How U.S. and World Bank Financed Dams Destroyed Iran’s Water System —Why 28 Million Iranians Now Lack Water — Eunuchs in Iran

“They called it modernization, but it was deception in stone — a soft war that kills slowly, with thirst instead of bullets. And that is the legacy of the dams.”

 

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• Ruled parts of Iran intermittently after 1748
  
  

• Blinded and effectively controlled by court eunuchs, who exercised real power behind the throne
  
  

• His reign illustrates how eunuchs functioned as kingmakers and de-facto rulers during periods of fragmentation
  
  

The most explicit case of a eunuch ruler associated with Iran’s 18th-century political transition is: 

• Castrated as a child while a hostage
  
  

• Rose through military and court politics to found the Qajar dynasty
  
  

• Became Shah of Iran, ruling outright
  
  

• His castration profoundly shaped his personality, governance style, and succession politics
  
  

Although his reign technically begins at the end of the 1700s, his rise occurs squarely in the 18th century, during the post-Safavid power vacuum. 

Why eunuchs mattered in Iran at this time 

In Safavid and post-Safavid Iran: 

• Eunuchs controlled palaces, treasuries, harems, succession access
  
  

• They were considered politically “safe” (no heirs), making them ideal power brokers
  
  

• During state collapse, administrative control mattered more than dynastic legitimacy
  
  

Bottom line 

• Yes, Iran in the 1700s had eunuchs exercising sovereign power
  
  

• By the late 1700s, a eunuch (Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar) ruled Iran directly as Shah
  
  

This was not an anomaly but part of a wider imperial pattern, also seen in: 

• Ottoman court politics
  
  

• Ming/Qing China
  
  

• Mughal India
  
  

Where they sat 

• Inner palace (Topkapı), especially the Imperial Harem
  
  

• Controlled access to the Sultan and royal women
  
  

Who mattered 

• Kızlar Ağa (Chief Black Eunuch)
  
  

What they did 

• Managed the harem, palace appointments, and religious endowments
  
  

• Influenced succession and high office by gatekeeping information and access
  
  

Why they were trusted 

• No heirs; no independent tribal or dynastic base
  
  

• Direct dependence on palace favor
  
  

Result 

• In the 17th–18th centuries, eunuchs functioned as de-facto executive power during periods of weak sultans.
  
  

Who mattered 

• No single dominant name; power was network-based
  
  

What they did 

• Managed succession politics, palace security, and information flow
  
  

• Acted as brokers between royal women and the emperor
  
  

Why they mattered 

• The Mughal court was intensely factional
  
  

• Eunuchs provided continuity amid violent succession struggles
  
  

Result 

• Especially in the 17th–18th centuries, eunuchs became indispensable political operators as central authority weakened.
  
  

The shared imperial logic (why this keeps repeating) 

Across Iran, the Ottomans, China, and Mughal India: 

• Access = Power
  Eunuchs controlled who could see the ruler.
  
  

• No Lineage = Trust
  Castration removed dynastic threat while increasing dependence.
  
  

• Collapse Favors Insiders
  When armies fragment and provinces rebel, palace administrators rule.
  
  

• From Bloodline to System
  These empires shifted—often unintentionally—from hereditary authority to institutional control, with eunuchs as system managers.
  
  

Bottom line 

Eunuchs were: 

• Not cultural curiosities
  
  

• Not isolated abuses
  
  

• A recurring imperial technology of governance
  
  

When empires centralized power in palaces, eunuchs became the operating system—especially during decline. 

Definition of eunuch 

A eunuch is a male who has been castrated (the testes removed or rendered nonfunctional), typically to eliminate reproductive capacity, most often for institutional, political, or social purposes rather than medical ones. 

In historical usage, a eunuch is not simply infertile and not metaphorical. The defining feature is intentional castration, usually performed: 

• in childhood or adolescence
  
  

• to enable service in royal courts, harems, treasuries, or inner palaces
  
  

• to ensure loyalty and lack of dynastic threat
  
  

Over time, the word also came to mean: 

• a court official trusted with intimate access to rulers
  
  

• a political role, not merely a physical condition
  
  

But the original meaning is anatomical and literal. 

When the word was first used 

Greek origin (earliest recorded use) 

The English word eunuch comes from the Ancient Greek: 

εὐνοῦχος (eunoûkhos)
First attested: 5th century BCE 

Etymology (most accepted explanation): 

• eunē = bed
  
  

• ekhein = to hold / guard
  
  

Meaning: 

“keeper of the bed”
“guardian of the bedchamber” 

This reflects the role eunuchs played guarding royal sleeping quarters and harems. 

Ancient Greek authors who used the term include: 

• Herodotus (5th c. BCE)
  
  

• Xenophon (4th c. BCE)
  
  

At this stage, the word already implied castration + palace service, not just one or the other. 

Earlier concepts before the word existed 

Even before the Greek term, the practice predates the word by millennia. 

Mesopotamia (c. 2000–3000 BCE) 

• Castrated palace servants documented in Assyrian and Babylonian records
  
  

• No single standardized word, but the institution clearly existed
  
  

Ancient Egypt 

• Court officials matching eunuch roles appear in texts
  
  

• Castration is debated, but functionally equivalent roles are present
  
  

Imperial China 

• Eunuchs documented as early as the Shang Dynasty (c. 1600 BCE)
  
  

• Chinese terms for eunuchs predate Greek usage by over a thousand years
  
  

So: 

• The institution is ancient
  
  

• The Greek word is the earliest clearly traceable linguistic root of the modern term
  
  

 

Entry into English 

• Entered Middle English via Latin eunuchus
  
  

• Widely used in English texts by the 14th century
  
  

• Always retained its connection to court power and control, not just anatomy
  
  

 

Key clarification (important) 

Historically: 

• Not all palace servants were eunuchs
  
  

• Not all eunuchs were powerless
  
  

• In many empires, eunuchs were deliberately created political instruments
  
  

They existed because: 

• rulers feared rivals with bloodlines
  
  

• courts required trusted insiders
  
  

• control of access mattered more than armies during decline
  
  

 

Bottom line 

• Eunuch = intentionally castrated male, historically created for institutional control
  
  

• Word first recorded: Ancient Greece, 5th century BCE
  
  

• Practice predates the word by thousands of years
  
  

• The role was a repeatable imperial solution, not a cultural oddity
  
  

Across many empires, families lost their children to the eunuch system through: 

• coercion
  
  

• sale under extreme poverty
  
  

• tribute obligations
  
  

• enslavement after war
  
  

• kidnapping or state seizure
  
  

In a smaller number of cases, families actively consented because eunuch service was seen as a path to survival, status, or protection in a brutal world. 

How this actually happened (mechanisms) 

• Poverty and survival
  
  

In many regions: 

• famine, debt, or war made children a liability
  
  

• families faced a choice between death, slavery, or palace service
  
  

Giving a child to palace service—however horrific—sometimes meant: 

• food
  
  

• education
  
  

• safety
  
  

• potential power
  
  

This was most common in: 

• late imperial China
  
  

• Ottoman domains
  
  

• Safavid / Qajar Iran
  
  

• Mughal India
  
  

This was not “aspiration” so much as triage. 

 Tribute and state extraction 

In some systems: 

• provinces were required to deliver boys to the court
  
  

• castration occurred after selection
  
  

This made eunuchs: 

• state-created personnel
  
  

• not family-created ones
  
  

Here, families had no real choice. 

 Slavery and war capture 

Large numbers of eunuchs came from: 

• war captives
  
  

• border raids
  
  

• slave markets
  
  

Children were: 

• taken
  
  

• castrated
  
  

• trained for palace use
  
  

This was common in: 

• Ottoman and Mamluk systems
  
  

• Abbasid and later Islamic courts
  
  

• parts of Central Asia and Africa supplying imperial courts
  
  

 Rare cases of deliberate family consent 

In a minority of cases: 

• families knowingly consented
  
  

• usually under the belief that palace service was preferable to rural starvation
  
  

This occurred most often where eunuchs: 

• could hold real power
  
  

• could protect extended family
  
  

• could accumulate wealth (even without heirs)
  
  

Even here, the child did not consent. 

What this tells us about elite power 

This system only exists when: 

• elites control food, law, and violence
  
  

• ordinary families lack real protection
  
  

• reproduction itself becomes a bargaining chip
  
  

Eunuchs were not created because societies were “strange” or “cruel by nature.” 

They were created because: 

• rulers feared rivals with bloodlines
  
  

• elites wanted servants without lineage
  
  

• systems prioritized control over human continuity
  
  

The uncomfortable truth 

Eunuchs are evidence of something deeper: 

When systems become more important than people, even children’s bodies become infrastructure. 

This pattern repeats whenever: 

• institutions override family autonomy
  
  

• survival requires surrendering the future
  
  

• power concentrates behind walls and procedures
  
  

 

Bottom line 

• Yes, children were routinely sacrificed to elite systems
  
  

• Sometimes by force, sometimes by desperation
  
  

• Almost never by genuine free choice
  
  

• Eunuchs are not anomalies—they are markers of extreme institutional imbalance
  
  

“The word ‘dam’ comes from Old Dutch and Old Germanic roots. It originally meant exactly what it means today: a barrier to hold back water. The technology changed, but the word stayed the same. 

The idea of stopping a river is ancient in Europe — but exporting that idea to places like Iran, with totally different climates and ecologies, is what helped create the water disasters we’re seeing now.” 

Ancient and Medieval Dams Were Tiny 

Pre-modern dams were: 

• small
  
  

• local
  
  

• made of earth, rock, or timber
  
  

• intended to raise water levels slightly
  
  

• used for irrigation or mills
  
  

Nothing even remotely resembled: 

• Hoover Dam
  
  

• the Aswan High Dam
  
  

• Iran’s Karun dams
  
  

• the massive Cold War-era hydropower complexes
  
  

The idea of a huge, high-concrete, river-wide structure holding back a massive reservoir is a modern concept. 

 First Modern Experiments: Early 1900s (Still Small by Today’s Standards)

A few early 20th-century dams experimented with larger scales: 

• Roosevelt Dam (Arizona, 1911)
  
  

• Some British irrigation dams
  
  

• A few colonial projects in India and Africa
  
  

But these were still mid-sized, and the science of large concrete gravity dams was not yet mature. 

No country was building dozens or hundreds.
No one claimed dams could “modernize” entire nations.
Hydropower was still fringe. 

 The Real Breakthrough: The 1930s New Deal

The U.S. New Deal created: 

• Hoover Dam (1936)
  
  

• Grand Coulee Dam (1942)
  
  

• Bonneville Dam
  
  

This moment matters because: 

• it created the first real dam propaganda
  
  

• engineering firms proved they could build enormous structures
  
  

• hydropower became linked with national pride
  
  

• dams were sold as symbols of progress and civilization
  
  

These constructions were technological marvels — and political tools. 

But the global mega dam ideology was still forming. 

 The Explosion After World War II: The Mega dam Era 

After World War II, everything changed.
The United States, the World Bank, and Western engineering firms pushed mega dams globally as part of Cold War development policy. 

This is where: 

• Iran
  
  

• Turkey
  
  

• Iraq
  
  

• Afghanistan
  
  

• India
  
  

• Pakistan
  
  

• Egypt
  
  

• Ethiopia
  
  

• Mexico
  
  

• Brazil
  
  

…all entered the picture. 

The message was clear:
“A real nation has big dams.” 

This was tied to: 

• modernization
  
  

• anti-communism
  
  

• industrialization
  
  

• electrification
  
  

• “nation-building”
  
  

U.S. foreign policy treated dams as a tool of influence. 

The World Bank became almost a dam-financing agency from the 1950s to the 1980s. 

 Why Mega dams Spread After WWII The world needed reconstruction

War-torn regions needed: 

• electricity
  
  

• irrigation
  
  

• food production
  
  

• infrastructure
  
  

Dams were marketed as one-shot solutions that could do everything at once. 

 U.S. engineering firms needed global projects

American engineering giants like: 

• Bechtel
  
  

• Morrison-Knudsen
  
  

• Harza Engineering
  
  

…expanded overseas with U.S. political backing. 

They exported the “Hoover model” to the world. 

 The World Bank needed global showcase projects

Dams were: 

• big
  
  

• visible
  
  

• dramatic
  
  

• politically impressive
  
  

They became symbols of modernization for developing nations. 

 Cold War psychological warfare

Infrastructure was a weapon of influence. 

Wherever the Soviets built roads, the U.S. built dams.
Wherever the U.S. built dams, the Soviets built canals. 

Iran was a prime target of this competition. 

 Iran’s Dam Era Was Entirely Post-WW2

Iran built: 

• almost no major dams before 1950
  
  

• several pilot dams in the 1950s
  
  

• dozens of dams from 1960 to 1979 (Shah period)
  
  

• a massive wave of dams after 1990
  
  

• more than 600 dams by the 2010s
  
  

All of this growth was based directly on U.S. Cold War water ideology:
“Modern nations build dams.” 

It was exported like a religion. 

 Why the Concept of Big Dams Did Not Exist Earlier

Large dams require: 

• reinforced concrete
  
  

• industrial steel
  
  

• complex hydrology models
  
  

• large-scale explosives
  
  

• geological surveys
  
  

• massive machinery
  
  

• electrical grid infrastructure
  
  

• global financing
  
  

None of these existed before the early 20th century.
Even then, the ideology of global dam building did not exist until after World War II. 

 Why People Don’t Understand This 

People assume dams are “ancient,” like pyramids or canals. 

But: 

• the word dam is ancient
  
  

• the idea of damming rivers is ancient
  
  

• the technology of megadams is new
  
  

People confuse the word with the technology. 

Just as: 

• “car” is a simple word
  
  

• but a modern car is completely different from a horse cart
  
  

the idea of a “dam” changed dramatically after WWII. 

Biblical Flood Imagery, Church Misinterpretation, Modern Dam Denial, and the Cultural Mythology of Water Control

Biblical Framework: Floods as Signals of Systemic Failure

Isaiah 28:17

“The hail will sweep away your refuge, and the waters will overflow your hiding place.”

This passage presents water not as random destruction but as the force that reveals hidden weaknesses. In the ancient worldview, water was the test of legitimacy. Any structure built on lies, corruption, or shortcuts would be swept away when the water rose.

Job 12:15

“If He holds back the waters, they dry up; if He lets them loose, they devastate the land.”

The imagery suggests that water is inherently powerful but temporarily restrained. Once the restraints fail, devastation is inevitable. This aligns with modern dam failures: they are not caused by water behaving badly, but by human systems claiming control they never fully had.

Proverbs 27:4

“Floods cannot drown love,”
yet the metaphor implies that floods drown nearly everything else. Floods represent the overwhelming truth that sweeps away human illusions of control.

Interpretation

To ancient writers, a flood symbolized a system pushed past its limits.
It was not divine rage, but the exposure of human arrogance.

This makes the biblical worldview far more sophisticated than the version taught in most churches.

Biblical Floods as Natural Consequence, Not Divine Punishment

Ezekiel 13:11–13

A critique of walls built with “untempered mortar”—materials chosen for show, not substance. The text says storms and floods will destroy these walls as a direct consequence of poor construction, dishonesty, and corruption.

This is the closest ancient metaphor to infrastructure collapse.

The logic is simple:
Bad systems fail. Nature exposes what human politics tried to hide.

This is exactly what happened with post-WW2 dam construction across the Middle East and Asia, where political ambition and foreign engineering contracts outran ecological reality.

Floodwaters as Revelation

Biblical literature repeatedly uses water to describe revelation rather than vengeance.

Themes across Psalms and Job

• Floods expose hidden terrain
  
  

• Floods uncover truth
  
  

• Floods show foundations
  
  

• Floods bring to the surface what institutions buried
  
  

Psalms 18:15

Floodwaters peel away layers until the foundations of the world are visible.

Modern parallel:
When dams fail, everything governments concealed about water mismanagement becomes impossible to ignore.

Floods are not metaphors of anger but metaphors of forced clarity.

Fire and Water as Paired Consequences

In biblical literature, fire and water are twin forces that dismantle human hubris.

Water

• collapse of systems
  
  

• exposure
  
  

• structural weakness
  
  

• collective failure
  
  

Fire

• destruction of what remains
  
  

• unmaking of the built environment
  
  

• internal combustion
  
  

• systemic burnout
  
  

Peter 3:5–7

This text describes a pattern: one era collapses by water, another by fire.
Not prediction, but observation.

Modern application:
Dams represent the water side.
Data centers represent the fire side.

Both are infrastructures built with haste, political ego, and more optimism than engineering humility.

Both fail under stress.

How Churches Misread Disasters to Retain Power

Turning Natural Events into Moral Ones

Church institutions rely on a model where clergy interpret disasters.
By reframing natural events as moral events, they keep themselves indispensable.

This model creates a cycle:

• Disaster
  
  

• Fear
  
  

• Clergy interpretation
  
  

• Obedience
  
  

The mechanism has worked for over a millennium.

Fear Is a More Efficient Tool Than Understanding

Fear achieves instant compliance.
Nuance requires education, time, and autonomy.

Historically, church attendance spikes after disasters. People crave meaning during chaos, and the church positions itself as the source of meaning.

Ignorance of Natural Processes

Before scientific understanding, clergy had no explanations for:

• floods
  
  

• earthquakes
  
  

• droughts
  
  

• epidemics
  
  

• fires
  
  

Rather than admit uncertainty, they offered moral explanations.

These explanations stuck culturally long after science replaced them.
Many Christians today still talk about weather as if it were a moral actor.

Disaster as a Tool for Deflecting Responsibility

By blaming sin for disaster, churches conveniently avoid discussing:

• corruption
  
  

• infrastructure failure
  
  

• political incompetence
  
  

• misuse of funds
  
  

• poor engineering
  
  

• questionable alliances
  
  

• environmental mismanagement
  
  

Saying “God is punishing us” protects the powerful and silences inquiry.

This same logic shields failed dam policies in Iran and elsewhere.
The moral story replaces the engineering story.

Punishment Theology Is Not Biblical Theology

Ancient Hebrew writers describe a universe where cause and effect govern outcomes.
They do not present God as a being who lashes out in anger at weather.

Churches simplified the text into fear-based lessons for children and peasants.
This is not the Bible; it is institutional psychology.

Fear Maintains Dependency

If people believe every disaster is divine punishment, they will always return to clergy for:

• interpretation
  
  

• comfort
  
  

• protection
  
  

• ritual
  
  

• guidance
  
  

Fear keeps the hierarchy intact.

Why Criticizing Dams Triggers Immediate Denial

Most people do not react to factual content when you mention dams.
They react to conditioning.

Post-WW2 Propaganda

Dams were aggressively promoted as the hallmark of modernity.
They were presented as:

• technological triumphs
  
  

• humanitarian gifts
  
  

• national milestones
  
  

• symbols of progress
  
  

In many places, dams became the first image of development children saw in textbooks.

Criticizing dams is perceived as criticizing progress itself.

Engineers Elevated to Godlike Status

Hydrological engineering was treated as infallible.
Media portrayed engineers as brilliant problem-solvers who could tame nature.

Criticizing dams feels to many like criticizing science, rationality, or national achievement.

Churches Reinforced the Myth

Churches endorsed dams as a form of divine dominion over nature.
This tied dams to religious identity, making them sacred objects in the collective imagination.

Dam construction became a moral good.
Criticizing dams became an act of sacrilege.

Hollywood’s Heroic Narrative

Films, documentaries, and magazines portrayed dams as:

• colossal triumphs
  
  

• moral achievements
  
  

• symbols of unity
  
  

• icons of the American spirit
  
  

The Hoover Dam became a cultural shrine.
This imagery was exported globally.

Psychological Self-Defense

Accepting that dams are disastrous forces people to confront uncomfortable truths:

• governments failed
  
  

• experts misled
  
  

• institutions lied
  
  

• progress was not progress
  
  

• collapse is human-made
  
  

Most people choose denial over cognitive upheaval.

Dams as Symbols of Stability

Massive structures create the illusion that someone is managing the world.
Criticizing dams removes this psychological safety.

People react emotionally, not logically.

Denial Is Strongest Where Failure Is Greatest

In Iran:

• 600+ dams
  
  

• collapsing rivers
  
  

• shrinking aquifers
  
  

• desertification
  
  

• catastrophic floods
  
  

Yet the public clings to the narrative that “no one knew.”

Admitting the truth threatens national identity and institutional trust.

Dams as Modern Temples

Dams have become:

• sacred architecture
  
  

• symbols of control
  
  

• icons of national progress
  
  

• artifacts of political myth
  
  

Engineers function like priests.
Water management functions like liturgy.

This is why criticism feels threatening.

“The Bible does not describe floods as punishment. It describes them as consequences of imbalance. Churches simplified that into fear, and governments used that fear to protect their own mistakes.”

“A flood reveals what a society tried to hide. In ancient texts and in modern Iran, water exposes the truth.”

The Post-WWII U.S. Dam Push: How It Created Today’s Water Crises

After WWII, the U.S. launched a global “modernization” campaign

From 1945 through the 1970s, American engineers, planners, and development agencies aggressively promoted the idea that dams = modernization. 

This was not accidental — it was ideological and strategic. 

Root motives: 

• Export the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) model to “developing” regions
  
  

• Counter Soviet influence with infrastructure aid
  
  

• Transform rural societies into stable, compliant states
  
  

• Expand American engineering, construction, and hydropower companies
  
  

• Control regional water flows as strategic leverage
  
  

USAID, the World Bank, and the Bureau of Reclamation all became tools in this global dam-building machine. 

 Iran became one of the biggest Cold War dam targets

After the U.S. and U.K. installed the Shah in 1953, Iran became a showcase for “American-led modernization”. 

What happened: 

• U.S. Bureau of Reclamation engineers were brought in
  
  

• Hydropower and irrigation projects were fast-tracked
  
  

• American consulting firms designed the major dams
  
  

The Shah was sold the idea that industrial modernity required: 

• giant dams
  
  

• monocrop agriculture
  
  

• urban migration
  
  

• centralized water control
  
  

Between the 1950s and late 1970s, Iran built or planned over 600 dams — more per capita than almost anywhere else on earth. 

These designs created over-allocation — meaning the water was already promised to cities and farms as if climate would never change. 

That system is still in place. 

 The U.S. wasn’t doing this only in Iran 

The 1945–1980 dam wave was global. 

The same pattern happened in: 

• Iraq – the U.S.-supported Dukan & Darbandikhan dams
  
  

• Egypt – the High Aswan Dam (engineered first by U.S. firms, later built with Soviet support)
  
  

• Afghanistan, Pakistan – massive “irrigation modernization”
  
  

• Latin America – Itaipu, Guri, Tucuruí, Grand Coulee copies
  
  

• Southeast Asia – Mekong modernization plans pushed by U.S. engineers
  
  

It was a Cold War contest: 

• Soviets built socialist dams
  
  

• Americans built capitalist dams
  Both sides exported the same giant-infrastructure ideology.
  
  

 The problem was baked in from the start

These dams shared the same structural flaws: 

Overestimation of rainfall forever

Designers assumed: 

• consistent snowpack
  
  

• predictable precipitation
  
  

• stable watersheds
  
  

None of that remained true. 

Sedimentation ignored

Reservoirs everywhere have lost 30–60% of storage capacity because dam engineers assumed “we’ll fix it later”. 

Groundwater dependency grew

Dams encouraged water-intensive agriculture, which forced farmers to over-pump aquifers when reservoirs fell. 

This is exactly what’s happening in Iran now. 

Dam building locked countries into a rigid system

If the climate or population changed, the system failed — because dams cannot adapt. 

 Why the media now acts shocked

Journalists often treat water shortages as “unexpected”: 

• “How did Tehran run out of water?”
  
  

• “Why are Iran’s reservoirs dry?”
  
  

• “Why didn’t we anticipate this crisis?”
  
  

But the engineering community has known since the late 1990s that the post-WWII dam model was collapsing under: 

• climate shifts
  
  

• sedimentation
  
  

• over-allocation
  
  

• groundwater depletion
  
  

• urban expansion
  
  

Iran is just hitting the wall earlier and more visibly. 

 So yes — the crisis began “ages ago”

The modern news cycle pretends: 

• this is about drought
  
  

• this is about mismanagement
  
  

• this is about climate alone
  
  

But the root cause was the 1945–1980 American modernization doctrine that created: 

• too many dams
  
  

• with too-high water promises
  
  

• in a climate-sensitive region
  
  

• without adaptive management
  
  

• tied to Cold War geopolitics
  
  

Iran is paying for decisions made under the Shah with U.S. advisors — decisions baked into the entire water-allocation system today. 

Eugenics in Concrete: The Dark History of Dams

American Blueprint: Dams as Myth

The Frontier Logic

• 1902: U.S. Bureau of Reclamation founded to “make the desert bloom.”
  
  

• Mission: capture rivers in the West, irrigate deserts, control settlers, and eliminate Indigenous independence.
  
  

• Reality: treaties promised tribes land “as long as the buffalo roam.” Then the government killed the buffalo, dammed the rivers, and starvation forced tribes into reservations.
  
  

Hoover Dam (1931–1936) — A National Stage Play

• Built during the Depression, Hoover was more performance than project.
  
  

• PR campaigns showed men dangling on ropes, concrete pouring night and day.
  
  

• Sculptor Oskar Hansen added winged statues, zodiac engravings, and bronze eagles. Hoover looked like a temple of destiny.
  
  

• Newspapers called it the “Eighth Wonder of the World.”
  
  

The TVA (1933–1940s) — Selling Electricity as Salvation

• The Tennessee Valley Authority was wrapped in films (The River 1938, Valley of the Tennessee 1944), posters, and schoolbooks.
  
  

• Families shown flicking on light bulbs, children taught in class: dams = modernity.
  
  

• By the 1940s, Americans no longer saw dams as concrete. They saw them as proof of national destiny.
  
  

Exporting the “Dam Miracle” (1940s–1970s)

• Cold War Tool: USAID and the World Bank sold dams abroad as “modernization.”
  
  

• TVA as Blueprint: U.S. engineers traveled to Iran, Egypt, India — not just to build, but to cut ribbons, give speeches, and pose with leaders.
  
  

• Prestige Politics: For leaders like the Shah, Nasser, and Nehru, a dam was more than water. It was a photo op, a claim to greatness, a seat at the modern table.
  
  

Iran: The Shah’s Concrete Crown

The Coup and the Concrete (1953–1970s)

• 1953: CIA–MI6 topple Mossadegh. The Shah is reinstalled as Washington’s loyal partner.
  
  

• U.S. engineers and World Bank loans flow into Iran.
  
  

• Dez Dam (1963) — literally built by Tennessee Valley Authority veterans.
  
  

• Karaj Dam and others follow, promoted as “symbols of progress.”
  
  

The Reality

• Ancient qanats (underground water channels) that sustained farming for centuries were destroyed.
  
  

• Wetlands drained, aquifers collapsing.
  
  

• Farming communities are abandoned as salinity spreads.
  
  

After the Revolution (1979–2000s)

• The Islamic Republic condemned the Shah’s “Westernization.”
  
  

• But under Rafsanjani (1989–97), Iran built a new dam every 45 days.
  
  

• The Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) profited through its conglomerate Khatam al-Anbia.
  
  

Today

• 600+ dams. Most failing, silted, or evaporating.
  
  

• Lake Urmia shrank to less than 5% of its former size.
  
  

• The Zayandeh Rud River in Isfahan dried into a cracked desert.
  
  

• 28 million Iranians lack reliable water.
  
  

• Protests since 2018 cry “We are thirsty.” The regime answers with bullets.
  
  

Egypt: Nasser’s “Yes-Man” Dam

The Dream

• In the 1950s, Gamal Abdel Nasser wanted his own Hoover Dam — the Aswan High Dam.
  
  

• Symbol: independence, modernization, defiance of colonial Britain.
  
  

The Warnings

7–8 groups of engineers warned:

• The Nubian sandstone foundation was fractured.
  
  

• Sediment would clog the reservoir.
  
  

• Evaporation would waste water.
  
  

• Farmland would salinize.
  
  

• Stagnant canals would spread schistosomiasis.
  
  

Nasser shopped until he got a “yes.”

The Break and the Soviets

• The U.S./U.K./World Bank pledged ~$70M but withdrew in 1956 when Nasser bought Soviet arms and refused Western pacts.
  
  

• Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Britain, France, and Israel invaded.
  
  

• The U.S. forced them to withdraw, but Egypt turned to Moscow.
  
  

• Soviets provided $1.12B in loans and 2,000 engineers.
  
  

The Result (1970)

• Lake Nasser was created.
  
  

• Hydropower provided up to 50% of Egypt’s electricity.
  
  

• But: Nile Delta eroded, farmland salinized, fisheries collapsed, Nubians displaced.
  
  

• Egypt became more dependent on food imports, not less.
  
  

China: The Three Gorges Monster

• Planned for decades, completed in 2006.
  
  

• Cost: ¥254B (~$37B).
  
  

Displaced 1.3M people, drowning entire towns and heritage sites.

• Engineers warned of cracks, seismic risks, and downstream chaos.
  
  

• Today: “controlled discharges” flood poor villages.
  
  

• Electricity flows to industry; households see little benefit.
  
  

• Officially “paid off” in 2013, now profitable — but ecological collapse and displacement remain.
  
  

Financing the Concrete Dreams

Country	Project	Loan Amount / Source	Total Cost	Current Status
Iran	Dez Dam (1963)	$42M World Bank loan + $100M for irrigation	~$142M	Paid, but ecological collapse left behind
Egypt	Aswan High Dam (1970)	$70M pledged by U.S./UK (withdrawn) → $1.12B Soviet loan	~$1.3B	Debt repaid/managed; ecological fallout ongoing
China	Three Gorges Dam (2006)	State bank loans, bonds, electricity surcharges	¥254B (~$37B)	Paid off by 2013, now profitable; ongoing risks
Ethiopia	GERD (Grand Renaissance Dam)	$1B Chinese loan for turbines; rest via bonds	~$5B	Still under repayment; geopolitical flashpoint

Pattern: loans = leverage. Dams were never just engineering — they were economic soft power.

The Hidden Social Cost

• Targeting the Poor: Dams built where vulnerable groups lived — Native Americans, Nubians, Iranian farmers, Chinese villagers.
  
  

• Forced Evictions: Bulldozers, soldiers, “resettlements.” Most lost land and never recovered.
  
  

• Trapped by Concrete: Many ended up living near the dam itself, forced to risk collapse or “controlled flooding.”
  
  

• Time Bomb: All dams age. Sediment builds, cracks form. The poor — those displaced to the dam’s shadow — will be first to die when disaster strikes.
  
  

The Parallels: Shah & Nasser

• Both embraced dams as prestige monuments.
  
  

• Both ignored expert warnings.
  
  

• One took U.S. loans, the other Soviet loans.
  
  

• Both left their nations with ecological ruin and millions suffering.
  
  

Different sides of the Cold War. Same empire of concrete.

The Pattern

Across continents, the same script repeats:

Prestige project. Experts say no. Leaders find a yes.
Concrete rises. People fall.

Dams don’t just hold back rivers. They hold back lives.
What looks like salvation is really slow death.
This is eugenics in concrete — no bullets, no bombs, just thirst.

How Iranians Got So Many Dams

• From the 1960s through the early 2000s, successive Iranian governments (both before and after 1979) promoted large-scale dam building.
  
  

• The goals were typical of the time:
  
  

• Expand irrigation and grow more food.
  
  

• Generate hydroelectric power.
  
  

• Store water to reduce flood and drought risks.
  
  

• By the 2010s, Iran had built more than 600 dams — one of the highest densities in the region.
  
  

• These projects were widely celebrated as symbols of modernization and national progress.
  Politicians and engineers were proud of them; very few people at the time expected them to lead to future shortages.
  
  

Why the Mood Changed

• After decades of construction, many rivers shrank or dried, wetlands like Lake Urmia and the Hamun wetlands collapsed, and groundwater was over-pumped.
  
  

• By the mid-2010s, severe drought exposed that the reservoirs behind many dams were empty.
  
  

• Farmers, herders, and towns downstream lost water supplies.
  
  

• Scientists and environmental groups began speaking openly about over-building of dams and mismanagement as root causes of Iran’s crisis.
  
  

• This created a sense of betrayal among many ordinary Iranians: they had been told dams were the answer — but in hindsight they seemed to have worsened the problem.
  
  

Public Feelings Today

There are different strands of public opinion inside Iran:

• Anger at mismanagement:
  Many people believe the government pursued dam building for political prestige and construction contracts, ignoring the science of living in an arid land.
  
  

• Disillusionment, not conspiracy:
  While you sometimes hear people say “they tricked us” or that it was “a long-term plan,” most public criticism points to policy mistakes, corruption, and short-term thinking, not to an intentional plot to deprive the country of water.
  
  

• Environmental awareness:
  A growing share of urban and younger Iranians now see the crisis as a human-made disaster that needs urgent reform — less about secret tricks and more about decades of the wrong approach.
  
  

In Simple Terms

• For decades, dams were believed to be a tool for prosperity.
  
  

• With climate change and overuse, they turned into part of the problem.
  
  

• Today, many Iranians feel betrayed by their leaders’ past choices, but the mainstream view is that this was due to mismanagement and short-sighted development policies, not a deliberate “long-term trick.”
  
  

Bottom line:
Iranians don’t generally believe there was a hidden conspiracy to deprive them of water.
They mostly see it as a tragic policy error — huge investment in dams that looked smart decades ago but left the country less resilient to drought today.

What We Know Factually

• Large dams have well-documented downsides:
  
  

• Displacement of millions of people (for example, more than a million were resettled for China’s Three Gorges Dam).
  
  

• Ecosystem collapse (floodplains and fisheries downstream).
  
  

• Increased evaporation losses in arid areas.
  
  

• In some cases, increased risk of catastrophic flooding or landslides if the dam is poorly sited or maintained.
  
  

• Many were built for understandable aims:
  Irrigation, flood control, hydropower, navigation.
  Governments and engineers saw them as symbols of modernization and development.
  
  

• The failures are mostly about unintended consequences, not hidden plots:
  Historians and water-policy scholars point to political prestige projects, short-term economic motives, corruption, and lack of environmental knowledge at the time — not to evidence of an organized population-reduction plan.
  
  

Three Gorges Dam

• Location: built on the Yangtze River in a geologically complex area with known landslide-prone slopes.
  
  

• Problems reported:
  
  

• Reservoir-induced landslides and bank erosion.
  
  

• Downstream sediment starvation and ecosystem disruption.
  
  

• Ongoing debate about whether the site increased the risk of earthquakes.
  
  

• These are engineering and environmental-risk issues, not evidence of an eugenics agenda.
  
  

• The project was championed by the Chinese state as a national infrastructure and energy project; no credible historians or environmental scientists have found documentation linking it to population-reduction ideology.
  
  

On the “Eugenics Tool” Claim

• Eugenics refers to policies designed to encourage or discourage reproduction of particular groups.
  
  

• No mainstream historical record or documentary evidence links dam-building programs — in China, Iran, the U.S., the Soviet Union, or elsewhere — to eugenics campaigns.
  
  

• Dams have often had harmful social effects, especially on Indigenous and rural communities, but those are generally explained by power politics, disregard for local rights, and technocratic thinking — not by population-control planning.
  
  

• It’s understandable that, given the scale of harm, some people interpret it as deliberate; however, the scholarly consensus is that these harms were unintended consequences of top-down development models.
  
  

A Balanced Historical Reading

• Harm: displacement, ecological collapse, sometimes worsened floods or droughts downstream.
  
  

• Benefit: reliable electricity in some regions, flood protection in some valleys, and water storage for dry seasons.
  
  

• Pattern: early optimism, followed by disappointment or crisis as long-term effects became clear.
  
  

• The pattern looks much more like repeated policy mistakes and hubris than a coordinated covert program.
  
  

In short:
Your view highlights the real human and environmental harm caused by many dams — that concern is well-founded.
The idea that dams were intentionally designed as a eugenics tool is not supported by historical evidence.
Most historians and water-policy researchers attribute the problems to short-sighted development policies, authoritarian decision-making, and poor environmental understanding, rather than to a long-term population-control conspiracy.

• Historical fact: Many large dam projects, particularly in the U.S., Canada, China, India, and elsewhere, displaced Indigenous peoples and other rural communities. For example:
  
  

• The building of dams on the Columbia and Colorado Rivers in the U.S. flooded Native American fishing grounds and sacred sites.
  
  

• Canada’s hydroelectric expansion in the 20th century often flooded First Nations lands.
  
  

• Large dams in Asia and Africa likewise uprooted long-settled communities.
  
  

• Mainstream historical interpretation: Scholars generally explain this as a combination of:
  
  

• State power and technocratic planning that ignored Indigenous land rights.
  
  

• Economic motives (hydropower, irrigation, navigation).
  
  

• Racial and colonial attitudes that treated Indigenous communities as expendable.
  
  

• Your interpretation: You regard these patterns as evidence of a long-term eugenics agenda. That is a sincerely held opinion, but it goes well beyond what the documented historical record supports. No primary-source evidence (policy documents, official plans, or correspondence) has been found that shows dam projects were deliberately designed as a population-reduction or eugenics program.
  
  

Early View (mid-20th century)

• From about the 1930s to the 1970s, engineers, governments, and many academics were enthusiastic about dams.
  
  

• Dams were seen as “modern progress”: they produced hydropower, controlled floods, and irrigated farmland.
  
  

• The social and ecological costs were poorly understood or were dismissed as an acceptable price for development.
  
  

Shift in the Late 20th Century

• By the 1980s and 1990s, evidence accumulated that big dams had major downsides:
  
  

• Massive displacement of people (often Indigenous and rural communities).
  
  

• Loss of river fisheries, wetlands, and biodiversity.
  
  

• Siltation of reservoirs, which reduces a dam’s life span.
  
  

• Higher evaporation losses in dry regions.
  
  

• In some cases, increased flood or landslide risk downstream.
  
  

• The World Commission on Dams (2000) concluded that while some dams delivered benefits, their costs were often far higher than predicted and were not borne equally.
  
  

Present View (21st century)

• Mainstream water scientists and historians today do not think that most big dams were “good.”
  
  

• Many argue that the era of large multipurpose dams is over in most parts of the world because:
  
  

• Cheaper and less disruptive energy sources (like wind and solar) now exist.
  
  

• Water scarcity and climate change make big reservoirs less reliable.
  
  

• Restoring river ecosystems often brings more benefit than further damming.
  
  

• There is still debate over small-scale dams or upgrading existing ones, but building new mega-dams is widely regarded as a mistake.
  
  

To Sum Up

• Past attitude: big dams = progress.
  
  

• Current expert consensus: big dams have caused major harm; in many cases the long-term costs outweighed the benefits.
  
  

• Historians now often treat 20th-century dam-building as an example of technocratic hubris — a lesson in how powerful states and engineers reshaped landscapes without accounting for social and ecological consequences.
  
  

Bottom line:
Modern historians and water scientists generally regard the large-scale dam-building boom of the 20th century as a regrettable policy choice, not as a good one.
The debate today is more about how to manage or de-commission existing dams than about building new ones.

• Debate today:
  The mainstream discussion is indeed practical:
  
  

• Which old dams to dismantle or modify to restore river systems.
  
  

• How to protect communities already living downstream.
  
  

• How to replace the electricity or water storage those dams still provide.
  
  

• No evidence of a hidden plan:
  The historical research into dam-building by governments — including the big U.S. Bureau of Reclamation projects, the Soviet, Chinese, and Iranian dam campaigns — shows political, economic, and technological motives.
  It does not show documentation of a eugenics-based strategy.
  
  

• Your interpretation:
  You’re noting that if such a plan had existed, steering the public debate toward technical management and away from questioning the original motive would have been an effective way to keep that plan hidden.
  
  

The Documented “Root Causes” of the Dam Problem

Even if you set aside any hidden-agenda theories, researchers have identified several very concrete historical roots:

• Technocratic Development Model: mid-20th-century governments saw megaprojects as proof of progress.
  
  

• Economic Incentives: construction contracts and cheap hydropower were politically attractive.
  
  

• Colonial & Racial Attitudes: Indigenous and rural communities were often treated as expendable.
  
  

• Poor Environmental Knowledge: decision-makers underestimated how rivers and aquifers would respond.
  
  

Those elements are the recognized “background” that led to over-building of dams and the harms that followed.

Why Some People Feel the Root Cause Is Being Skipped

• Public discourse often moves to practical management because:
  
  

• The dams already exist and must be maintained or de-commissioned.
  
  

• Governments and engineers are often defensive about past mistakes.
  
  

• It’s easier to debate technical fixes than to confront political or historical wrongs.
  
  

• That can feel, to many people, like a deliberate avoidance of responsibility or like a cover-up, even if it’s more about institutional inertia and short-term politics.
  
  

Keeping the Background in View

For any honest debate, it helps to keep both things in the frame:

1. The historical decisions and power structures that led to building the dams in the first place.
   
   

2. The present-day practical needs of people living with those dams.
   
   

Many environmental historians, Indigenous leaders, and river-restoration advocates do call attention to the history of dispossession and mismanagement as the true root cause. So there is space in the debate for talking about background, even if it sometimes gets overshadowed.

• During the 1980s:
  
  

• The U.S. worked with Afghan mujahideen factions (anti-Soviet guerrillas) and channeled aid through Pakistan’s ISI.
  
  

• The Taliban did not yet exist.
  
  

• Many future Taliban members were young fighters or students in the refugee camps and religious schools in Pakistan during this time, but they were not a distinct movement.
  
  

• 1994 onward:
  
  

• The Taliban emerged as a new movement during the Afghan civil war, years after the Soviet withdrawal and after U.S. aid had largely wound down.
  
  

• Their rise was driven primarily by Pakistan’s ISI and by conditions in post-war Afghanistan (lawlessness, warlord abuses, displaced students from religious schools).
  
  

• U.S. stance toward Taliban in the 1990s:
  
  

• Washington did not create or formally ally with the Taliban.
  
  

• Some U.S. officials and oil companies initially saw them as a possible stabilizing force that might allow for pipeline projects, but the U.S. never provided them weapons or organized their formation.
  
  

• Once the Taliban sheltered Al-Qaeda, especially after the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa, relations became openly hostile.
  
  

Bottom Line

• The U.S. helped create the conditions (by arming the mujahideen and then walking away after 1989) in which the Taliban could arise.
  
  

• The U.S. did not set out to create the Taliban and never had a formal partnership with them.
  
  

• So the relationship is best described as indirect historical connection and blowback, not deliberate founding.
  
  

Timeline: Shah and the Dams

• 1941 – Reza Shah (the father) abdicates under Allied pressure during World War II.
  → His son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi becomes Shah.
  
  

• 1951 – Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh nationalizes Iran’s oil industry, challenging the Shah’s power.
  
  

• August 1953 – Shah briefly flees Iran during the political crisis.
  → A U.S.–UK-backed coup (Operation Ajax) overthrows Mossadegh.
  → Shah returns to Iran and consolidates power with Western support.
  
  

• Mid-1950s (1954–1958) – U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and U.S. engineering firms (e.g., Morrison-Knudsen) begin river-basin surveys and planning for large dams.
  
  

• 1961 – Karaj Dam completed near Tehran – one of the first big modern dams.
  
  

• 1963 – Dez Dam completed in Khuzestan Province – an iconic U.S-engineered multipurpose dam for power and irrigation.
  
  

• 1970s – Karun-1, Karun-3 and other dams built as part of the Shah’s rapid industrial and agricultural development drive.
  
  

• 1979 – Iranian Revolution; Shah is overthrown and goes into exile.
  → The new Islamic Republic continues the dam-building model in the following decades.
  
  

Key Takeaway

• Shah’s exile and return: August 1953.
  
  

• Dam planning begins: mid-1950s, a few years after his return.
  
  

• First major modern dams built: early 1960s.
  
  

• Massive dam-building boom: 1960s–1970s.
  
  

The 1953 Crisis

• Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was Iran’s elected leader.
  
  

• He wanted to nationalize Iran’s oil industry (which had been controlled by the British) and curb the Shah’s power.
  
  

• The Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, opposed Mossadegh’s policies.
  
  

The Shah Flees

• In August 1953, amid a political standoff and massive street protests, the Shah left Iran for a short period (first to Iraq, then to Italy).
  
  

• Mossadegh was still in power at that moment.
  
  

Operation Ajax

• The CIA (U.S.) and MI6 (U.K.) carried out a covert operation to undermine Mossadegh’s government.
  
  

• They funded street protests and worked with Iranian military officers to overthrow Mossadegh.
  
  

• Within a few days, the coup succeeded; Mossadegh was arrested.
  
  

Shah Returns

• August 22, 1953: the Shah returned to Iran and re-established his authority.
  
  

• From that point on, his rule was firmly backed by the United States and Britain.
  
  

• This close alignment opened the door for heavy Western involvement in Iran’s economic development programs, including U.S.-backed planning for major dams a few years later.
  
  

Bottom Line

• The Shah did indeed leave Iran during the crisis.
  
  

• He returned to power with decisive U.S. and U.K. support after the coup removed Mossadegh.
  
  

• This marked the start of a quarter-century of close U.S.–Iran cooperation on security and large-scale development projects (including the dam programs).
  
  

Background: The Oil Nationalization Crisis

• Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC):
  Before 1951, Britain controlled most of Iran’s oil industry and took most of the profits.
  
  

• Nationalist resentment:
  Many Iranians felt exploited and wanted control over their own resources.
  
  

• Mossadegh:
  A popular, nationalist prime minister, elected by parliament, championed nationalizing the oil industry to end British dominance.
  
  

Growing Tensions

• 1951: Parliament votes to nationalize oil.
  
  

• Britain responds with an oil embargo and withdraws technicians, which hurts Iran’s economy.
  
  

• 1952–53: Economic hardship and political infighting deepen.
  
  

• Mossadegh tries to reduce the Shah’s political power by asserting parliamentary control over the army and the palace.
  
  

The Protests

• Pro-Mossadegh crowds:
  Organized demonstrations in support of nationalization and against foreign influence.
  
  

• Royalist and conservative crowds:
  Backed by elements in the military, clerics, and later covertly by the CIA and MI6, staged counter-demonstrations against Mossadegh.
  
  

• The street clashes were not spontaneous; both sides mobilized supporters.
  
  

Shah’s Flight

• August 1953:
  Mossadegh dismisses a pro-Shah military commander.
  The Shah attempts to dismiss Mossadegh by decree but fails and, fearing for his safety amid massive pro-Mossadegh demonstrations, flees Iran to Iraq and then Italy.
  
  

The Coup

• August 19, 1953:
  A second, better-organized coup attempt — aided by CIA-funded provocateurs, royalist officers, and some clerics — brings large anti-Mossadegh crowds into the streets.
  
  

• Army units loyal to the Shah seize key points in Tehran.
  
  

• Mossadegh is arrested; the Shah returns on August 22.
  
  

Key Point

The protests in the streets were about Iran’s direction:

• Nationalists and left-leaning groups: wanted Mossadegh’s oil nationalization and less royal control.
  
  

• Royalists, conservatives, some clerics: opposed Mossadegh and wanted the Shah’s authority preserved.
  
  

• The unrest provided the opening for the CIA/MI6 to tip the balance in favor of the Shah.
  
  

In short:
The protests that triggered the Shah’s flight were part of a deep internal struggle over oil nationalization, foreign influence, and the balance of power between the Shah and the elected prime minister.
The crisis in the streets allowed foreign powers to intervene and restore the Shah.

Sykes–Picot (1916)

• A secret wartime agreement between Britain and France (with Russia’s assent) to divide the Ottoman Empire’s Arab lands into spheres of influence once the war was over.
  
  

• The line they drew cut up much of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire:
  
  

• Britain got what became Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine.
  
  

• France got Syria and Lebanon.
  
  

• Iran was not part of the Ottoman Empire and therefore not directly included in Sykes–Picot.
  
  

• But the agreement reflected the imperial competition that also affected Iran.
  
  

Iran in the Post-WWI Era

• Iran (then called Persia) was a nominally independent monarchy under the Qajar dynasty, but it had long been a zone of rivalry between Britain and Russia.
  
  

• After the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) and the Russian withdrawal from Iran, Britain became the dominant foreign power.
  
  

• Britain wanted a stable, centralized Iran as a buffer against Soviet Russia and as a secure route to the Persian Gulf and the newly discovered oilfields.
  
  

Rise of Reza Shah

• 1921: Reza Khan, an officer in the Cossack Brigade, led a coup in Tehran.
  
  

• 1925: Reza Khan deposed the last Qajar monarch and became Reza Shah Pahlavi, founding the Pahlavi dynasty.
  
  

• His rise was not part of the Sykes–Picot plan, but it happened in the same post-Ottoman, post-WWI period when European powers were reorganizing much of the region.
  
  

• Britain tacitly supported Reza Khan because they saw him as a strong ruler who could modernize Iran and resist Bolshevik influence.
  
  

The Connection

• Sykes–Picot: redrew borders of former Ottoman Arab lands under colonial mandates.
  
  

• Iran: remained independent but underwent its own internal political reorganization, encouraged by the power dynamics of the same era.
  
  

• Both events reflected the decline of old empires (Ottoman and Qajar) and the rise of European influence in shaping the new order of the Middle East.
  
  

Key Takeaway

• The Shah’s Pahlavi line did not come from Sykes–Picot, but from Iran’s internal coup and state-building drive.
  
  

• Both, however, were part of the larger geopolitical reshuffling after World War I, as Britain and France extended their influence and local elites consolidated new nation-states.
  
  

Timeline: Sykes–Picot and the Rise of Reza Shah

• 1914–1918 – World War I
  
  

• The Ottoman Empire collapses; Britain and France seek to divide its Middle Eastern lands.
  
  

• May 1916 – Sykes–Picot Agreement
  
  

• A secret British–French pact to divide Ottoman Arab territories into spheres of influence.
  
  

• Sets the stage for postwar British control in Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan and French control in Syria and Lebanon.
  
  

• Iran is not part of the agreement because it was never Ottoman territory.
  
  

• 1917 – Bolshevik Revolution in Russia
  
  

• Russia withdraws troops from northern Iran, leaving Britain as the dominant outside power there.
  
  

• 1920–1921 – Postwar Upheavals
  
  

• Britain tries (unsuccessfully) to impose a protectorate over Iran.
  
  

• Political instability in Tehran leads to the rise of strongman officers.
  
  

• Feb. 1921 – Coup by Reza Khan
  
  

• Reza Khan, an officer in the Persian Cossack Brigade, leads a coup with tacit British approval.
  
  

• He becomes War Minister and then Prime Minister, consolidating central authority.
  
  

• 1925 – End of the Qajar Dynasty
  
  

• The Majlis (parliament) deposes the last Qajar monarch.
  
  

• Reza Khan becomes Reza Shah Pahlavi, founding the Pahlavi dynasty.
  
  

Big Picture

• Sykes–Picot (1916): Divided Ottoman Arab lands between Britain and France.
  
  

• Reza Shah’s rise (1921–25): Transformed Iran, which stayed formally independent but moved into Britain’s informal sphere of influence.
  
  

• Both were part of the post–World War I reshaping of the Middle East, but they were separate processes.
  
  

 

Britain backed the Shah after the 1953 coup, British and later U.S. companies profited from Iranian oil, and foreign engineering firms helped plan Iran’s big river projects.

Documented Facts

• Oil and the 1953 Coup:
  
  

• Britain’s Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later BP) had dominated Iranian oil before 1951.
  
  

• Mossadegh’s move to nationalize oil led Britain and the U.S. to orchestrate the 1953 coup that restored the Shah.
  
  

• After the coup, a consortium of Western oil firms (including BP and U.S. majors) regained major stakes in Iranian oil production.
  
  

• Foreign Development Influence:
  
  

• From the mid-1950s, the Shah’s government invited U.S. agencies (notably the Bureau of Reclamation) and Western firms to do river-basin surveys and to design big multipurpose dams such as Karaj and Dez.
  
  

• The projects were promoted as modernization—irrigation, flood control, power generation—rather than as tools of political control.
  
  

• The dams did indeed create long-term environmental problems and have contributed to today’s water crisis.
  
  

What Is Not Documented

• There is no evidence in released archives or scholarship that Britain or the U.S. planned the dams as a hidden strategy to control Iran by manipulating its water supply.
  
  

• Historians see it as a mix of:
  
  

• Cold-War geopolitics (securing an ally and its oil), and
  
  

• mid-20th-century development thinking (big dams were in fashion
  
  

The Shah’s close alignment with Britain and later the U.S. after the 1953 coup put Iran’s oil and water development on a Western-guided path — a path that proved environmentally damaging and helped set up today’s water crisis.

Regional Power Politics

• 1916 – Sykes–Picot
  
  

• 1921 – Reza Khan’s coup
  
  

• 1925 – Reza Shah crowned
  
  

• 1951 – Mossadegh nationalizes oil
  
  

• 1953 – UK/U.S.-backed coup restores Shah
  
  

• 1954 – Oil consortium formed under Western control
  
  

Iran’s Development Path

• mid-1950s – U.S. engineers begin river-basin planning
  
  

• 1961 – Karaj Dam completed
  
  

• 1963 – Dez Dam completed
  
  

• 1970s – Karun projects and other large dams
  
  

• 1979 – Shah overthrown; Islamic Republic continues dam-building
  
  

Two parallel tracks show how political control of oil and large-scale water projects advanced side by side during the Shah’s alliance with Western powers.

Master Timeline: Politics, Oil & Dams in Iran

• 1916 – Sykes–Picot Agreement
  Britain and France secretly divide Ottoman Arab lands; Iran is not part of the pact but remains in Britain–Russia rivalry.
  
  

• 1921 – Reza Khan’s Coup in Tehran
  Military officer seizes power amid instability; signals rise of a strong central state.
  
  

• 1925 – Reza Shah Pahlavi Crowned
  Ends the Qajar dynasty; begins centralization and modernization.
  
  

• 1951 – Mossadegh Nationalizes Oil
  Elected prime minister challenges British control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
  
  

• 1953 – UK/U.S.–Backed Coup Restores Shah
  Operation Ajax overthrows Mossadegh; Shah returns with Western support.
  
  

• 1954 – Oil Consortium Formed under Western Control
  British, U.S., and other foreign oil firms gain major shares in Iran’s petroleum sector.
  
  

• Mid-1950s – U.S. Engineers Launch River-Basin Planning
  U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and Western consultants conduct nationwide water-resource surveys; begin designs for large dams.
  
  

• 1961 – Karaj Dam Completed
  One of the first modern multi-purpose dams near Tehran.
  
  

• 1963 – Dez Dam Completed
  Built in Khuzestan with U.S. engineering input; centerpiece of Shah-era irrigation and power plans.
  
  

• 1970s – Karun River Projects & More Mega-Dams
  Massive expansion of river diversion and hydropower under Shah’s industrialization program.
  
  

• 1979 – Iranian Revolution Overthrows Shah
  Pahlavi monarchy collapses; the new Islamic Republic continues large-dam building in subsequent decades.
  
  

Dams as a Continuing State Policy

• Under the Shah (1950s-1979):
  Dams were symbols of modernization and national progress. They were backed by foreign loans, engineers, and international development banks.
  
  

• After the Revolution (1979 onward):
  The new Islamic Republic condemned many of the Shah’s policies but kept the large-dam development model.
  
  

• They saw dams as vital for self-sufficiency in food and energy and as nation-building projects.
  
  

• The Revolutionary Guards and Iranian engineering firms took over many of the construction roles once filled by Western companies.
  
  

• 1980s–2000s:
  
  

• Despite the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and sanctions, the state continued to expand dams.
  
  

• By the early 2000s Iran had more than 600 dams, far more than under the Shah.
  
  

 

Consequences

• Over-damming of rivers, over-pumping of aquifers, and climate-driven drought have together led to today’s chronic water shortages.
  
  

• The continuity of policy shows that large dams became a deeply entrenched development approach, transcending ideology and regime change.
  
  

Bottom Line

• Yes: Both the Shah’s monarchy and the Islamic Republic pursued big-dam projects.
  
  

• The choice to keep building was driven by economic and technocratic beliefs, not by loyalty to the Shah.
  
  

• This continuity is one reason the environmental problems tied to dams — drying rivers, shrinking lakes, displaced communities — have compounded over decades.
  
  

Documented Reality

• Large-scale dam building in Iran spans more than 60 years and two very different regimes.
  
  

• The policy has persisted through:
  
  

• Monarchy (1950s-1979)
  
  

• Revolutionary theocracy (1979-present)
  
  

• International sanctions, war, and changing political factions.
  
  

• The official stated reasons have been hydropower, irrigation, food and energy self-sufficiency, and flood control.
  
  

• Environmental researchers now widely agree that this long-term reliance on dams has been ecologically damaging and often counter-productive.
  
  

Mainstream Historical Interpretation

• Most historians and water-policy scholars explain the continuity as the result of:
  
  

• A global development paradigm in the mid-20th century that equated big dams with modern progress.
  
  

• Domestic bureaucratic and engineering interests that remained in place after 1979.
  
  

• Political leaders in both eras wanting to show visible “nation-building” projects.
  
  

• There is no archival or documentary evidence that either the Shah or the Islamic Republic framed the dams as a eugenics project.
  
  

Your Critical View

• You note that when a major policy persists despite revolutions, ideology changes, and leadership turnover, it can look like proof of a hidden through-line.
  
  

• That interpretation reflects suspicion about motive, not something demonstrable in the historical record.
  
  

Key Distinction

• Fact: Iran’s dam-driven water-management model has been remarkably continuous since the 1950s and has had severe environmental and social consequences.
  
  

• Interpretation: Seeing that continuity as evidence of a covert eugenics agenda is a personal hypothesis — it is not supported by historical documentation.
  
  

Iran’s Dam-Building Timeline after 1979

• 1979 – Iranian Revolution
  Shah is overthrown; Islamic Republic inherits ongoing water and energy projects.
  
  

• 1980-1988 – Iran-Iraq War
  Many projects pause or slow due to war and resource needs.
  Some dams are still completed or planned for both power and wartime irrigation.
  
  

• 1990s – Reconstruction & Expansion
  After the war, the government launches a major dam-building push for hydropower and irrigation.
  
  

• Gotvand Dam (planning phase)
  
  

• Karun-3 Dam (construction begins, later completed in 2005)
  
  

• Dozens of medium-size dams on regional rivers.
  
  

• 2000s – Peak Dam-Building Era
  
  

• Karun-3 (2005), one of the largest hydroelectric dams in the Middle East.
  
  

• Karun-4, Upper Gotvand, and others added.
  
  

• By the late 2000s Iran has over 500 completed dams.
  
  

• Large-scale irrigation schemes and river diversions accelerate.
  
  

• 2010s – Environmental Alarm Grows
  
  

• Continued dam building contributes to drying of Lake Urmia, reduced river flows, dust-storm crises.
  
  

• Experts and some Iranian policymakers begin warning of unsustainable water use.
  
  

• Public protests emerge in Isfahan and Khuzestan over water shortages.
  
  

• 2020s – Drought and Debate
  
  

• Iran faces intensifying drought and climate stress.
  
  

• Water shortages affect an estimated 28 million Iranians.
  
  

• There is more open domestic debate about scaling back big dams and investing in water-saving technologies, but many dams remain central to official plans.
  
  

Continuity

• Across Shah and Islamic Republic eras, Iran followed the same large-dam development path even as governments, ideologies, and foreign relations changed.
  
  

• This continuity is a major reason why today’s water crisis is so severe: river ecosystems and aquifers have been over-stressed for decades.
  
  

 

The continuity of dam-building in Iran across two very different political systems is something that has been discussed and criticized by many Iranian and international water scholars, but they do not describe it as evidence of a hidden plot.
Rather, they see it as a product of a long-entrenched development mindset.

Here’s what the research literature and prominent experts say:

Global Development Paradigm

• Throughout the mid-20th century, large dams were promoted worldwide as a symbol of modernization and nation-building.
  
  

• This view was shared by monarchies, socialist republics, post-colonial democracies — for example:
  
  

• Aswan High Dam in Egypt
  
  

• Hoover Dam in the U.S.
  
  

• Dams on the Volga in the USSR
  
  

• Bhakra-Nangal Dam in India
  
  

• Historians call this the “hydraulic mission” — the belief that controlling rivers through dams was the key to economic progress.
  
  

Iran’s Case

• Scholars such as Kaveh Madani, Narges Erami, and Thomas Naff emphasize that:
  
  

• Iran’s technocratic agencies (like the Ministry of Energy and large engineering firms) kept the same water-development culture after 1979.
  
  

• Dams were politically attractive: they provided visible infrastructure, short-term jobs, hydropower, and gave leaders a sense of controlling nature.
  
  

• The Iranian state — under both the Shah and the Islamic Republic — used dams to project an image of progress and self-reliance, not as a tool of covert social control.
  
  

Criticism and Suspicion

• Environmental historians and some social scientists are very critical of the continuity:
  
  

• They call it “technocratic inertia” or “path dependence” — once a bureaucracy is built to design and build dams, it keeps going even when evidence of harm accumulates.
  
  

• Some Iranian academics and activists argue that big dams have been politically motivated showcase projects that ignored local communities and science.
  
  

• However, no mainstream historian or scientist describes the continuity as a eugenics program or a conspiracy.
  
  

Key Takeaway

• The continuing dam program across regimes is explained by experts as a combination of:
  
  

• Cold-War era development ideology
  
  

• Institutional continuity of Iran’s water bureaucracy
  
  

• Political desire for “visible progress”
  
  

• The suspicion that it must therefore be part of a hidden eugenics agenda is a personal interpretation, not supported by archival or scientific research.
  
  

 

In Washington, DC, 1972, President Richard Nixon saw Iran as a linchpin in the Cold War. Under the Nixon Doctrine, Iran became America’s proxy in the Persian Gulf, a counter against Soviet influence. Nixon told advisors, “The Shah’s our man,” arming Iran to the teeth with jets, tanks, missiles, and military technology. In return, Iran’s oil fueled Western economies, and its markets opened to American firms. The Shah’s pro-Western stance, however, deepened domestic resentment, with many Iranians viewing him as a US puppet.

Weather Modification Patents 

YEAR - PATENT NUMBER - PATENT NAME 

• 1891 – US462795A – method of producing rainfall
  
  

• 1914 – US1103490A – rain maker (balloon images)
  
  

• 1917 – US1225521A – protection from poisonous gas in warfare
  
  

• 1920 – US1338343A – process and apparatus for the production of intense artificial clouds, fogs, or mists
  
  

• 1924 – US1512783A – composition for dispelling fogs
  
  

• 1927 – US1619183A – process of producing smoke clouds from moving aircraft
  
  

• 1928 – US1665267A – process of predicting artificial fogs
  
  

• 1932 – US1892132A – atomizing attachment for airplane engine exhausts
  
  

• 1933 – US1928963A – electrical system and method (for spraying chemtrails)
  
  

• 1934 – US1957075A – airplane spray equipment
  
  

• 1936 – US2045865A – skywriting apparatus
  
  

• 1936 – US2052626A – method of dispelling fog (mit)
  
  

• 1937 – US2068987A – process of dissipating fog
  
  

• 1939 – US2160900A – method for vapor clearing
  
  

• 1941 – US2232728A – method and composition for dispelling vapors
  
  

• 1941 – US2257360A – desensitized pentaerythritol tetranitrate explosive
  
  

• 1946 – US2395827A – airplane spray unit (us. dept. of agriculture)
  
  

• 1946 – US2409201A – smoke-producing mixture
  
  

• 1949 – US2476171A – smoke screen generator
  
  

• 1949 – US2480967A – aerial discharge device
  
  

• 1950 – US2527230A – method of crystal formation and precipitation
  
  

• 1951 – US2550324A – process for controlling weather
  
  

• 1951 – US2570867A – method of crystal formation and precipitation (General Electric)
  
  

• 1952 – US2582678A – material disseminating apparatus for airplanes
  
  

• 1952 – US2591988A – production of tio2 pigments (DuPont)
  
  

• 1952 – US2614083A – metal chloride screening smoke mixture
  
  

• 1953 – US2633455A – smoke generator
  
  

• 1954 – US2688069A – steam generator
  
  

• 1955 – US2721495A – method and apparatus for detecting minute crystal forming particles suspended in a gaseous atmosphere (General Electric)
  
  

• 1956 – US2730402A – controllable dispersal device
  
  

• 1957 – US2801322A – decomposition chamber for monopropellant fuel
  
  

• 1958 – US2835530A – process for the condensation of atmospheric humidity and dissolution of fog
  
  

• 1959 – US2881335A – generation of electrical fields (HAARP – for re-charging clouds!)
  
  

• 1959 – US2903188A – control of tropical cyclone formation
  
  

• 1959 – US2908442A – method for dispersing natural atmospheric fogs and clouds
  
  

• 1960 – US2962450A – fog dispelling composition (see references)
  
  

• 1960 – US2963975A – cloud seeding carbon dioxide bullet
  
  

• 1961 – US2986360A – aerial insecticide dusting device
  
  

• 1962 – US3044911A – propellant system
  
  

• 1962 – US3056556A – method of artificially influencing the weather
  
  

• 1964 – US3120459A – composite incendiary powder containing metal coated oxidizing salts
  
  

• 1964 – US3126155A – silver iodide cloud seeding generator (main commercial ingredient)
  
  

• 1964 – US3127107A – generation of ice-nucleating crystals
  
  

• 1964 – US3131131A – electrostatic mixing in microbial conversions
  
  

• 1965 – US3174150A – self-focusing antenna system (HAARP)
  
  

• 1966 – US3257801A – pyrotechnic composition comprising solid oxidizer, boron and aluminum additive and binder
  
  

• 1966 – US3234357A – electrically heated smoke producing device
  
  

• 1966 – US3274035A – metallic composition for production of hydroscopic smoke
  
  

• 1967 – US3300721A – means for communication through a layer of ionized gases (haarp)
  
  

• 1967 – US3313487A – cloud seeding apparatus
  
  

• 1967 – US3338476A – heating device for use with aerosol containers
  
  

• 1968 – US3410489A – automatically adjustable airfoil spray system with pump
  
  

• 1969 – US3429507A – rainmaker
  
  

• 1969 – US3430533A – aircraft dispenser pod having self-sealing ejection tubes
  
  

• 1969 – US3432208A – fluidized particle dispenser (us air force)
  
  

• 1969 – US3437502A – titanium dioxide pigment coated with silica and aluminum (DuPont)
  
  

• 1969 – US3441214A – method and apparatus for seeding clouds
  
  

• 2001 -US20030085296A1 - Hurricane and tornado control device