Menachot 21 - February 1, 14 Shvat

The braita initially listed two items offered on the altar that do not require salting: wood and blood. However, the Gemara notes a difficulty: this braita appears to follow the position of Rebbi, yet Rebbi himself maintains that blood does require salting. Consequently, the Gemara emends the text, removing "wood" and replacing it with libations (wine). To support this, a second braita is cited which lists wine, blood, wood, and incense as exempt from salting. Yet, this proof-text presents its own challenge, as it aligns neither with Rebbi (who requires salting for blood) nor with the Rabbis (who require it for incense). Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that this braita follows Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, who uses a different categorization based on the characteristics of a mincha (meal offering) to determine which items require salt.

A further challenge on the braita quoted in Menachot 20a is raised. The braita implies that blood is excluded from salting only because of a specific scriptural derivation (drasha). However, according to Zeiri, if blood is salted, it becomes disqualified for use on the altar regardless; if so, why is a drasha necessary to exclude it? To resolve this, the Gemara distinguishes between two levels of salting: a small amount of salt, which might not disqualify the blood but is still excluded by the verse, and a large amount, which renders the blood physically unfit for the altar. This leads to a discussion regarding the status of salted or coagulated blood: is it still considered "blood" enough to be valid for the altar, and conversely, does the prohibition against eating blood still apply to it?

A braita is then introduced expounding on the biblical verses regarding salting to derive various procedural laws. These include the type of salt required, the quantity ushttps://five.libsyn.com/showed, and the specific method of application. Another braita clarifies the legal status of salt found in the sanctuary: if salt is found directly on a sacrificial limb, it is considered sanctified and subject to the laws of meila (misappropriation of sacred property). However, if the salt is found on the altar's ramp or on the roof of the altar itself, it does not carry this sanctity.

A Mishna in Shekalim states that the rabbis allowed the kohanim to benefit from the salt of the Temple. Shmuel explains that this permission applies only to the kohanim’s offerings and not for eating. The Gemara analyzes whether Shmuel meant that salt is permitted only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbidden for the meat the kohanim eat, or if it is permitted for seasoning their sacrificial meat but forbidden for use with non-sacred food. The Gemara initially concludes that since the kohanim were even permitted to use Temple salt for tanning animal hides, they must certainly be allowed to use it to season the holy meat they consume. Under this view, Shmuel’s restriction only excludes using the salt for personal, non-sacred food. This is further supported by the logic that if even an Israelite’s sacrifice is salted with Temple salt, a kohen’s sacrifice surely would be as well, meaning the court's special decree must have addressed something else. However, Rav Mordechai suggests an alternative reading that could reinstate the first possibility: that the court permitted salt only for the actual sacrifice on the altar but forbade it for the meat the kohanim eat. He explains that the Mishna’s decree was specifically necessary to account for the position of Ben Buchri, as will be explained further on.