over time, despite facing encirclement campaigns by Nationalist forces, Mao’s Red Army persevered, using flexible tactics, alliances, and propaganda. This period laid the groundwork for the growth of the Jiangxi Soviet, where the Red Army united diverse groups and adapted communist policies to local conditions, eventually strengthening their movement for future battles. #126 The first Encirclement Campaign Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We last left off with the establishment of the Jiangxi Soviet and its expansion into Fujian province. In spite of the continuous attacks by provincial and NRA forces, the communist movement was flourishing in the countryside. After the multiple failed uprisings in 1927, support for urban insurrection as the cornerstone of the revolution was fragmented. Likewise the KMT unleashed anti-communist campaigns inside major cities, cracking down on communist activities, driving them underground. The urban labor unions were also not very receptive to communist propaganda. A lack of enthusiasm for communism was evident in the early party demographics. In 1928 peasants made up ¾’s of the CCP membership while Shanghai labor union members dropped from 3000 to 700 by 1930. In the face of these statistics, the CCP continued to look at the urban centers as the key to the communist revolution. It was an issue of philosophy. The Central Committee maintained an unwavering belief that the proletariat should carry out urban uprisings as a means of inciting the grand revolution. As the head of the CCP propaganda department, Li Lisan was one of the largest proponents for the urban insurrection model. Li Lisan had returned to China from France in 1928 and argued the proletariat was still very much the center of the movement and that “the peasantry is petty bourgeois and cannot have correct ideas regarding socialism. Only a proletarian mentality can lead us onto the correct revolutionary road.” Li Lishan pushed for the occupation of large cities, rather than expanding the rural Soviets. However his attempts to reinvigorate the labor movements in urban centers was not going well. In 1929 Joseph Stalin came under the belief the communist revolution in China was heating up, citing the economic depression because of the market crash of 1929 as evidence. He had the comintern to begin publishing a series of guidances and measures in February and June of 1929 that reemphasized urban insurrection. In September the Comintern pushed for the CCP to leverage labor unions as a means of delivering the revolution to the masses. In October the Comintern estimated that a crescendo was met and that the revolutionary upsurge was well on its way. Yet the Comintern did not know when the revolution would begin and its subsequent guidance became incoherent to the CCP. Regardless, the CCP took the guidance and prepared to start a revolution. By 1930 the Red Army remained the only force able to lead urban uprisings. Urban labor movements were still not complying, thus Li Lisan was forced to depend on the Red Army. He planned to gain control over the Red Army by establishing central party control over it, dividing the forces away from their leaders. In April of 1930 the Central Committee issued two resolutions for the creation of a General Front Committee to lead urban uprisings. Li Lisan also requested Mao Zedong and Zhu De travel to Shanghai to separate them from their troops. Neither would end up coming to Shanghai. In 1930 the CCP began promoting the Cominterns October directive, reaffirming to all conditions were ripe for revolution, despite the urban labor realities. In February the Conference of Delegates from the Soviet Areas repudiated Mao Zedong's strategies of encircling cities in favor of urban insurrections. To this the Central Committee chastised Mao Zedong and Zhu De’s forces for having what they termed a “hide-and-disperse view,” and instead pushed for the Red Army to concentrate and attack. Clearly the Li Lisan plan was counter to Mao Zedongs. Mao Zedong was promoting slow expansion focusing on land distribution and establishing Soviets, rather than a full frontal attack and seizure of a city like Changsha. Mao Zedong foresaw a slow bottom up model; recruits would start as local village militia, become Red Guards, join the local Red Army forces and then the main Red Army units. Li Lisan saw this as defeatist and wanted to concentrate weapons instead of dividing them equally amongst local militias, Red Guards and other Guerilla units. Li Lisan also complained to his colleagues Mao Zedong’s strategy was too slow and famously said “by such tactics our hair will be white before the revolution is victorious.” By 1930 the CCP focused on two provinces to ignite its revolution. A series of uprisings would be unleashed in Nanchang, Changsha and Wuhan. It was believed if Wuhan fell, the revolution would spread to Shanghai setting off a worldwide chain of revolutionary events. Things were not looking good for uprisings in cities. From 1926 to 1930 the working class membership of the CCP had dropped from 66% to 8%. The Red Army, despite growing, suffered from a lack of equipment and training. Mao Zedong and Zhu De had their misgivings about the uprisings, but were something of a minority and complied nonetheless. On June 22nd they both issued orders to conduct attacks. The 1st Red Army Corps, formed from the 4th Red Army was to attack Nanchang while the 3rd Red Army Corps, formed from Peng Dehuai’s 5th Red Army would attack Changsha. Yet against the wishes of Li Lisan, Mao Zedong left 3 army units back at the Jiangxi Soviet to defend the area. The 3rd Red Army corps was the first to attack, capturing Changsha on July 29th. Peng Duhai quickly established a Soviet government with Li Lisan acting as its chairman. However the arrival of Red soldiers did not illicit an urban uprising. On July 30th, British, American, Italian and Japanese ships sailed up the Xiang River to defend their concessions and citizens. Naval bombardment coupled with a lack of urban support dislodged Peng Dehuai’s men from the city by August 3rd. They did however grab as much money and supplies as they could on the way out. After their withdrawal, the NRA occupied the city and began purging all communist sympathizers they could find. The first Red Army corps did not do much better. Mao Zedong and Zhu De’s men attacked Nanchang, but initially dispatched reconnaissance forces into the city on August 1st. It was quickly determined that little progress could be made, so the forces moved to Liuyang in Hunan. At Liuyang the 1st and 3rd Red Armies consolidated their forces into the first front red army and planned their next move. The assessment for Changsha and Wuhan was quite grim. NRA forces had recently begun reinforcing the two cities while also establishing a defense in depth. Foreign naval ships were stationed along the Yangtze River providing fire support. Mao Zedong and Zhu De both argued against it, but reluctantly agreed to attack Changsha on September 1st. The second attack against Changsha was a complete disaster. The better equipped enemy, within strong defensive positions, tossed the Red Army on its ass. After 10 days of fighting and facing severe losses, Mao Zedong and Zhu De made a bold move. They ordered a withdrawal on the 13th, stating that Li Lisan was wrong and a change of plan was required. This caused a deep divide in the Red Army, with many political commissars objective to the order. But the Red soldiers complied and conducted an orderly withdrawal. Now there emerged a faction in the CCP backed by Li Lisan calling for another attack against Nanchang. Mao Zedong and Zhu De believed it was impossible as the NRA held an even stronger position at Nanchang. Thus Mao Zedong came up with a compromise: they would attack Ji’an, a strategic city centered on the Jiangxi Soviet. If captured, the southwestern portion of the Jiangxi Soviet would be joined together to greatly expand the Soviet area. On the morning of October 4th, the Red Army with local militias advanced into Ji’an from 3 different directions and by nightfall captured the city. This was facilitated by a large influx of peasant support for the Red Army, some claim over a million peasants marched upon the city to support the Reds. They also covertly raided the KMT HQ in Ji’an where they discovered documents about an upcoming NRA encirclement campaign. With this discovery the Li Lisan strategy ended as the CCP now needed to secure their survival. Li Lisans epic failure released a cascade of internal power grabs, that influenced the political and military direction going forward. After the second failure at Changsha, Mao Zedong began publicly attacking Li Lisan to increase his own standing. Within the Red Army two diverging viewpoints emerged, that of Mao Zedong’s rural encirclement strategy and Li Lisans urban uprising strategy. Political commissars labeled Mao Zedong as treacherous for attacking Li Lisan, while the peasant troops all agreed with Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong was also confronted with another issue, the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee was also looking to power grab. They were a newly formed committee who were vying for control over the Red Army. Mao Zedong was currently performing a survey over the rural area of Xingguo and while doing so he suddenly identified suspicious linkages between the KMT funded Anti-Boshevik Corps, aka the AB Corps, who had undercover agents charged with sabotaging communist units and the local Jiangxi Action Committee and 20th Red Army leaders such as one Li Wenlin. Armed with this evidence, Mao Zedong unleashed a huge purge of the Red Army. In November he arrested 4000 members of the 20th Red Army, including all but 2 members of the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee, all charged with treason. The purge effectively negated his little problem, what a coincidence, but it would cause him some headaches. The following month, a battalion of the 20th Red Army led by Liu Dizao captured Futian and there they released 40 recently purged comrades who were suspected to have ties to the AB Corps. The men who let released them then took them across the Gan River to establish a new Soviet in Yongyang. From the Soviet the accused men looked to clear their names and appealed to the Central Committee as well as Zhu De and Peng Dehuai. The 20th Red Army argued they were wrongfully accused of being AB Corps members. It was their argument that Mao Zedong accused them because they had criticized him. A large group of the 20th Red Army left the Soviet apparently to perform peace talks in July of 1931, but would be arrested, put on trial and executed. This became known as the Futian incident, though quite slanderous, it did not pick up a lot of steam at the time, mostly because the Comintern and Central Committee were too busy condemning Li Lisan for his failures. Zhou Enlai was sent back to Russia to try and clean up the embarrassing Changsha debacle. When h arrived, he distanced himself and the party from Li Lisan, and this effectively handed the congruence to Mao Zedongs strategy, further helping him consolidate power. Added to this the Comintern sent a letter to the CCP in November of 1930 stating Li Lisans ideas were inconsistent with the Cominterns guidance and antagonistic to the greater communist cause. Li Lisan was recalled to Moscow where he tried to save his ass. In the meantime the CCP’s leadership had a difficult time regaining traction until late 1931. Now going back to the documents found, speaking about an encirclement campaign. The NRA dispatch a large force to deal with the Reds. It consisted of the 9th route Army led by the governor of Jiangxi, Lu Diping; the 6th route army from Hunan ld by Zhu Shaoling and the 19th Route army led by Jiang Guangnai. Altogether they were 44,000 men strong, divided into 5 divisions and 3 air-bombing corps. The plan was to encircle the Jiangxi Soviets, pressing them back into the mountains. Once fully encircled the NRA would attack Donggu, Longgang, and Dongshao. After the capture of Ji’an, the Red Army leadership alongside the Jiangxi Action Committee held a conference at Luofang on October 25th, to figure out how to respond to the incoming encirclement campaign. Many called for re-attacking Nanchang and Jiujiang to try and divert the NRA forces away from the Jiangxi Soviet. Mao Zedong argued instead to perform his classic “lure the enemy in deep” strategy. Essentially Mao Zedong wanted to trade land for time. Initially the Red ARmy would evacuate the western areas of the Gan River and head east to mobilize the local people, raise funds and recruit. The eastwards movement would also lure the NRA across the river into Red Army terrain, overstretching their logistics lines. This way the Reds could choose where to face the enemy and hopefully divide and conquer them. It was Mao Zedongs belief the only feasible way to defeat the NRA was to lure them in and then attack places like Nanchang and Jiujiang when they were depleted of defenders. On November 1st the Red Army began advancing across the Gan River into Ji’an, Jishui, Xingan, Le’an, Yongfeng, Yihuang, Chongren and Nanfeng counties. Within 6 days the Red Army had seized 400,000 yuan and enlisted the support of the local populaces. During this time, members of the 3rd Red ARmy corps rebelled against Mao Zedong’s strategy, arguing instead to occupy the western Gan River area. Peng Dehuai was able to suppress the dissension and by mid November the entire Red Army was occupying the eastern bank of the Gan River. The NRA followed the Reds across the Gan River. By November 18th the NRA were advancing in 3 columns; the first occupied Yongfeng and Jishui; the second occupied Le’an and Yihuang and the third occupied Ji’an. As the NRA continued to advance they had limited engagements against the Reds. By the 26th the Reds were now occupying Donggu, Nanlong and Longgang. Things were all going according to plan, but then the Futian incident hit on December 7th. The mutiny jeopardized the Red Army’s western flank, forcing them to abandon Donggu and the Futian area by December 15th. The remainder of the 3rd ARmy corps advanced to the northern area of Ningdu county and then occupied Pingtian and Anfu. NRA intelligence began figuring out there was internal strife amongst the Reds and exploited it. On the 16th Lu Diping ordered 2 divisions to encircle and attack Donggu. The 5th and 18th NRA divisions attacked Donggu forcing the Reds to withdraw while attacking the 5th NRA as they did so. The 2 NRA divisions entered the Donggu area each on the opposite side of a ridgeline unable to know what was going on with the other. On the 20th the 18th NRA attacked Donggu with artillery, unknowingly firing upon their comrades in the 5th NRA for half of a day. By the end of December the NRA forces had taken most of the Jiangxi Soviet. However the NRA forces logistical lines were overextended, exposing them to constant guerrilla attacks. They had captured numerous towns each requiring occupation forces seeing only a third of the troops actually at the front lines. The communist efforts to gain the support of the local populaces also saw them hindering the NRA occupational forces. The local populace spied upon the NRA and provided the Reds with information about a pending attack against Longgang. 2 brigades of the NRA 18th Division were going to attack Longgang on December 30th. With this information the Red Army countered by encircling the 2 brigades using mountainous terrain to mass fires and cut off any reinforcements. On the morning of the 30th, the NRA forces entered Longgang only to be surrounded. The 1st Red Army Corps attacked the 2 brigades while the 4th red Army and elements of the 3rd Red Army Corps blocked the 18th NRA division’s rear preventing them from helping from Donggu. By the end of the day the Reds had taken 9000 prisoners, including the divisional commander, Zhang Huizan. Hearing word of the 18th Divisions plight, Lu Diping ordered a withdrawal of the forces to consolidate and reorganize. Tan Daoyuan’s 15th NRA division advanced south towards Yuantou. Again the local populace spied and fed the Reds intel, allowing them to quickly pursue them. On the morning of January 3rd, the Red ARmy attacked the 15th NRA division near Dongshao from 3 different directions. The NRA routed under the attack, many of the troops simply tossed weapons and ran. Meanwhile the 3rd Red Army was unable to fully encircle them allowing many to escape. But nonetheless they managed to capture 3000 prisoners, 4000 rifles, 40 machine guns and a cache of ammunition. The defeats at Longgang and Dongshao effectively ended the first NRA encirclement campaign, providing the Reds with numerous recruits, a lot of equipment and much experience. The destruction of multiple NRA divisions saw 15,000 prisoners, 12,000 weapons captured and had validated Mao Zedongs strategies. The victories spread word of the communist forces' strength in the region and this began to swing the tide of public favor. The Red Army followed this up by executing Zhang Huizan, the commander of the 18th NRA division. His head was sent to Ji’an to serve as a warning. From march to April the Red Army held 4 different meetings to determine strategy going forward. During the first meeting on March 18th many were calling for vacating the Soviet areas because of the NRA’s numerical superiority. Yet no decision was made. The next meeting a month later the same argument was made, but others also advocated for staying and dividing into small units in order to conduct coordinated attacks to break the encirclement and destroy their enemy. Again no decision was made. A third meeting occurred days later, this time acting on Mao Zedong’s advice, the Red Army leadership invited different military units to participate. Dividing forces gained traction, but now they were first asking to make a concentrated attack on the 19th NRA route army to establish a route out of the encirclement. Mao Zedong agreed to this idea, but argued it should be levied against the 5th route army who were facing many issues. The 5th route army were originally from Northern China, thus unfamiliar with the territory. The meeting saw an agreement on attacking and then dividing, but no agreement on...
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3.125 Fall and Rise of China: From the Jinggangshan Mountains to the Jiangxi Soviet
11/11/2024
3.125 Fall and Rise of China: From the Jinggangshan Mountains to the Jiangxi Soviet
Last time we spoke about the Central Plains War. Chiang Kai-Shek faced a formidable anti-Chiang coalition led by Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang, and Li Zongren. Zhang Xueliang, initially absent, worked tirelessly from Mukden to prevent Northern warlords from joining the coalition. The conflict, exacerbated by severe famine in Shaanxi that fueled unrest, saw major battles as Chiang's forces clashed with the anti-Chiang fronts across multiple railways. Despite initial setbacks, Chiang's strategic maneuvers and alliances, including a pivotal deal with Zhang Xueliang, gradually turned the tide. The Young Marshal’s entry into the fray and the subsequent defections from Feng Yuxiang's camp weakened the anti-Chiang forces. By October, the anti-Chiang leaders, overwhelmed and isolated, sought peace. The Central Plains War, a grueling seven-month struggle, ended with the anti-Chiang factions disbanding, leaving China’s civil war landscape dramatically altered. Within the vacuum, the CCP was thriving, but now the Generalissimo could direct his full attention on the Red Menace. #125 From the Jinggangshan Mountains to the Jiangxi Soviet Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The last time we were talking about the CCP, they had performed the Nanchang uprising, Autumn Harvest Uprisings and the Guangzhou uprising. These all did not go very well and literally saw the surviving CCP forces fleeing for their lives into the mountains. Their experiences during these uprisings reinforced the idea they required a strong military force to push forward a new agrarian-based communist revolution. To develop such conditions favoring a revolution, Mao Zedong and Zhu De adapted the Red Army and CCP policies to the local conditions in order to recruit, sustain and retain loyal troops and build a relationship between the army, local populaces and party. After the collapse of the Harvest Autumn Uprisings, the Red Army scattered into the rural parts of China. Mao Zedong himself narrowly escaped capture by the NRA, as he made his way to Sanwan of Jiangxi province. Countless were killed, arrested or deserted. Less than 1000 Red soldiers remained from the original uprising force. Moral was law, there lacked direction, there existed conflicting loyalties and many blamed Mao Zedong for the failings. In order to counteract this, Mao Zedong held a conference on September 29th of 1927 whereupon he implemented a series of radial policies to stave off an implosion. He began streamlining the command structure, instituted political representatives within each unit to instill revolutionary spirit within the troops. A political cell was established in each squad, a branch at company levels and a party committee at the battalion and regiment level. Next he established troop soviets within the units to provide a form of democratic centralism within the units. Additional he began spinning the narrative in his own favor, shifting blame for the failed uprisings to the collective poor understanding of the revolutionary course within China, rather than upon her leadership. Now initially a large part of the Red Army wanted to return to their hometown of Anyuan, but the local military presence was too strong there. Another option was needed and quickly as they had many sick and wounded amongst their ranks. They looked to the nearby Jinggang Mountain Area as a temporary fix. Many of Mao Zdong’s former Peasant Movement Training students knew the area well. Jinggangshan meaning “well ridge mountain”, derived its name from the 5 villages around its main city of Ciping: Big Well, Middle Well, Little Well, Upper Well, and Lower Well. The mountain is situated in the Luoxian range, straddling the border between Jiangxi and Hunan. It also happens to be a place where 4 counties converge: Lingxian, Suichuan, Ninggang and Yongxin. Surrounding it were factional and political enemies, thus preventing most provincial forces from really coordinating efforts or massing against them. The terrain provided ample defensive obstacles. It also stood in the midpoint between Changsha, Nanchang and Guangdong, offering the Red Army flexibility to try and finish the uprisings they started in those locations. Given the weak state the Red Army was in, it would not be feasible to occupy Jinggangshan by force. Jinggangshan was controlled by two bandit leaders named Yuan Weicai and Wang Zuo. Mao Zedong was forced to negotiate with the two to come to an arrangement. The CCP was of course concerned about the trustworthiness of the two bandit leaders. At an early meeting in Gucheng, some CCP members of the front committee doubted the revolutionary character of Yuan and Wang, believing them to only be bandits at heart. Mao Zedong on the other hand argued the two leaders and their loyal followers were crucial to the communist movement. I would argue Mao Zedong was grasping at straws. As for Yuan and Wang, their primary concerns were the impact of a new military force affecting the regional balance of power. In essence the mountain areas outside the major cities had a complex power dynamic. Bandits and local elites maintained the status quo, any change to that power dynamic could lead to problems. There was also an ethnicity issue. Jinggangshan was considered something of a Hakka ancestral land, and the Han settlers amongst them were more like guests. There always remained a Hakka-Han tension, and this prompted Hakka to vet any Hans coming in. Mao first convinced Yuan how a partnership would be mutually beneficial. In exchange for food, housing and local support the Red Army would provide weapons, training and support Yuan and Wang’s operations. Mao presented Yuan with a gift of 100 rifles to sweeten him over. Mao then made a similar gesture to Wang, sending him 70 rifles. The two bandit leaders let the Red Army right in. Upon arriving, the Red Army began conducting guerilla operations and peasant mobilization. On October 7th, 1927 the began activity in Maoping and moved to Ciping. While marching they passed through Lingixan and Shuikou villages, attacking the local elites and their militias, freeing prisoners in jails and holding mass rallies to recruit. On the 22nd they reached Dafen, where they were ambushed by a local militia. Using their knowledge of the terrain the militia inflicted severe casualties, forcing the Red Army to retreat towards Wang Zuo for aid. Wang Zuo was wary of them, but Mao Zedong won him over by promising more weapons and training for his bandits. Mao also pledged to support him against his local rivals, one of whom was Xiao Jiabi. Wang’s bandits and the Reds joined forces in Dajing and together seized Shimen. Then the Reds arrived in Ciping on October 15th. They quickly seized the city center and within a month's time established a base of operations. The CCP quickly expanded its influence in the surrounding area, preying upon local populations where government control was weak or in flux. By mid November the Red Army dispatched a battalion west to capture Chaling. This success allowed them to further expand into Suichang in January of 1928. In February the Red Army occupied its first major city, Xincheng in Ningang country. Within two months of action the Reds had nearly doubled their territory now occupying portions of 3 counties. For the most part Mao Zedong was left alone because of the political shakeup after the failed uprisings in the larger metropolitan areas. Contact with the provincial and regional CCP community still existed though. Zhou Lu, a member of the southern Hunan special committee heard about the CCP expansion in the mountain areas and came to inspect them. While at Jinggangshan he gave Mao Zedong orders to dispatch his unit to support Zhu De’s forces in a uprising about to hit southern Hunan. After the failed Nanchang Uprising, Zhu De took the remnants of his forces and fled into southern Jiangxi and then Fujian where he linked up with a fellow Yunnanese NRA leader, Fan Shisheng. They stayed with Fan Sisheng’s unit awhile, but once rumors spread he was harboring Reds they had to go. By January of 1928 they fled for southern Hunan to try and support urban uprisings. Upon arriving, Zhu De’s force began augmenting the local peasantry forces and Zhou Lu said he would get Mao Zedong to lend his support. However the uprising never really got its legs. It began in late January, but the urban workers and local populace couldn't rise as expected. Instead local support turned against the communists. Likewise Mao Zedong’s men never made it to southern Hunan, he had intentionally dragged his feet on the issue. Instead Mao Zedong focused his attention in central Hunan holding rallies and mobilizing local peasant groups. Thus Zhu De was pounced upon by local warlord groups in Guangdong and Hunan. Zhu De’s Red Army engaged the warlord armies as they slowly retreated into Jinggangshan. Zhu De and Mao Zedong would meet in Maoping for a conference. On May 20th, 1928 they agreed to establish the Jinggangshan Special Committee, with Mao Zedong as its general secretary. Additionally the 4th Red Army was created and nicknamed the Ironsides Army. The 4th Red Army was roughly 12,000 men strong consisting of Zhu De’s Nanchang uprising force, now designated the 28th regiment, Mao Zedongs Autumn Uprising force now designated the 31st regiment, Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo’s bandits, later designated the 32nd regiment and the Hunan uprising force now designed the 29th regiment. Zhu De’s arrival also brought in a traditional military mindset, adding some more professionalism to the Red Army. Here Zhu De also made a famous quote “When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy halts and encamps, we harass them; when the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack; and when the enemy retreats, we pursue”. This statement would guide much of the Red Army’s actions going forward. The increase in communist numbers brought unwanted attention immediately from Jiangxi and Hunan forces. The first major military campaign against the Reds began in May of 1928 and was led by Zhu Peide wielding Jiangxi provincial military units. The campaign was based out of Yongxin with the Jiangxi government unleashing the 27th division. One regiment garrisoned at Yongxin was held as reserve while the division sent another regiment to attack the Red Army stronghold in Nanchang and another regiment flanked to the east. The Reds countered by stationing a regiment in the mountains to protect the base, another regiment to defend the mountain passes and 2 regiments to conduct spoiling attacks on the Jiangxi regiments flank. The Red Army was able to destroy the flanking unit, forcing them to retreat back to Yongxin. They pursued them to Yongxin, destroying its garrison regiment in the process. The Red Army then maneuvered to the rear of the Jiangxi division pushing them to pull back to Ji’an. Thus the Reds occupied Yongxin where they went to work establishing a worker-peasant government, expanding the Soviet across the county. A second encirclement campaign was unleashed in late MAy, with the same Jiangxi 27th division leading the action. This time they were reinforced as they quickly recaptured Yongxin and began cautiously pursuing the Reds into the mountains. The Reds tried to exploit the terrain for guerilla warfare but was met with little success. The Red 28th regiment was soon forced to help distressed red forces at Chaling county. However the Jiangxi Division did not account for the Red Army’s mobility. The Red 31st regiment quickly assumed the 28th regiments former defensive positions offering a stiff fight against the Jiangxi forces. When the 28th regiment returned to reinforce the 31st they hit the enemy's rear and advanced upon Yongxin again while the Jiangxi forces pulled back to Ji’an again. Another encirclement campaign was unleashed the following June this time seeing Jiangxi and Hunanese forces work together against the Reds. The Jiangxi 9th division was deployed in combination with the remaining 2 regiment of the 27th Jiangxi division. The Jiangxi forces performed a frontal attack through the mountain passes using 3 regiments. Meanwhile the Red Army had to perform a feint attack in the east to occupy a Hunanese division. The Red Army deployed a battalion augmented by local guerilla groups along the western flank of the mountain passes. Guerilla attacks on the eastern flank of the Jiangxi forces caused the commander to maintain 2 regiments at Yongxin. Exploiting the mountain terrain the Red Army managed to destroy one regiment as they funneled up the passes. This small victory brought much needed arms and new soldiers who quickly recaptured Yongxin for a third time. By the end of June, the Jinggangshan base had basically hit its apex in terms of size. They now controlled Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua counties and parts of Ji’an and Anfu. At this point Chiang Kai-Shek took notice of the Red gains and directed a new campaign against them. Another series of campaigns were unleashed seeing Hunanese and Jiangxi armies attack the 4th Red Army beginning in July 1928. The Hunan 8th Army began their attack from the west through Ninggang while the Jianxi army unleashed 11 regiments from the 3rd and 6th armies through Yongxin against the eastern border of Jinggangshan. To meet this threat the Reds kept 2 regiments to defend the bases while the 28th and 29th regiments advanced west to slip behind the Hunanese forces to conduct raids against their rear. Meanwhile local Red Army militia forces began a scorched earth strategy removing all food, poisoning water sources and evacuating villagers to deny their enemy. The Hunan 8th army was forced to retreat in the face of this, allowing the Reds to focus on the Jiangxi forces around Yongxin. The 28th and 29th regiments advanced west to support the attack against the Jiangxi forces, but then suddenly turned south towards southern Hunan, citing orders to assist the Southern Hunan Special Committee. Then these 2 regiments attacked the city of Chenzhou, roughly 200 kms away from the Jinggangshan mountains. There they defeated local forces. Afterwards the Red troops began strolling through the streets of Chenzhou as civilians, many of them had families in the area. Some began looting the area. They had made the egregious error of now pursuing their enemy further and gave them too much respite to reorganize themselves. The local forces counterattacked driving the 28th regiment to withdraw with little casualties. The 29th regiment fared much worse, being ambushed trying to retreat over the only bridge leading in Chengzhou. They suffered heavy casualties and many of their surviving forces simply joined the 28th regiment as a result. Meanwhile with the 2 regiments gone from the mountain, the NRA forces were emboldened. 3 Hunanese regiment joined 11 Jiangxi regiments to attack the Jinggangshan mountains. The remaining Reds employed every tactic they knew to survive. They began giving up terrain as the enemy penetrated closer to the mountain base. The 31st and 32nd regiments found themselves retreating to the protection of higher ground, where the established defensive positions along key routes to maximize casualties upon the invaders. Mao Zedong took a battalion from the 3st regiment south to escort the incoming 28th regiment, further weakening the lines. Meanwhile guerillas raided the flanks and rear of the advancing NRA forces heading up the mountain. After repeated failed attempts to get to the peaks of the mountains,the Jiangxi and Hunanese forces ultimately had to withdraw come September allowing the 28th regiment to safely get back to Jinggangshan. From there the Red Army contuined to fight and recapture lost territory. By October they retook Ninggang county and portions of Suichuang, Lixing and Yongxin, but were unable to reclaim everything they once had. Another campaign coincided with an economic blockade and the arrival of General Peng Dehaui’s 5th Army. The Jiangxi and Hunanese forces adopted blockade tactics, normally employed against bandits, to try and deprive the Reds from using markets in the lowlands. Starting in the fall of 1928, NRA and local militias established checkpoints along all routes and trails leading into the Jinggangshan mountains. Local private armies with troops familiar with the area conducted interdiction patrols to capture anyone trying to get past blockades. The blockade halted most local trade, meaning little medicine, clothing, food or salt was getting into Janggangshan. The Reds began subsisting on sweet potatoes and pumpkins, then Peng Dehuais 5th army arrived in December worsening the burden on the area. Simulteanously NRA forces from Fujian were added to the Jiangxi and Hunanese to fully surround the mountains in preparation for a offensive. In the face of all of this the 4th Red Army’s leadership convened a conference at Bailu. The attendees all were trying to figure out how to overcome the situation but their options were very limited. Many called for the same tactics that had been winning them the battles as before. Some called for withdrawing to a safer area momentarily and launch a counterattack when the enemy lightened up. The economic blockade exacerbated the civilian military relations in the mountains and it seemed the local populace was no longer willing to help the Reds. The last option many advocated for was to mount a defense of the mountain range, but this would not allow for any withdrawal route for the 6000 or so troops. Ultimately the adoptd a hybrid solution. The 4th army would break through the blockade to try and draw forces away from the mountains while also obtaining supplies. The 5th army who were pretty battered from their march would defend mountains and base. On January 14th of 1929 the 4th army led by Zhu De and Mao Zedong broke through the blockade and headed south into Jiangxi. The 4th army at first was only meeting light resistance as they captured Suichuan and Shangyu. After this they headed for Dayu, but there found 3 Jiangxi regiments who ambushed them. The Reds were forced north into the Xingguo-Ji’an area. They marched 30 days, often 30 miles per day to avoid their pursuers, while taking casualties and losing equipment. They found themselves at Dabaidi village on February 10th where 2 regiments of the 15th NRA division fought them. The Reds routed the NRA forces and even captured the two regimental commanders alongside 800 soldiers and their equipment. This victory earned the 4th army a safe place to rest up for quite some time. As we saw in the former episodes, the Chiang-Gui and Central Plains War engulfed Chiang Kai-Sheks attention, giving the Reds some breathing space. During this period, Mao Zedong and Zhu De expanded that is referred to as the Jiangxi Soviet. They did so through a series of campaigns into western Fujian. In February 1929 the 4th army incorporated 2 independent guerilla regiments and used them to occupy Ji’an, Ningdu and Ruijin. In March they entered western Fujian and captured Tingzhou. At Tingzhou the Reds got 3000 NRA soldiers...
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3.124 Fall and Rise of China: Sino-Tibetan War of 1930–1932
11/04/2024
3.124 Fall and Rise of China: Sino-Tibetan War of 1930–1932
Last time we spoke about the first Encirclement Campaign against the CCP. Amidst ongoing attacks, the communist movement thrived in rural Jiangxi, even as urban support dwindled. Li Lisan championed urban uprisings, opposing Mao Zedong's focus on rural encirclement. Failed assaults on Nanchang and Changsha highlighted their discord. The Red Army's strategy shifted after capturing Ji’an, bolstered by peasant support. As the NRA prepared an encirclement, Mao proposed luring them deep before striking. Internal strife peaked with the Futian Incident, leading to a purge that solidified Mao’s power but weakened the Red Army’s defenses. Amidst internal strife, the NRA launched attacks on the Reds but faced fierce resistance. Lu Diping's forces encircled Donggu, leading to heavy losses as artillery mistakenly struck their own troops. The Reds capitalized on local support and guerrilla tactics, inflicting significant defeats on the NRA in Longgang and Dongshao. Despite Chiang Kai-Shek's attempts to reclaim territory, the Reds successfully executed a series of ambushes and strategic retreats. By the end of the campaign, the Jiangxi Soviet expanded significantly, validating Mao's strategies and shifting public favor towards the communists. #124 Sino-Tibetan War of 1930–1932 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. For those who know their Sino history, we are drawing close to the year of 1931. This is arguably the year WW2 actually began, some of you might be confused by that statement, but I assure you mainland Chinese would argue this point very much. Once we breach that door its going to be a very long time before we can talk about the multiple other things going on in China. For example, a lot happens in China’s northwest. So I thought it would be best to tackle some of that before we jump into the 15 year China War. Do forgive me for being a tease. So the first thing I wanted to talk about is the Second Sino-Tibetan War of 1930-1932. Now this is a huge can of worms as they say and to truly understand it we need to cover a lot of history. There has always been conflict between whatever we consider historically China and Tibet. Historians have often broken things down into three major conflicts during the early 20th century that led directly to the second Sino-Tibetan War. After the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution, the 13th Dalai Lama closely monitored the political changes in mainland China and the situation of the central government's officials and military stationed in Tibet, preparing to organize Tibetan forces and initiate an anti-Han Incident movement. In March 1912, the Dalai Lama issued a "Public Letter" through the Ganden Palace via the Kashag. The Kashag was the governing council of Tibet during the rule of the Qing all the way to the 1950s. Following the release of this letter, the 13th Dalai Lama immediately formed a "Tibetan People's Army" of over ten thousand troops, deciding to use force to expel the Sichuanese army. The Tibetan forces first dealt with the Sichuan troops stationed in Yadong, Jiangzi, and Shigatse, and then besieged the Sichuan troops in Lhasa. Fearing being attacked from both within and outside, the Tibetan forces hastened to eliminate the Sichuan troops already within Tibet. The local Tibetan authorities also initiated an offensive against the region known as the Kham in the west of Sichuan. After 1939 this would be called Xikang, so to make things easier I will refer to it as such. The extensive eastward expansion of the Tibetan army shocked the entire nation, prompting military and political figures from Sichuan, Yunnan, and other areas to issue telegrams or contact the central government, demanding military action to quell the unrest and stabilize Tibet. In response to the chaotic situation in Tibet and Xikang, the Yuan Shikai government adopted a strategy of sending troops to suppress it. On May 25, 1912, Yuan Shikai issued an order for a westward expedition, and on June 14, the Beiyang government directed Governor of Sichuan,Yin Changheng to lead the troops westward. On July 10 Yin Changheng led 2,500 Sichuan troops westward from Chengdu. At the same time, Cai E also dispatched Yunnanese troops northward to meet the Sichuan army in Tibet. In August, the Sichuan army split into two routes: the southern route led by Zhu Senlin attacked Hekou, modern day Yajiang and Litang, defeating the Tibetan troops and capturing the key strongholds of Maguizong, Jianzibay, and Xie Luoluo, subsequently laying siege to Litang; the northern route was led by Liu Ruilin, who provided assistance to Chengdu and Batang. Meanwhile, the Yunnanese troops entered Tibet via the Nu River, capturing the gateway of Yanjing in northern Yunnan. At the end of August, Liu Ruilin attacked the eastern Tibetan stronghold of Chengdu. On September 3, Zhu Senlin's forces captured Litang and recaptured Gongjue, Sanyan, and Tongpu; shortly thereafter, the areas of Zhanhua, Baiyu, Daocheng, Xiangcheng, and Zha Ya also surrendered. On September 16, the western expeditionary army advanced westward from Chengdu, attacking Jiangda. By the end of September, the western expeditionary army had recovered all territories belonging to the late Qing dynasty's Sichuan-Yunnan border affairs department, except for the counties of Kema and Chayu in the southern route, and Dingqing represented by roughly 39 clans, Shobanduo, Lari, and Jiangda in the northern route. On September 12, the Beijing government ordered the change of Jiangda in Tibet to Taizhou Prefecture, Lari to Jiali Prefecture, and Shobanduo to Shodu Prefecture. On the 25th, Yin Changheng was appointed as the pacification envoy at the Sichuan border, overseeing the Xikang region, which was divided into the eastern and western border areas, governing the six prefectures of Kangding, Lihua, Ba'an, Dengke, Chengdu, and Jiahe, as well as the two states of Dehua and Ganzi. Just as the western expeditionary army was achieving victory and preparing to enter Tibet from Kangding, the British colonial authorities publicly intervened, trying to prevent the expeditionary army from entering Tibet. Under British pressure, Yuan Shikai was forced to order the Sichuan and Yunnan armies to delay their advance, effectively halting their progress at the Nu River line. At the same time, the Beiyang government's policy towards Tibet shifted from suppression to pacification. Although the Sichuan and Yunnan armies ceased their military actions against Tibet, the significance of the western expedition was profound, as it enabled the central government to basically recover Xikang and played a significant role in curbing the British colonizers and Tibetan separatist forces, preventing Tibet from repeating the fate of Outer Mongolia. Thus ended the first period of conflict. What proceeded was known as the Simla Convention, we actually covered that event in some detail a long time ago in this series. More or less the convention divided Tibet into Outer and Inner Tibet, which also were referred to as U-Tsang and western Kham, ie: Xikang. With the support and assistance of Britain, the Tibetan local government gathered troops in Eastern Tibet to confront the Sichuan army, aiming to use military force to advance the control area of the Tibetan government to Dajianlu. In September 1917, two Tibetan soldiers from the Lhoka area invaded the Sichuan army's defense zone and were captured and sent to Chengdu by the border troops. After questioning by Commander Peng Risheng, it was made clear that the captured Tibetans would have to be detained. Tibet sent a letter to negotiate, requesting the return of the captured Tibetans, to be handled by Tibetan officials. Peng, without assessing the situation, executed the captured individuals and sent their heads back, which obviously infuriated the Tibetans, leading them to mobilize a large force to attack En and Lhoka. The British immediately supplied the Tibetan army with 5,000 quick-firing rifles and 5 million rounds of ammunition to support a large-scale offensive against Enda County and Lhoka. By January 1918, Enda County had fallen, and the counties of Chaya, Ningjing, and Changdu were all under attack from the well-armed Tibetan army. In March, Ningjing County was lost, and the Chengdu garrison, who were quote “surrounded on all sides, though there was plenty of food in the city, had run out of ammunition.” In June, the Tibetan army captured Chengdu, and after accepting Peng Risheng's surrender, advanced rapidly eastward across the Ningjing Mountains and the Jinsha River, capturing the counties of Dege, Dengke, Shiqu, Baiyu, Gongxian, Wucheng, and Ningjing, until they were stopped by fierce fighting from the border troops at Ganzi. On August 8, 1918, the Dalai Lama expressed his unwillingness to oppose what he called “the Chinese benefactor” but agreed to ceasefire negotiations. On August 21, a ceasefire agreement consisting of thirteen articles was reached in Chengdu among Liu Zanting, a representative of the Sichuan border troops, Jiangbadan, a representative of the Tibetan side, and a representative of the British government. They agreed that the Tibetan army would withdraw from the recently occupied counties of Zhanhua and Ganzi and return them to the Sichuan border, while the remaining occupied counties would be managed by Tibetan officials. They also agreed to a ceasefire for one year starting from October 17, 1918, awaiting a resolution to the Tibetan issue from the central government and the Dalai Lama. This “Thirteen-Article Agreement” effectively recognized the Tibetan army's occupation of the border areas in legal terms. After this, Chengdu and the aforementioned seven counties west of the Jinsha River came under the control of the Tibetan local government. Thus ended the second period of conflict. Here we come to the year of 1930. Now a lot had occurred during the 1920’s. The Beiyang government had tried to maintain the indirect administrative structures of the former Qing Dynasty. In the absence of effective Chinese political control over Tibet, implementation of national policy fell onto regional actors, in this case Fu Zuoyi in Suiyuan and Liu Wenhui in Xikang. Along the Qinghai/Amdo frontier, Sino-Muslim leaders like Ma Bufang projected military authority from the provincial capital of Xining. Now a lot of what we are about to talk about revolves around a place called Yushu. Yushu is a mountainous region of the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau. The Tanggula Mountains form the southwestern boundary of Yushu, bordering Tibet. In the largely uninhabitable northwestern region of Yushu, you'll find the renowned Kekexili nature reserve and the railway connecting Xining to Lhasa. The main branch of the Kunlun Mountains, which splits Qinghai province into northern and southern regions, forms Yushu’s northern boundary, while a branch of the Kunlun range, the Bayanhar Mountains, defines its northeastern edge. Yushu is the source of three of Asia’s major rivers. The northeasternmost section of Yushu drains into the Yellow River as it flows towards Lanzhou, the capital of Gansu. Central and southeastern Yushu give rise to the headwaters of the Mekong and Yangzi, known locally as the Zhaqu and Tongtian rivers. The Qinghai provincial government emphasized the region's prominent topographical features—mountain ranges and river systems. Provincial reports meticulously described the mountain passes that link Yushu to key areas such as Lhasa, Chengdu in Xikang, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Xining, along with the challenging passes within Yushu. Yushu is a very difficult terrain for communication and transportation, quite the obstacle for governance. The journey between the provincial capital and Yushu totaled over 1620 li, a highway connecting such a path would not be built until 1944. A strong local governance was found in the form of Tibetan tribes known as the 25 peoples of Yushu. Yet the Qinghai provincial government sought to govern the land and those in Xining viewed Yushu as a barbarian region, where pastoral nomadism reigned. They would speak of Yushu as being an endless steppe inhabited by barbaric people who wandered aimlessly. Yushu had a complicated economic geography with monasteries occupying the richest land and concentrating monetary, spiritual, and political power on the local scale and pastoral tribes migrating in the areas in between. The monasteries acted as sites for periodic markets of trade, throughout Yushu. As much as they were Tibetan Buddhist monasteries for religious devotion, they were also landowners with powers of taxation. The hereditary tribal ladders of the 25 peoples of Yushu were thus a secondary network of political and economic authority in Yushu. The pastoral tribes who traversed the borderless region of Yushu, Xikang and Kham confused outsiders. The Beiyang government, as I have said, tried to simply adopt the former Qing policies. For Yushu they were ruling through an indirect system of local headmen. Each tribe determined their title, either company commander or battalion commander and were responsible for bi-annual taxes and periodic military conscription to the government in Xining. One of these tribal leaders, Cai Zuozhen, the leader of the Buqing tribe came from Huangyuan, lying between Xining and the Riyue mountains. His father worked as a translator for the Xining tribute tax collection missions. The 1920’s were continuous years of strife, especially between the tribes. No governing body really understood or had any real control over the region. In 1929 Yusuhu became an official county and on August 6th of that year, Ma Qi advocated an 8 point plan for calming her border problems. The plan included reconstructing a civilian government, promoting Tibetan Buddhism, opening more land for agriculture, training troops, establishing factories and mills, improving transportation and securing borders. He sought to implement all of this through the Yushu county government. However in the same year the Civil Affairs Bureau recommended adding 7 new counties some of which would carve chunks out of Yushu. The plan never materialized due to ongoing government difficulties, but remained on the table. In the meantime the government began a provincial level training program for self-government regions within Qinghai. 50 graduates came out of this program, none came from or were sent to Yushu. By the late 1920’s the region was being fought over by multiple parties for multiple reasons. There were 3 overarching reasons for why war would break out. Number 1 was because of the border disputes between Tibet and China. The Tibetans claimed areas inhabited by their people in the neighboring provinces of Qinghai and Sichuan were being ruled by warlords with loose connections to the Nanjing government. 2) There was a dispute between the 13th Dalai Lama and 9th Panchen Lama. To clarify the Panchen Lama is second to the Dalai Lama, to be more specific “the Panchen Lama is the reincarnation of Amithaba, the Buddha of Boundless Light, while the Dalai Lama is the reincarnation of Avalokiteshvara (Chenrezig in Tibetan), the Buddha of Compassion. Traditionally, each acts as mentor to the other, and plays a key role in identifying the other's reincarnation”. Anyways the 9th Panchen Lama had been exiled and seen to be quite pro Chinese. 3) was the complex disputes of the people in regions like Yushu. Now the catalyst for the war was a chieftain from the town of Beri, which is in Yushu but is in an area claimed by Tibet, but under control of Sichuan. This chieftain whose name I cannot for the life of me find, seized items from the Targye Monastery. It is alleged the 9th Panchen Lama incited this action. The monks of the monastery rallied forces and took back the properties. The chieftain then asked for help from the governor of Sichuan, Liu Wenhui. Liu Wenhui unleashed forces into the area, forcing the Targye monks to ask for help from the Tibetan government who drove his men out. Thus began a series of clashes. The KMT Muslim official Tang Kesan was dispatched to negotiate an end to the conflict. Muslim General Ma Fuxiang, as head of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, sent a telegram instructing Tang Kesan to break the agreement with Tibet, fearing political rivals in Nanjing were exploiting the situation. In the following years, Tibetan forces launched repeated attacks on Liu Wenhui's troops but were defeated multiple times. In 1932, the Tibetans rallied 6000 troops along the Jinsha river, an area that acted as the boundary between Yushu and Xikang. In response to the Tibetan threat, in March the Qing government established the Qinghai Southern Border Region garrison under Ma Bufang. Two brigades deployed in Yushu; the first brigade was led by Ma Xun and the 2nd by Ma Biao. The Tibetans invaded, but only Ma Biao’s men were ready at the border as Ma Xun’s were still enroute from the provincial capital. At the time of the attack Ma Biao had one camp of cavalry, alongside some headquarters personnel for a combined total of 400 men. He dispatched his secretary Wang Jiamei to Tibet to try and negotiate a peaceful settlement. It is believe he did this simply to delay the enemy as he immediately telegrammed Ma Bufang for reinforcements, but they would not arrive until mid-june. On March 24th the Tibetans attacked Lesser Surmang, gradually forcing their way into southern Qinghai. After 8 hours of battle, both sides suffered tremendous casualties. During that night within the county seat of Jiegu, Ma Biao convened a conference attended by chieftains, merchants and important town leaders. At the meeting, Ma Biao asserted “our strength is sufficient to protect the lives and property of Yushu’s residents. Not only will we resist Tibetan incursions, but in the future we will tie our war horses at the gate of the Tibetan government compound!” However Ma Biao would find it quite difficult to make due on these promises. On March 26th, the Greater Surmang contingent of his forces met 500 Tibetans on the battlefield just southeast of Jiegu. As told to us by Cai Zuozhen “the Tibetans simply overwhelmed the undermanned provincial forces by at least five to one”. They retreated to a camp near Duolongduo where they quickly became surrounded by Tibetan forces. At the same time a detachment of other provincial forces at Lesser Surman, just 30 men were encircled by 100 Tibetans. The provincial forces continuously retreated in the face of an enemy 5-10 times larger than them. The Tibetans methodically seized territory heading north to encircle the county seat of Jiegu. At the same time a contingent of 300 troops from Xikang forded the Tongtian river to attack the monasteries at Labu and Xiewu situated on the two vital thoroughfares heading north to Jiegu. The Tibetans held a strong military position and in one incredible move sweeped and occupied all the areas surrounding Jiegu’s southern portion, severing the county seats communication with Xining. Jiegu was the site of Yushu’s county government and nominally held the headquarters...
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3.123 Fall and Rise of China: Central Plains War
10/28/2024
3.123 Fall and Rise of China: Central Plains War
Last time we spoke about the Chiang-Gui War. China was reunified, but not was all well in Camelot. Chiang Kai-Shek initially popular, faced opposition from various factions, including Northern warlords and rival generals. The KMT decided to relocate the capital from Beijing to Nanking, which sparked resistance from those attached to Beijing’s rich history. The KMT then struggled with demobilizing the massive National Revolutionary Army, which had over 2 million troops. Chiang Kai-Shek aimed to reduce this number significantly but faced challenges, including discontent among warlords like Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan. Tensions escalated into the Chiang-Gui War, where Chiang defeated the Guangxi Clique led by Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi. This victory, however, did not end the turmoil as Feng and Yan formed an anti-Chiang coalition with Wang Jingwei. The struggle led to a dramatic showdown, culminating in the Taiyuan Conference where Yan Xishan was promoted to commander-in-chief, setting the stage for further conflict. #123 The Central Plains War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We last left off with basically every other big dog in China getting ready to gang up on Chiang Kai-Shek. Yan Xishan was now the commander in chief of an anti-chiang coalition with his deputy commanders being Feng Yuxiang, Li Zongren and Zhang Xueliang….however Zhang Xueliang was nowhere to be found. During what has been referred to as the “telegram war” period, the Young Marshal had actually spent the entire time in Mukden frantically telegraming all the significant North Chinese warlords and generals to not join the anti-chiang movement. To take a small sidestep. In the last episode I explained why Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and their Guangxi clique turned against Chiang Kai-Shek, but what motivations did someone like Feng Yuxiang and his Guominjun have to do so? A severe famine hit the Guanzhong region of Shaanxi, where Feng Yuxiang held power. This famine, which occurred in the 18th year of the Republic of China, is also referred to as the "Famine of the 18th Year of the Republic of China." Within Shaanxi, a year without any harvest is called a famine year, two consecutive years of poor harvest are also labeled famine years, and three consecutive years are considered a severe famine. During the 18th year of the Republic of China, the region faced an extreme famine with virtually no harvest for six consecutive seasons over three years. Some considered it a once-in-a-century event, while others claimed it was a disaster seen once in 300 years. According to modern historical records and newspaper reports, Shaanxi experienced drought in 1928, which caused poor summer wheat yields, while autumn and winter crops could not be planted due to a lack of rain. By 1929, the drought worsened. No rain fell from spring through autumn, drying up wells and rivers like the Jing, Wei, Han, and Bao. Most trees withered, and crops failed—summer harvests only amounted to 20%, and autumn yields were nonexistent. The famine was so severe that grass roots and tree bark became scarce, with the roads littered with corpses and countless people fleeing the area. According to a report by the Shaanxi Disaster Relief Committee on September 5 of that year, 91 of the province's 92 counties were affected by the drought. Except for a few counties along the Wei River that had some green crops, the rest were barren. Among the 91 counties, 24 were extremely severely affected, 27 severely affected, 15 moderately affected, and 25 slightly affected. The most severely hit areas included Chang'an, Wugong, Fengxiang, Fufeng, Qianxian, Qishan, Meixian, Xingping, Xianyang, Lintong, Weinan, Zhouzhi, and others. Out of a total population of over 9.4 million, 2.5 million people died of starvation, approximately 400,000 fled, and over 200,000 women were sold to other regions such as Henan, Shanxi, Beiping, Tianjin, and Shandong. Back in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek established the KMT’s new government in Nanking. By June, Chiang and Feng Yuxiang succeeded in uniting the two Kuomintang warlord factions during the Xuzhou Conference. In February 1928, Chiang and Feng solidified their alliance by becoming sworn brothers. Before the launch of the "Second Northern Expedition," Chiang Kai-shek had control over the central KMT government and occupied affluent areas like Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hangzhou. Feng Yuxiang, on the other hand, controlled the impoverished and remote northwest, where transportation was difficult. He saw the Northern Expedition as an opportunity to expand his own influence, particularly eyeing Beijing and Tianjin for their wealth and strategic transportation routes. After the expedition, Chiang Kai-shek, concerned about Feng's growing power, exploited tensions between Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang. He ceded control of Hebei, Beijing, and Tianjin to Yan Xishan, appointing him commander of the Beijing-Tianjin garrison and allowing his 3rd Army to enter Beijing. Feng's 2nd Army, however, was restricted to Nanyuan and denied entry into the city, which greatly displeased Feng. In response, he ordered his troops to retreat to Shandong and Henan, and feigned illness in Xinxiang, Henan, refusing to travel to Beijing. In the political realm Feng Yuxiang advocated for "civilian politics" and stood against dictatorship. Within the Kuomintang, he opposed Chiang Kai-shek's views, calling for the establishment of a clean government, promoting joint industrial development, providing aid to disaster victims, and fighting corruption. He also opposed salary increases for central government officials, argued for distributing leadership roles based on the strength of different factions, and rejected Chiang Kai-shek's dominance over party matters and the Nanjing government. These positions sharply conflicted with Chiang Kai-shek's ideas. After the success of the "Northern Expedition," Chiang Kai-shek proposed a reorganization of the army. This initiative sparked intense conflict between Chiang and Feng Yuxiang. On July 6, 1928, Chiang invited Feng, Yan Xishan, Li Zongren, and Bai Chongxi to a symposium in Beiping. However, Feng and other faction leaders strongly opposed Chiang's plan to reduce the army, leading to an unsatisfactory end to the meeting. On August 8, 1928, Chiang presided over the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Second Central Committee in Nanjing, where he sought to force the various factions to comply with his military reduction plan. Supported by the Guangdong-born members of the Central Committee, the proposal was passed, and the army reduction plan became part of the Kuomintang's official resolution. Feeling threatened by this plan, Feng traveled along the Longhai Railway, inspecting the Northwest Army, and held a commemorative military parade marking the second anniversary of the Northwest Army's Wuyuan Oath-taking Ceremony. In October 1928, after the reorganization of the Nanjing National Government, Chiang appointed Feng as Vice President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Military Affairs, asking him to report to Nanjing immediately. Feng, however, refused, citing various excuses. Under increasing public pressure, Feng and other faction leaders were eventually forced to attend the demobilization meeting in Nanjing. On December 26, 1928, Chiang chaired a preparatory meeting for the demobilization conference, using factional politics to manipulate and divide his rivals. Feng proposed a "three haves and three demobilizations" plan, which was initially opposed by Yan Xishan and Li Zongren. Secretly, Chiang won over Yan, encouraging him to submit a proposal that would counter Feng's influence. When the National Demobilization Meeting convened on January 1, 1929, most attendees supported Yan's proposal over Feng's. The "Outline of the Procedure for the Demobilization Committee of the National Army" was passed, favoring Chiang's position. Eventually, Feng, Yan, and Li shifted from opposing each other to uniting against the demobilization process. In March 1929, as we saw in last episode, the Chiang-Gui War broke out. In order to concentrate military forces and eliminate the Guangxi clique, Chiang Kai-shek sent Shao Lizi and others to Huashan to win over Feng Yuxiang. They offered Feng the chance to continue cooperating with Chiang and send troops to help Chiang defeat Guangxi in exchange for the premiership of the Executive Yuan and the territory of Hubei and Hunan provinces. Feng agreed to Chiang's request on the surface. He then frequently deployed troops on the border between Henan and Hubei, hoping to seize the opportunity to send troops to occupy Wuhan when Chiang and Guangxi were both defeated. However, Chiang soon defeated the Guangxi clique, which increased Chiang Kai-shek's resentment and made the contradiction between Chiang and Feng irreconcilable. Now that pretty much covers Feng Yuxiang’s motivations, but what about Yan Xishan? In January 1930, after Yan Xishan returned to Taiyuan from Zhengzhou, central Henan began to experience increasing turmoil. On February 10, Yan sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, urging a spirit of courtesy for the country's sake that they "share the burden" to resolve party conflicts. Chiang responded on February 12 with a telegram stating, "Revolution to save the country is an obligation, not a right. The country is in dire straits, and it is not the time for us to be arrogant." By February 21, Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Bai Chongxi, Zhang Fakui, and Hu Zongduo all stated supported Yan Xishan to be the commander-in-chief of the anti-chiang national army, navy, and air force. In many ways the issue was simply thrust onto him. Meanwhile Yan Xishan’s army went to Peiping, current day Beijing, disarming the KMT forces there and setting up a HQ. With perhaps a stronger backing, Chiang Kai-Shek would have gone to war against the anti-chiang cabal much earlier, but was reluctant to do so now. The terrain was the difficulty, he would have to fight his way into Shandong, where the local sympathy rested on Feng Yuxiang. So for now he battled them through the use of diplomacy. Within the chaos, the CCP also managed to cut their own piece of the pie by capturing Changsha in late July. They would only hold the city for a few days however, before burning it down and fleeing. Early into the conflict Chiang Kai-Shek’s attention was drawn to Manchuria. The Young Marshal had not made a move in either direction and he was sitting upon an army 200,000 plus strong. Where did his sympathies truly lie, everyone was waiting to see. Chiang Kai-Shek believed chances were slim the Young Marshal would rebel against him, he was not very much like his tiger of a father. Zhang Xueliang was a thinker, an idealistic and most importantly he had been an opium addict for a long time. Such a life conditioned the young man to be a lot more passive. Zhang Xueliang seemed to be looking to pledge himself to a real leader who could deliver salvation to China. But who was the better choice for him? Chiang Kai-Shek or Wang Jingwei? Chiang Kai-Shek did not wait for an official answer to this question he hastily announced that Zhang Xueliang was his new deputy commander in chief. Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan followed this up by offering Zhang Xueliang a place in the Peiping state council, yet Zhang Xueliang remained quiet until the middle of September. It was a real nail bitter for both sides, Zhang Xueliang had a large, decently trained and pretty well armed army, he would tip the tides for either side. The waiting game had Yan Xishan thinking strongly about pulling out of the coalition. In the meantime the war truly began to heat up in May when Chiang Kai-Shek swore a public oath to attack Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang. On May 11th, both sides began engaged another along a north and south front. The main battlefield in the north was centered around Henan with a secondary front in Shandong fought mainly along the Pinghan, Longhai and Jinpu railways. In the southern theater the fighting was fought mainly in the Yuezhou, Changsha and Xiangjiang river areas. To be more specific the anti-Chiang Kai-shek army organized a total of 8 war front areas: the Guangxi clique army was the 1st front, led by Li Zongren, going north from Hunan and heading towards Wuhan; the Northwest Army was the 2nd front, led by Feng Yuxiang, with Lu Zhonglin being responsible for the Longhai and Pinghan lines in Henan; the Shanxi Army was the 3rd front, led by Yan Xishan, with Xu Yongchang responsible for the Jinpu and Jiaoji lines and the eastern section of the Longhai line in Shandong; Shi Yousan's troops were the 4th front; the Northeast Army, which was designated by Zhang Xueliang, was the 5th front though whether he took up the post or not was yet to be seen; Liu Wenhui's troops were the 6th front; He Jian's troops were the 7th front, and Fan Zhongxiu's troops were the 8th front. The Northwest Army and the Shanxi Army, as the main forces, had been fully mobilized and marched to the Longhai, Pinghan, and Jinpu lines. Yan also appointed Shi Yousan as the chairman of Shandong Province, leading his troops to attack Shandong from Henan, and appointed Sun Dianying as the chairman of Anhui Province, attacking the Bozhou area of Anhui. Altogether the Anti-Chiang forces were about 260,000 men strong The fighting kicked off in mid May. The strategy of the anti-Chiang army was for the first front army, the Guangxi army led by Li Zongren to march into Hunan and advance towards Wuhan; the second front army, the Northwestern Army of Feng Yuxiang, was responsible for the Longhai and Pinghan routes in Henan Province, and would attack Xuzhou and Wuhan respectively; the third front army, the Shanxi Army of Yan Xishan was responsible for the operations along the Jinpu and Jiaoji routes in Shandong Province. It would join Feng Yuxiang to attack Xuzhou, then advance southward along the Jinpu Line and attack Nanking; Shi Yousan was in charge of the Fourth Front Army, which would use its main forces to attack Jining and Yanzhou, and would use part of its forces to join the Third Front Army in the attack on Jinan; Zhang Xueliang’s Northeast Army was designated as the Fifth Front Army, and efforts were made to jointly fight against Chiang Kai-shek, but again his status was still unknown; Liu Wenhui of Sichuan was appointed as the Sixth Front Army, and He Jian of Hunan was appointed as the Seventh Front Army. In order to encourage generals of non-directly affiliated units, Shi Yousan was appointed as the chairman of Shandong Province, Wan Xuancai as the chairman of Henan Province, and Sun Dianying as the chairman of Anhui Province. After this, Fan Zhongxiu was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Eighth Front Army. Chiang Kai-Shek deployed the NRA 2nd Corps led by Liu Zhi along the Longhai railway line; the 3rd Crops of H Chengjun was deployed on the Pinhan line; the 1st Corps of Han Fuju was deployed along the Jinpu line and Chiang Kai-Shek set up his HQ in Xuzhou to personally command forces. On May 11th, Chiang Kai-Shek issued his general attack orders, with the 2nd corps attacking Guide from Xuzhou. The two sides began clashing, with the KMT gaining the upper hand rather quickly as they held an advantage in air power. A NRA division led by Chen Jicheng occupied Mamuji due east of Guide. Then Liu Maoen defected to Chiang Kai-Shek handing his forces over at Ningling while also luring Colonel Wan Xuancai into a trap. This left Guide to be easily captured by Chiang’s forces as the only other enemy division was that of Sun Dianying who withdrew to Bozhou. Although Chiang Kai-Shek had won technically the first major battle, his situation was not at all enviable. After losing Guide, Yan Xishan urgently reinforced the Longhai Railway line area with divisions led by Yang Yaofang, Sun Laingcheng and Ji Hongchang. This saw Chiang Kai-Sheks forces suffer extremely heavy losses over the course of 10 days of fighting. Chiang Kai-Sheks forces were reeling from the fierce fighting and forced to retreat into the southwestern portion of Shandong. Along the Pinghan railway, Chiang Kai-Shek ordered He Chengjun’s 3rd Corps to depart the Yancheng area and attack northwards. The 3rd Corps quickly found themselves fighting the northwest Army in the Linying and Xuchang areas. The 3rd Corps were trying to contain and isolate the northwest army who were currently receiving reinforcements along the Longhai line. On May 25th, He Jians forces began occupying Linying and by Juny 7th Xuchang. At this time the Guangxi army invaded Hunan and by the 28th of May had taken Yongzhou, Qiyang, Hangzhou and Baoqing. On June 8th they took Changsha and Yueyang, with their vanguard entering Hubei. Feng Yuxiang took advantage of the situation to launch a full scale attack along the Pingham line. After two days of fighting, Chiang Kai-Sheks men were retreating south to Luohe. However, Feng Yuxiang made an error. His subordinates urged him to link up with the Guangxi army and attack Wuhan. Instead he ordered his forces to advance into eastern Henan where he might annihilate a large portion of Chiang Kai-Sheks army. Meanwhile Chiang Kai-Shek had suffered major defeats across the Longhai and Pingham lines and lost the key city of Changsha, his men were demoralized. By mid June Feng Yuxiang adjusted his battle plan and launched another offensive along the Longhai line as Chiang Kai-Shek came to Liuhe to supervise the battle. Chiang Kai-Shek tossed some of his elite divisions equipped with heavy artillery to attack Feng Yuxiang from Qixian to Taikang, hoping to seize Kaifeng and Chenliu. Yet he fell directly into a pocket-sized encirclement and his forces were battered. Over on the Jinpu line front, Yan Xishan had organized 6 divisions and 3 artillery regiments to perform an offensive against Jinan. They advanced south along the Jinpu line and formed two pincers against the city. Han Fuju knew he would lose considerable forces in a defense of the city and ended up simply pulling out to conserve his strength, handing Jinan over. July brought significant change to the war. Over in Hunan, Chiang Kai-Shek organized 3 armies to counterattack Changsha; a naval fleet under Chen Skaokuan would assist them and he ordered the 8th route army under Jiang Hauangnai and Cai Tingkai to retake Hengyang. The Guangxi army could not focus on two fronts, so they abandoned Yueyang and Changsha to meet the enemy at Hengyang. The two sides fought bitterly in southern Hunan, but by July 4th the Guangxi army was forced to retreat to the province of Guangxi. Afterwards Chiang Kai-Shek’s forces took Bozhou within the Longhai/Jinpu triangle area, effectively trapping forces led by Sun Dianying. On July 8th Chiang Kai-Shek diverted a bunch of divisions from the Longhai line to the Jinpu Line. By the end of the month Chiang Kai-Shek unleashed a general offensive along the Jinpu line. Feng Yuxiang retaliated by launching an offensive over the Longhai line trying to seize Xuzhou. Feng Yuxiang hoped by doing so he could unite the Jinpu and Longhai lines for a combined...
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3.122 Fall and Rise of China: Chiang-Gui War
10/21/2024
3.122 Fall and Rise of China: Chiang-Gui War
Last time we spoke about the Sino-Soviet Conflict of 1929. In 1919, Soviet Commissar Lev Karakhan promised China the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway at no cost, aiming to foster good relations amid the Russian Civil War. However, the Soviets retracted the offer, causing tensions. Over the next decade, control of the railway shifted between Chinese and Soviet hands, sparking conflicts. By 1929, Zhang Xueliang, a Chinese warlord, attempted to reclaim the railway, leading to military confrontations. Despite initial diplomatic efforts, the situation escalated into a full-scale war. The Soviets, under General Vasily Blyukher, launched a powerful offensive, using their superior military force to overpower the Chinese defenses. After intense battles, including naval engagements, the Soviets gained the upper hand, leading to heavy Chinese casualties and loss of territory. The conflict ended with the Soviets firmly in control, highlighting the fragile nature of Sino-Soviet relations during this tumultuous period. #122 The Chiang-Gui War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. With the reunification of China, China’s Warlord Era was over…but it really wasn't. Chiang Kai-Shek came to Beijing via a trail laid open by Yan Xishan. The Northern Expedition had been completed by August, just as the Generalissimo promised it would. According to previous agreements amongst the KMT, he tendered in his resignation upon completing the Northern Expedition. But the party refused to accept it, instead the Generalissimo was commanded to go visit the tomb of Dr Sun Yat-Sen over in the western Hills. He was accompanied by many of his generals who all oversaw a impressive ceremony, culminating with Chiang Kai-Shek weeping before Dr Sun Yat-Sen’s shrine. Now Beijing was of course a symbol of China’s Manchu past. The KMT and all revolutionaries within China for that matter hated it for that reason. It was seen as suitable enough for the government of North China, but not for the national capital, no this was moved to Nanking. Nanking of course had been seen as the secondary capital for centuries and held ancient history as being the first capital of China. Yet there was a lot of opposition to this. The Northern Chinese of course wanted to retain Beijing as the capital, many Chinese scholars had arguments against it, the foreign legations were annoyed at the idea of moving their residence and staff, so on and so forth. There was a great love for the northern capital, for its wonderful shops, restaurants rich history and such. Many did not believe Nanking could match Beijing’s beauty. But the KMT assured all Nanking would become the gem of China. Beijing, which was actually called Peking at this time, again I just keep using modern terms to not confuse you guys, but Peking was then changed to Peiping translating to “northern peace”. As much as the capital was ruffling feathers, another more pressing issue was the enormous NRA army now that they had no Northern Expedition to run. Armies are not cheap, demobilization obviously needed to be done. However the KMT dragged their feet on the issue. Demobilization is something many governments face, but China’s situation was rather unique. The NRA held many professional armies, made up of men who had never been anything but soldiers with no desire to become civilians. Many of the NRA generals also did not wish to carry on as civilians. Most of these men were doing a career and knew nothing else. In June of 1928, over 2 million men were on military pay roll. The minister of finance, T.V Soong, believed in keeping straight books and protested the enormous military expense. The KMT central committee passed resolutions and formed a plan; the standing army, needed to be cut down to at least 715,00 men. But when it came to deciding who gets disbanded, here lay the troubles. There was another issue, the mechanics of the new government. In the first days of the peace, Chiang Kai-Shek had proven himself a pretty good manager. He had a lot of help from his political right hand man, Hu Hanmin, and they were on good terms. Chiang Kai-Shek was quite popular in the beginning, many looked up to him. However as the days went by, things started to crumble. The first major conflict occurred when Chiang Kai-Shek attempted to do away with the political subcouncils in Guangzhou and Wuhan. Chiang Kai-Shek argued this new united China did not need any more than a single central federal government office. The regimes in Guangzhou and Wuhan needed to disband and become integrated properly at Nanking. However Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren were the respective governors of the two provinces that held these regimes and they very much liked their current status. They obviously resented what they saw as a slight against them by Chiang Kai-Shek. Both men began using the term “dictator” to describe Chiang Kai-Shek, they said things like he was getting too big for his boots. Now going back to the roots of the KMT, Dr Sun Yat-Sen had hoped to implement a national constitution. Yet simply flinging out what Sun Yat-Sen had once written down was out of the question, a new constitution needed to be drafted. Thus, basically for the next 5 years, China went through an awkward transformation process, trying to become a real voting republic. But in the meantime the country was controlled by a government of 5 “yuans” (committees). These were the executive, legislative, control, judicial and examination committees. The high officials of these committees were members of the State council, also seen as a cabinet, headed by the President. Chiang Kai-Shek became the first president and was very careful on who he included in his cabinet. Yan Xishan became the Minister of the Interior and Feng Yuxiang Minister of War. Both of these men were still bonafide warlords, but they were the two leaders who helped reunify China with him. He had to keep them happy, they controlled vast private armies, he also knew to keep them close. Nanking was fraught with activity, but no demobilization. Months went by. Chiang Kai-Shek was happy, it was quite a creative time for him, but the reality was, the government was filled with potential traitors, great amounts of land were not really assimilated, nor were their populations. Nonetheless China had not seen such unity in centuries. Chiang Kai-Shek felt an immense sense of pride, he himself was full of energy and overworking. Chiang Kai-Shek began promising to rebuild Nanking in a fitting style. A magnificent tomb was planned for the slope of Purple Mountain, above the ruins of the old Ming temple, where Sun Yat-Sens remains would be moved. The city was remodeled, its old narrow and messy streets were cleared out. Nanking possessed a certain antiquity look, and many were fond of it and hated the construction efforts. Chiang Kai-Shek envisioned retaining the Chinese style of architecture, with sloping roofs, painted ceilings, tiles and courtyards, but also clean, cool interiors with electrical appliances. He basically wanted to blend the new with the old. Chiang Kai-Shek found an American architect to help rebuild Nanking. He also began hunting down advisors for just about every field. He looked up foreign farmer experts, German military advisors, American educational advisors, medical advisors, highway construction advisors and such. The climax to it all was recognition of the new Nanking government from the great powers. Chiang Kai-Shek found himself stuck in interviews with diplomats nearly every day. It is said the Generalissimo worked from dawn to night, with his wife Meiling as his secretary. Her primary role was translating important work into English, she was also his English interpreter. Meiling pushed Chiang Kai-Shek to try and learn English so he would be less dependent on her. She taught him as best as she could, and he was apparently making good headway until he had a incident. One day he was meeting with the British Minister and tried to practice his english by saying “good morning, Lampson” but instead he said “kiss me, Lampson”. Henceforth he never tried talking in English with foreigners. In May came some excitement with the Sino-Soviet conflict. Zhang Xueliang literally tossed the Soviet ultimatum to Nanking, an unwelcome gift to Chiang Kai-Shek. Ultimately Zhang Xueliang could do nothing against the Soviet power. It was certainly a blow to China, but perhaps in the grand scheme of things, Chiang Kai-Shek’s mind worried more about the Japanese. The Soviets and Japanese were not all Chiang Kai-Shek should have been worried about, there were plenty of internal enemies. Back in July of 1928, it was estimated the NRA held over 2.2 million soldiers within 84 corps and 272 divisions. This accounted for an annual expenditure of over 800 million yuan, when the national fiscal revenue was something like 450 million yuan. Chiang Kai-Shek advocated for demobilization, hoping to bring it down to 1.2 million with 80 divisions, thus reducing expenditures to 60% of the national budget. By January of 1929 the issue came up again, now based on German military advisors advice, Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to reduce the NRA to 50 divisions at around 800,000 troops. His First Army belonging to the central system would be reorganized into 20 divisions, and the remaining army groups would be divided into 10 divisions. Uh huh you see where this is going. Chiang Kai-Shek also proposed establishing a 200,000 man strong military police force. So if you remember from the end of the Northern Expedition, there were 4 NRA collective armies. The 1st was led by Chiang Kai-Shek, the 2nd by Feng Yuxiang, the 3rd by Yan Xishan and the 4th by Li Zongren. Each of these men were warlords in the own right with cliques behind them. For example Li Zongren was the leader of the New Guangxi Clique who controlled Guangxi, Hunan, Hubei and parts of the Shanhai pass connecting Hubei to Tianjin. The NRA 4th army had 16 divisions and 6 independent units, some 200,000 troops. When Wang Jingwei went into exile, Li Zongren inherited his Wuhan regime government. Li Zongren also had the support of Li Jishen who controlled Guangdong. Now Chiang Kai-Shek certainly had the upper hand, his first NRA army was 500,000 strong and he was the President of the nation. Yan Xishan had over 200,000 troops in his 3rd NRA army and controlled the Shanxi clique, Shanxi province, northern Hubei, Beijing and Tianjin. Lastly Feng Yuxiang had 400,000 troops in his 2nd NRA army, was the leader of the Guominjun and controlled a large part of northwest China, alongside Henan. Alone none of the others could challenge Chiang Kai-Shek, but what if they united against him? The Guangxi clique led by Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren had won a lot from the northern expedition. They controlled Wang Jingwei’s old Wuhan Regime, Guangxi, Hubei, but did not control all of Hunan. They both felt they should control Hunan and its lucrative revenues of course. Yet the governor of Hunan insisted the taxes collected were property of Nanjing. So Bai Chongxi and Li Zongrenplaced him under house arrest. After this Lu Diping was appointed by Li Zongren to preside over Hunan’s civilian government affairs. Lu Diping was forced to work with a bitter rival, He Jian. What the Guangxi Clique members did not know was that Lu Diping had been groomed by Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang Kai-Shek also began arming Lu Diping’s private army in February of 1928. He Jian found out about this and reported it to the rest of the Guangxi clique. Li Zongren took notice of the situation and immediately had Lu Diping removed from office and deported. He was replaced by He Jian, go figure. Lu Diping then fled to cry to Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang Kai-Shek was furious his man had been taken out of office and began threatening the Guangxi clique. Li Zongren’s family were living in Nanking at the time and he took them quickly over to the Shanghai concession as he believed a storm was brewing. Li Zongren then met with Chiang Kai-Shek striking a peaceful deal by march 2nd, both agreeing He Jian would temporarily serve as the chairman over Hunan. However back over in Hunan, the situation was quickly deteriorating. Guangxi troops were taking out political opponents in the province and looked to be fomenting a rebellion. Chiang Kai-Shek took decisive action and mobilized his forces to pacify the Guangxi clique. Li Jishen, fearing a war would break out at any moment, sped north to Nanking to mediate, only to be arrested upon arriving by Chiang Kai-Shek. He was charged with treason. With Li Jishen out of Guangdong, the Cantones Generals Chen Jizhen and Chen Mingshu tossed their lot in with Chiang Kai-Shek, thus severing the Guangdong-Guangxi alliance. On March 21st Nanking issued a statement expelling Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and Li Jishen from the KMT, accusing the 3 men of treason. Now Chiang Kai-Shek actually was dealing with a lot more than insubordination from the Guangxi clique, in fact there was a growing anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition forming. I wont get into it here, but Feng Yuxiang was raising hell in the northwest, Yan Xishan was not at all happy with the new Nanking government and even Wang Jingwei over in Europe was tossing public accusations against Chiang Kai-Shek. This led a lot of KMT officials to resign in protest. Chiang Kai-Shek had a serious rebellion, perhaps a civil war on the horizon. He reacted first by bribing key Northern Chinese leaders to be neutral for the time being so he could focus all of his attention on the Guangxi clique menace. Chiang Kai-Shek did another clever thing, he reconciled with the exiled Tang Shengzhi. Many forces under Bai Chongxi were former soldiers under Tang Shengzhi, many of whom were still loyal to him. Chiang Kai-Shek brought Tang Shenzhi back over to China from Japan and dispatched him to Tangshan in Hubei, where he was ordered to steal back two of his old divisions from Bai Chongxi. Yes Chiang Kai-Shek was playing the divide and conquer strategy. First he bribed as many as he could, so he could focus on the Guangxi clique. Then amongst the Guangxi he tried to bribe some and arrest others, isolating Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren. In the face of the situation, Zhang Xueliang was the first to publicly express his support for Chiang Kai-Shek, he was followed by Liu Wenhui, the warlord over Sichuan, then Yan Xishan and finally a reluctant Feng Yuxiang. Initially Bai Chongxi was going to lead his troops station in Hubei to march south to Xuzhou to try and link up with other Guangxi clique forces to advance east and attack Nanking. However as he quickly found out, most of his troops were loyal to Tang Shengzhi who purchased their service and stole them from him. Bai Chongxi lost control over a significant part of his army, panicked and fled Hubei by boat. He intended to flee for Hong Kong, but Chiang Kai-Shek ordered the Navy to halt the ship, and if it did not stop to sink it. Li Zongren quickly asked support from Japanese allies to get Bai Chongxi safely to Hong Kong. Meanwhile Li Zongren began mobilizing 3 armies under Guangxi Generals Xia Wei, Tao Wei and Hu Zongqi. These armies were intended to be deployed in Huangpu and Wuxue, however Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi could not physically get over to them to command them. Meanwhile Chiang Kai-Shek appointed General Zhu Peide in command of 5 divisions in Jiujiang and Nanchang. Their job was to occupy the Wuchang-Changsha railway, thus cutting off the withdrawal of any troops from Guangxi. Chiang Kai-Shek also placed General Liu Zhi in command of 5 divisions over in Anhui and Hubei’s border area with orders to attack Wuhan and General Han Fuju would take 5 divisions from southern Henan to attack Wuhan. On March 31st, Chiang Kai-Shek dispatched his general attack orders. Subsequently He Jian betrayed the Guangxi clique and joined Chiang Kai-Shek. Within the Guangxi clique, the Generals Hu Zongtang, Tao Shu, Li Mingrui and Yu Zuobai all began inhouse fighting over old petty grudges. Chiang Kai-Shek learnt of the situation and bribed Yu Zuobai and Li Mingrui to join his side for 400,000 silver dollars. On April 3rd, Li Mingrui’s troops began to defect over in Huayuan and Xiaogan. A bunch of other Guangxi Generals began contacting Chiang Kai-Shek privately, tell him they would not participate in the civil war and asked if they could take their men safely out of the region. So many gaps in the Guangxi cliques defensive lines around Wuhan were exploited by Nankings forces coming from Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan and Yichang. Nearly surrounded at Wuhan, the Guangxi forces fled into western Hubei. At the same time, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi both arrived in Hong Kong and made their way to Guangxi only to find the situation an utter mess. On April 11th, Nanking issued a message calling upon the Guangxi clique’s soldiers to give up resistance. The demoralized Guangxi troops of Xia Wei, Tao Jun, Hu Zongtang all began surrendering themselves at Shashi, Yichang and other places. On April 25th, Chiang Kai-Shek unleashed an offensive into Guangxi. The response by the surviving Guangxi Clique was to establish an anti-Chiang Kai-Shek coalition on May 5th. They dispatched a telegram calling upon everyone to join them and initiated an offensive first aimed at Guangdong. By the 15th, Feng Yuxiang heeded the call, and began discussing how the Guominjun might send troops to attack Chiang Kai-Shek. However Feng Yuxiangs colleagues, Han Fuyu and Shi Yousan urged Feng Yuxiang not to do so. Then Chiang Kai-Shek offered Feng Yuxiang the position as president of the Executive committee, control over Hubei and Hunan if he continued to support him and send forces against the Guangxi rebels. Feng Yuxiang superficially agreed to Chiang Kai-Sheks request, mobilizing his forces between Henan and Hubei. While this looked like he was helping Chiang Kai-Shek, in reality he was eagerly waiting in the shadows for Chiang Kai-Shek and the Guangxi clique forces to weaken so he might pounce upon Wuhan. By mid May Guangxi’s troops began entering Guangdong from two directions, easily overwhelming he Guangdong Provincial army, and marched into Guangzhou. Chiang Kai-SHek mobilized further armies in Hunan, Yunnan and Guizhou to invade Guangxi. This soon saw major battle break out in the Baimu region, ultimately dislodging the Guangxi troops from Guangdong and back into Guangxi. However, simultaneously, the Guangxi forces advanced on the front lines in Guilin and Liuzhou, defeating the Xiangjun, Qijun, and Qijun troops. In the same month, in Hunan, a significant push was made from Shonan to Guilin; meanwhile, Chen Guangdong's forces attacked Zhaoqing from Wuzhou, He County, and Guizhou's Dushan County, ultimately seizing Liuzhou. Chiang Kai-shek quickly mobilized forces led by Li Mingrui, Yu Zuobai, and the old Guangxi clique army under Yang Tenghui to move south towards Guangdong and west to attack Guangxi. Thanks to the strong efforts of these forces, they swiftly captured Wuzhou and Guiping. Wei Yunwei abandoned the city, and the Guangxi forces...
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3.121 Fall and Rise of China: Sino-Soviet Conflict of 1929
10/14/2024
3.121 Fall and Rise of China: Sino-Soviet Conflict of 1929
Last time we spoke about the Guangzhou, Gansu and Red Spear Uprisings. During China’s Warlord Era, the CCP faced many challenges as they sought to implement land revolutions and armed uprisings. Following the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest uprisings, the CCP held an emergency meeting criticizing Chen Duxiu for his appeasement of the KMT right wing. With strong encouragement from Soviet advisors, the CCP planned a major uprising to seize control of Guangdong province. In November 1927, the CCP saw an opportunity as petty warlords in Guangdong and Guangxi engaged in conflict. Zhang Fakui's troops, vulnerable and demoralized, were targeted by the CCP. Mobilizing workers and peasants, the CCP initiated the Guangzhou Uprising. The uprising was ultimately suppressed by superior NRA troops, resulting in heavy CCP casualties and brutal reprisals. The failed uprisings, though unable to achieve immediate goals, ignited a persistent revolutionary spirit within the CCP, marking the beginning of a prolonged civil conflict that would shape China's future. #121 The Sino-Soviet Conflict of 1929 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. All the way back in 1919, the brand new Soviet government’s assistance Commissar of foreign affairs, Lev Karakhan, issued a manifesto to the Beiyang government, promising the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway at zero financial cost. That statement was made in late July and alongside the railway, he also mentioned relinquishing a lot of rights the former Russian Empire had acquired from unequal treaties, such as the Boxer Protocol. This all became known as the Karakhan Manifesto, and it was formed in a time when the Soviets were fighting the Russian Civil War, advancing east into Siberia. In order to secure the war in Siberia the Soviets had to establish good relations with the Chinese. Yet six months after the july manifesto, Karakhan personally handed over a second version of said manifesto, one that did not influence the rather nice deal of handing over the Chinese eastern railway for free. The Soviets official statement was that they had accidentally promised the deal prior. The truth of the matter was some real politik work at play. The Soviets had been trying to secure a Sino-Soviet alliance against the Japanese, but it looked to them it would never come to be so they simply took the deal off the table. Henceforth the issue cause a lot of friction. In March of 1920 the Fengtian forces disarmed White Russian Troops along the railway and seized control over its operations. In February of 1922 China and the USSR signed a agreement stipulating the Beiyang government would set up a special agency to manage the railway. Then in November the Chinese announced an area within 11 km along the railway would be designated a Eastern Province special district. In December the Soviet Union officially formed and by May the two nations agreed to settle a list of issues. The Soviets agreed to abolish all the unequal treaties formed by the Russian Empire handing over all the leased territories, consular jurisdiction, extraterritoriality, Boxer payments and such, but the Chinese Eastern Railway would be jointly managed by China and the USSR. Now since the railway sat in the area that Zhang Zuolin came to control, in September of 1924 the Soviets signed an agreement with the Fengtian clique. In this agreement, the Soviets lessened the 80 year lease over the railway to 60 years. The Soviets also promised to hand full control to Chinese administrators, but had a trick up their sleeve. The Soviets let the Chinese think they were adding workers and officials loyal to them, in reality the Soviets were creating more jobs on the railway while hiring Soviet workers. In the end the Soviets controlled roughly 67% of the key positions. When Zhang Zuolin went to war with Feng Yuxiang’s Guominjun this changed things considerably. In December of 1925, Zhang Zuolin’s army owed the Chinese eastern railway some 14 million rubles, prompting the Soviet administrator over the railway, Ivanov to prohibit Zhang Zuolin’s army from using it. Fengtian commander Zhang Huanxiang simply arrested Ivanov disregarding his ban. The Soviets then sent an ultimatum to the Beiyang government demanding his release. So Zhang Zuolin ran to the Japanese to mediate. Things smoothed over until 1928 when the Huanggutun incident saw Zhang Zuolin assassinated. As we saw at the end of the northern expedition, his son Zhang Xueliang responded by raising the KMT flag on December 29th of 1928, joining Chiang Kai-Shek. The next day Zhang Xueliang was made commander in chief of the Northeast. Now Chiang Kai-Shek’s government had broken diplomatic relations with the USSR after the Shanghai massacre purge. Thus Zhang Xueliang felt the old treaties signed by his father with the Soviets were null and void and looked upon the Chinese Eastern Railway enviously. To give some context outside of China. At this point in time, the USSR was implementing rural collectivization, ie; the confiscation of land and foodstuffs. This led to wide scale conflict with peasants, famines broke out, I would say the most well known one being the Holodmor in Ukraine. Hundreds of millions of people starved to death. The USSR was also still not being recognized by many western powers. Thus from the perspective of Zhang Xueliang, it looked like the USSR were fraught with internal and external difficulties, they had pretty much no friends, so taking the railway would probably be a walk in the park. Zhang Xueliang began diplomatically, but negotiations were going nowhere, so he got tougher. He ordered his officials to take back control over the Chinese Eastern Railway zone police, municipal administration, taxation, land, everything. He instructed Zhang Jinghui, the governor of Harbin’s special administrative zone to dispatch military police to search the Soviet embassy in Harbin and arrest the consul general. Zhang Jinghui did so and closed the Soviet consulates in Harbin, Qiqihar and Hailar. All of this of course pissed off the Soviets who responded by protesting the new Nanjing government, demanding the release of their people, while increasing troops to the border of Manchuria. The Soviets announced they were willing to reduce their control over the railway as a concession. This entire situation became known as the May 27th incident and unleashed a tit for tat situation. On July 13th, the Soviets sent an ultimatum giving three days for a response "If a satisfactory answer is not obtained, the Soviet government will be forced to resort to other means to defend all the rights of the Soviet Union." On the 17th the Soviets recalled their officials, cut off the railway traffic between China and the USSR, ejected Chinese envoys from the USSR and cut off diplomatic relations with China. In the background Joseph Stalin was initially hesitating to perform any military actions, not wanting to antagonize the Japanese in Manchuria. However the Soviet consul in Tokyo, sent back word that Japan was completely willing to stay out of any conflict if the Soviets limited it to just northern Manchuria. Thus Stalin decided to act. On August 6th, Stalin formed the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army under the command of General Vasily Blyukher. It was composed of three infantry divisions; the 1st Pacific Infantry Division, the 2nd Amur Infantry Division, and the 35th Trans-Baikal Infantry Division), one cavalry brigade (the 5th Kuban Cavalry Brigade), and the addition of the Buryat Mongolian Independent Cavalry Battalion. The total force was said to be as many as 30,000 with their headquarters located in Khabarovsk. Blyukher also had the support of the Far Eastern Fleet, roughly 14 shallow water heavy gunboats, a minesweeper detachment, an aviation detachment with 14 aircraft, and a marine battalion commanded by Yakov Ozolin. Blyukher had served during the civil war and was a military advisor in China attached to Chiang Kai-SHek’s HQ. He had a large hand to play in the northern expedition, and was one of the select Soviets Chiang Kai-Shek intentionally made sure got home safe during the purge. Blyukher would exercises a unusual amount of autonomy with his far east command, based out of Khabarovsk. For the upcoming operation a 5th of the entire Red Army was mobilized to assist. On the other side Zhang Xueliang mobilized as many troops as he could, including many White Russians hiding out in Manchuria. His total strength on paper was 270,000, but only 100,000 would be actively facing the Soviets as the rest were needed to maintain public order and to defend southern Manchuria. The person in charge of the Eastern Line of the Chinese Eastern Railway was the brigade commander of the Jilin Army, Ding Chao, and the western line was the brigade commander of the Heilongjiang Army, Liang Zhongjia, and the chief of staff was Zhang Wenqing. Wang Shuchang led the First Army to guard the eastern line, and Hu Yukun led the Second Army to guard the western line. The Soviet army also had a quality advantage in equipment. In terms of artillery, the Soviet army had about 200 artillery pieces, including more than a dozen heavy artillery pieces, while the Chinese army had only 135 infantry artillery pieces and no heavy artillery. At the same time, the Soviet army also had a quality advantage in machine guns because it was equipped with 294 heavy machine guns and 268 highly mobile light machine guns. The Chinese army was equipped with only 99 heavy machine guns. In terms of air force, the Chinese army had 5 aircraft that were combat effective. On July 26th the Soviets bombarded Manzhouli from three directions along the western end of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Two days later a Soviet infantry regiment, 3 armored vehicles and 4 artillery pieces advanced to Shibali station, cutting the lines to Manzhouli. They then ordered the Chinese military and police to withdraw as they captured Manzhouli. Then on the 29th the began bombarding Dangbi. On August 8th, 100 Soviet troops carrying two artillery pieces and 3 machine guns engaged Chinese forces outside the south gate of Oupu County street, casualties were heavy for both sides. 5 Soviet aircraft circled over Suifenhe City firing 200 rounds and dropping bombs over the Dongshan Army defense post and Sandaodongzi. The next day 40 Soviet soldiers established two checkpoints at Guzhan blocking traffic and they even began kidnapping civilians. That same day 300 Soviet soldiers and two gunboats occupied the Hujiazhao factory. On the 12th, Sanjianfang, Zhongxing and Lijia’s Oil Mill were occupied by over 2000 Soviet troops. Meanwhile 80 Soviets amphibiously assaulted Liuhetun using 8 small boats, killing its defenders before returning to the other side. The next day two Soviet gunboats, 300 marines and 2 aircraft attacked Suidong county in Heilongjiang province while another force attacked Oupu county with artillery. On the morning of the 14th both counties fell. In response the Nanjing government dispatched Liu Guang, the chief of the military department to inspect the Northeast front. On the 15th Zhang Xueliang issued mobilization orders against the USSR, seeing his standing front line forces bolstered to 100,000. On the 15th the foreign minister of the Nanjing government, Wang Zhengting reported to Chiang Kai-Shek negotiations were going nowhere, the Soviets were adamant about getting their rights returned over the Chinese Eastern Railways. The next day, Wang Zhenting told reporters that if the Soviets attacked anymore China would declare war. The next day Zhang Xueliang was interviewed by the Chicago Daily News and had this to say. "The Soviet Union disregarded international trust, trampled on the non-war pact, and rashly sent troops to invade our country. We respect the non-war pact and have repeatedly made concessions to show our responsibility for provoking the provocation. If the Russian side continues to advance, we will be willing to be the leader of the war, so we have prepared everything and will do our best to fight to the death." On the 16th two Soviet infantry companies and one cavalry company attacked Zhalannur from Abagaitu along the border. The two sides fought for 2 hours until the Soviets stormed the Zhalannur station. After another 5 hours of combat the Soviets pulled back over the border. By this point enough was enough. China declared war on August 17th escalating what was an incident around the Chinese Eastern Railway zone into a full blown war. Blyukher had developed a plan for an offensive consisting of two rapid operations. The first would be against the Chinese naval forces and the second against the ground forces via a large encirclement. After the war was declared on the 17th, the Soviet Army advanced into Manchuria from the western end of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Red Banner Special Far Eastern Army initially dispatched a total of 6,091 infantrymen and 1,599 artillerymen in front of Manchuria, equipped with 88 artillery pieces of 76.2 mm or above, excluding artillery belonging to infantry regiments, 32 combat aircraft, 3 armored trains, and 9 T-18 light tanks . The army units included: the 35th and 36th Infantry Divisions of the 18th Infantry Army; the 5th Cavalry Brigade; the Buryat Mongolian Cavalry Battalion; an independent tank company equipped with T-18 tanks, the 6th Aviation Detachment, the 25th Aviation Detachment, the 26th Bomber Squadron, the 18th Army Artillery Battalion, the 18th Engineering Battalion, and a Railway Battalion. The first battle broke out around Manzhouli. Liang Zhongjia, the brigade commander stationed in Manzhouli, reported this to his superiors of the engagement “of the battle situation, the 38th and 43rd regiments under my command fought with a regiment of Soviet infantry and cavalry for 4 hours in the afternoon and are still in a standoff. The Soviet army has more than one division of troops near Abagaitu”. At 10:30 p.m. on the 18th, the Soviets began to attack the positions of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 43rd Regiment of the Northeastern Army in Zhalannur. At 1 p.m. on August 19, the Soviets added about 600 to 700 troops opposite the positions of the 43rd Regiment of Zhalannur. At 5 a.m the Soviets dispatched five aircraft from Abagaitu to Shibali Station. On the 19th, the Soviets captured Suibin County with ease. At 6 a.m. on the 20th, the Soviets used armored trains to transport more than 200 troops to attack the 10th Cavalry Regiment of Liang Zhongjia's troops. After fighting for about an hour, the Soviets retreated. On the 23rd a battle broke out in Mishan and on the 25th 400 Soviet cavalry began building fortifications roughly a kilometer near the Chinese 43rd regiment at Zhalannur. Zhang Xueliang spoke again to the Chinese and foreign press on the 25th stating this. "Foreigners have many misunderstandings about the Eastern Province's actions this time, thinking that it is to take back the Eastern Route and violate the treaty. In fact, we have no intention of violating the 1924 Sino-Russian Agreement or the Agreement with Russia, because China has signed it and has no intention of violating it. China has no intention of taking back the route at all. What it wants is to remove the Russian personnel who are involved in the communist movement. Moreover, in this matter, the Eastern Route is a very small issue. The real point is that the Russians use China as a base for communism, and we have to take measures in self-defense." Between the 28th to the 30th an intense battle broke out at Wangqing. On the 31st, Soviet gunboats bombarded three garrisons around Heihe. On September 4th, the Soviet army bombarded the right wing of the 43rd and 38th Regiments stationed in Lannur. At 4 pm on the 9th, a single regiment of the Soviet army, under the cover of artillery, launched a fierce attack on the Chinese army at Manzhouli Station from the Shibali Station, but by 8:30 pm, they pulled back. At 4 pm, 8 Soviet aircraft bombed Suifenhe Station, causing over 50 Chinese casualties and injured a regimental commander. On the night of the 16th, more than 100 Soviet troops attacked the Kukdoboka checkpoint in Lubin County and burned down the checkpoint. On the 18th, the Soviet government announced to the ambassadors of various countries that they had always advocated for a peaceful solution to the issue of the Chinese Eastern Railway, while China's attitude was hypocritical and insincere. It was believed that future negotiations were hopeless, and all previous negotiations mediated by Germany were terminated. From now on, they stated quote “the Soviet Union would not bear any responsibility for any ominous incidents caused on the Sino-Russian border”. With negotiations completely broken down, Blyukher was given the greenlight to launch a fatal blow. On October 2, more than a thousand Soviet infantryman, supported by aircraft and artillery stormed the positions of the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Regiment in Manzhouli. The two sides fought until the morning of the 3rd. On the 4th Zhang Xueiliang drafted the “national volunteer army organization regulations letter” trying to embolden the population stating "when the foreigners invade the border, the first thing to do is to resist. All citizens or groups who are willing to sacrifice their lives for the country on the battlefield will be volunteers or volunteer soldiers." The new regulations stipulated that volunteers of this new group would be named as the National Volunteer Army. On October the 10th, 30,000 Soviet forces on the Baikal side advanced through the northeastern border of China. At this time, the brigade responsible for defending Liang Zhongjia had been fighting with the Soviet troops for dozens of days. There was no backup and they were in urgent need of help. According to Chinese observations, the Soviets deployed nearly 80,000 troops by land, sea and air on the Sino-Soviet border. Along the eastern front, the Soviets capture in succession Sanjiangkou, Tongjiang and Fujin. Meanwhile at 5am on the 12th the Far Eastern Fleet commanded engaged in a firefight with the Songhua River Defense Fleet, near Sanjiangkou. According to Chinese reconnaissance, the Soviet warships participating in the battle included: the flagship "Sverdlov" a shallow-water heavy gunboat led by Sgassk, the shallow-water heavy gunboat "Sun Yat-sen", the shallow-water heavy gunboat "Red East", the shallow-water heavy gunboat "Lenin", the inland gunboat "Red Flag", and the inland gunboat "Proletariat", with a total of 4 152mm cannons, 26 120mm cannons, 6 85mm anti-aircraft guns, 8 37mm anti-aircraft guns, and more than ten aircraft for support. The Chinese forces were led by Yin Zuogan who commanded six shallow-water gunboats, including the "Lijie" (flagship), "Lisui", "Jiangping", "Jiang'an", and "Jiangtai", and the "Dongyi" armed barge as a towed artillery platform. Except for the "Jiangheng" of 550 tons and the "Liji" of 360 tons, the rest were all below 200 tons, and the entire fleet had 5 120mm guns. In the ensuing battle the Jiangping, Jiang'an, Jiangtai,...
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3.120 Fall and Rise of China: Guangzhou, Gansu and Red Spear Uprisings
10/07/2024
3.120 Fall and Rise of China: Guangzhou, Gansu and Red Spear Uprisings
Last time we spoke about the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings. On August 1st, during the Nanchang Uprising, the CCP's 2nd Front Army inflicted heavy casualties and seized substantial weaponry. Reorganized under He Long and Ye Ting, the army, then 20,000 strong, celebrated in Nanchang, attracting new recruits. However, faced with an imminent counterattack, they retreated south in what became known as the "little long march." Despite initial successes, like capturing Huichang County, internal strife and harsh conditions reduced their numbers significantly. By the end of August, they reached Guangdong, but relentless opposition from Nationalist forces led to severe losses. The remaining forces retreated east, encountering brutal battles and a final, devastating defeat. Scattered, the remnants sought refuge and eventually regrouped, with leaders like Zhou Enlai and He Long navigating exile and adversity. The uprising marked the CCP's first armed resistance against the KMT, a prelude to continued revolutionary efforts, notably the Autumn Harvest Uprising, amid widespread, strategic shifts in CCP policy and leadership, including Mao Zedong's influential role. #120 The Guangzhou, Gansu and Red Spear Uprisings Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Last we left off the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest uprisings saw mixed to….lets be honest kind of lackluster results. Both certainly saw their hardships for the passionate people involved. Countless gave their lives for a cause they truly believed in. This was China’s warlord era, so many differing groups made grand promises for bright futures, such as warlords, the KMT and of course the CCP. The CCP having undergone the White Terror, now sought to unleash their own independent revolution, now released by the shackles of the KMT. On the 7th the CCP Central Committee held an emergency meeting, where Chen Duxiu was criticized for his appeasement of the KMT right wing. It was also during this meeting, the CCP formalized how they would go about implementing a land revolution and armed uprisings. The CCP then received strong suggestions from Joseph Stalin, that they should unleash a major uprising to seize control over a province, hinting at performing such a deed in Guangzhou in the hopes of taking Guangdong. In accordance the head of the CCP Qu Qiubai decided they needed to persuade soldiers to their cause to perform such a thing. Many within the CCP leadership did not support such plans, deeming the chance of winning control over a province to be highly unlikely, but their Soviet advisors were strongly pushing for it. On the 20th Zhang Tailei, the secretary of the Guangdong CCP provincial committee, discussed plans for a provincial wide uprising. They would mobilize the workers and peasants to hold riots in key locations within Guangdong, particularly Guangzhou. The ultimate plan was to seize Guangdong by establishing uprising committees in Beijiang, Xijiang and Guangzhou. In early October the Nanchang uprising suffered tremendous losses at Chao’an and Shantou. This setback changed the minds of those seeking to seize all of Guangdong and instead they directed their efforts to mobilizing workers in Guangzhou to carry out political and economic struggles. On November 17th within Guangdong and Guangxi, petty warlords began a little war. This was between the KMT aligned warlords Zhang Fakui and Li Jishen. The CCP Central Committee believed this little war was a major opportunity and jumped to exploit it. Zhang Fakui was vulnerable in particular. He was colluding with Wang Jingwei at the time, his primary job was to eliminate the pervading influence of the CCP in the Guangzhou area. Zhang Fakui’s troops continuously rounded up suspected communists and kept a close eye on the Soviet consulate at all times. Zhang Fakui’s troops were more or less brutalizing the common people, not a tasteful job by any means and one that demoralized them. It was because of this the CCP knew they might be able to win over some of his troops to their side. The CCP played upon the low standard of living and economic instability of warlord era China, hoping to appeal to the masses for a Soviet communist style system rather than what the KMT proposed. Here is a taste of some of the slogans they wrote on placards and proclaimed in major city centers: Raise the Soldiers’ Pay to 20 Silver Dollars! Food for the Workers! Land to the Tillers! Knock Down the KMT and the Warlords! Kill All the Country Bullies and the Evil Landlords! Confiscate the Capitalists’ Homes and Give Them to the Rebel Masses! All Authority to the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers! They passed the “resolution of the Guangdong work plan”, this would require the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee to expand some riots using workers and peasants within the cities and villages; incite soldiers to mutiny and resist the war and hopefully direct all said into a general riot to seize power. They would first begin by mobilizing farmers to refuse to pay winter rent and riot if they could. On November 26th, Zhang Tailei went to Guangzhou from Hong Kong covertly and convened a secret meeting with CPP members there. During these meetings it was decided they would take advantage of Zhang Fakui troops, who were currently very demoralized from fighting battles they honestly wanted nothing to do with. Within Guangzhou was the 4th army teaching corps and part of the guards corps amongst smaller CCP militia groups. Zhang Tailei would act as chairman, Huang Ping and Zhou Wenyong would all lead the uprising. After the meeting Zhang Tailei and the others went to the Teaching Corps and Guards Corps to mobilize them, as well as begin training some worker Red Guards who formed into 7 regiments and 2 death squads with Zhou Wengyong as their commander in chief. The Fourth army teaching corps was reorganized from a KMT political school with Ye Jianying as their leader. In early December, Comintern agent Heinz Neumann arrived in Guangdong, to add the uprising. Its said he had a large influence on the committee and took a leading role in what happened. Ye Jianying formed a communist infiltrated cadet regiment roughly 1200 men strong, that would form the core of their army. Added to this was an ad-hoc Red Guard of about 2000 armed workers. On December 6th the Guangdong Provincial Committee chaired by Zhang Tailei approved a declaration and letter to the people as well as made arrangements for the establishment of a Soviet government in Guangzhou. They had decided to enact the uprising on December 12th. In the meantime the headquarters and staff for the uprising were established, Ye Ting would be commander in chief and Ye Jianying would be his deputy. On the eve of the uprising, Wang Jingwei and Zhang Fakui both became aware of the impending uprising so they immediately began disbanding the teaching units, imposed martial law in Guangzhou and transferred their main forces back to Guangzhou. The CCP found out the jig was up so they unleashed the uprising ahead of schedule on the morning of the 11th. At 3:30am under the leadership of Zhang Tailei, Ye Ting, Huang Ping, Zhou Wenyong, Ye Jianying and Yang Yin, the entire teaching regiment, part of the guard regiment and the armed worker Red Guards totaling about 5000 people, 2000 of which were the Red Guards, launched a surprise attack upon key points in Guangzhou from several directions. Some Soviets, Koreans and Vietnamese in Guangzhou also were said to participate in the uprising. I read that last one from a single source and I kinda doubt it. In fact evidence suggests the CCP leadership was extremely mixed on this uprising. Commanders Ye Ting, Ye Jiangying and Xu Xiangqian strongly suggested against going through with it, arguing they were too badly armed to have any success, only 2000 of them even had rifles. The CCP began by first seducing troops of Zhang Fakui. The first units to enter the city were the infamous dare-to-die units. As the name suggests, these men were like a suicidal vanguard stormed police stations, seizing their weapons and cars. They also took control over city buses and trucks to spread the incoming Red army units throughout the city as fast as possible. Along the eastern route, under the direct command of Ye Ting the main force quickly defeated an infantry regiment stationed in Shahe, capturing 600 prisoners, numerous small firearms and eliminated an artillery regiment stationed at Yantang. On the middle route, part of the teaching regiment and Red Guards captured the KMT Guangdong Provincial government building sitting on the commanding heights of Guangyin Mountain, known today as Yuexiu Mountain. On the southern route, the 3rd battalion of the Guards regiment and Red Guards attacked the headquarters of the 4th army and their arsenal, but encountered stiff resistance and were unable to capture them. Meanwhile peasants in Fangcun, Xicun and suburbs of Guangzhou launched uprisings with some gaining urban worker cooperation. Within 4 hours of battle the uprising was providing results, excluding the headquarters of the 4th army. The armory, rear office of the 12th division of the 4th army, the police forces and urban area north of the Pearl River was secured. They took control over government buildings, the central bank which at that time had a very large silver reserve and numerous barracks. To suppress any resistance they began grabbing KMT troops who refused to comply and executed them in the streets. They also marked and burnt down the residences of KMT officials. They had eliminated numerous enemies and captured 20 artillery pieces and 1000 small arms. That same day members the new Soviet government of Guangzhou was formed with Su Zhaozheng becoming its chairman. Upon its establishment the Guangzhou Soviet declared a “letter to the people” with decrees. Meanwhile during the outbreak of hostilities, Chen Gongbo, the chairman of the KMT Guangdong provincial government, Zhang Fakui, Huang Qixiang the commander of the 4th Army and other KMT officials hastily fled to the headquarters of Li Fulin’s 5th army stationed over at the Haizhong temple on the south bank of the pearl river. There they ordered the 12th division, the 78th rgiment of the 26th division, the 25th division in Dongjiang and the 1st and 2nd regiment of the 1st training division in Shunde to march upon Gaungzhou. This saw roughly 15,000 NRA troops converging upon the city. On the 12th more than 3 of Zhang Fakui’s divisions and part of Li Fulin’s 5th army assembled along the south bank of the pearl river with the support of British, American, French and Japanese warships and marines. They prepared a counterattack from the east, west and south. The communists fought desperately against much superior forces in terms of numbers, training and equipment. They suffered heavy losses, including the death of Zhang Tailei. Zhang Fakui’s troops arrived one after another gradually surrounding the city. At a critical moment the CCP leadership called for a retreat from the city to preserve the forces they had left. The surviving 1000 Reds fled Guangzhou in the early hours of the 13th whereupon they were reorganized into the 4th Red division. They fled to Huaxian, then Haifeng and Lufegen counties where they joined others performing uprisings in the Dongjiang and Youjiang areas. A few survivors went to Shaoguan, joining survivors of the Nanchang uprising led by Zhu De and Chen Yi. After the KMT secured Guangzhou they carried out a bloody suppression of anyone suspecting of being a communist or sympathetic to the cause. The CCP estimated that perhaps more than 5700 people were killed. The Soviet consulate in Guangzhou was also attacked around 8pm on the 13th. All of its personnel were arrested and according to the testimony of Soviet Consul Pokhvalinsky, diplomats Ukolov and Ivanov “Each of them had a sign tied to their body that read: ‘Russian Communist, anyone can punish him at will.’ … Along the way, people threw things at them, hit them, stabbed them with knives, and spit on them.” They both would later be shot, alongside the deputy consul named Hasis. Ye Ting, was scapegoated, purged and blamed for the failure of the Guangzhou uprising, despite the fact he was one of the commanders arguing it should have been called off in the first place. Enraged by how he was treated, Ye Ting fled China and went into exile in Europe. Although the Nanchang, Autumn Harvest and Guangzhou uprisings had all failed to achieve their primary objectives, they did kindle a fire within China. Rather then become demoralized and whither away, the communists pushed even more uprisings and would grow each year. This began what the CCP refers to as the “ten year civil war”, a period that will end in 1936. Now we are going to take a little break from the Chinese Civil War until we hit the early 1930’s, but there have been quite a lot of events overshadowed by the Northern Expedition. I of course can’t get into everything that was going on in China during the late 1920’s, but I thought it be a good idea to at least tackle some of the big ones. If you remember all the way back when I was listing the different warlord cliques, one of them was the Ma clique. Feng Yuxiang’s Guominjun had been shoved into the northwest after the Anti-Fengtian war and one province his men began to oversee was Gansu. At the time famine, natural disasters and the forced seizure of farming land for opium cultivation drove the people of Gansu to rebellion. Two Hui Muslim Generals, Ma Zhongying and Ma Tingxiang exploited the situation to perform a revolt against the Guominjun in 1928. Prior to this, there had been a lot of ethnic/religious fighting within the province of Gansu. An American botanist named James Rock wrote accounts of how he saw fighting between the Hui Muslims ld by the warlord Ma Qi and Tibetan Buddhists at the Labrang Monastery. Back in 1917, Tibetans in Xunhua had rebelled against Ma Anliang because of over taxation. Ma Anliang did not report this to the Beiyang government and was reprimanded for it, seeing Ma Qi sent by the Beiyang government to investigate and suppress the rebellion. Ma Qi commanded the Ninghai Army in Qinghai and used his forces to seize the Labrang Monastery in 1917. This was the first time non-Tibetans had taken the monastery. Because of this ethnic/religious riots broke out between Muslims and Tibetans seeing Ma Qi defeat the Tibetans. Afterwards he heavily taxed the town of Labrang for over 8 years and repeatedly quelled uprisings. In 1921 he crushed Tibetan Monks trying to retake the monastery. In 1925 a full blown Tibetan rebellion broke out, seeing thousands attacking Hui Muslims. Ma Qi responded by deploying 3000 troops who quickly retook Labrang and machine gunned thousands of Tibetans trying to flee. Ma Qi would besiege Labrang numerous times seeing Hui Muslims, Mongols and Tibetans all fighting for control over Labrang, but by 1927 Ma Qi gave it all up. Ma Qi became the governor of Qinghai and moved on. However, that was not the last Labrang would see of General Ma Qi. The Hui forces looted and ravaged the monastery again and in revenge Tibetans skinned alive many Hui soldiers. One of the most common practices was to slice open the stomach of a living soldier and then put hot rocks inside the stomach. Many Hui women were sold to the ethnic Han and Kazakhs. Children were adopted by the Tibetans. Now come 1927, Feng Yuxiang became the governor of Gansu. To control the region, Feng Yuxiang incorporated and promoted Hui Muslim Generals within his Guominjun. Feng Yuxiang placed Liu Yufen with 15,000 troops to act as governor while he jumped into the northern expedition. There was a particularly nasty earthquake that year, followed by drought and famine. Liu Yufen responded to the situation by overtaxing the populace. During the later half of the northern expedition, Zhang Zuolin fomented any rebellious fires he could amongst his enemies and he could see within Gansu there was an opportunity to exploit. He began sending shipments of weapons to the son of Ma Anliang, Ma Tingxiang who unleashed a revolt against Liu Yufen in Liangzhou. The revolt soon spread and this saw Ma Tingxiang unleash a siege against Hezhou in the spring of 1928. To support the siege, Ma Zhongying recruited Hui, Dongxiang and Salar Muslims, forming an army nearly 10,000 strong. By November, the Hezhou besiegers numbered 25,000 and were beginning to starve. So the men were directed towards the Tao River Valley in the south where they began slaughtering Tibetan monks. They burned the place of the Tibetan Tusi Chief King Yang Jiqing after defeating his 3000 man strong army and sacked the Tibetan city of Chone. The Tibetan areas south of Gansu were laid to waste. At Taozhou Tibetan militias tried to fight off the force of Ma Tingxiang but were defeated. However they did inflict severe casualties upon Ma Tingxiang’s forces. This only emboldened more atrocities, seeing muslim forces burn printing presses and temples of the Tibetan Buddhists in Chone. The muslims then looted the Gompa (for those who don’t know a Gompa is a sacred Buddhist spiritual compound, sort of like a buddhist university) and massacred the Tibetan Buddhist monks of the Labrang monastery. The Austrian-American botanist Joseph Rock witnessed much of the carnage and even found himself stuck in a battle in 1929. He described seeing Muslim armies leaving behind Tibetan skeletons over wide areas and decorated the Labrang Monastery with severed Tibetan heads. During the 1929 battle of Xiahe near Labrang, severed Tibetan heads were apparently used as ornaments by Hui Muslim troops within their camps. Rock stated “how the heads of young girls and children were staked around the encampment. Ten to fifteen heads were fastened to the saddle of every Muslim cavalryman. The heads were "strung about the walls of the Moslem garrison like a garland of flowers" The blood flowed until 1929 whence Liu Yufen with support of Feng Yuxiang finally drove off their forces. Its estimated up to 2 million died in the war across Gansu. Ma Tingxiang tried to defect to Chiang Kai-Shek, but would find himself captured later by Feng Yuxiang who executed him. Another notable rebellion occurred in the good old province of Shandong, because where else right? You may remember me talking about a small group known as the Red Spear Society. They were a movement made up of peasants, who formed self-defense militias during China’s Warlord Era. There were numerous branches, but the largest one was in Shandong, particularly within Laiyang county. They of course were so numerous in Shandong because of our old friend the Dogmeat General Zhang Zongchang. Zhang Zongchang notoriously abused the populace of Shandong with gross mismanagement, over taxation and pure brutality. Lets also be honest, Shandong just keeps rearing its head through this podcast series, its basically the melting pot for uprisings. In the fall of 1928, banditry rose exponentially across the Shandong Peninsula, leading...
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3.119 Fall and Rise of China: Nanchang & Autumn Harvest Uprisings
09/30/2024
3.119 Fall and Rise of China: Nanchang & Autumn Harvest Uprisings
Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Chinese Civil War. By early 1927, Chiang Kai-Shek had assembled a team of right-wing KMT members and anti-communist allies like Dai Jitao and Wu Tiecheng, strategizing to sever ties with the Soviet Union and garner support from local gentry, merchants, and international diplomats. Despite publicly maintaining a façade of supporting the Soviet alliance, Chiang Kai-Shek was secretly preparing an anti-communist campaign. The turning point came on April 12, 1927, when Chiang’s forces, with the help of the Green Gang, launched a brutal attack on CCP members and workers in Shanghai, marking the beginning of the Shanghai Massacre. This violent crackdown spread across the country, leading to the collapse of the first united front between the KMT and CCP. In the aftermath, the CCP called for mobilization against the KMT, sparking further conflicts such as the Wuhan-Nanjing war and the Nanchang Uprising. Key CCP leaders like He Long and Zhou Enlai emerged during this period, setting the stage for the next phase of the Chinese Civil War. #119 The Nanchang & Autumn Harvest Uprisings Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We left off in the midst of the Nanchang uprising. On August the 1st the CCP 2nd front army had successfully inflicted 3000 casualties and captured more than 5000 small arms of various types, 700,000 rounds of ammunition and a few cannons. With more and more CCP aligned units arriving the army needed to be reorganized. It was decided the uprising army would continue to use the designation of 2nd front army of the NRA with He Long serving as its commander in chief and Ye Ting as his deputy. Ye Ting would also command the 11th army consisting of the 24th, 25th and 10th divisions, Nie Rongzhen would be his CCP party representative; He Long would command the 20th Army consisting of the 1st and 2nd divisions with Liao Qianwu as his CCP party representative. Zhou Enlai with Zhu De as his deputy would lead the 9th army with Zhu Kejing as his CCP party representative. Altogether they were 20,000 strong and now very well armed. On August 2nd, tens of thousands of people gathered in Nanchang to celebrate the great victory and the establishment of the revolutionary committee. This drew a large number of new recruits, particularly young students. Upon hearing the news of the uprising, Wang Jingwei urgently dispatched Zhang Fakui and Zhu Peide to quell the uprisers. On August the 3rd in accordance with orders from the CCP Central Committee the 2nd front army withdrew from Nanchang heading south along the Fu River. This withdrawal became known as the “little long march”. They planned to enter Guangdong province via Ruijin and Xunwu where they would first occupy Dongjiang. They hoped there they could develop further forces, perhaps gain foreign aid and if all went spectacularly capture Guangzhou. Upon entering Jinxian county, the commander of the 10th Division, Cai Tingkai expelled the communists from his ranks and instead took his division northeast into Jiangxi leaving the movement. A large reason he was able to pull this off was because the 2nd front army had been too hastily reorganized. The troops rushed into new formations and left Nanchang far too fast. The conditions of their march were also rough, it was a scorching hot week. By the time they made it to Linchuan on August 7th, they now numbered 13,000. They rested in Linchuan for 3 days then continued advancing southwards. On August 25th, their vanguard reach Rentian of Ruijin county. Li Jishen the commander of the NRA 8th route army was stationed in Guangdong. Li Jishen dispatched 9000 troops led by Qian Dajun from Ganzhou over to Huichang and around Ruijin to block the advance of the Reds. He also transferred 9000 troops led by Huang Shaohongs army based in Nanxiong and Dayu over to Yudu to support Qian Dajun. The CCP Front Committee took advantage of the fact Qian and Huang’s armies were not yet fully concentrated in the area, unleashing a one by one attack. On the 26th the Red’s attacked Rentians defenders, routing them and capturing Ruijin county. They then concentrated their forces to attack the main portion of Qian Dajun’s army in Huichang. After a fierce 4 day battle they managed to capture Huichang county. The Red’s reported inflicting over 6000 casualties upon Qian Dajun’s army and capturing over 2500 guns while suffering 2000 casualties. Then in early September the Reds repelled an attack by Huang Shaohongs forces near Luokou just due northwest of Huichang. Having survived the encounter, the Reds withdrew to Ruijin, one unit after another, then they changed their route to head east, passing through Changting and Shanghang in Fujian province. From there they headed south along the Tingjiang River and Hanjiang river. On the 22nd, the 25th Division of the 11th Army occupied Sanheba in Dapu county of Guangdong province. Meanwhile the main force continued southwards and occupied Chao’an and Shantou by the 23rd. During this period Li Jishen ordered the remnants of Qian Dajun’s army to try and contain the 25th Division and Huang Shaohongs army to attack Chao’an via Fengshun. He also dispatched Chen Jitang and Xue Yue with 3 divisions, roughly 15,000 men from the East Route to advance eastwards from Heyuan hoping to force a decisive battle. By the way for Pacific War fans, Xue Yue will become one of China’s greatest Generals. Just a little bit about him. He was born to a peasant family in Xiaopingshi village of Guangdong in 1896. In 1907 he entered the Huangpu military primary school and two years later he joined the Tongmenghui. In 1917 he was admitted to the 6th class of the Baoding Military academy. The next year however he departed in July to join Dr Sun Yat-Sen and Chen Jiongming’s new army in Guangzhou. He entered their army as a captain following the army into Fujian where he helped capture over 20 counties centered around Zhangzhou. In 1920 he help attack the Guangxi army of Cen Chunxuan where the commander of the 1st division, Deng Keng, appointed him as a major commanding a machine gun company. The following year the machine gun company expanded into a battalion. In 1921 Deng Keng ordered a personal guard to be formed to protect Dr Sun Yat-Sen, with Xue Yue, Ye Ting and Zhang Fakui as the commanders of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd battalions. In March of 1922 when Chen Jiongming went to war with Dr Sun Yat-Sen, Xue Yue escorted his family to Guangzhou. There he defended the presidential palace where a 10 hour battle emerged nearly seeing Dr Sun Yat-Sen killed. Xue Yue and some of his men got Dr Sun Yat-Sen and his family away to safety as he led a campaign to quell Chen Jiongmings rebellion. As Chiang Kai-Shek led troops to attack Chen Jiongming, Xue Yue was appointed major general adjutant and chief of staff of the 1st division of the Guangdong army. In 1925 he served as deputy commander of the 14th division of the 1st NRA Army. During the campaign heading east, Xue Yue proved himself a brilliant commander, enough so to receive personal praise from Chiang Kai-Shek via telegram. During the Northern Expedition Xue Yue helped capture Jiangxi, Changsha, Liuyang and Nanchang. He was promoted to commander of the 1st division as the NRA invaded Zhejiang and led men to capture Hangzhou, Nanjing and Shanghai. However after the Shanghai massacre, Xue Yue made the rather poor decision of publicly calling for Chiang Kai-Shek to be arrested for being a counterrevolutionary. He was quickly purged from the 1st Army, fled for Guangdong where he found a new post as a divisional commander under Li Jishen. Back to our story, the CCP Front Committee decided to establish a 3rd division of the 20th army and stationed them at Chaoshan. Thus there 6500 men were positioned to meet the enemy's advance. On September 28th the main bulk of the Red army encountered the East Route Army near Shanhu in Jieyang county. The Reds managed to defeat them and marched upon Tangkeng where they fought a fierce battle near Fenshui village, a monument to that battle exists there to this day. By the 30th, the Reds had suffered another 2000 casualties and were unable to put up much of a fight so they pulled back to Jieyang. That night Huang Shaohongs men recaptured Chao’an. On October 3rd the Red army evacuated Chaoshan and advanced to Haifeng, passing through the Lianhua Mountain. However enroute they were intercepted by the East Route Army, leading to a bloody battle where they were broken badly. Units and commanders dispersed, with one large force of 1300 making it to Haifeng. The Reds had suffered a disastrous and decisive defeat with only over a 1000 troops remaining as a complete unit, who would later reform into a regiment. Zhu De and Chen Yi faked their names and sought refuge amongst a local Hunanese warlord. Starting basically from scratch they turned their little force into a 10,000 strong army who would go on to fight in the border areas of Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi and Hunan, managing to save 800 Reds who were simultaneously performing an uprising in southern Hunan. Countless were arrested, deserted or went into exile. Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying and Ye Ting lost contact with the others and fled to British Hong Kong, with Zhou Enlai becoming seriously ill. The three had two pistols with them and were successful in reaching Hong Kong. Nie Rongzhen, the other communist leader, also successfully escaped to Hong Kong. He Long who had strongly opposed the little long march plan, accurately pointed out that marching 1000 miles in the blazing heat of summer would put too much strain on the troops and that the Hunan would have been a better place to set up shop rather than Guangdong. He Long simply took up and went home, demoted from his position as commander. It is said he became a beggar and was not well received by his family. Yet he would rise back up and lead a 3000 man strong Red Force who would later be wiped out by the KMT. By April of 1928 these forces would contribute to the Autumn Harvest Uprising, something we will talk about later. The Nanchang Uprising saw the first shots in armed resistance against the KMT. It was also when the CCP officially declared their firm stance against the KMT and marked the beginning of their journey to create their own military. Within the vacuum of hundreds of smaller uprisings, the Nanchang Uprising alongside two other events we will talk about, the Guangzhou Uprising and Autumn Harvest Uprising are the three more important uprisings during this period of time. Back on August 7th, the CCP Central Committee held an emergency meeting in Hankou known as the “August 7th Meeting”. Here they abandoned Chen Duxiu’s right-wing appeasement strategy and determined a new policy that would involve implementing land revolution and armed uprisings. They called upon the entire party and people of China to resist the KMT. This saw widespread uprisings spring up all over the place. One of their largest campaigns was referred to as the Autumn Harvest Uprising, which would be performed in Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong and Jiangxi where the foundation of the workers and peasants movement was the highest. A lot was debated about how to perform such a campaign. Many called for making the peasant association the center of it by declaring them a type of local government, whence they the CCP would seize all of the power from them. In addition to seizing rural power, they needed the backing of urban workers and the poor. Many pointed out the Autumn Harvest Uprising like the Nanchang Uprising should have the main purpose of launching a land revolution. It would be optimal of it was launched simultaneously in Hunan centered around Hengyang, Changsha and if possible at Baoqing. After their August 7th conference the CCP Central Committee sent one Mao Zedong and Peng Gongda, at the time alternate members of the Provisional Political Bureau to Hunan to reorganize the Hunan Provincial committee. For the Autumn Harvest Uprising Mao Zedong was appointed the Central Special Commissioner with Peng Gongda as Secretary of the Provincial Committee. Now we haven't spoken about Mao Zedong in some time. I think the last time we left off about him was with the founding of the CCP party. In 1921 alongside those like Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, he too was a founder and he began setting up a branch of the CCP in Changsha. Within Hunan he also established a branch of the Socialist Youth Corps and Cultural Book Society, who opened a bookstore to spread communist literature throughout the province. During the warlord era, Mao Zedong was involved in the struggle for Hunan autonomy. Mao Zedong hoped a Hunanese constitution might increase civil liberties, thus making his work to cause a communist revolution easier. The movement was successful at establishing a provincial autonomy under a Hunanese warlord, but Mao Zedong would find that not quite optimal. By that same year of 1921, communist groups had sprung up in Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Guangzhou, Jinan and Changsha, and on July 23rd it was decided to form a central meeting. The first session of the national congress of the CCP was in Shanghai, attended by 13 delegates, one being Mao Zedong. However, undercover police infiltrated the congress, forcing the delegates to hop on a boat near Jiaxing in Zhejiang to escape. Although Soviet and CCP delegates attended the first congress pretty much ignored Lenin’s advice to temporarily accept an alliance between them and the bourgeois democrats who were also espousing a national revolution, ie: the KMT. Instead many in the CCP sought to stick strictly to the Marxist belief only an urban proletariat could cause a real communist revolution. At that point Mao Zedong was the party secretary for Hunan, working out of Changsha. In August he founded the “self study university” where readers could gain access to revolutionary literature. He also joined the YMCA Mass Education Movement to combat illiteracy, though it should be noted he had a huge habit of editing textbooks to fit his communist ideals. He continuously organized worker strikes, particularly against the warlord governor of Hunan, Zhao Hengti. Some of these successful strikes were the Anyuan coal mine strikes, which saw both bourgeois and proletarian methodology incorporated. Mao Zedong had mobilized many walks of life, miners, gentry, military officials, merchants, Triads and even members of the Church. His work in the Anyuan mines also involved his wife Yang Kaihui who was fighting for women's rights. She sought to increase women’s literacy, education and political power within peasant communities. Mao Zedong and Yang Kaihui were not irregular in advocating for women's rights amongst the communist leaders, but they would be some of the most effective. Because of Mao Zedong's success in the Anyuan mines, Chen Duxiu invited him to become a member of the CCP Central Committee. Mao Zedong failed to make it to the second congress of the CCP in Shanghai, held in July of 1922, with the excuse he lost the address. There the CCP delegates agreed to forming the first united front. Mao Zedong enthusiastically agreed to this decision, arguing for an alliance across China’s socio-economic classes. Mao Zedong’s work in the first united front would see him become the chief of propaganda for the KMT. Mao Zedong was a vocal anti-imperialist with a lot of his writing directed against the governments of the UK, US and Japan. At the third congress of the CCP in Shanghai in June of 1923, the delegates reaffirmed their commitment to the first united front. Here Mao Zedong was elected to the Party Committee and took up residence in Shanghai. At the first KMT congress held in Guangzhou in 1924, Mao Zedong was elected as an alternate member of the KMT Central Executive Committee where he would put forward resolutions to decentralize power to the urban and rural bureaus. His enthusiastic support for the KMT would earn him suspicion from colleagues such as Li Lisan who had worked closely with him in Hunan. After the KMT congress he went to Shaoshan where he found the peasants were becoming increasingly restless. Many had seized land and wealth from local landowners. This convinced Mao Zedong that peasants were an effective revolutionary force, something the KMT leftists were proposing, but not the CCP at the time. Later Mao Zedong would be one of many in the CCP calling for an end to the first united front in the face of major grievances. However Borodin continuously advised not to break off with the KMT. In the winter of 1925, Mao Zedong fled for Guangzhou after receiving a lot of heat for revolutionary activities. He led the 6th term of the KMT’s peasant movement training institute, the first government sponsored training institute for rural political activities. Here Mao Zedong was secretly training and preparing militants while also teaching them basic socialist theory. When Sun Yat-Sen died and Chiang Kai-Shek rose to power, Mao Zedong supported his NRA and their northern expedition. Yet in the wake of the northern expedition Mao Zedong was helping the peasants rise up and seize the land of wealthy landowners, in many cases with violence. It was this type of behavior that began to really ruffle the feathers of the KMT leaders who of course were landowners themselves. In March of 1927 Mao appeared at the 3rd Plenum of the KMT central executive committee in Wuhan, who were actively trying to strip Chiang Kai-Shek of his power and bolster Wang Jingwei in his stead. Mao Zedong played an active role, pushing peasant issues, arguing for the death penalty to be exacted on those found guilty of counter revolutionary activity, justifying it by simply stating “peaceful methods cannot suffice”. In April Mao Zedong was appointed to the KMT’s 5 member central land committee where he urged peasants to stop paying rent. He then put into motion a draft resolution for land acquisition calling for the confiscation of land belonging to "local bullies and bad gentry, corrupt officials, militarists and all counter-revolutionary elements in the villages". Mao Zedong then carried out a "Land Survey", stating that anyone owning over 30 mou (four and a half acres), which constituted 13% of the population at the time, were uniformly counter-revolutionary. Many of his colleagues thought he was going too far, some not far enough. In the end only some of his suggestions were partially implemented. When the Wuhan-Nanjing war broke out, Chiang Kai-Shek performed the Shanghai Massacre, beginning the White Terror. The CCP state more than 5000 communists were killed by the hands of the Green Gang in Shanghai. Over in Beijing Zhang Zuolin performed his own little white terror taking the life of those like Li Dazhao. In May the CCP claim tens of thousands of communists and their suspected allies were murdered, perhaps up to 25,000. The CCP contuined to support the Wuhan government, somthing Mao Zedong supported initially. Yet by the time of the CCP’s 5th Congress he had changed his mind and was staking...
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3.118 Fall and Rise of China: Chinese Civil War Draws First Blood
09/23/2024
3.118 Fall and Rise of China: Chinese Civil War Draws First Blood
Last time we spoke about the finale of the Northern Expedition, the reunification of China. In May the NRA advanced from the Yellow River bridgehead despite losing access to the Tianjin-Pukou railway, forcing a 60-mile march. General Chen Tiaoyuan captured Tehzhou on the 13th, as the NRA cleared northern Shandong. They then converged on Beijing, with Feng Yuxiang’s 2nd Collective Army and Yan Xishan’s 3rd Collective Army advancing from different directions. Yan Xishan fought the NPA, recapturing territories and capturing Nankou, which led to speculation he would enter Beijing first. Despite NPA counterattacks, the NRA forces continued their advance. By late May, the NRA's combined efforts and internal NPA issues led to a general retreat of the NPA forces. On June 6, Yan Xishan’s troops entered Beijing. The NPA's Zhang Zuolin was assassinated by Japanese officers, leading to a power shift to his son Zhang Xueliang, who later aligned with Chiang Kai-Shek. By December 1928, China was unified under the KMT. #118 The Chinese Civil War Draws First Blood Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So I said a few times during the northern expedition that I wanted to push aside the emerging Chinese civil war. Although we loosely covered a lot of the major events, this episode is going to try and narrow and focus it down. Now please note, up until this point I have to admit I had been using sources that were either skewed towards the Chinese nationalist views or were trying to be non biased. For some of these episodes I intentionally am using some CCP aligned sources, I will try my best to balance things out. Also a large part of this is going to be a retelling of the Shanghai Massacre, but more from the point of view of the CCP. All the way back in 1926, Chiang Kai-Shek had managed to seize power over the Kuomintang. He exerted control over the party and army as he unleashed the Northern Expedition. By November 9th Chiang Kai-Shek set up a new headquarters in Nanchang. Chiang Kai-Shek was determined to purge the party of communists and began to do so here. He began by recruiting a large number of right-wing Kuomintang members such as Dai Jitao and Wu Tiecheng. Dai Jitao was a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and had served as the Minister of the KMT’s propaganda department. After the death of Sun Yat-Sen, Dai Jitao had actively promoted an anti-communist movement, drawing support from warlords, right wingers and those the CCP would describe as “imperialists”. In May of 1925 with the support of Chiang Kai-Shek, Dai Jitao began an anti-communist campaign in Shanghai. He ran two successful pamphlets loosely translated in English as "The Philosophical Foundation of Sun Yat-senism" and "National Revolution and the Chinese Kuomintang”. Both worked to promote the teachings of Confucius and Mencius while distorting Sun Yat-sen's thoughts. Dai Jitao was arguing that Sun Yat-Sen’s ideology chiefly came from Confucianism instead of western philosophy and that in fact the man was a traditionalist. He twisted Sun Yat-Sen’s three principles, castrating them of revolutionary content. All of this quickly became a "banner" for the Kuomintang right-winger to carry out anti-communist activities. After Chiang Kai-Shek arrived in Nanchang, he immediately invited him to go north to jointly plan the purge of the party and anti-communism. Wu Tiecheng joined Dai Jitao, he was the director of the Guangzhou Public security Bureau and a well known KMT right-winger. Prior to the Zhongshan ship incident, Wu Tiecheng stated he had suggested to Chiang Kai-Shek that they impose sanctions on the CCP. In his words “with the registration materials of the special household registration of our Public Security Bureau, we can immediately arrest a dozen of the main Communist Party members, and then use a ship to transport them to a small island near Zhongshan County , or send them to Shanghai. As for the minor members, they will be temporarily detained." Chiang Kai-Shek said "I will think about it first." After the Zhongshan incident, Chiang Kai-Shek pretended to dismiss him from his post, but specially invited him later to Nanchang and dispatched him to Japan as a liaison. Another large figure who was invited over was Huang Fu, who had served as the Minister of Foreign affairs and Education for the Beiyang Government and as its Prime Minister. When Chiang Kai-Shek came to Nanchang he wrote to Huang Fu twice inviting him to come south. On December 31st, Zhang Jingjiang and Chen Guofu were also invited to Nanchang. Zhang Jingjiang was a member of the KMT’s Central Supervisory Committee. After the secondary Plenary session of the second central committee, he became chairman of it. He used his authority and colluded with Chen Guofu, the Minister of Organization to dissolve the Guangzhou Municipal Party committee, which at the time was being led by left winger KMT. They did this by placing confidants in various positions to steal power. Simultaneously, they suppressed worker and peasant movements in Guangdong, even dispatching gangsters to kill their leaders and burn down the provincial and Hong Kong strike committee HQ. All of these people gathered at Nanchang formed a anti-communist cabal backing Chiang Kai-Shek. In January of 1927 these men went up Mount Lushan to a famous hotel called Xianyan where they plotted. After several days of meetings, as my source argues, mostly based on the advice of Huang Fu, these following decisions were obtained. Number 1, they would enact a policy of separating from the USSR and purging the party of CCP. Number 2, the NRA must settle the southeast by forming an alliance with the gentry and merchant class there. Number 3 in their diplomatic efforts they had to abandon the USSR and ally themselves to Japan. Number 4, to increase their military power they had to unite with Feng Yuxiangs Guominjun and Yan Xishan. Upon returning to Nanchang, Chiang Kai-Shek took action, first by attacking Borodin. He sent a telegram to Xu Qian, the chairman of the Wuhan joint conference, stating Borodin had insulted him in public at Wuhan and demanded he be removed from his advisory position. He also recomended expell Borodin back to the USSR. The source I am reading states Chiang Kai-Shek had two rationales for going after Borodin. "Chiang Kai-Shek felt that except for Borodin, the Kuomintang leaders in Wuhan were all politically incompetent. ... As long as Borodin was there, he could not gain a dominant position. Secondly, he was using Borodin like a scape goat to hide his real anti-Soviet purpose’. At this time Chiang Kai-Shek was being labeled a USSR stooge by the NPA and a Japanese stooge by the CCP. In response, Chiang Kai-Shek stated publicly "Our alliance with Russia was left by the Prime Minister. Although its representatives have been arrogant for a long time and oppressed our party leaders in many ways, I believe that this has nothing to do with the Soviet Union's spirit of treating us equally. No matter what their personal attitudes are, we will never change our relationship with the Soviet Union towards Japan. Why should we unite with the Soviet Union? It is because the Soviet Union can treat China equally. Since the Soviet Union has not given up treating us equally, how can we give up the policy of alliance with Russia. ... Not only Japan, but any country, if it can treat China equally, then we will treat them the same way as we treat the Soviet Union. It is not impossible to unite with them. We unite with the Soviet Union to seek freedom and equality for China. It is completely based on the meaning of treating our nation equally, so we must unite with the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union does not treat us equally and oppresses us in the same way, we will also oppose them in the same way. I have said for a long time." In regards to the CCP Chiang Kai-Shek stated to his close confidants “When I was in Guangzhou, I was always paying attention to the actions of the CCP. I wanted to implement my proposal to overthrow the CCP in Guangzhou, however I did not do so. I was unable to do so because it could mean the end of the Kuomintang”. After the success of the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-Shek lamented to his confidants “although our army has won a great victory, I still worry the enemy is not at our front but at our rear. The CCP is causing much trouble within, we must make sure it does not split out party or even collapse our army. There are thorns everywhere”. Publically Chiang Kai-Shek stated "Now there is a rumor that I distrust and alienate my Communist comrades and have a tendency to oppose them. In fact, it cannot be said that I will not oppose the Communist Party. I has always supported the Communist Party... But that is to say, if the Communist Party becomes strong in the future and its members are arrogant and tyrannical, I will definitely correct them and punish them. ... Now many Communist Party members are actually oppressing the Kuomintang members, showing an overbearing attitude, and tend to exclude Kuomintang members, making Kuomintang members embarrassed. In this way, I can no longer treat Communist Party members with the same preferential treatment as before. If I still have the same attitude as before, then I am not in the position of a Kuomintang member, and I cannot be a Kuomintang member. Although I am not a Communist Party member, from a revolutionary perspective, I have to take some responsibility for the success or failure of the Communist Party! I am the leader of the Chinese revolution, not just the leader of the Kuomintang. The Communist Party is a part of the Chinese revolutionary forces. Therefore, if Communist Party members do something wrong or act tyrannically, I have the responsibility and power to intervene and punish them." As you can see, publicly Chiang Kai-Shek was always walking on eggshells when attacking the CCP. If you know the old boiling frog analogy, it's more or less like Chiang Kai-Shek gradually getting the public to attack the CCP. At the ceremony where Li Liejun was appointed chairman of Jiangxi, Chiang Kai-shek once again gave a speech, saying that communism was only a method of economic development, which might be applicable in some countries, but if China adopted communism, it would be a great harm and would only lead to the overthrow and revolution of China. In late January, Chiang Kai-Shek met with Momuro Keijiro, a representative sent by Japan’s minister of Finance and Navy at Lushan. Chiang Kai-Shek explained to Keijiro that he understood the importance of the political and economic relationship between Manchuria and Japan. He understood the Japanese had spilt a lot of blood there during the Russo-Japanese War. He believed Manchuria required special consideration and hoped the Japanese would correctly evaluate the KMT’s struggle to reunify China. Chiang Kai-Shek then met with the Japanese consul General in Jiujiang, Edo Sentaro, explaining he did not only intend to abolish the unequal treaties but would try to respect the existing conditions as much as possible, such as guaranteeing the recognition of foreign loans and repayments and respecting foreign owned enterprises. After these meetings Chiang Kai-Shek met with representatives of the Imperial Japanese Military such as Nagami Masuki and Matsumuro Takayoshi. It was Dai Jitao who set up these meetings. Chiang Kai-Shek began the talks by making it clear the KMT would not work with the CCP and was willing to work with Japan to prevent the spread of Communism in China. Chiang Kai-Shek also met with the Japanese politician Yamamoto Jotario who would go on to say in Beijing that he believed the Generalissimo was an outstanding military leader. Needless to say, as my source would put it “Chiang Kai-Shek was closely colluding with Japanese imperialism”. He was also establishing contacts with the US. He dispatched Wang Zhengting to Shanghai to meet the American consul general there. Wang Zhengting told him the KMT had washed their hands of the communists and that there would be nor more incidents such as the one that befell Hankou. The American consul general in Guangzhou was likewise contacted through the finance minister of Guangdong, Kong Xiangxi. What the American consuls told their government was “if the powers want to drive the Soviets out of China, they should establish direct contact with Chiang Kai-Shek”. Chiang Kai-Shek also publicly expressed regret to numerous nations for incidents such as the one in Nanjing. He was gaining a reputation as being the only leader in China capable of restoring order amongst the chaos. Many of these foreign diplomats privately told Chiang Kai-Shek that if he wanted to really brush shoulders with them he had to purge the communists and soon. To truly purge the communists Chiang Kai-Shek reaches a deal with the bourgeoisie of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. They will support him economically if he helps suppress the worker movements in Shanghai. They fund Chiang Kai-Shek some 500,000 Yuan in early March, then on the 29th the Shanghai Commercial Federation pledges 5 million Yuan, with another 3 million on April 1st. Around this time Chiang Kai-Shek secretly send Wang Boling, the deputy commander of the 1st army; Yang Hu, chief of the special affairs department of the general HQ and Chen Qun the director of the political department of the eastern route army to Shanghai in disguise to meet Huang Jinrong. Huang Jinrong was a chief detective working in the French concession of Shanghai. He also happened to be one of the top three gangsters working under Du Yuesheng of the Green Gang. Huang Jinrong summoned Du Yuesheng and the other Green Gang leader Zhang Xiaolin, as they all discussed how to purge the communists. The Green Gang leaders seized the opportunity to help the KMT. They began monitoring the CCP, armed their gang members and began to attack anyone who was picketing. They formed the “China Progress Association”, which in reality was just Green Gang members. This association proceeded to attack the Shanghai General Labor Union, providing the perfect pretext for Chiang Kai-Shek to act. On April 1st Wang Jingwei returns to Shanghai from aboard. By the 3rd Chiang Kai-Shek telegrams that Wang Jingwei is reinstated and holds secret talks with him. On the 8th Chiang Kai-Shek organizes a Shanghai Provisional Political Committee, stipulating it will decide all military, political and financial decisions and will replace the Shanghai special municipality provincial government that was established after the third Shanghai worker uprising. On the 9th he unleashes martial law prohibiting assemblies, strikes and marches, and established the Songhu Martial Law Command, with Bai Chongxi and Zhou Fengqi as the commander and deputy commander. Chiang Kai-Shek then takes his leave for Nanjing, leaving the job to Bai Chongxi who will supervise a coup in Shanghai. In a vain attempt Chen Duxiu tells the CCP to ease up on the Anti-Chiang Kai-Shek stuff. Then its announced to them that Chen Duxiu had managed to form a deal with Wang Jingwei. Chiang Kai-Shek send word from Nanjing to carry out the purge, in a very “execute order 66 fashion”. April the 12th takes a wild turn in Shanghai. In the early morning a signal is raised over a warship anchored near the Gaochang temple. Hundreds of well armed Green Gang, Triads and some secret agents wearing blue shorts and white cloth armbands with a black gongs on them, dispersed from the French concession in several cars. From 1 to 5am they attacked the picketing workers in Zhabei, Nanshi, Huxi, Wusong, Hongkou and other districts. The workers resisted immediately causing fierce street battles to break out. The 26th Army of the NRA, an old Sun Chuanfang unit that recently defected, came to forcibly confiscate guns while stating they were “mediating an internal strife amongst the workers”. Over 2700 armed workers in Shanghai were disarmed. More than 120 were killed with another 180 injured. The Shanghai General Labor Union club and all their associated pickets in the districts were occupied. Within the foreign concessions, foreign military and police forces arrested more than 1000 CCP members and workers who were immediately handed over to Chiang Kai-Shek's men. On the morning of the 13th, the workers from Shanghai’s tobacco, silk factories, trams, municipal administration, postal services, sailors and various other industries went on strike. Over 200,000 workers took to the streets and the Shanghai General Labor Union held a mass rally in Qingyun Road Square in Zhabei with over 100,000 participants. They held a quick conference calling for resolutions. The first resolution was to hand over their weapons. Secondly those who destroyed their unions should be severely punished. Third the families of those killed needed to be compensated. Fourth protests should be made against the imperialists within the concessions. Fifth a telegram needed to be sent to the central government, then whole nation and world to demand assistance. Lastly the military authorities should be responsible for protecting the Shanghai trade unions. After the conference, the masses marched upon the headquarters of the 2nd division of the 26th army along Baoshan road to petition for the release of their comrades and for their weapons to be returned to them. They marched for a kilometer and upon reaching the Sandeli area of Baoshan road, soldiers of the 2nd division rushed out and opened fire upon them killing more than 100 on the spot. It was said Baoshan road was flooded with blood. That afternoon Chiang Kai-Sheks forces occupied the Shanghai General Labor Union and General Command of the Shanghai workers. They closed down and disbanded numerous revolutionary organizations and carried out searches and murders. Within 3 days after the Shanghai incident, more than 300 Shanghai CCP members were killed, another 500 were arrested and 5000 went “missing”. Like I said in the previous podcast on this very subject, I will leave it to you as to what missing meant. On the 15th of april the Kuomintang in Guangzhou launched their own coup. On that day more than 2000 CCP members and their supporters were arrested, 200 trade unions were closed. This all would b followed by similar activities in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian and Guangxi where CCP members were purged. The NPA in the north would likewise crack down on communists. Li Dazhao had been placed on the Beiyang governments list of most wanted back in 1926 following the March 18th massacre. Since then he was hiding in the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, continuing to lead political maneuvers against the warlords. When the first united front collapsed as a result of Chiang Kai-Sheks purges, Zhang Zuolin ordered troops to raid the Soviet embassy. Li Dazhao, his wife and daughter were all arrested. Among 19 other communists, Li Dazhao was executed on April 28th of 1927 by strangulation. One of the behemoths who ushered in the New Culture Movement and was a founder of the CCP had become one of its greatest...
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