Menachot 8 - Rosh Chodesh Shvat - January 19, 1 Shvat
Release Date: 01/19/2026
Menachot 8 - Rosh Chodesh Shvat - January 19, 1 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rabbi Eliezer holds that when the Kohen accepts the blood from a sacrifice into a sanctified vessel, there must be enough collected in that single bowl to be used for placing the blood on the altar. If one collects some blood in one bowl and some in another, and later mixes them together before performing the placements, the blood is not sanctified. The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Eliezer contradicts himself, as regarding the Kohen Gadol’s griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin), he holds that it is sanctified even if placed in two separate bowls. To resolve this, the Gemara first suggests...
info_outline
Menachot 7 - January 18, 29 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
According to Yosi ben Yasiyan and Rabbi Yehuda the Baker, ben Beteira permits returning a kometz taken in a disqualified manner to the original dough, provided it has not yet been placed in a sanctified vessel. Rav Nachman challenges this ruling: if taking the kometz is a significant ritual, the act should be irreversible; if it is not, placing it in a sanctified vessel should be meaningless. Rav Nachman resolves this by explaining that while taking the kometz is indeed a ritual act, it is not complete until the kometz is placed in the vessel. If so, the Gemara objects, returning the kometz to...
info_outline
Menachot 6 - Shabbat January 17, 28 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rav Sheisha brings a fifth explanation of an ambiguous line in the braita brought on Menachot 5b, “If you had raised a difficulty on the logical argument.” As in all the previous explanations, also this one is rejected. Rav Ashi suggests that one could knock out the logical argument from the beginning as perhaps one could not even bring a kal v’chomer from blemished animals as they have a stringency. This suggestion of Rav Ashi is modified a few times and ultimately his explanation is that if one were to make a kal v’chomer with both blemished animals and ones born not through natural...
info_outline
Menachot 5 - January 16, 27 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
There are three different opinions about the status of the mincha offering of the omer that is offered for the sake of a different offering. Rav says it is completely disqualified, Reish Lakish holds it is valid, but the obligation to bring the mincha is not fulfilled and a new one must be brought, and Rava holds that it is valid and the obligation is fulfilled. Rav added another disqualified case to the list – a guilt offering of the nazir and leper. After a discussion about why he would distinguish between that guilt offering and a guilt offering for theft or misuse of consecrated...
info_outline
Menachot 4 - January 15, 26 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
What was clear to Raba on one hand and Rava on the other - regarding how to understand Rabbi Shimon’s words and whether a noticeably incorrect intent (machshava nikeret) disqualifies or not - was not clear to Rav Hoshaya, who deliberated on how to interpret Rabbi Shimon’s position. The Gemara explains why he did not accept the opinions of Raba, Rava, or Rav Ashi as a sufficient explanation for his doubt. The Mishna mentions two exceptions to the rule of a meal offering (mincha) that was perfomed for the wrong purpose (where the offering is valid but the owner has not fulfilled their...
info_outline
Menachot 3 - January 14, 25 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
There are three ways to resolve the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two braitot: in one, he states that a meal-offering (mincha) brought for a different purpose than its original intent is valid and fulfills the owner's obligation, while in the other, he states that it is valid but does not fulfill the owner's obligation. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to this contradiction. Raba explains Rabbi Shimon’s words according to their simple meaning - that when it is evident from a person's actions that their stated thought was not sincere (or was...
info_outline
Menachot 2 - January 13, 24 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
If one takes a dough of a mincha that was designated for a specific type of meal offering and takes the kemitza with the intention that it be offered for a different type of mincha, the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the mincha. There are exceptions to this rule - cases in which the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering - specifically in a mincha of a sinner and of the sotah. The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word "ela"...
info_outline
Introduction to Masechet Menachot with Dr. Ayelet Hoffman Libson
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Introduction to Masechet Menachot
info_outline
Zevachim 120 - January 12, 23 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rabbi Zeira raises the question of an offering designated for a private altar: if it was slaughtered on the private altar, then brought into the Tabernacle, and afterward taken back out, must it now be returned to the Tabernacle and treated like a public‑altar sacrifice with all its associated requirements? Initially, the Gemara suggests that this issue might hinge on the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef regarding high level sanctity offerings that were slaughtered in the South instead of the required Northern area and were then mistakenly placed on the altar. Ultimately, however,...
info_outline
Zevachim 119 - January 11, 22 Tevet
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
During the period when the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices on private bamot. This is derived from Devarim 12:9: “For you have not yet arrived at the menucha and the nachala.” Menucha refers to Shiloh, and nachala refers to Jerusalem. The additional word “to” between them serves to separate the two stages, indicating that bamot were permitted in the interim period. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan why maaser sheni is not mentioned in the Mishna regarding the period of Nov and Givon. Rabbi Yochanan answered that when there is no Ark, there is no...
info_outlineRabbi Eliezer holds that when the Kohen accepts the blood from a sacrifice into a sanctified vessel, there must be enough collected in that single bowl to be used for placing the blood on the altar. If one collects some blood in one bowl and some in another, and later mixes them together before performing the placements, the blood is not sanctified.
The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Eliezer contradicts himself, as regarding the Kohen Gadol’s griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin), he holds that it is sanctified even if placed in two separate bowls. To resolve this, the Gemara first suggests that perhaps Rabbi Eliezer does not derive one law from another—specifically, a mincha offering from blood. However, this is rejected because Rabbi Eliezer does derive laws for a mincha from the bowls of frankincense of the Showbread. In conclusion, the Gemara distinguishes between learning a mincha offering from another mincha-style offering and learning a mincha offering from an animal sacrifice (blood).
Rabbi Yochanan disagrees with Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin and rules that it is not sanctified if placed in the vessel in parts. Rabbi Acha brings the source in the Torah for his prohibition, and the Gemara brings two braitot that support his opinion and contradict Rabbi Elazar’s position.
Rabbi Yochanan’s position regarding the Kohen Gadol’s griddle-cake offering (minchat chavitin) is questioned in light of a position he holds against Rav in a case of a regular mincha offering that is sanctified even before the person completely filled the vessel with the fine flour. Why does he differentiate between the cases?
The Gemara then asks about Rav, who disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan and requires the vessel to be filled: would he hold like Rabbi Yochanan or Rabbi Elazar regarding the minchat chavitin offering? They conclude that since he derives one item from another (on a different mincha-related issue), he would derive from the minchat chavitin to here, and therefore he must hold like Rabbi Yochanan by the minchat chavitin and requires it to be complete to sanctify.
Since the Gemara mentions a different mincha-related issue where Rav derives one thing from another, they quote that source in its entirety and delve into his debate with Rabbi Chanina about mincha offerings where not all the parts were added yet to the bowl – are they sanctified without everything being there?
At the beginning of the daf, Rabbi Elazar had made a comparison of taking the kometz from a mincha in the Sanctuary, which is permitted as it is derived from the bowls of frankincense from the Showbread. Rabbi Yirmia raises a difficulty against this from a braita, but the drasha in that braita is reinterpreted to fit with Rabbi Elazar’s ruling.