Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
It is forbidden to offer any sacrificial item outside the Azara. This prohibition applies both to valid offerings and to offerings that became invalid in the kodesh—meaning either after they were brought into the Azara or after they were slaughtered. A braita derives the various valid and invalid items for which one is liable if offered outside the Azara from derashot on the verses in Vayikra 19:8–9. The Mishna rules that if one offers outside the Temple an olive‑bulk composed of a combination of meat and imurim (the fatty portions burned on the altar) of a burnt offering, one is liable....
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
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Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
What is the source for the opinion of the rabbis in the Mishna that one who slaughters outside and then offers it outside is liable? Three possible derivations are presented, and the Gemara raises difficulties with the different possibilities. What is the source for the law in an upcoming Mishna that one who sprinkles the blood outside the Temple is liable? Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael each derive it from different verses. The Gemara then asks: what does each of them learn from the verse that the other used for this prohibition? What is the source for the law in an upcoming Mishna that one...
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Since Rabbi Shimon holds that one becomes impure only through direct involvement in the burning of the bulls and goats, the Gemara asks how he interprets the verse “outside the camp” in the context of the Yom Kippur offerings. He applies it to a gezeira shava linking these offerings to the para aduma, establishing that they must be burned outside all three camps and specifically east of Jerusalem. The rabbis, however, reject this comparison and distinguish between the two burning sites: the para aduma was burned to the east, whereas the sin offerings of Yom Kippur were burned to the north...
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Two additional questions are raised regarding the impurity status of those who handle the bull and goat offerings whose bodies are burned outside Jerusalem, but neither question receives a definitive answer. Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about the impurity of the scapegoat (se’ir la’azazel) that is sent off a cliff on Yom Kippur. While both sides agree that the red heifer and the bulls and goats burned outside Jerusalem impart impurity to food and drink, they dispute whether the scapegoat does the same. According to the rabbis, since the scapegoat is a live animal - and live animals...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The hide of burnt offerings is given to the kohanim, as stated in Vayikra 7:8. However, the Mishna explains that if the offering became disqualified before the blood was sprinkled, the kohanim do not receive the hide. If it was sacrificed for the sake of a different type of offering, since the sacrifice remains valid, the hide is given to the kohanim. In addition to burnt offerings, the kohanim also receive the hides of all kodshei kodashim, such as guilt and sin offerings. This is derived through a kal va’chomer argument in the Mishna, but later a braita brings different opinions of how to...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rav held that Moshe served as a kohen gadol. Four tannaitic sources are brought to challenge this position, but each one is ultimately resolved. A braita is then cited to show that whether Moshe was a kohen gadol is itself a tannaitic dispute. One of the tannaitic views in that debate cites a statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha: whenever the Torah uses the expression charon af, anger, it implies some concrete action or consequence. His statement is challenged by the verse in Shemot 11:8, where Moshe becomes angry at Pharaoh, yet no action seems to follow. Reish Lakish resolves this...
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There is a dispute between Rabbi Nechemia and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding the reason Aaron burned the sin‑offering goat on the eighth day of the inauguration (miluim). Rabbi Nehemiah holds that the reason was aninut (the status of a mourner on the day of death), whereas Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda argue that the goat was burned because it had become impure. They raise three objections to Rabbi Nechemia’s position - how can these objections be resolved, and how does each of them interpret the verses in the passage? When did Pinchas become a kohen? According to Rav, Moshe...
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Three additional resolutions, bringing the total to five, are proposed to reconcile the contradiction between the two baraitot, each of which presents a different view of Rabbi Shimon on whether an onen may eat the Pesach offering at night. A challenge is raised against the third resolution, evidence is presented in support of the fourth, and a statement of Rava bar Rav Huna is cited to bolster the fifth.
info_outlineThis week's learning is sponsored by Dvora Lopez in loving memory of her mother on her 51st yahrzeit. "She had great strength and abundant love."
This week's learning is sponsored by the Futornick family in honor of Shira's 21st birthday.
This week's learning is sponsored by Yisroel and Masha Rotman, for a refuah shleima, a complete and speedy recovery, for Elisheva Mindel bat Masha Tzivia.
The Mishna appears to contradict itself regarding general oaths about eating. It implies that a general oath "not to eat" would not include foods that cannot be eaten (which would encompass non-kosher food), yet another case in the Mishna rules that someone who makes a general oath "not to eat" does include non-kosher food in that prohibition. Two different resolutions are offered. The first resolution distinguishes between someone who made a general oath ("I will not eat") and someone who made a specific oath ("I will not eat regular and non-kosher foods"). The sages provide two different interpretations for why an oath that specifically mentions both non-kosher and kosher foods would be effective. Difficulties are raised against both positions, and one remains unresolved. The second interpretation explains that the previous implication from the Mishna is incorrect—"foods that cannot be eaten" refers to truly inedible items and does not include non-kosher foods, which are technically edible. The final case in the Mishna is cited as proof for this position but is ultimately rejected.
What distinguishes issur kollel from issur mosif? Issur kollel occurs when a second prohibition encompasses additional prohibited items, while issur mosif occurs when a second prohibition adds further restrictions to the same item or extends the prohibition to additional people. Based on this distinction, Rava explains why someone who accepts that issur mosif applies would not necessarily accept the same for issur kollel. Since issur mosif relates to a single item—adding a prohibition to the item itself or prohibiting the item to more people, it can apply. However, when additional items are included in the prohibition, it will not necessarily apply to what was already forbidden.
Rava further explains that just as issur kollel takes effect, the same principle applies to an oath that includes other items. He needed to specify this because one might have assumed it only applies to prohibitions that arise independently, not to oaths where a person creates the prohibition.
Rava the son of Raba raises a challenge to Rava's statement based on a Mishna in Kreitut, which suggests that an oath adding additional prohibitions would not apply to what was already forbidden. Six different explanations are offered to resolve this contradiction.