Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rabbi Chiya bar Abba recounts a discussion between Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the legal weight of a minor’s intent. In the first version, the question is whether a minor’s thoughts alone are significant. Rabbi Ami argues it is obvious they are not, citing a Mishna in Kelim 17:15. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that the doubt applies when a minor's action reasonably demonstrates their intent, but not completely - such as moving an animal to the northern part of the Temple courtyard, the specific area for slaughtering burnt offerings. Rabbi Ami challenges this, noting that Rabbi...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rav Nachman states in the name of Rav that meat is permitted if someone supervised the slaughter throughout the process. The Gemara questions why supervision is necessary, given the principle that most who engage in slaughtering are experts. It concludes that the case involves someone known to be ignorant of the laws of shechita who successfully severed the first siman (sign); however, this is insufficient to assume the second will be handled correctly, thus requiring supervision to ensure no disqualifying error occurs during the remainder of the slaughter. Rav Dimi bar Yosef asked Rav...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
The Gemara asks for the source of the principle that we follow the statistical majority (rubba), such as in cases of yibum involving minors where we assume the male is not a saris (sterile) and the female is not an aylonit (barren). The Gemara proposes ten different Torah laws as potential sources for this rule. While difficulties are raised against each possibility and some are resolved, the Gemara ultimately rejects them all. It suggests that these sources might only prove that we follow the majority when it is impossible to clarify the actual status; however, in a case where it is possible...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
If it is discovered after shechita that the knife has nicks, can we assume the slaughter was valid because the nicks occurred after the two simanim were cut, or is there a concern that they occurred while cutting the hide before the simanim? Rav Huna and Rav Chisda disagree on this matter. Two difficulties are raised against Rav Chisda’s ruling to permit, but they are resolved. From where do we derive the principle that an item retains its status until proven otherwise (chazaka)? Rabbi Yonatan derives it from the case of a leprous house, but Rav Acha disagrees with his derivation.
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
There is a dispute between Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav and Rav Chanania bar Shlemia in the name of Rav regarding which practical skills a Torah scholar must master through repetition. The first opinion lists writing, slaughtering, and circumcision, while the second adds the knot of the tefillin, the sheva berakhot, and the tying of tzitzit. Rav Yehuda quotes two further statements in the name of Shmuel. The first is that a slaughterer must be expert in the laws of shechita; otherwise, the meat may not be eaten. Since meat can be disqualified for five specific reasons, an unlearned...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rabbi Zeira says in the name of Shmuel that if one heats a knife and uses it for slaughtering, the animal is not considered a treifa. Although the heat could potentially damage the animal, the sharp edge of the blade severs the windpipe and gullet before the heat from the sides of the blade can cause a burn. A question is raised regarding a person who strikes another with a hot knife, resulting in a leprous mark: is this classified as a boil (shechin) or a burn (michve)? The Gemara explores the practical halakhic implications of this distinction. Two sources are brought to resolve the matter -...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi decreed that produce in Beit Shean did not require tithing, as he ruled the area was not considered part of Israel for those specific purposes. This decision was based on the testimony of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Zeiruz, who observed Rabbi Meir eating a vegetable leaf without tithing it. Rabbi Yirmia challenged this testimony, suggesting various reasons why Rabbi Meir might have eaten the leaf without realizing it was untithed or why it might have actually been tithed. In response, Rabbi Zeira argued that if God protects the animals of the righteous from inadvertent sin, then God...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
When Rabbi Zeira heard that Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Asi were eating meat slaughtered by a Cuti, he assumed they must have been aware of a prior decree permitting it. He reasoned that had it been forbidden, they would have inadvertently consumed non-kosher meat - a mistake God would not allow to befall the righteous. This principle is derived from the story where God protected the animal of a righteous person from sin; how much more so would He protect the righteous individuals themselves! From this incident, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Zeira eventually conceded to Rabbi Yaakov that the...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
After explaining that the source for Rav Anan’s statement in the name of Shmuel, that one can trust the slaughter of a person who worships idols was derived from Yehoshafat, the Gemara seeks evidence that Yehoshafat actually consumed Achav's meat. Two additional sources are examined to support Rav Anan. The first involves Eliyahu, who was fed meat by ravens (orvim), which supposedly originated from Achav’s kitchen. However, this is dismissed as a unique divine decree that cannot serve as a legal precedent. The second source is a braita previously cited about accepting the slaughter of a...
info_outlineDaf Yomi for Women - Hadran
Abaye and Rava each found support for their respective positions in a braita - Abaye from the first sentence and Rava from the second. How does each Sage address the proof cited by the other? The second case in the braita permits a Jew to rely on a Cuti and consume birds strung together, provided the Cuti eats the head of one of the birds on the string. The Gemara raises difficulties with this case: perhaps the Cuti is merely tricking the Jew, or perhaps Cutim do not hold that one must slaughter birds at all, as the requirement is not explicitly written in the Torah. The Sages resolve the...
info_outlineRabbi Chiya bar Abba recounts a discussion between Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the legal weight of a minor’s intent. In the first version, the question is whether a minor’s thoughts alone are significant. Rabbi Ami argues it is obvious they are not, citing a Mishna in Kelim 17:15. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that the doubt applies when a minor's action reasonably demonstrates their intent, but not completely - such as moving an animal to the northern part of the Temple courtyard, the specific area for slaughtering burnt offerings. Rabbi Ami challenges this, noting that Rabbi Yochanan himself previously ruled in the context of ritual impurity that a minor’s action is significant when the minor’s intent is reasonably clear from the action. Rabbi Yochanan responds that his question was whether such actions are valid by Torah law or only by Rabbinic decree; the matter remains unresolved.
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers a different version of the discussion, focusing on whether a minor’s actions are effective. This version concludes with Rabbi Yochanan distinguishing between three categories: actions with clear intent, actions with reasonably clear, but not completely clear intent, and intent without any accompanying action.
Shmuel asks Rav Huna for the biblical source disqualifying sacrifices that were slaughtered without the specific intent to perform a slaughter (mitasek).
The Mishna rules that meat slaughtered by a non-Jew is considered neveila (a carcass) and imparts impurity by carrying (masa). Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Ami draw different inferences from this. Rabbi Yochanan suggests the Mishna follows the Sages (against Rabbi Eliezer) in assuming that gentiles do not automatically slaughter for idolatrous purposes; if they did, the meat would be forbidden even for benefit. Rabbi Ami infers that the slaughter of a heretic (min), one who is a devout idol worshipped is strictly forbidden for any benefit, a position supported by a braita.
The Gemara explains that we generally do not fear a gentile will slaughter for idolatry because they are typically not devout in their practice. However, a min is considered deeply dedicated to their worship, and their slaughter is presumed to be for an idol. Rav Nachman distinguishes between Jewish heretics and gentile heretics, showing more leniency toward the latter, though the Gemara clarifies this applies specifically to accepting their sacrifices.
The shechita of one who slaughters in the dark or a blind person is accepted.