Menachot 22 - February 2, 15 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rav Mordechai reinstates the original interpretation of Shmuel’s limitation on the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7 - namely, that the court permitted the kohanim to use Temple salt for salting their sacrifices (for burning on the altar) but not for salting the meat of the sacrifices for consumption. This ruling of the court follows Ben Buchri’s opinion that kohanim are not obligated to pay the half-shekel (machatzit hashekel) used to fund communal items in the Temple. Since they did not contribute to the fund, one might have assumed they were ineligible to benefit from Temple salt; therefore, the...
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Menachot 21 - February 1, 14 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The braita initially listed two items offered on the altar that do not require salting: wood and blood. However, the Gemara notes a difficulty: this braita appears to follow the position of Rebbi, yet Rebbi himself maintains that blood does require salting. Consequently, the Gemara emends the text, removing "wood" and replacing it with libations (wine). To support this, a second braita is cited which lists wine, blood, wood, and incense as exempt from salting. Yet, this proof-text presents its own challenge, as it aligns neither with Rebbi (who requires salting for blood) nor with the Rabbis...
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Menachot 20 - Shabbat January 31, 13 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rav explained that details that are essential (me’akev) are specifically those that are repeated (appear twice) in the text. Rav Huna raises a difficulty on this assertion from the requirement of salting the offering; both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon rule that salting is essential, yet the command does not appear twice. Two answers are suggested to resolve this. Rav Yosef suggests that Rav may hold like the Tanna of our Mishna, who holds that salting is actually not essential. Another possible answer is that salting is a unique exception to the rule because the word "covenant" (brit)...
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Menachot 19 - January 30, 12 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning was based on “a...
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Menachot 18 - January 29, 11 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The Gemara explains the braita in a different way than previously to show that there is really no Tannaitic opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds one is liable for karet if they have a pigul thought to eat something normally burned or burn something normally eaten. They explain that the braita is highlighting a three-way debate between tanna kama, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbl Elazar ben Shammua about whether in a case of someone who has a thought to leave over part of the blood until the next day without sprinkling it, would both the rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that is it valid, invalid or do they...
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Menachot 17 - January 28, 10 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The sharp scholars (charifei) of Pumbedita argue that one burning can create pigul for another. Specifically, if one burns the kometz (handful) with the intention to burn the levona (frankincense) outside its designated time, it becomes pigul. They explain that even the Rabbis - who generally hold that a pigul thought during only half of a permitting act (matir) is ineffective - would agree here, because the levona was included in the person's thoughts. Rava supports this from the general rule in the Mishna, however, his proof is rejected as it is inconclusive. Rav Hisda, however, cites...
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Menachot 16 - January 27, 9 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether the meal offering can become pigul if the pigul thought was only during part of the permitting act (matir), such as during the burning of the kometz, but not the burning of the frankincense, or the slaughtering of one sheep of the two sheep offerings on Shavuot. Rabbi Meir holds that it is pigul, while the rabbis do not. Rav and Shmuel disagree regarding this debate. Rav holds that if the first action included a pigul thought, while the second was performed in silence, it is pigul, even according to the rabbis, as the second action follows the...
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Menachot 15 - January 26, 8 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
If one of the loaves of the two loaves for Shavuot or one of the sets of six loaves of the showbread become impure, are the others to be burned as well? Rabbi Yehuda holds that public offerings are all treated as one unit and therefore they are all disqualified and are burned. The rabbis disagree and permit them to be eaten. Rabbi Elazar limits their debate to a case where they became impure before the blood was sprinkled. According to Rav Papa, the debate centers on whether the tzitz atones for items that are to be eaten. If it atones for the bread, then the blood can be sprinkled and is...
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Menachot 14 - January 25, 7 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rabbi Yosi and the rabbis debate in the Mishna whether a pigul thought about eating one of the two loaves, while slaughtering both sheep of the Shavuot offering, would render only one loaf pigul or both. Rav Huna explains that Rabbi Yosi, who held that only one loaf is disqualified, would hold the same for a pigul thought about one limb of an animal sacrifice - and only that limb, and not the others, would be pigul. The Gemara brings a braita as a difficulty against Rav Huna. Since the braita cannot be explained according to the rabbis, it can only be explained according to Rabbi Yosi;...
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Menachot 13 - Shabbat January 24, 6 Shvat
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The Mishna states that an intent to eat half an olive-bulk and an intent to burn half an olive-bulk do not combine to create a status of pigul. The Gemara infers from this Mishna that two intents regarding eating - one concerning an item meant to be eaten and one concerning an item not meant to be eaten - would indeed combine to render the item pigul. This inference, however, contradicts the previous Mishna. Rabbi Yirmia simply rules that this Mishna follows a different opinion than the previous one, while Abaye rejects the inference entirely. The second chapter begins with a debate between...
info_outlineThe dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon on whether pouring of the oil of a meal offering requires a kohen is based on different ways of interpreting the verses in Vayikra 2:1-2. The Rabbis maintain that the requirement for a kohen is only mentioned from the act of scooping, or kemitza, allowing a non-kohen to handle the pouring and mixing of the oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, views the connective language in the verse as a link that binds the entire process together, necessitating a kohen for every stage. At first the Gemara suggested that Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning was based on “a phrase can relate to both the upcoming and previous action,” but after showing that in a different issue, Rabbi Shimon did not employ that principle, they explain the “vav”(“and”) connects the previous section to the kohen.
Rav explains that if the words torah and chukka appear in a verse, that signifies that a failure to perform a detail exactly as described invalidates the entire offering. Through a series of challenges involving the nazir, the metzora, and the service of Yom Kippur, the Gemara refines this: if either term is employed, it indicates it is an essential detail. However, after raising a difficulty from all sacrifices, Rav’s statement is further refined: the term chukka is the primary indicator of indispensability, whereas torah on its own is not.
Repetition serves as another marker of necessity in the eyes of Rav, who argues that when the Torah returns to a subject multiple times, it is to emphasize that the detail is essential. This leads to a clash with Shmuel about whether or not is it essential that the scooping (kemitza) be performed by hand. Rav considers the method essential because it is repeated in the context of the Tabernacle’s inauguration. Shmuel, however, holds that a one-time historical event is not a binding source for future generations.
A difficulty is raised against the principle of Rav that if something is repeated, it is indispensable, as the act of hagasha, bringing the mincha offering to the Altar, is repeated and yet is listed in the Mishna as not essential. The Gemara responds by explaining that the second mention is needed for a different purpose – to pinpoint the exact location on the Altar where the mincha offering is to be brought.