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1902–1932: Foundation of the House of Saud 

1902 – Abdulaziz ibn Saud retakes Riyadh, beginning military reconquest. 

1915–1916 – Treaties with the British Empire: 

• Britain recognizes him as a ruler. 
• Provides money, weapons, and diplomatic backing. 

1932 – Kingdom of Saudi Arabia formally declared. 

Governance model established: 

• Absolute monarchy 
• Power centralized in the male descendants of Abdulaziz 
• No constitution, no parliament, no succession law beyond family consensus. 

Key structural choice:
Succession stays inside the family, enforced by religion, money, and force. 

 

1932–1964: Succession Among Brothers (Not Sons) 

Abdulaziz fathers 45+ sons. 

To prevent fragmentation: 

• Kingship passes brother → brother, not father → son. 

• This delays generational conflict but guarantees one later. 

 

1964–1990s: Rise of the Sudairi Bloc 

A powerful faction forms: the Sudairi Seven (sons of the same mother). 

Includes: 

• King Fahd 
• Prince Sultan 
• Prince Nayef 
• Prince Salman (future king) 
• Other branches (Abdullah line, Talal line, etc.) remain weaker, dispersed. 

Effect:
Saudi rule becomes factional, not unified. 

 

1995–2015: The Abdullah Interlude (Rival Branch in Power) 

King Abdullah (not Sudairi) becomes de facto ruler, then king. 

Attempts to: 

• Balance Sudairi dominance 
• Elevate his own sons 
• Creates Succession Council to manage future transfers. 

But:
He does not dismantle Sudairi institutional control (defense, interior, oil). 

 

2015: King Salman Takes the Throne 

King Salman (Sudairi) becomes king. 

Immediately: 

• Removes Abdullah’s sons from key roles 
• Rewrites succession order 

Appoints: 

• Mohammed bin Nayef (MBN) as Crown Prince 
• Mohammed bin Salman as Defense Minister 

This is the pivot point. 

 

2015–2017: MBS Builds Power Inside the State 

MBS rapidly accumulates control: 

• Defense Ministry (war in Yemen) 
• Economic policy (Vision 2030) 
• Royal Court access (gatekeeper to the king) 
• Intelligence and security overlap 

MBN remains Crown Prince on paper, but: 

• Loses operational control 
• Is isolated from media and foreign contacts 

 

2017: The Palace Coup (Legal, Bloodless, Total) 

June 2017 – MBN is removed as Crown Prince. 

Placed under house arrest 

Allegedly coerced into abdication 

MBS becomes Crown Prince. 

This ends the brother-to-brother system permanently. 

 

Late 2017: Ritz-Carlton Purge 

Over 200 princes, ministers, and tycoons detained. 

Officially called “anti-corruption.” 

In practice: 

• Financial extraction 
• Loyalty enforcement 
• Neutralization of rival family lines 
• Billions transferred to state control. 

No senior prince is left with independent power. 

 

2018–Present: Single-Node Rule 

Family consensus replaced by: 

• Surveillance 
• Detention 
• Financial pressure 

Key rivals: 

• Abdullah line → neutralized 

• Nayef line → imprisoned 

• Talal / reformist lines → silenced or exiled 

Saudi Arabia shifts from: 

Dynastic oligarchy → centralized personal rule 

 

Bottom Line 

• Abdulaziz built the system with British backing. 
• The family ruled collectively for decades. 
• That system could not survive generational turnover. 

MBS won by: 

• Controlling security 
• Controlling money 
• Eliminating rivals before becoming king 

This is not ancient tradition.
It is modern power consolidation, completed in one decade. 

 

 

After 911 Bush holding Saudis hand, not just any Saudi

Question Addressed 

Does the lineage of King Salman trace directly to the original Saudi ruler whose power was consolidated with British backing, followed by succession through his sons rather than new elites—and does this context explain the long-standing U.S.–Saudi relationship and later narrative deflection after 9/11? 

Answer: Yes. The lineage, succession structure, and geopolitical continuity are accurately described. 

 

Founding figure and British consolidation 

The founding figure is Abdulaziz ibn Saud (often called Ibn Saud). 

• 1902: Abdulaziz begins reconquering territory in central Arabia. 
• World War I era: He enters into agreements with the British Empire, which: 
• Recognize him as ruler over specific territories, 
• Provide funding, arms, and political legitimacy. 
• 1932: He unifies most of the Arabian Peninsula and proclaims the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 

This was not a European-style land grant, but imperial recognition and sponsorship. Britain selected Abdulaziz as the local authority through whom stability and influence would be exercised after the Ottoman collapse. 

Succession by sons (horizontal succession) 

Abdulaziz ibn Saud had dozens of sons. Saudi succession evolved as a horizontal system: 

• Power passed from brother to brother, all sons of Abdulaziz, 
• Authority remained tightly concentrated within the founder’s direct male line. 

This explains why, for decades, Saudi kings were sons of Abdulaziz, not grandsons. Only recently has succession begun to move to the next generation. 

The Sudairi Seven bloc 

Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud is: 

• The 25th son of Abdulaziz ibn Saud, 
• A member of the Sudairi Seven. 

The Sudairi Seven were seven full brothers born to Hassa bint Ahmed al-Sudairi and became the most powerful internal faction, dominating: 

• Defense, 
• Interior security, 
• Provincial governorships, 
• The throne itself. 

Kings from this bloc include Fahd and Salman, and it produced Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). 

Britain, the United States, and regional organization 

Britain (early 20th century)

• Dismantled the Ottoman system, 
• Installed or recognized friendly dynasties (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Gulf sheikhdoms), 
• Used treaties, subsidies, and military backing rather than direct colonization in Arabia. 

United States (post-WWII): 

• Inherited Britain’s strategic position, 
• Cemented the oil-for-security arrangement, 
• Made the Saudi royal family a central pillar of U.S. Middle East strategy. 

The Saudi royal holding hands with President Bush was Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, then Crown Prince. 

• He was a direct son of Abdulaziz ibn Saud, 
• Not a distant descendant. 

The image compresses a century of power into one frame: 

• A U.S. president, 
• With the son of the British-backed founder of Saudi Arabia, 
• At the center of the oil, security, and currency system shaping the modern Middle East. 

This is dynastic continuity meeting imperial succession, not coincidence. 

Post-9/11 narrative deflection (analysis) 

Given the long, tight, and strategically intimate relationship among: 

• The Saudi ruling family, 
• The United States, 
• And, quietly, Israel on shared regional interests, 

a reported private claim attributing 9/11 to Mossad functions most plausibly as crisis deflection, not sincere attribution. 

Structurally, such a claim: 

• Deflects scrutiny from Saudi nationals (15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens),
• Signals domestic loyalty through familiar anti-Israeli rhetoric,
• Preserves elite relationships by remaining private and unofficial. 

This is pressure management, not investigation. 

 

What this does and does not imply 

• Does illustrate: How elites manage narrative risk during legitimacy shocks. 
• Does not prove: Israeli or Mossad responsibility for 9/11. 
• Does not override: Findings that al-Qaeda planned and executed the attacks. 

 

Bottom line 

• Yes, King Salman’s lineage runs directly to the British-backed founder. 

• Yes, succession remained within the founder’s sons for decades. 

• Yes, the U.S. later locked this dynasty into place through oil, arms, and security guarantees. 

• The Mossad remark, read in context, fits a well-documented pattern of elite deflection under pressure, not a break in alliances. 

Saudi Arabia is not a post-colonial state that rotated elites. It is a single-family state, created through imperial recognition, stabilized through oil, and maintained through uninterrupted great-power patronage. 

 

Saudi Arabia

Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

• Common shorthand: MBS
• Title: Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia
• Father: King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
• De facto ruler since ~2017

United Arab Emirates

Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan

• Common shorthand: MBZ
• Title: President of the United Arab Emirates
• Also: Ruler of Abu Dhabi
• Succeeded his half-brother Khalifa bin Zayed in 2022
• De facto ruler for years before formal presidency

Qatar

Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani

• Title: Emir of the State of Qatar
• Came to power in 2013 after his father abdicated
• Youngest of the three, but fully consolidated authority

 

Country	Ruler (Full Name)	Common Shorthand	Status
Saudi Arabia	Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud	MBS	Crown Prince / PM (de facto ruler)
UAE	Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan	MBZ	President / Ruler of Abu Dhabi
Qatar	Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani	—	Emir

---

All three:

• Rule family-based monarchies
• Derive authority through British-era protectorate transitions
• Centralize power outside constitutional accountability
• Function more like corporate-state CEOs than traditional kings

 

Saudi Arabia — House of Saud (Al Saud) 

What Britain did with the Al Saud: wartime recognition → postwar independence recognition + non-aggression toward British protectorates 

• Treaty of Darin (Tarut), 26 Dec 1915 
• Britain and Abdulaziz (Ibn Saud) sign a pact that (a) recognizes him as ruler of Najd and al-Hasa and (b) ties him into Britain’s WWI regional system; the agreement also sought to protect Britain’s Gulf protectorates from attack.  
• Treaty of Jeddah, 20 May 1927 
• Britain formally recognizes the “complete and absolute independence” of Ibn Saud’s dominions (Hejaz + Najd and dependencies), and Ibn Saud undertakes to stop raids/harassment against neighboring British protectorates.  

Key point: Saudi state formation is tied to British diplomatic recognition and boundary stabilization, but it’s not the same “protectorate treaty chain” as the Trucial States and Qatar. 

 

United Arab Emirates — Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi) within the Trucial States system 

What Britain did on the Trucial Coast: maritime control → permanent truce → exclusivity (no other foreign power) 

This is the British treaty machine that produced the “Trucial States,” inside which Abu Dhabi’s ruling family (Al Nahyan) became one of the principal signatories. 

• General Maritime Treaty (1820) 
• Britain signs with coastal rulers (including Abu Dhabi and others) to impose a British-policed framework for maritime security—this is the seed of “Trucial” status.  
• Perpetual Maritime Truce (1853) 
• Moves from periodic truces to a permanent maritime peace, locking in British leverage over external security at sea.  
• Exclusive Agreement (1892) 
• The rulers bind themselves not to deal with any foreign power except Britain, and not to cede/sell/mortgage territory except to Britain—this is the classic “exclusive” protectorate logic without always using the word “protectorate.”  

Key point: The Al Nahyan family’s modern position emerges inside a British-built treaty system that monopolized external relations and “foreign policy” for the Trucial rulers. 

 

Qatar — Al Thani (Al Thani) 

What Britain did with Qatar: recognize Al Thani authority → formal protectorate-style treaty 

• 1868 Agreement / treaty with Sheikh Muhammad bin Thani and Britain’s Political Resident Lewis Pelly 
• After conflict in the region, Britain signs an agreement that is widely treated as the first formal British recognition of the Al Thani as Qatar’s political authority (i.e., Qatar as a distinct political unit in British diplomatic practice).  
• Anglo-Qatari Treaty (1916) 
• Qatar enters the standard Gulf pattern: Britain provides protection; Qatar undertakes restrictions typical of British Gulf agreements (including limits on ceding territory and provisions affecting British presence/privileges).  

Key point: Qatar’s ruling family’s international standing is built first through British recognition (1868) and then through a formal treaty regime (1916). 

 

• UAE (Trucial States): Britain created the external-relations cage (1820 → 1853 → 1892).  

• Qatar: Britain recognized Al Thani authority (1868) and later formalized control/“protection” (1916).  

• Saudi: Britain legitimized Ibn Saud via recognition treaties (1915, 1927) aimed at stabilizing Britain’s Gulf protectorates and regional order. 

 

 

Saudi Power Blocs (2000–2017) 

Abdullah Faction (Consensus / Balancer Bloc) 

Core figure 

• King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz (King 2005–2015) 

Power base 

• National Guard (SANG) — tribal, not technocratic 
• Royal Court networks 
• Reformist credibility abroad 

Key traits 

• Ruled by arbitration, not domination
• Maintained horizontal brother succession
• Avoided empowering a single son 

Key figures 

• Prince Mishaal bin Abdullah (Mecca governor)
• Prince Turki bin Abdullah (Riyadh governor)
• Khalid al-Tuwaijri (Royal Court power broker) 

Fatal weakness 

• No control of Interior or Defense long-term 
• No locked succession path for his sons 

End state 

Administratively dismantled 2015–2017 

• Sons removed, arrested, or sidelined 
• Network erased without public conflict 

 Sudairi Faction (Control / Vertical Rule Bloc) 

Core figures 

• King Salman bin Abdulaziz
• Mohammed bin Salman (MBS)

Power base 

• Defense Ministry 
• Royal Court 
• Media + finance 
• Eventually Interior (post-2017) 

Key traits 

• Vertical succession (father → son)
• Zero tolerance for rival power centers 
• Centralization + speed 

Key moves 

• 2015: Purge Abdullah’s court 
• 2015: Remove Crown Prince Muqrin 
• 2017: Remove Mohammed bin Nayef 
• 2017: Ritz-Carlton detentions 

Strategic shift 

• End of brother-to-brother rule
• End of consensus monarchy
• Saudi state becomes personalized regime

End state 

Total dominance 

• No independent branches remain 

 Nayef Line (Security / Western-Aligned Bloc) 

Core figure 

• Mohammed bin Nayef (MBN) 

Power base 

• Interior Ministry 
• Counterterrorism apparatus 
• Deep CIA/FBI ties 

Key traits 

• Seen as “safe hands” by Washington 
• Controlled police, intelligence, internal security 
• Technocratic, not dynastic 

Role 

• Transitional buffer (2015–2017) 
• Prevented instability during succession rewrite 

Fatal weakness 

• Controlled security but not the court
• No mass family backing

End state 

• Removed June 2017 
• Interior Ministry fragmented 
• Placed under house arrest 

 

STRUCTURAL SNAPSHOT 

Bloc	Style	Succession Model	Outcome
Abdullah	Consensus	Horizontal	Neutralized
Nayef	Security	None	Removed
Sudairi	Control	Vertical	Dominant

 

Why the Bush Hand-Holding Photo Misleads People 

“Everyone’s seen the photo — George W. Bush holding hands with a Saudi royal after 9/11. People assume that man is MBS’s father. He isn’t. 

That’s Crown Prince Abdullah — from a different power line entirely. 

That image captures a Saudi leadership that no longer exists: consensus rule, brother-to-brother succession, and quiet balancing between factions. 

After Abdullah died, that system was dismantled. 

Salman took over. MBS followed. And the Saudi state stopped being a family council — and became a vertical regime. 

So the photo isn’t continuity. 

It’s the last image of a power structure that was erased.” 

 

 

Where Abdullah’s sons are now (post-2017) 

Prince Turki bin Abdullah

Former role: Governor of Riyadh

What happened: 

• Arrested during the Ritz-Carlton detentions (Nov 2017) 
• Accused in connection with PetroSaudi / 1MDB-related corruption 
• Assets reportedly seized 

Current status: 

• Still detained or under strict restrictions 
• Not publicly active 
• No official role 
• Considered fully neutralized 

 Prince Mishaal bin Abdullah

Former role: Governor of Mecca (2013–2015) 

What happened: 

• Removed from governorship in 2015 
• Briefly detained in 2017 
• Lost administrative and security backing 

Current status: 

• Free but sidelined 
• No public profile 
• No political authority 
• Effectively under soft internal exile 

 Prince Abdulaziz bin Abdullah

Former role: Deputy Foreign Minister 

What happened: 

• Removed from post in 2015 
• Brief detention reported during 2017 purge 

Current status: 

• Not imprisoned 
• No diplomatic role 
• Maintains a low-profile private life 

 Other Abdullah sons (general pattern)

King Abdullah had dozens of sons. The pattern across them: 

• No governorships 
• No ministries 
• No security commands 
• No foreign policy roles 
• Limited travel 
• Quiet financial oversight 

In Saudi terms, that is political death. 

 

Was the Ritz “not that bad”? 

Material conditions 

• Private rooms 
• Room service 
• Medical care 
• No shackles 
• No public trials 

What made it effective 

• Total uncertainty 
• No lawyers 
• No due process 
• Asset seizure under pressure 
• Isolation from allies 

The purpose was not punishment. 
It was submission and asset transfer. 

 

Comparison to U.S. prison 

Aspect	Ritz Detention	U.S. Prison
Physical conditions	Comfortable	Often harsh
Legal process	None	Formal (even if flawed)
Psychological pressure	Extreme	High
Duration	Indefinite	Fixed sentence
Political intent	Elimination	Punishment

Saudi method: break elite networks quietly 
U.S. method: incarcerate individuals publicly 

Different systems, different tools. 

The real consequence (often missed) 

None of Abdullah’s sons: 

• Can organize 
• Can speak publicly 
• Can align with foreign backers 
• Can pass power to their sons 

Their line didn’t just lose office —
it lost time. 

In dynastic politics, that’s irreversible. 

 

“They weren’t thrown into dungeons — they were erased from the future.” 

 

Comparison to earlier Saudi practice (important context) 

Old Saudi pattern: 

• Rivals exiled 
• Power dispersed 
• Quiet accommodation 

New Saudi pattern (post-2017): 

• Rivals kept close 
• Assets controlled 
• Movement limited 
• Silence enforced 

Control works better when people don’t leave. 

 

“They weren’t sent to London or Washington — they were kept at home, comfortable, quiet, and out of the future.” 

 

 

SAUDI ROYALS: ABROAD vs INSIDE 

CATEGORY A — INSIDE SAUDI ARABIA (kept close on purpose) 

Who 

• Sons of King Abdullah 
• Sons of King Fahd 
• Most non-Sudairi branches 

Any prince once linked to: 

• Independent wealth 
• Regional governorships 
• Security or administrative power 

Why they are kept inside 

Very simple logic: 

You control people better when they don’t leave. 

Inside Saudi Arabia: 

• Assets can be frozen 
• Travel can be denied 
• Families are accessible 
• Silence can be enforced quietly 

These princes are: 

• Free to live 
• Free to spend some money 
• Not free to speak, organize, or travel politically 

This includes Abdullah’s sons. 

They are not exiles.
They are contained. 

 

CATEGORY B — ABROAD BUT APOLITICAL (allowed out) 

Who 

Royals with: 

• No power base 
• No following 
• No claim 
• Often younger, peripheral, or ceremonial princes 

Those focused on: 

• Art 
• Fashion 
• Business without leverage 
• Personal lifestyles 

Where 

• UK 
• France 
• Italy 
• UAE 
• Occasionally the U.S. 

Why they’re allowed out 

Because they are: 

• Harmless 
• Not organizing 
• Not embarrassing 
• Not claiming legitimacy 

They are not threats, so there’s no reason to contain them. 

 

CATEGORY C — EXILES / ABROAD BECAUSE THEY HAD TO LEAVE 

This is the smallest group — and the most telling. 

Prince Khalid bin Farhan Al Saud

• Open critic of MBS 
• Public statements, media interviews 

Where: Germany
Why abroad: Could not return safely 

Prince Sultan bin Turki bin Abdulaziz

• Past abduction attempt (2003 Geneva) 
• Later fled again 

Where: Europe
Why abroad: Direct conflict with royal authority 

Prince Turki bin Bandar

• Former police officer 
• Public accusations against Saudi state 

Where: Europe
Why abroad: Broke silence publicly 

 

Pattern with exiles 

Every one of them: 

• Spoke publicly 
• Accused the leadership 
• Sought Western protection 
• Lost access to Saudi Arabia permanently 

Exile = irreversible escalation. 

 

CATEGORY D — ROYALS ABROAD BUT UNDER PROTECTION (rare) 

Mohammed bin Nayef (MBN) 

• Former Crown Prince 
• CIA / FBI counterterrorism partner 

Status: 

• Mostly inside Saudi Arabia now 
• Limited travel at times 
• Special case due to U.S. ties 

MBN was not exiled because: 

• His removal was negotiated 
• The U.S. needed quiet stability 
• Killing or exiling him would’ve caused backlash 

Even then — he was neutralized, not freed. 

 

THE CORE RULE (THIS IS THE KEY) 

Who gets to live abroad? 

• Royals with no future claim 
• Royals with no voice 
• Royals with no leverage 

Who is kept inside? 

• Royals with name recognition 
• Royals with institutional memory 
• Royals whose existence alone could become a rally point 

Abdullah’s sons fall squarely into the second group. 

SUMMARY 

• Exile is dangerous — it creates martyrs 

• Containment is cleaner — it creates silence 

• Saudi Arabia now prefers quiet control over dramatic punishment 

Abdullah’s sons were not sent abroad because: 

• They didn’t rebel 
• They didn’t speak 
• And keeping them close is safer than pushing them out 

 

“The Saudi royals who talk end up abroad forever — the ones who stay silent are kept at home, comfortable, watched, and out of history.” 

 

Why London stopped being a safe Saudi exile hub 

The old system (1970s–2000s) 

For decades, London was the safety valve for Gulf royals. 

Why London worked: 

• British elite culture protects exiled aristocrats 
• Strong libel laws (good for quiet living, bad for loud critics) 
• Deep UK–Gulf financial interdependence 
• MI6 preferred watching exiles, not provoking Riyadh 
• Royals could live comfortably without speaking publicly 

Rule back then: 

“Leave quietly, don’t embarrass the family, and you’ll be left alone.” 

This applied to Saudis, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, Qataris. 

 

What changed (mid-2010s) 

Three things broke that system. 

Social media killed “quiet exile”

• Exiles no longer stayed silent 

• Twitter/X, YouTube, WhatsApp made every prince a broadcaster 

• Silence could no longer be enforced by geography 

London stopped being a pressure-release valve
and became a megaphone. 

MBS rejected the old British-style aristocratic deal

MBS’s worldview: 

• Exile = future threat 
• Silence must be enforced before someone leaves 
• Reputation is controlled centrally, not socially 

So the logic flipped: 

Old logic: 

“Let them go, they’ll fade.” 

New logic: 

“If they go, they’ll talk. So they don’t go.” 

That alone kills London as a hub. 

The UK quietly chose commerce over sanctuary

This is uncomfortable but real. 

• Arms contracts 
• Energy 
• Financial flows 
• Post-Brexit dependency on Gulf capital 

The UK did not publicly announce this shift.
It simply stopped offering friction. 

London became: 

• Safe for wealth 
• Unsafe for political Saudi royals 

 

Bottom line (London) 

London stopped being safe not because it changed — but because Saudi Arabia did. 

 How Jamal Khashoggi fits into this shift 

Khashoggi is the line in the sand. 

Before Khashoggi 

Saudi dissidents abroad were: 

• Pressured 
• Threatened 
• Monitored 
• But generally not physically eliminated 

There was still an assumption: 

“If you leave, you live.” 

 

What Khashoggi broke (2018) 

Khashoggi did three things the system could not tolerate together: 

• He left 
• He spoke publicly 
• He spoke with legitimacy 
• Insider 
• Arabic audience 
• Washington Post platform 

He was not just criticizing.
He was re-framing Saudi legitimacy abroad. 

That crossed the new red line. 

 

Why the killing mattered structurally (not morally) 

This is the key insight most people miss. 

The killing wasn’t just about silencing Khashoggi. 

It was a signal to three audiences: 

To Saudi royals

“Leaving is not safety.” 

To Saudi elites

“Silence is the only protection.” 

To Western capitals

“This is how control works now. Decide if you’re still in business.” 

After some noise, the West answered: 

Yes. 

That answer mattered more than any speech. 

After Khashoggi: the new rule set 

New Saudi rule: 

• Exile is escalation 
• Containment is safer 
• Silence beats distance 

That is why: 

• Abdullah’s sons stayed 
• London emptied out 
• Royals stopped “escaping” 
• Critics either shut up or disappeared from public life 

 

London used to be a retirement home for inconvenient princes 

• Social media turned retirees into influencers 
• MBS decided exile creates enemies 
• Khashoggi proved the threat was real 
• The West tolerated the response 
• So Saudi Arabia stopped letting people leave 

 

The man holding Bush’s hand did not fall from favor. 

• He won that moment. 
• He stabilized U.S.–Saudi relations after 9/11. 
• He later became king and ruled for 10 years. 
• He died old, in power, in office. 

So the puzzle is not: 

“Why did Abdullah fall?” 

The real question is: 

Why were his sons defenseless after he died? 

Because Abdullah ran Saudi Arabia like a referee — and Salman took over and ran it like an owner. 

Abdullah believed the family mattered more than his bloodline

Abdullah’s mindset: 

• “If the family stays balanced, the country stays stable.” 
• “No son of mine should dominate the others.” 
• “Consensus prevents coups.” 

So he: 

• Shared power 
• Avoided crowning a son 
• Let other branches keep ministries 
• Kept peace inside the family 

This worked while he was alive. 

Abdullah did NOT build a shield for his sons

He did not give his sons: 

• Control of the Interior Ministry (police, intelligence) 
• Control of Defense 
• Control of succession 
• Control of the court 

So when he died: 

• His sons had titles 
• But no force 
• No institution 
• No guarantee 

They were respected — but exposed. 

Salman believed the family itself was the threat

Salman’s mindset was the opposite: 

• “If power is shared, it will be taken.” 
• “If my son doesn’t control everything, he will be killed or removed.” 
• “Consensus is weakness.” 

So when Salman became king: 

• He ended the referee system 
• He ended brother-to-brother rule 
• He ended patience 

This wasn’t about Abdullah personally.
It was about rewriting how Saudi power works. 

Abdullah’s sons were not punished — they were cleared off the board

They were not accused because they were “bad.” 
They were removed because they were: 

• A branch 
• A future alternative 
• A claim 

In absolute monarchies, that alone is enough. 

So: 

• Governors removed 
• Assets frozen 
• Movement restricted 
• Silence enforced 

No show trials.
No executions.
No drama. 

Just removal from the future. 

Why people feel “something big must have happened”

Because the visual contrast is jarring: 

• One generation: smiling, welcomed in Texas 
• Next generation: sidelined, detained, erased 

It feels like betrayal or revenge. 

But structurally: 

• Abdullah’s era = shared power 
• Salman/MBS era = winner-take-all 

When rules change, people who played by the old rules lose instantly. 

 

Abdullah ran the kingdom like: 

“Everyone gets a seat at the table.” 

Salman changed it to: 

“There is one chair. Everyone else stands.” 

Abdullah’s sons were still waiting for seats —
but the table was gone. 

“The Saudi prince holding Bush’s hand didn’t fall from grace — he ruled until he died. What died with him was the system he believed in. Abdullah thought balance protected his sons. Salman believed balance would kill his. When the rules changed from family consensus to absolute control, Abdullah’s sons weren’t punished — they were simply unnecessary. And in monarchies, unnecessary is enough.” 

 

 

Why London stopped being a safe Saudi exile hub

The old system (1970s–2000s)

For decades, London was the safety valve for Gulf royals.

Why London worked:

• British elite culture protects exiled aristocrats
• Strong libel laws (good for quiet living, bad for loud critics)
• Deep UK–Gulf financial interdependence
• MI6 preferred watching exiles, not provoking Riyadh
• Royals could live comfortably without speaking publicly

Rule back then:

“Leave quietly, don’t embarrass the family, and you’ll be left alone.”

This applied to Saudis, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, Qataris.

What changed (mid-2010s)

Three things broke that system.

Social media killed “quiet exile”

• Exiles no longer stayed silent
• Twitter/X, YouTube, WhatsApp made every prince a broadcaster
• Silence could no longer be enforced by geography

London stopped being a pressure-release valve
and became a megaphone.

MBS rejected the old British-style aristocratic deal

MBS’s worldview:

• Exile = future threat
• Silence must be enforced before someone leaves
• Reputation is controlled centrally, not socially

So the logic flipped:

Old logic:

“Let them go, they’ll fade.”

New logic:

“If they go, they’ll talk. So they don’t go.”

That alone kills London as a hub.

The UK quietly chose commerce over sanctuary

This is uncomfortable but real.

• Arms contracts
• Energy
• Financial flows
• Post-Brexit dependency on Gulf capital

The UK did not publicly announce this shift.
It simply stopped offering friction.

London became:

• Safe for wealth
• Unsafe for political Saudi royals

Bottom line (London)

London stopped being safe not because it changed — but because Saudi Arabia did.

How Jamal Khashoggi fits into this shift

Khashoggi is the line in the sand.

Before Khashoggi

Saudi dissidents abroad were:

• Pressured
• Threatened
• Monitored

• But generally not physically eliminated

There was still an assumption:

“If you leave, you live.”

 

What Khashoggi broke (2018)

Khashoggi did three things the system could not tolerate together:

• He left
• He spoke publicly
• He spoke with legitimacy

Insider

• • Arabic audience

  • Washington Post platform

He was not just criticizing.
He was re-framing Saudi legitimacy abroad.

That crossed the new red line.

 

Why the killing mattered structurally (not morally)

This is the key insight most people miss.

The killing wasn’t just about silencing Khashoggi.

It was a signal to three audiences:

To Saudi royals

“Leaving is not safety.”

To Saudi elites

“Silence is the only protection.”

To Western capitals

“This is how control works now. Decide if you’re still in business.”

After some noise, the West answered:

Yes.

That answer mattered more than any speech.

After Khashoggi: the new rule set

New Saudi rule:

• Exile is escalation
• Containment is safer
• Silence beats distance

That is why:

• Abdullah’s sons stayed
• London emptied out
• Royals stopped “escaping”
• Critics either shut up or disappeared from public life

London used to be a retirement home for inconvenient princes

• Social media turned retirees into influencers
• MBS decided exile creates enemies
• Khashoggi proved the threat was real
• The West tolerated the response
• So Saudi Arabia stopped letting people leave

“London stopped being safe for Saudi royals when silence stopped being guaranteed — and Khashoggi’s murder was the moment the kingdom made clear that leaving no longer meant living.”

The irony at the heart of it  

London helped make them rich.
Now London isn’t safe for them to speak. 

That’s not poetic — that’s the plot. 

 The Making of Royals 

• British agents draw borders 
• Sign protection treaties 
• Decide which families get titles 
• Teach them how to look royal 
• Route oil money through London banks 

London is the finishing school: 

• Tailors 
• Lawyers 
• Accountants 
• Schools 
• Palaces-by-proxy 

They learn: 

“This is how power looks.” 

 The Golden Age 

• Princes shop in Mayfair 
• Mansions in Knightsbridge 
• Children at Eton 
• Quiet deals in wood-paneled offices 
• Everyone pretends this is ancient tradition 

They are at home there — more tha

Now: 

• They have too much money 
• Too many cousins 
• Too many phones 
• Too many receipts 
• Too much memory 

Suddenly: 

• London isn’t a salon — it’s a courtroom 
• Silence matters 
• Distance creates microphones 

So the rule flips: 

“You can have the money — but don’t bring the story.” 

That’s where the irony bites. 

 

The funniest (and bleakest) twist 

The people who: 

• Were installed by Britain 
• Enriched through Britain 
• Educated by Britain 
• Protected by Britain 

Now have to worry: 

• About cousins 
• About uncles 
• About sons 
• About tweets 
• About old photos 
• About who might talk 

Not about enemies.
About relatives. 

Let the absurdity speak: 

• Absolute power 
• Total wealth 
• Still terrified of family WhatsApp groups 

That’s the human crack in the armor. 

“They were crowned by Britain, enriched by Britain, and educated by Britain — and now the only thing they fear is one another.” 

 

 

THE BRITISH TREATY ORIGINS OF TODAY’S GULF RULERS 

TRUCIAL STATES → UAE (Al Nahyan / Al Maktoum / others) 

1820 – General Maritime Treaty 

What Britain gained: 

• Legal authority to police Gulf shipping lanes 
• Suppression of rivals under the label “anti-piracy” 
• First step toward maritime dominance between India and Europe 

What the ruling families gained: 

• British recognition as “legitimate rulers” 
• Protection from rivals and internal challengers 
• Survival through alignment with empire 

 

1853 – Perpetual Maritime Truce 

What Britain gained: 

• Permanent control over Gulf maritime security 
• De facto external governance without formal annexation 

What the ruling families gained: 

• Guaranteed survival under British protection 
• End of inter-tribal maritime conflict enforced by the Royal Navy 

 

1892 – Exclusive Agreement 

What Britain gained: 

• Total monopoly on foreign relations 
• No land sales, treaties, or alliances without British approval 
• Lockout of Ottomans, Germans, French, Russians 

What the ruling families gained: 

• Absolute dynastic security 
• Immunity from foreign overthrow 
• Continuation as hereditary rulers regardless of legitimacy 

→ Result: 
Britain created the Trucial system, inside which Abu Dhabi (Al Nahyan) later emerged dominant.
This treaty architecture becomes the UAE in 1971. 

 

QATAR (Al Thani) 

1868 – Britain–Qatar Agreement (Lewis Pelly & Muhammad bin Thani) 

What Britain gained: 

• Recognition of Qatar as a separate political unit 
• A loyal intermediary between British India and the Gulf 
• Reduced regional instability threatening trade routes 

What the Al Thani family gained: 

• First international recognition as Qatar’s rulers 
• British backing against Bahrain and Ottoman pressure 
• Dynastic legitimacy created by foreign power 

 

1916 – Anglo-Qatari Treaty 

What Britain gained: 

• Protectorate-style control without annexation 
• Exclusive influence over Qatar’s external affairs 

What the Al Thani family gained: 

• Guaranteed rule under British protection 
• Survival through WWI and imperial restructuring 

→ Result: 
Qatar is not “ancient royalty.”
It is a British-recognized dynastic project, later monetized through gas. 

 

SAUDI ARABIA (Al Saud) 

(Different model: recognition + boundary enforcement, not protectorate) 

1915 – Treaty of Darin (Tarut) 

What Britain gained: 

• A wartime ally against the Ottomans 
• Containment of Ibn Saud within boundaries that protected British Gulf clients 
• Stabilization of Britain’s Gulf protectorate perimeter 

What the Al Saud family gained: 

• British recognition of Abdulaziz ibn Saud as ruler of Najd and al-Hasa 
• Arms, money, legitimacy 
• A green light to expand inward, not toward British protectorates 

 

1927 – Treaty of Jeddah 

What Britain gained: 

• Formalized borders 
• Non-aggression toward British-protected Gulf states 
• A stable Saudi state that wouldn’t disrupt imperial trade routes 

What the Al Saud family gained: 

• Full international recognition of independence 

• Legitimacy to rule the Hejaz and Najd 

• The legal foundation of modern Saudi Arabia 

→ Result:
Saudi Arabia is not a timeless kingdom.
It is a British-recognized state built to stabilize empire, later handed to the U.S. 

 

Britain didn’t “influence” the Gulf — it contractually manufactured ruling families, guaranteed their survival, controlled their foreign policy, and then exited once oil and order were secured. 

 

Countries With Equal or Greater Gold Potential Than Sudan 

Where Extraction Is Constrained by Law, Lawyers, and Public Resistance 

Gold is not scarce geologically. What differs across countries is whether extraction can be stopped. In jurisdictions with strong legal systems, environmental law, and public resistance, gold often remains underground or is mined only at high cost. Sudan’s exploitation reflects governance failure, not unique geology. 

 

United States 

Significant gold reserves 

• Nevada (Carlin Trend — one of the richest gold belts on Earth) 
• Alaska 
• California 

Why extraction is constrained 

• EPA and federal environmental regulation 
• Tribal sovereignty and land claims 
• Environmental lawsuits and injunctions 
• Citizen activism and media scrutiny 

Result 

• Mining occurs, but at high legal and financial cost 
• No militias, no forced labor, no mass displacement 

Counterfactual 
If Sudan-style artisanal or militia-controlled mining were attempted in Nevada: 

• Operations would be shut down immediately 

• Executives would face civil and criminal liability

Canada 

Gold potential 

• Ontario 
• Quebec 
• Yukon
  One of the world’s richest gold-bearing geological zones. 

Why extraction is constrained 

• First Nations land rights 
• Mandatory environmental review boards 
• Class-action litigation and treaty enforcement 

Result 

• Mining is slow, regulated, and heavily litigated 
• Costs are far higher than in Africa 

What Canada demonstrates 
Gold exists, but extraction is not cheap when communities can say no. 

Australia 

Gold potential 

• Western Australia (one of the world’s largest gold producers by reserves) 

Why extraction is constrained 

• Environmental law 
• Labor protections 
• Royalty and tax regimes 

Result 

• Mining can be profitable, but cannot externalize violence 
• No viable war-financing or militia-extraction model 

 Europe (Germany, France, Sweden) 

Gold-bearing geology 

• Known deposits exist across multiple regions 

Why mining is dormant 

• Strong public opposition 
• Environmental protections 
• EU regulatory and permitting barriers 

Result 

• Gold remains in the ground 
• Extraction is abandoned because it is not worth the legal fight

New Zealand 

Gold potential 

• Known and surveyed deposits 

Why extraction is blocked or limited 

• Conservation law 
• Māori land and treaty claims 
• Public referenda and judicial review 

Result 

• Gold is largely left untouched 

 

Comparison: Sudan 

Current conditions 

• No enforceable property rights 
• No functioning courts 
• No environmental enforcement 
• Armed groups replacing the rule of law 
• Populations with no capacity to refuse extraction 

Result
Gold becomes: 

• Cheap to extract 
• Easy to steal 
• Easy to launder 
• Deadly for local populations 

This is not geology.
This is governance arbitrage. 

The Uncomfortable Truth 

Gold is mined where: 

• Resistance is weakest 
• Lives are cheapest 
• Lawsuits are impossible 
• Violence substitutes for contracts 

Gold is not mined where: 

• Attorneys intervene 
• Courts enforce 
• Journalists expose 
• Communities have leverage 

That is why: 

• Sudan is exploited 
• Nevada is regulated 
• Sweden is left alone 

 

Bottom Line 

• Sudan does not have uniquely valuable gold 
• It has uniquely undefended people 

Wealthy countries leave gold in the ground because extraction would trigger: 

• Injunctions 
• Litigation 
• Public backlash 

Poor, destabilized countries become mines because no one can stop it. 

That is the mechanism. 

 

TIMELINE 

How Britain Entered, Structured, and Locked In Gulf Royal Power 

 

WHY THE GULF MATTERED TO BRITAIN (Pre-1600 Context)

Before Britain ever “arrived,” the Gulf was: 

• A commercial zone, not nation-states 

Dominated by: 

• Tribal confederations 
• Merchant families 
• Religious authorities 
• Power was fluid, negotiated, and often maritime 

Britain’s interest was never cultural or humanitarian. It was logistical. 

Britain’s Core Strategic Need 

• Protect the India trade route 
• Prevent rival empires from controlling chokepoints 
• Reduce uncertainty along sea lanes 

The Gulf was a corridor, not a destination. 

 

FIRST BRITISH PENETRATION: TRADE → MILITARY (1600s–1809)

1600–1750: Commercial Presence 

East India Company traders operate across: 

• Muscat 
• Basra 
• Bandar Abbas 
• Britain initially tolerates local autonomy 
• Uses treaties, bribes, and trade privileges 

Late 1700s: Reframing Resistance as “Piracy” 

British shipping increasingly challenged by: 

• Qawasim naval power 
• Independent Gulf fleets 
• Britain labels this “piracy” 
• Not a neutral term 
• A legal justification for force 

Key insight: 
“Piracy” = unlicensed violence against British commerce 

 IMPERIAL FORCE AND THE BIRTH OF THE TRUCIAL SYSTEM (1809–1820) 

1809 & 1819 Naval Campaigns 

• British warships bombard coastal settlements 
• Civilian ports destroyed 
• Naval power crushed 

This was not policing.
It was regime shaping. 

1820 – General Maritime Treaty 

Britain imposes a new legal order: 

Rulers must: 

• Renounce maritime warfare 
• Fly approved flags 
• Submit disputes to Britain 

Britain gains: 

• Inspection rights 
• Arbitration authority 

This is the true founding document of Gulf royal rule. 

From this point forward: 

• Power flows from London outward 
• Not from tribes upward 

 THE “TRUCE” AS A GOVERNANCE TECHNOLOGY (1820–1853)

Britain invents a new model: 

The Trucial Formula 

Britain

Controls external affairs 

• Guarantees ruler security 
• Rulers: 
• Control internal populations 
• Enforce order locally 

This is outsourced governance. 

Why Britain Loved This Model 

• Cheap 
• No administrators needed 
• No accountability 
• Local elites absorb blame 

This becomes a prototype later reused elsewhere. 

 

 

FORMALIZING DYNASTIC POWER (1853–1892)

1853 – Perpetual Maritime Truce 

• Ends all independent warfare permanently 
• Britain becomes the only military authority at sea 

1892 – Exclusive Agreements (Critical Turning Point) 

These agreements: 

• Lock rulers into: 
• No foreign treaties 
• No land sales 
• No alliances except Britain 

In exchange: 

• Britain guarantees: 
• Ruler survival 
• Succession continuity 

This is where royal families become permanent. 

Britain does not just recognize rulers.
It freezes them in place. 

 

BRITAIN’S DELIBERATE NON-DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

Britain’s development choices were intentional. 

What Britain Built 

• Ports 
• Telegraphs 
• Airfields 
• Oil infrastructure 
• Residency offices 

What Britain Refused to Build 

• Constitutions 
• Parliaments 
• Political parties 
• Independent courts 
• Citizenship concepts 

Why? 

• Institutions create claims. 
• Claims create rights. 
• Rights threaten control. 

Monarchy without representation is the most stable imperial client. 

OIL CHANGES EVERYTHING (1900–1938) 

Oil as a Multiplier, Not a Cause 

Oil did not create the system.
It supercharged it. 

How Britain Structured Oil Power 

• Concessions negotiated only with rulers 
• No public ownership 
• No revenue transparency 
• Royalties paid directly to families 

Oil income: 

• Replaced taxation 
• Eliminated need for consent 
• Turned rulers into rent distributors 

This is the birth of: 

• Rentier states 
• Patronage governance 
• Absolute monarchy on steroids 
•  

 SAUDI ARABIA: THE OUTLIER THAT ISN’T (1744–1932) 

Saudi Arabia looks different—but follows the same logic. 

Britain’s Role 

• Funds Ibn Saud 
• Arms his forces 
• Recognizes his claims 
• Undermines Ottoman rivals 

Key Difference 

Saudi Arabia becomes too large to manage directly 

Britain pivots to: 

• Recognition 
• Advisory influence 
• Oil access 

Later, the U.S. replaces Britain in Saudi Arabia—but inherits the same structure. 

LABOR, DEMOGRAPHY, AND CONTROL (1930s–1960s)

Britain enables a system where: 

• Citizens are a minority 
• Labor is imported 
• Political rights are absent 
• Deportation replaces imprisonment 

This is not accidental.
It is maximum control with minimal friction. 

BRITISH WITHDRAWAL IS NOT DECOLONIZATION (1968–1971)

When Britain leaves: 

• Borders are fixed 
• Families remain 
• Treaties morph into defense agreements 
• Legal codes persist 

No truth commissions
No constitutional rewrites
No reckoning 

Britain exits without dismantling anything. 

 THE U.S. INHERITS THE MACHINE (1970s–Present)

The U.S. does not redesign the Gulf.
It plugs into it. 

• Military bases replace gunboats 
• Surveillance replaces residency agents 
• Arms deals replace treaties 
• Data centers replace oil depots 

Same logic.
Higher tech. 

CONCLUSIONS 

• Gulf monarchies are imperial artifacts 
• Royal legitimacy was engineered 
• Oil wealth entrenched non-representation 
• Britain prioritized: 
• Stability 
• Compliance 
• Exclusion of rivals 
• The population was never the client 

This is why: 

• Apologies never happen 
• Transparency never emerges 
• Power never decentralizes 

 

Modern Gulf monarchies were not ancient nation-states but were formalized through British treaty systems that stabilized selected ruling families, fixed borders, suppressed rivals, and converted tribal authority into permanent dynastic sovereignty—later reinforced by oil rents and external security guarantees. 

 

What Kind of “Royalty” Existed in the Gulf Before Britain? 

Pre-British Gulf rule was: 

• Tribal and kinship-based, not centralized nation-states 
• Authority derived from: 
• Lineage 
• Religious legitimacy 
• Control of trade routes, water, or protection 
• Often unstable, with frequent internal conflict 

Examples: 

• Al Saud lineage: emerges mid-1700s (Diriyah) 
• Al Sabah (Kuwait): ruling since ~1752 
• Al Khalifa (Bahrain): since 1783 
• Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi): since late 1700s 
• Al Thani (Qatar): prominence mid-1800s 

These families existed—but their survival was not guaranteed. 

What Britain Actually Did (This Is the Critical Part)

Britain did not create Gulf rulers from nothing, but it decisively transformed them. 

1820–1916: British “Protection” Phase 

Britain signed treaties with Gulf sheikhs to: 

• Suppress piracy (British definition) 
• Secure sea lanes to India 
• Exclude rival European powers 

Key treaties: 

• 1820 General Maritime Treaty 
• 1853 Perpetual Truce 
• 1892 Exclusive Agreements (no foreign relations without UK) 

Result: 

• Britain froze certain families in power 
• Britain eliminated rivals 
• Britain defined borders where none had existed 

This is when: 

• “Sheikhs” became internationally recognized rulers 

• Informal authority became dynastic monarchy 

 Oil Turned Client Rulers into Strategic Royals

Before oil: 

• Pearl diving, trade, tribute 
• Many rulers were poor and vulnerable 

After oil (1930s onward): 

• Britain (then the US) ensured: 
• Ruling families received royalties 
• Internal dissent was suppressed 
• External threats were deterred 

The Gulf monarchies became: 

• Rentier states 
• Security-dependent 
• Externally guaranteed 

This is fundamentally different from European monarchy. 

 Comparison: British Royals vs Gulf Royals

Feature	British Monarchy	Gulf Monarchies
Origins	Feudal state-building	Tribal kinship rule
Continuity	~1,000 years (with breaks)	Mostly 18th–19th c.
Power today	Largely symbolic	Executive, absolute
Legitimacy source	Parliament + tradition	Lineage + force + external backing
Imperial role	Colonizer	Protectorate client → capital hub

Crucially: 

• British monarchy lost real power 

• Gulf monarchies consolidated it 

 Why They Resemble Each Other Today

This resemblance is not accidental. 

Britain exported: 

• Court protocol 
• Title hierarchy 
• “Never complain, never explain” culture 
• Dynastic legitimacy as stabilizing fiction 

Gulf rulers adopted: 

• British royal aesthetics 
• British legal frameworks 
• British schooling and advisory systems 

They learned monarchy as a technology of rule. 

 Bottom Line

• Yes, hereditary rulers in the Gulf existed before the UK as a nation-state. 

• No, modern Gulf monarchies are not ancient kingdoms in the European sense. 

• Their current form is inseparable from British imperial engineering. 

• Britain did not invent the families—it made them untouchable. 

• Oil + protection turned fragile local rulers into permanent dynasties. 

 

 

What Was Created Out of Thin Air 

Britain did create—almost wholesale—the following: 

Fixed Borders

• Pre-1800s Arabia had no hard borders
• Britain drew lines to serve shipping, oil, and imperial logistics
• These borders later became “countries” 

Example: 
Qatar, UAE, Kuwait as bounded sovereign entities did not exist historically

 International Legitimacy

Britain decided: 

• Which family was “the ruler” 
• Which rivals were illegal 
• Who could sign treaties 
• Who could sell oil 

A local strongman → international monarch overnight.

Permanence of Rule

Before Britain: 

• Rulers fell constantly 
• Power shifted by force, alliance, or religious revolt 

After British treaties: 

• Britain enforced dynastic continuity
• Succession disputes were managed externally
• Rebellion became “illegitimate” 

This is the key transformation. 

 The State Itself

Modern Gulf states were born as: 

• Protectorates
• Security clients
• Administrative shells

They had: 

• No mass citizenship 
• No national army 
• No independent foreign policy 
• No internal legitimacy apart from force + subsidy 

That is not organic state formation. 
That is state fabrication. 

 Why It Feels Like “Out of Thin Air” 

Because compared to Europe: 

• No medieval state-building 
• No popular sovereignty 
• No social contract 
• No national wars of formation 
• No bottom-up legitimacy 

Instead: 

• External recognition first 
• Internal population second 
• National identity last 

That reverses the normal historical order. 

The Honest Bottom Line

If you mean: 

“Did Britain wave a wand and invent families?” 

No.

If you mean: 

“Did Britain manufacture modern Gulf monarchies as durable, sovereign states that could not have existed otherwise?” 

Yes. Absolutely. 

They are engineered monarchies, not evolved nations. 

That is why: 

• They resemble corporate holding companies 
• They function as capital and logistics hubs 
• They rely on foreign labor and foreign security 
• They behave like imperial subcontractors, not nation-states 

So when people say “out of thin air,” what they are reacting to is real: 

These states skipped centuries of political evolution and appeared fully formed—because they were assembled, not grown. 

 

 

 

Why You Would Expect This to Be Mentioned 

The British treaty system (1820–1971) is not a minor footnote. It is the root architecture of: 

• Gulf borders 
• Dynastic permanence 
• External security dependence 
• The rentier state model 
• The transition from British to U.S. protection 

In classical political history, this would be the starting chapter, not an aside.

So yes—one would reasonably expect it to be foregrounded.

 Why It Is Commonly Omitted by Contemporary Analysts (Including Krieg)

Disciplinary Framing: Security Studies, Not Imperial History

Dr. Krieg works primarily within: 

• Security studies 
• Political risk 
• Contemporary strategic competition 

That field: 

• Treats states as given units
• Starts analysis after state formation
• Rarely interrogates how sovereignty itself was manufactured 

This is a methodological cutoff, not ignorance. 

The “Post-1971 Assumption”

Most Gulf analysis implicitly begins: 

• After British withdrawal 
• After oil revenues stabilize regimes 
• After formal independence 

The protectorate period is treated as prehistory, even though it explains everything that follows. 

 

Professional Incentives and Access

There is a harder reality: 

Gulf states fund think tanks, fellowships, conferences 

Analysts rely on elite access 

Directly framing monarchies as imperial constructions is career-limiting 

You can critique policy behavior.
You generally cannot critique foundational legitimacy. 

That boundary is widely understood—even if unspoken. 

 

The “Neutral State” Fiction

Modern geopolitics prefers the fiction that: 

• States are neutral actors 
• Sovereignty is organic 
• Borders are settled facts 

Once you reintroduce British fabrication: 

• Neutrality collapses 
• Moral authority weakens 
• “Mediator” narratives (UAE, Qatar) look manufactured 

That destabilizes current diplomatic storytelling. 

 What Krieg Does Talk About Instead—and Why 

Dr. Krieg emphasizes: 

• Proxy warfare 
• Narrative control 
• Strategic autonomy 
• Security outsourcing 
• Non-state actor management 

These are second-order phenomena. 

They make sense only because: 

• Monarchies were externally stabilized 
• Internal legitimacy was never popular 
• Security was always outsourced 

But the first cause—imperial state construction—is left implicit.  

This Is a Pattern,Not a Personal Failing 

This omission is common across: 

• Gulf think-tank literature 
• Policy analysis 
• Security conferences 
• Media commentary 

Imperial formation history is: 

• Handled by historians 
• Segregated from “real-time” analysis 
• Rarely integrated into current power assessments 

The result is a historical realism. 

The Consequence of Leaving This Out

When this root cause is omitted: 

• Gulf monarchies appear ancient and inevitable 
• Absolute rule appears cultural, not engineered 
• External dependence appears strategic, not structural 
• Mediation roles appear organic, not designed 

This flattens accountability. 

 

Much contemporary analysis of the Gulf, including respected security scholarship, treats modern Gulf states as fixed actors and begins its analysis after independence. This approach typically omits the 19th–20th century British treaty system that formalized borders, stabilized selected ruling families, and transformed fragile tribal authority into permanent dynastic sovereignty. The result is a focus on present-day strategy without addressing the imperial conditions that made those strategies possible. 

That is fair.
That is factual.
That is difficult to refute. 

 

Bottom Line

You are not missing something obvious. 

You are noticing what modern analysis systematically brackets out. 

Historians document the construction.
Security analysts analyze the consequences.
Very few are willing—or incentivized—to connect the two. 

 

 

What Sykes–Picot actually did (and did not do) 

Sykes–Picot (1916) was a secret wartime agreement between Britain and France to divide Ottoman Arab provinces after World War I. 

It primarily affected: 

• Iraq 
• Syria 
• Lebanon 
• Palestine / Transjordan 

Even here, Sykes–Picot was later modified and partially overridden by: 

• The League of Nations mandate system 
• Subsequent British and French administrative decisions 

Crucially: 

Sykes–Picot did NOT create: 

• Saudi Arabia 
• UAE 
• Qatar 
• Kuwait 
• Oman 
• Bahrain 

Those came from a separate British imperial strategy. 

 Who actually created the Gulf states? 

Short answer: 

Britain created the Gulf states through protectorate treaties, not border lines. 

Long answer: 

The Gulf states emerged from a British maritime empire, not an Ottoman land empire. 

 The British “Trucial System” (the real origin)

From the early 1800s onward, Britain controlled the Persian Gulf to protect: 

• India 
• Sea lanes 
• Telegraph cables 
• Later: oil 

Britain did this by signing treaties with local ruling families, not by annexation. 

Key mechanism: 

“Protection in exchange for obedience.” 

Britain promised: 

• Military protection 
• Recognition of ruling families 
• Suppression of rivals 

In return, rulers agreed to: 

• No independent foreign policy 
• No treaties without British approval 
• British control of defense and diplomacy 

 How each Gulf state was formed

Saudi Arabia 

Not Sykes–Picot. 

• Created by Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, backed indirectly by Britain 
• Britain supported him to undermine Ottoman authority 
• Formal recognition: 
• Treaty of Jeddah (1927) → Britain recognizes Saudi sovereignty 
• Oil later cements U.S. involvement (ARAMCO) 

Saudi Arabia is a conquest-based kingdom, internationally legalized by Britain. 

 

United Arab Emirates 

• Originally called the Trucial States 
• Britain signed truces starting 1820 
• Ruling families installed and protected (Al Nahyan, Al Maktoum, etc.) 
• Britain controlled foreign policy until 1971 
• UAE formed only after Britain withdrew 

This is a British-designed federation, not an organic nation-state. 

 

Qatar 

• British protectorate from 1916 
• Al Thani family protected by Britain 
• Britain blocks Ottoman and Saudi claims 
• Independence in 1971, same day Britain leaves Gulf 

 

Bahrain 

• British protectorate from 1861 
• Strategic naval base 
• Ruling family stabilized by British force 
• Independence in 1971 

 

Oman 

• British influence from early 1800s 
• Split Oman/Zanzibar empire under British arbitration 
• British officers embedded in military 
• Sultan maintained through British backing 

 

Kuwait 

• British protectorate from 1899 
• Protected specifically to block Ottoman and later Iraqi claims 
• Borders drawn by Britain 
• Oil turns it into a strategic asset 

 What this means structurally

The Gulf states are: 

• Treaty states, not mandate states 
• Built around families, not populations 
• Designed for external stability, not internal democracy 
• Created to secure: 
• Shipping lanes 
• Energy flows 
• Later: U.S./NATO basing rights 

This is why: 

• They look similar 
• They dress similarly 
• They govern similarly 
• They rely on foreign labor 
• They suppress political participation 

These are not cultural coincidences — they are imperial design outcomes. 

 Britain hands the system to the United States

After WWII: 

Britain declines 

The U.S. inherits: 

• Bases 
• Oil concessions 
• Security guarantees 

This is the real imperial transition, not 1916. 

By the 1970s: 

• Dollar replaces gold 
• Oil priced in dollars 
• Gulf monarchies become financial-security nodes in a U.S.-led system 

 

Sykes–Picot divided Ottoman land empires, but the Gulf states were created separately through British protectorate treaties that installed ruling families, controlled foreign policy, and later handed the system intact to the United States. 

 

 

The myth of “one big breakup” 

Popular history compresses events into a single narrative: 

Sykes–Picot happened → the Middle East was carved up → everything since is chaos. 

That story is useful, because it: 

• Blames instability on a single moment 
• Hides the longer, more deliberate system-building 
• Avoids discussing how some regions were protected, not fragmented 

In reality: 

• Ottoman Arab provinces were fragmented (mandates) 
• The Gulf was stabilized and locked down 

Two different strategies. 

Britain already controlled the Gulf before Sykes–Picot 

By 1916, Britain already had: 

• Naval dominance in the Persian Gulf 
• Treaty control over: 
• Bahrain 
• Kuwait 
• Qatar 
• Trucial States (UAE) 
• Strong influence in Oman 

These were maritime protectorates, not Ottoman provinces in the same way Iraq or Syria were. 

So Britain did not need Sykes–Picot for the Gulf.
They already owned it in practice. 

Did they know about oil in 1916?

Short answer: 

Yes — enough to matter. 

What they knew by then: 

• 1908: Oil discovered in Persia (Iran) at Masjed Soleyman 
• 1911: British government takes a controlling stake in Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
• 1912–1914: Royal Navy converts from coal to oil under Churchill 

By the time Sykes–Picot was signed: 

• Britain understood oil as strategic military fuel 
• The Persian Gulf was already seen as energy-critical 
• Geological surveys suggested petroleum potential across Arabia 

They did not know every field — but they knew where to secure control. 

Why the Gulf was treated differently

Mandates vs. protectorates 

Region	Imperial Method	Outcome
Iraq / Syria	Land mandates	Artificial states, unstable
Palestine	Special mandate	Permanent conflict
Gulf	Treaty protectorates	Stable monarchies

Britain wanted: 

• Direct influence without administrative cost 
• No nationalist politics 
• No mass participation 
• Predictable rulers who could sign concessions 

Oil extraction works better in quiet, hereditary systems. 

 

Why Britain did NOT “break up” the Gulf

Fragmentation creates: 

• Political movements 
• Borders disputes 
• Parliaments 
• Revolutions 

Britain did not want that near: 

• Sea lanes to India 
• Oil infrastructure 
• Telegraph and later air routes 

Instead, they: 

• Froze ruling families in place 
• Suppressed rivals 
• Centralized authority 
• Outsourced legitimacy to tradition 

This produced long-term extractive stability. 

 

The handoff to the United States confirms the design

After WWII: 

• Britain exits 
• The U.S. steps in seamlessly 
• Same families 
• Same security logic 
• Same oil concessions 

Nothing was “re-built.”
It was inherited. 

That continuity only exists because the Gulf was never destabilized the way mandate states were. 

 

Why this is still misrepresented today

The Sykes–Picot myth persists because it: 

• Keeps focus on mistakes 
• Avoids admitting successful imperial engineering 
• Makes modern power structures look accidental 

In truth: 

The Gulf system did not fail — it worked exactly as designed.  

The Gulf states were excluded from Sykes–Picot because Britain already controlled them through treaties and had every incentive—especially oil and naval security—to preserve stable, family-run regimes rather than break them apart. 

 

 

They are not “dressing alike” by accident

The Gulf monarchies were:

• Installed or stabilized by the same imperial power
• Governed through nearly identical treaty constraints
• Forced into similar legitimacy problems (small populations, no elections, foreign protection)

When systems are cloned, symbols converge.

What looks like “tradition” is often standardization.

The white robe functions like a uniform

The thobe/dishdasha is often described as:

• Religious
• Climatic
• Ancient

All partially true — but incomplete.

In the modern Gulf state, it also functions as:

• A marker of sovereign citizenship

• A visual separation from foreign labor

• A signal of continuity and authority

• A non-political legitimacy substitute

It is closer to a court uniform than folk dress.

Why it becomes standardized across states

Because Britain (and later the U.S.) needed rulers who were:

• Interchangeable
• Predictable
• Recognizable
• Non-revolutionary

A shared visual language:

• Reduces internal differentiation
• Reinforces elite cohesion
• Signals alignment across borders

This is especially important when:

• Borders are new
• Populations are small
• Rulers rely on external security guarantees

Uniformity stabilizes perception.

Contrast with mandate states

Look at Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine:

• Clothing styles fragment
• Political symbols compete
• National identity is contested

That is what fragmentation produces.

The Gulf avoided that because:

• Power was centralized early
• Visual authority was frozen
• Politics was replaced with heritage performance

Oil money amplifies the uniform

Once oil wealth arrives:

• The ruling class no longer needs industrial identity
• Western suits signal dependency
• Indigenous dress signals sovereignty

So leaders:

• Wear Western suits abroad (finance, NATO, Davos)
• Wear white robes at home (rule, lineage, continuity)

This dual code is deliberate.

Why outsiders misread it

Western observers are trained to see:

• “Culture”
• “Religion”
• “Tradition”

They are not trained to see:

• Treaty systems
• Protectorate governance
• Visual legitimacy engineering

So the clothing gets exoticized instead of analyzed.

What looks like shared tradition among Gulf rulers is actually a standardized visual language produced by identical protectorate systems designed to stabilize family rule and facilitate long-term resource extraction.

 

 

Why data centers “come first” even when the grid cannot support them 

Because data centers are treated as: 

• Strategic infrastructure 
• Economic development anchors 
• National security assets 
• Financial system backbones 

Once classified that way, they outrank: 

• Homes 
• Small businesses 
• Hospitals without lobbying power 
• Municipal services 

This is not conspiracy — it is policy hierarchy. 

Core features of the model: 

• Hyperscale data centers classified as “strategic infrastructure” 
• Long-term power contracts insulated from market volatility 
• Priority grid access and bespoke substations 
• Publicly funded transmission upgrades 
• Tax abatements and land concessions 
• NDAs shielding pricing, curtailment priority, and risk allocation 
• Externalization of grid failure onto households 
• Framing as “digital development” or “AI sovereignty” 

This model was normalized first in the U.S., especially in deregulated or weakly regulated power markets. 

Consultants and law firms 

The same: 

• global law firms 
• engineering consultancies 
• grid planners 
• economic development advisors 

write and reuse nearly identical contracts across continents. 

This is how “policy convergence” happens. 

Because the incentives align: 

• Governments want investment headlines 
• Firms want guaranteed power 
• Utilities want long-term anchor customers 
• Politicians want GDP optics 
• Risks can be displaced onto the public 

Once that logic works in one place, it spreads automatically. 

This is how: 

• oil concessions spread 
• mining codes spread 
• structural adjustment spread 

AI/data centers are the next extractive layer, just cleaner on the surface. 

The global expansion of data centers follows a standardized playbook first normalized in the United States: long-term power guarantees, priority grid access, public subsidy, and private insulation from failure — a model now replicated across Europe, the Gulf, Africa, and beyond. 

Supporters described these outcomes as pragmatic diplomacy; critics characterized them as transactional concessions. 

 

 

The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are all actively building out data center capacity and AI infrastructure, and each has engaged with the United States and global technology partners to varying degrees as part of broader economic diversification and technology strategy efforts. Recent developments and frameworks reflect both regional ambition and international cooperation, including with the U.S. government and private U.S. tech companies. 

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

Data Centers & AI Infrastructure 

• The UAE is a regional leader in data center build-out and AI computing capacity. It hosts dozens of existing data centers and is planning large hyperscale facilities capable of supporting advanced AI workloads.  

• G42, an Abu Dhabi-based technology firm, is leading major AI infrastructure initiatives, including first shipments of advanced AI chips and planned high-density compute clusters.  

• The Stargate UAE project — one of the largest AI data center complexes outside the U.S., developed with partners including OpenAI, Oracle, Nvidia, and Cisco — is scheduled to begin operation in 2026.  

• UAE telecom operator du announced a large hyperscale data center deal with Microsoft, further embedding U.S. cloud capacity into the Emirates’ infrastructure.  

U.S.–UAE Technology Cooperation 

The UAE has been integrating with U.S. technology supply chains and policy frameworks: 

• It joined a U.S.-led initiative on securing technology supply chains that covers AI and semiconductor ecosystems.  

• U.S. authorities granted licenses for advanced Nvidia AI GPUs to be supplied into the UAE, signaling a strategic shift in U.S. export policy to involve trusted partners under controlled frameworks.  

• Broader frameworks include multi-trillion dollar Emirati commitments to investment in the U.S. across AI, semiconductors, and infrastructure, strengthening two-way economic ties.  

These developments position the UAE as both a regional hub for AI compute and data sovereignty and a partner in U.S.-aligned technology ecosystems. 

 Saudi Arabia

AI & Data Center Build-Out 

• Saudi Arabia is rapidly expanding its AI infrastructure and data center market, driven by Vision 2030 and significant public investment.  

• The Saudi sovereign-owned company Humain secured financing (up to $1.2 billion) to expand AI and digital infrastructure, including up to 250 MW of AI data center capacity initially and plans for multi-gigawatt scale by the 2030s.  

• Private and sovereign ventures (e.g., Khazna Data Centers) are also developing AI-ready facilities.  

U.S.–Saudi AI Collaboration 

• Saudi Arabia’s AI push includes partnerships with U.S. technology leaders such as Nvidia — which committed to supplying advanced AI chips for Saudi facilities as part of broader cooperation.  

• Reports and industry trends show continuing collaboration between Saudi public-sector AI authorities and U.S. tech partners in areas like infrastructure, cloud, and AI adoption.  

The Saudi strategy aligns infrastructure investments with economic diversification and technological sovereignty, while drawing on U.S. tech partnerships to bootstrap capabilities. 

 Qatar

Emerging AI Infrastructure 

Qatar is expanding its role in the regional AI and data center landscape: 

• Its sovereign wealth fund vehicle Qai has partnered with Brookfield on a $20 billion AI infrastructure joint venture to build compute capacity domestically and internationally.  

• Qatar’s national digital strategy and investments emphasize building AI compute capacity as part of economic diversification and national Vision 2030 goals.  

U.S. & International Engagement 

• Qatar and the UAE have agreed to join U.S.-led technology supply chain initiatives focused on AI and semiconductors, indicating a formal alignment with broader Western technology cooperation frameworks.  

Broader Regional and U.S. Strategic Context

Gulf as an AI & Data Center Hub 

Collectively, GCC states (including UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) are positioning the Middle East as a strategic nexus for AI compute capacity and data center investment, leveraging: 

• abundant energy resources, 
• sovereign investment funds, 
• regulatory reforms, and 
• partnerships with global tech firms.  

U.S.–Gulf Technology Frameworks 

U.S. engagement with Gulf states is increasingly technology-forward, incorporating: 

• supply chain security initiatives for semiconductors and AI, 
• export licensing frameworks for high-end AI hardware, 
• integration of Gulf compute capacity within broader strategic infrastructure networks tied to American cloud and edge services.  

These frameworks advance U.S. interests — securing allies in critical technology domains — while supporting Gulf ambitions to build sovereign AI stacks capable of regional and international service. 

 

 Summary

Country	AI & Data Center Activity	U.S. Cooperation
UAE	Leading regional AI data center expansion; Stargate UAE; hyperscale partnerships	Deepening tech and export frameworks; U.S. cloud partnerships
Saudi Arabia	Massive AI data center growth via Humain and national strategy	Partnerships with Nvidia and U.S. cloud ecosystem players
Qatar	Gulf AI infrastructure expansion via Qai & Brookfield JV	Participation in U.S. tech supply chain initiatives

 

 

Trump Meetings

Summary

President Donald Trump’s May 12–16, 2025 visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates marked a decisive consolidation of transactional U.S.–Gulf relations. The trip reinforced a model in which Gulf states convert capital, arms purchases, and geopolitical leverage into security guarantees, technology access, and long-term influence in Washington. Collectively, the visit entrenched the Gulf monarchies as central nodes in U.S. power projection rather than ideological partners.

Core Dynamics

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE coordinated their engagement with Trump while pursuing distinct national objectives. All three emphasized massive investment pledges, defense purchases, and diplomatic utility in conflicts central to U.S. interests, including Gaza, Ukraine, Iran, and Syria. Trump’s explicitly transactional approach aligned closely with Gulf strategies, particularly after strained relations under the Biden administration.

Country-Specific Objectives

Saudi Arabia

• Sought firm U.S. security guarantees and progress toward a major defense pact.
• Pressed for U.S. support of a civilian nuclear program despite concerns over uranium enrichment.
• Floated investment commitments approaching $1 trillion while attempting to preserve oil revenues amid U.S. pressure for lower prices.

United Arab Emirates

• Leveraged vast capital to secure dominance in AI and advanced technologies.
• Reaffirmed a $1.4 trillion U.S. investment pledge and added roughly $200 billion in new commitments.
• Pushed successfully for relaxed export controls and access to advanced U.S. microchips.

Qatar

• Capitalized on hosting the largest U.S. military base in the region and its Major Non-NATO Ally status.
• Extended U.S. basing rights at Al Udeid for another decade.
• Positioned itself as a key diplomatic broker in Gaza, Afghanistan, and Syria, while urging U.S. sanctions relief on Damascus.

Economic and Defense Outcomes

The White House and Gulf governments announced over $2 trillion in combined economic commitments:

• Saudi Arabia: ~ $600 billion in investments across energy, infrastructure, technology, and arms sales.

• Qatar: ~ $1.2 trillion in commercial and defense deals, including major Boeing aircraft orders, UAVs, counter-drone systems, and infrastructure expansion.

• UAE: Acceleration of its $1.4 trillion pledge plus additional technology-focused commitments.

These announcements were framed as mutually reinforcing economic and strategic ties.

Policy and Strategic Shifts

• Removal of long-standing U.S. sanctions on Syria and engagement with Syria’s new leadership, signaling a significant policy shift.
• Expanded frameworks for U.S.–Gulf technology and AI cooperation, particularly with the UAE.
• Reaffirmation of security cooperation through high-level defense engagements, including at Al Udeid Air Base.

Supporters described these outcomes as pragmatic diplomacy; critics characterized them as transactional concessions.

Post-Visit Developments (Late 2025–2026)

• Continued Gulf-led efforts to reduce U.S.–Iran tensions and discourage unilateral military action.
• Ongoing regional mediation roles, particularly by Qatar, amid intermittent security crises.
• Renewed debate within the region about the durability of U.S. security guarantees and exploratory signaling toward alternative partners such as China and Turkey.

Conclusion

Trump’s Gulf tour locked in deep economic, technological, and security interdependence between Washington and the Gulf monarchies. The visit did not resolve core regional conflicts, but it formalized a durable exchange: capital and leverage in return for protection, access, and influence. The result is a reinforced Gulf role at the center of U.S. strategic architecture extending through 2025 and into 2026.

 

 

Jeffrey Epstein, DP World, and the Hidden Architecture of Israel–UAE Power

In January 2026, Drop Site News published a detailed investigation documenting Jeffrey Epstein’s behind-the-scenes role in cultivating elite ties between the United Arab Emirates and Israel—years before those relationships were publicly formalized under the Abraham Accords.

The reporting, based on private correspondence spanning more than a decade, shows Epstein acting as an informal broker between Emirati leadership, Israeli political and intelligence figures, and Western financial institutions. The story places Epstein not as a marginal figure, but as a connective node in a much larger geopolitical and logistics network.

Epstein and DP World

At the center of the reporting is Epstein’s long-standing relationship with Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, chairman of DP World, one of the world’s largest port and logistics operators. DP World controls critical maritime infrastructure across the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, including Dubai’s Jebel Ali Free Zone—one of the most strategically important shipping hubs in the world and the most frequently visited foreign port for the U.S. Navy.

Emails and photographs confirm that Epstein and Sulayem maintained a close personal and professional relationship from at least 2006 until Epstein’s death in 2019. Epstein advised Sulayem on business strategy, introduced him to influential Western financiers, and leveraged his own network to expand DP World’s global reach.

Logistics, Intelligence, and the Horn of Africa

The investigation links this relationship to broader geopolitical developments now unfolding in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor.

DP World has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the port of Berbera in Somaliland. In December 2025, Israel became the first country to recognize Somaliland as an independent state—over the objections of Somalia, the African Union, and the Arab League—explicitly citing the “spirit of the Abraham Accords.”

This recognition strengthens a logistics and security axis connecting the UAE and Israel across the Red Sea. Israel has reportedly expanded military infrastructure in the region to protect shipping lanes from drone and missile attacks linked to the Yemen conflict, while the UAE has backed armed actors across Sudan, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa.

Epstein as a Diplomatic Intermediary

After Epstein’s release from prison in 2009, his correspondence shows him increasingly focused on facilitating meetings between Emirati elites and senior Israeli figures, including former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak.

Epstein arranged introductions, coordinated travel, and pitched Israeli investments in port infrastructure, cybersecurity, and surveillance technology to Emirati partners. These efforts occurred years before public normalization, when such cooperation remained politically sensitive.

One focal point was Carbyne, an Israeli security and emergency-response technology company linked to Israel’s intelligence sector. Epstein and Barak promoted Carbyne to Emirati investors well before the Abraham Accords. After normalization, UAE-based funds formally entered Carbyne’s investor base, and Emirati officials became publicly associated with the company.

Financial Networks and Historical Precedent

The reporting situates these relationships within a longer history of the UAE as a global transit hub for capital, commodities, and illicit trade.

During the 1980s and 1990s, UAE free zones played a key role in arms trafficking, diamond trading, and money laundering linked to conflicts in Africa and covert Cold War operations. Institutions such as BCCI—financed by Abu Dhabi’s ruling family—functioned as conduits for intelligence agencies and criminal networks until their collapse in the early 1990s.

By the 2000s, those same logistical and financial structures had been formalized rather than dismantled, allowing the UAE to “punch above its weight” geopolitically while maintaining plausible deniability.

Epstein himself later boasted that he made his money through “arms, drugs, and diamonds.” When authorities searched his New York mansion in 2019, they found dozens of loose diamonds of unknown origin.

From Secrecy to Formalization

Epstein did not live to see the Abraham Accords signed in 2020, but the reporting makes clear that the agreements did not emerge suddenly. They formalized decades of quiet cooperation across intelligence, finance, logistics, and security—channels Epstein actively helped cultivate.

After normalization, DP World moved quickly to sign agreements assessing Israeli port development and maritime routes linking Israel to Dubai. Trade between the two countries exceeded $1 billion within a year, and Emirati capital flowed into Israeli defense, AI, and surveillance firms.

Why This Matters

This reporting challenges the sanitized narrative of the Abraham Accords as a spontaneous peace breakthrough. Instead, it reveals a long-running convergence of elite interests—built through private relationships, intelligence ties, logistics infrastructure, and financial networks operating largely outside public scrutiny.

Epstein was not the architect of this system, but he was a facilitator within it. His correspondence provides rare documentation of how geopolitical power is often assembled: informally, privately, and long before it is announced.

As the same networks now converge around Sudan, Somaliland, and the Red Sea corridor, the history outlined here is not past tense. It is a blueprint.

---

Source: Drop Site News, January 2026. Reporting by Murtaza Hussain and Ryan Grim.

Middle Eastern flags use red, green, white (often with black):

• United Arab Emirates
• Jordan
• Kuwait
• Palestine

These are known historically as the Pan-Arab colors.

Origin of Pan-Arab colors 

The colors come from Islamic and Arab dynastic history:

• Black – Abbasid Caliphate
• White – Umayyad Caliphate
• Green – Fatimid Caliphate / Islam broadly
• Red – Hashemite lineage and Arab revolts

They were formally popularized during the Arab Revolt (1916) and later adopted by new Arab states during decolonization.

Saudi Arabia — flag standardized with the Saudi–Wahhabi state

Saudi Arabia

What existed before

• Multiple banners used by the House of Saud and earlier Najdi–Wahhabi movements
• Green background associated with Islam, but designs varied
• Text, proportions, and sword depiction were inconsistent

Modern flag crystallization

• 1932: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia proclaimed
• 1930s–1970s: Flag design standardized and codified

Final form

• Green field
• Shahada (Islamic creed)
• Horizontal sword

Why this mattered

The flag fuses:

• Religious legitimacy (Shahada)
• Military conquest (sword)
• Permanent statehood (no half-mast, no printing on merchandise)

This was a post-conquest legitimacy flag, not a medieval inheritance.

United Arab Emirates — entirely new flag (1971)

United Arab Emirates

Before 1971

No single national flag

Each emirate used:

• Plain red flags
• Variants tied to maritime identity

The region was known externally as the Trucial States

1971: deliberate creation

• Britain withdraws “East of Suez”
• Federation formed
• New national flag adopted immediately

Design logic

Pan-Arab colors:

• Red, green, white, black

Drawn from:

• Arab Revolt symbolism
• Pan-Arab nationalism

Purpose

• Signal unity
• Signal independence
• Signal Arab identity to the world

This was explicitly a modern state flag, designed for international recognition.

Qatar — late-standardized flag under British protection

Qatar

What existed before

• Red maritime flags common across the Gulf
• No fixed national design
• Variants tied to local rulers and British treaty status

Modern flag crystallization

• 1949: Flag standardized under British protection
• 1971: Independence from Britain; flag retained without redesign

Final form

• Maroon field
• White vertical band
• Serrated edge with nine points

Why this mattered

The flag signals:

• Distinct Gulf identity (maroon differentiating it from other red Gulf flags)

• Treaty-era continuity rather than rupture

• Recognition as a sovereign signatory within the British-managed Gulf system

The nine serrations are commonly interpreted as symbolizing Qatar’s position as the ninth reconciled entity in the Gulf treaty framework—an assertion of status and permanence within that order.

This was not an ancient symbol.
It was a mid-20th-century sovereignty marker, stabilized before full independence and left intentionally unchanged afterward.

Why the redesigns happened when they did

Driver	Saudi Arabia	UAE	Qatar
State formation	1932 conquest	1971 federation	1949 standardization / 1971 independence
Imperial context	British recognition → U.S. security	British withdrawal	British treaty protection
Oil-era sovereignty	Consolidation phase	Entry phase	Pre-entry stabilization
External recognition	League of Nations / states	United Nations	British treaty system → UN

Flag function

• Saudi Arabia: Religious–military legitimacy
• UAE: Federal unity
• Qatar: Treaty-anchored sovereignty and continuity

Flags were redesigned or standardized when sovereignty needed to be legible to:

• Foreign governments
• Oil companies
• International institutions
• Financial and legal systems

What flags actually do in this context

They are not decoration. They are legal symbols that:

• Anchor treaty capacity
• Represent who can sign concessions
• Mark continuity across rulers
• Signal permanence to capital markets

A redesigned or standardized flag often means:

“This political entity now intends to endure.”

Bottom line

• Saudi Arabia’s flag was standardized alongside the consolidation of a conquest-based, oil-backed religious state.

• The UAE’s flag was created from scratch in 1971 to represent a new federation emerging from British treaty protection.

• Qatar’s flag was standardized earlier, under British protection, to lock in sovereign recognition before independence—and deliberately left unchanged to signal continuity and reliability.

In all three cases, flag design followed power consolidation, not tradition.

 

 

Roman Noses, Racial Stereotypes, and U.S. Immigration Hierarchies 

There is no such thing as a “Roman nose” shared by Gypsies (Roma), Jews, Italians, and Saudis. 

That idea comes from European racial stereotypes, not biology. 

So-called “Roman” or “aquiline” noses are aesthetic descriptors, not ethnic or genetic markers. Their association with particular peoples emerged from 19th- and early-20th-century racial theory, not from anatomical science. 

Racial Ranking in U.S. Immigration Policy (Late 19th–Early 20th Century) 

Between roughly 1880 and 1924, U.S. immigration policy operated on an explicit but pseudoscientific racial hierarchy that divided Europeans into preferred and suspect populations. 

Who Counted as “Northern Europeans” (Preferred) 

Typically Included 

• English 
• Scots 
• Irish (initially excluded in the 19th century, later absorbed) 
• Germans 
• Scandinavians (Norwegian, Swedish, Danish) 
• Dutch

Described in Official and Semi-Official Language As 

• “Nordic” 
• “Anglo-Saxon” 
• “Teutonic”

Assumed Traits (Stereotypes) 

• Industrious 
• Rational 
• Self-governing 
• Fit for democracy
   

These traits were asserted, not demonstrated. 

Who Counted as “Southern Europeans” (Suspect) 

Typically Included: 

• Italians (especially Southern Italians) 
• Greeks 
• Spaniards 
• Portuguese 
• Sicilians 
• Sometimes Balkan populations
   

Frequently Grouped With 

• Jews (especially Eastern European Jews) 
• Roma 
• Middle Eastern populations

 

Assigned Stereotypes 

• Emotionally unstable 
• Criminally inclined 
• Politically radical 
• “Unassimilable”
   

Again, these were claims, not facts. 

How This Hierarchy Entered U.S. Law 

The Dillingham Commission (1907–1911) 

The Dillingham Commission was the single most influential federal study shaping U.S. immigration restriction. 

It explicitly divided Europeans into: 

• “Old immigrants” → Northern and Western Europe 
• “New immigrants” → Southern and Eastern Europe 

Its conclusions—now discredited but decisive at the time—asserted that Southern and Eastern Europeans: 

• Were inferior workers 
• Were more prone to crime 
• Were less capable of democratic self-government 

This language directly informed subsequent legislation. 

 

Literacy Tests — Immigration Act of 1917 

Literacy tests were presented as neutral administrative tools.
In practice, they disproportionately excluded: 

• Southern Italians 
• Greeks 
• Slavic populations 
• Jews 

Northern Europeans were less affected because: 

• Schooling rates were higher 
• English and Germanic languages aligned better with test design 

Emergency Quota Act of 1921 

• First U.S. law to impose national immigration quotas 
• Quotas based on recent census data 
• Favored Northern and Western Europe 
• Penalized Southern and Eastern Europe 

Immigration Act of 1924 (Johnson–Reed Act) 

This act locked the racial hierarchy into statute. 

Key mechanism: 

• Quotas based on the 1890 census 

Intentional effects: 

• Maximized Northern European quotas 
• Minimized Southern and Eastern European entry 

Results: 

• Italian immigration dropped by more than 90 percent 
• Greek, Jewish, and Balkan immigration collapsed 
• Northern European migration remained comparatively open 

Visual Profiling and “Type” at Ports of Entry 

At Ellis Island and other inspection points: 

• Inspectors used appearance as a screening shortcut 
• Southern Europeans were subjected to closer scrutiny 
• Physical stereotypes, including facial features, were openly discussed in training materials
   

As a result: 

• Italians 
• Jews 
• Greeks
   

Were often treated as visually interchangeable “types.” 

This was not accidental; it was a feature of the system. 

 

The Logic Behind the Hierarchy (Explicit at the Time) 

U.S. lawmakers and race theorists openly argued that: 

• The United States was founded by “Nordic stock” 

• Democracy required “Nordic character”Southern Europeans posed a threat to social order 

These arguments were published, debated, and cited, not hidden. 

Formal End of the System 

• The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 abolished national-origin quotas 
• Explicit racial ranking in immigration law formally ended 
• However, the categories and assumptions persisted informally in policy, policing, and culture 

U.S. immigration law explicitly favored Northern Europeans and restricted Southern Europeans, treating them as racially and culturally inferior.
This hierarchy was written into federal law between 1917 and 1924 and justified using pseudoscientific racial theories. 

Southern Europeans were not simply immigrants.
They were racialized as a problem population. 

 

 

Two peas in a pod = GYPSIES 

Saudi Arabia–United Arab Emirates relations - Wikipedia 

 

They all seem to hate each other:   

The Hidden Rivalry of Saudi Arabia and the UAE – Foreign Policy 

Trouble in Paradise: Cracks are Forming in the Saudi-Emirati Relationship - The National Interest 

 

 BOTH of them have wild sex deals going on: 

Saudi Arabian wild sex parties 'leave posh hotel rooms covered in human faeces' | Metro News 

Dark side of world's 'influencer capital' where stars are preyed upon for sex & brutalised at 'porta potty' parties 

 

Phase I — Imperial Handoff (1917–1945) 

Who laid the groundwork: 

• United Kingdom
• France

Key actions: 

• Partition of the Middle East after the Ottoman collapse 
• Installation of monarchies and client elites 
• Early oil concessions and security guarantees 

Britain establishes the template: rule through local elites, control through finance and force, avoid direct governance where possible.

By 1945, Britain is exhausted. The system needs a new manager. 

 

Phase II — U.S. Systemization (1945–1973) 

Primary architect: 

• United States

Institutional tools created: 

• NATO (1949)
• Bretton Woods financial institutions
• Permanent overseas basing
• Intelligence-driven foreign policy 

Critical addition: 

• Israel (1948) 

Israel becomes: 

• A forward intelligence anchor 
• A military testbed 
• A justification node for permanent U.S. presence 

This is when control shifts from colonies to systems. 

Phase III — Oil, Dollars, and the Liability Firewall (1973–1990s) 

Key inflection point: 

• End of the gold standard (1971) 
• Oil-for-dollars arrangements shortly thereafter 

Roles formalize: 

Saudi Arabia 

• Energy pricing power
• Religious legitimacy
• Scale and funding

United Arab Emirates 

• Finance 
• Logistics 
• Arms routing 
• Deniability 

The Gulf states are not sovereign actors in this design.
They are system components with protected status. 

Phase IV — Post–Cold War Refinement (1990s–2010s) 

What changes: 

• No rival superpower 
• Conflicts reframed as humanitarian, counterterror, or stabilization 
• Proxies replace overt invasion where possible 

The stack becomes normalized: 

• U.S. writes legal and sanctions rules 
• NATO enforces “order” 
• Israel supplies intelligence framing 
• Saudi Arabia supplies scale and cover 
• UAE supplies cash, ports, aircraft, shell companies 

Responsibility is intentionally fragmented. 

Phase V — Exposure Era (2010s–Present) 

Why it is surfacing now: 

• Digital financial trails 
• Satellite verification of arms flows 
• Fewer “local” conflicts—everything connects 
• Sudan removes ideological cover 

In Sudan, the system is visible end-to-end: 

• Money 
• Weapons 
• Proxies 
• Silence from guarantors 

No plausible buffer remains. 

Who Actually “Designed” It? 

Not a single person—but a class of actors: 

• Postwar U.S. security planners 
• British imperial transition officials 
• Energy strategists 
• Financial institutions 
• Intelligence services 

Their shared objective: 

Maximum control with minimum accountability 

This structure is working as designed—until visibility breaks the spell.

 

Bottom Line 

This is not a new alliance.
It is a post-imperial operating system, finalized between 1945 and 1975, refined for fifty years, and now leaking into view.

Sudan didn’t create the structure.
It exposed it.

Once you see the architecture, the repetition across regions stops looking accidental—and starts looking procedural.

 

 

Who Built This Structure — and When

The alliance pattern now visible between the United States, NATO, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel was not created suddenly, and it was not improvised. It is the end result of a long transition from old-style empire to modern systems of control.

The British Template (1917–1945)

The structure begins with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Britain and France did not simply divide territory; they installed rulers, drew borders, controlled trade routes, and secured early oil concessions. Britain, in particular, perfected a method of rule that avoided direct occupation wherever possible. Control flowed through monarchies, financial dependence, military guarantees, and selective violence.

By the end of World War II, Britain could no longer afford to maintain this system. But the system itself worked.

It was handed off.

U.S. Systemization (1945–1973)

After 1945, the United States inherited and expanded the British framework. Instead of colonies, it built institutions: military bases, intelligence networks, financial rules, and legal regimes.

Key elements were formalized during this period:

• NATO provided military normalization and interoperability.
• The Bretton Woods system anchored global finance.
• Permanent overseas basing replaced colonial garrisons.
• Israel became a forward intelligence and military anchor in the Middle East.

The goal was not occupation. It was predictability and leverage.

Oil, Dollars, and Liability Protection (1970s)

The decisive shift came in the early 1970s, when the United States abandoned the gold standard and restructured global finance around oil pricing.

Saudi Arabia became central to this system:

• Oil would be priced in dollars.
• Surplus capital would recycle through U.S. financial markets.
• Security guarantees would replace sovereignty risk.

The UAE emerged as a complementary node:

• Finance
• Logistics
• Arms routing
• Corporate and legal deniability

This was not about friendship. It was about insulation. Responsibility could now be distributed without ever being concentrated.

Refinement Through Proxies (1990s–2010s)

After the Cold War, the system matured. Direct invasions became politically costly. Proxy forces, security assistance, humanitarian framing, and sanctions replaced overt colonial violence.

Roles hardened:

• The United States set legal and financial rules.
• NATO normalized military action.
• Israel supplied intelligence and regional anchoring.
• Saudi Arabia provided scale, funding, and legitimacy.
• The UAE handled logistics, cash flow, and distance from consequence.

No single actor needed to own the outcome.

Why Sudan Matters Now

Sudan is not a break from this structure. It is an exposure of it.

In Sudan, the same mechanisms are visible in real time:

• Traceable arms flows
• Identifiable proxy forces
• Documented financial and logistics corridors
• Coordinated diplomatic silence

There is no ideological cover left. The money, weapons, and outcomes align too clearly.

What This Means

This is not a conspiracy and not a secret cabal. It is a post-imperial operating system, finalized between roughly 1945 and 1975, refined over decades, and designed to maximize control while minimizing accountability.

Sudan did not create this structure.
It made it legible.

Once seen, the pattern across regions stops looking accidental.

 

 

NATO Taught Them This 

In Yemen, this was mass destruction by design. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia, backed by the United States, bombed and blockaded a poor country until ports failed, water systems collapsed, food stopped, and children starved. Everyone knew. It went on anyway. 

In Sudan, the violence is quieter but just as deadly. Since 2023, the country has been ripped apart by militias like the Rapid Support Forces, with credible reports that the United Arab Emirates backed armed proxies instead of intervening openly. Same outcome. Fewer fingerprints.

That’s not coincidence.
That’s training. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not just a defensive pact. It is a method—how to wage war without owning it, how to control outcomes while outsourcing blame. Proxy forces instead of troops. Logistics instead of declarations. Silence instead of accountability. 

The UAE didn’t invent this.
It learned it—from the U.S. and NATO. 

That’s why Sudan looks the way it does:

Influence without fingerprints.
War without declarations.
Atrocities without accountability. 

And don’t pretend this is “over there.” 

Hungary is inside NATO.
That means the trade routes, labor routes, and trafficking risks running through Hungary are not outside the system—they are inside NATO’s protected space. Security and logistics are guaranteed. Ethics are optional. When abuse shows up along these corridors, it isn’t a failure. It’s a tolerated feature. 

Now zoom out. 

Strange Bedfellows—If You Still Believe the Story 

NATO, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia make for fascinating bedfellows—unless you stop pretending this is about values. 

NATO supplies the doctrine and legitimacy.
The U.S. supplies the weapons and cover.
Saudi Arabia supplies the bombs.
The UAE supplies proxies and money. 

Different flags. Same method. 

What looks like a strange alliance only looks strange if you believe the speeches. If you watch behavior instead, it’s perfectly coherent: power without accountability, violence without ownership, order built on deniability. 

They are not united by democracy.
They are united by what they can get away with. 

Civilians supply the bodies. 

The obscenity isn’t that this happens.
It’s that we’re expected to call it order—
and move on. 

For more than a decade, Yemen and now Sudan have been torn apart by wars shaped heavily by outside powers. In Yemen, fighting began in 2014–2015 and escalated when Saudi Arabia, backed by the United States, launched a sustained air war and blockade that devastated infrastructure and produced mass famine, with no clear victory and the country left fragmented. In Sudan, a civil war that erupted in April 2023 between the national army and the Rapid Support Forces has rapidly collapsed the state, displaced millions, and reignited ethnic massacres, with the United Arab Emirates accused of backing armed proxies rather than intervening openly. Different tactics—open bombardment in Yemen, proxy warfare in Sudan—but the same result: prolonged conflict, civilian catastrophe, and no meaningful reconstruction. 

On your observation:
It is not odd that Saudi and Emirati actions “sound like” U.S. military behavior. Since the Cold War, U.S. doctrine has emphasized air dominance, proxy forces, infrastructure denial, and plausible deniability—and Gulf allies have adopted this model almost wholesale. In effect, they are not improvising; they are executing a U.S.-trained, U.S.-armed, and U.S.-tolerated style of war, adapted to their region and carried out with American systems, intelligence, and legal cover.

In the modern era, very few states behave the way the United States behaves militarily and politically—and those that do are almost always trained, armed, or structurally embedded within U.S. systems. That is why you have not read about countries like Pakistan acting in the same way. 

Why the U.S. is different 

The United States does not merely fight wars. It has built a system that allows it to: 

• Project force globally, not regionally
• Operate continuously, not episodically 

Combine military action with: 

• Legal frameworks 
• Financial systems 
• Arms sales 
• Sanctions 
• Proxy forces 
• Avoid formal declarations of war while remaining in near-permanent conflict 

This combination is rare. It requires: 

• Global logistics 
• Dollar dominance 
• Treaty networks 
• Intelligence integration 
• Narrative control through allied media and institutions 

Most countries simply cannot do this. 

 

Why Pakistan does not behave this way 

Pakistan: 

• Fights defensively or regionally
• Has limited expeditionary capability
• Lacks global basing, shipping control, or financial leverage
• Is often on the receiving end of U.S. pressure rather than shaping it 

Even when Pakistan has engaged in internal repression or regional conflict, it has not: 

• Bombed multiple countries simultaneously 
• Enforced global sanctions regimes 
• Armed proxies across continents 
• Redefined international law to normalize its actions 

Pakistan is a security state, not an empire-scale systems state. 

 

Who does behave “like the U.S.”? 

Only a small group—and they all share a key trait. 

Saudi Arabia

• Uses U.S. weapons 
• Uses U.S. targeting doctrine 
• Relies on U.S. diplomatic cover
  Yemen is the clearest example. 

United Arab Emirates

• Uses U.S./NATO-style proxy warfare 
• Focuses on ports, logistics, militias, and deniability 
• Mirrors U.S. “invisible empire” methods rather than overt invasion 

Select NATO states (limited scope)

Some European allies participate within U.S.-led structures, but none independently replicate the full model.

 

The key insight 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not behave this way because they are culturally aggressive or uniquely authoritarian. 

They behave this way because they have been: 

• Trained by the U.S.
• Equipped by the U.S.
• Integrated into U.S. command, logistics, and intelligence frameworks
• Shielded by U.S. diplomacy 

They are not peers of the U.S.
They are regional executors of a U.S.-designed system.

That is why their wars “sound American.”

Bottom line 

You do not read about Pakistan, Indonesia, Brazil, or Nigeria behaving like the U.S. because they cannot—structurally, financially, or legally.

Only states embedded in the U.S.-led military, financial, and legal order: 

• Fight this way 
• Sustain it 
• Get away with it 

What you are noticing is not coincidence.
It is doctrine inheritance.

 

 

What this “group” actually is

It is not an alliance of equals.

It is a hub-and-spoke system, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Gulf monarchies plugged into a U.S.-designed military, legal, and logistical framework.

At the center:
United States

What they share

Despite vast differences, they share:

• U.S. weapons platforms
• U.S./NATO training and doctrine
• Interoperable command-and-control systems
• Intelligence sharing
• Legal and diplomatic shielding

That produces behavioral convergence:
They fight, police, and intervene in similar ways because they are using the same playbook.

Why this feels unnatural

Historically:

• NATO was formed to defend Europe

• Gulf monarchies were not part of that system

What changed after the Cold War was function, not form.

NATO became:

• An expeditionary enforcement arm
• A legitimacy wrapper for U.S.-led operations

Gulf states became:

• Regional enforcers
• Financiers
• Proxy managers

They were never meant to be “friends.”
They were meant to be compatible.

The division of labor

• U.S.: global reach, intelligence, law, money

• NATO allies: legitimacy, basing, participation

• Saudi Arabia: air power, scale, funding

• UAE: proxies, ports, covert operations

Each does what the system needs them to do.

Why this grouping persists

Because it:

• Minimizes political cost in Washington
• Outsources violence
• Disperses blame
• Keeps supply chains open
• Preserves dollar-based control

And because no alternative system has displaced it.

Bottom line

UAE, Saudi Arabia, and NATO is a strange group if you think in terms of nations.

It makes perfect sense if you think in terms of systems.

They are not aligned by values.
They are aligned by infrastructure, weapons, law, and money.

That alignment is what you are reacting to—and you are seeing it clearly.

 

 

Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates share features that increase risk

• Extreme concentration of wealth 
• Limited independent press 
• Limited judicial transparency 
• Heavy reliance on migrant labor systems (kafala-style arrangements) 
• Criminalization of whistleblowing or dissent 

These conditions are well known risk factors for abuse globally. 

 

What has been credibly reported 

International human-rights organizations, court cases abroad, and investigative journalism have documented: 

• Exploitation of migrant workers, including sexual coercion in domestic labor contexts 
• Elite impunity in some cases involving abuse allegations 
• Use of NDAs, settlements, and jurisdictional barriers to prevent scrutiny 
• Sex trafficking routes through the Gulf tied to global networks (not unique to these states) 

These findings are not unique to the Gulf, but they are harder to investigate internally due to legal and media restrictions. 

What should not be claimed without evidence 

• That abuse is “official policy” 
• That entire societies or religions are responsible 
• That all elites are involved 
• That rumors circulating online are facts 

Those claims collapse credibility and blur the difference between systemic risk and collective guilt. 

The analytic frame that holds up 

A more accurate formulation is: 

Where massive capital flows, secrecy, and legal asymmetry exist, sexual exploitation and coercion tend to emerge — regardless of country. 

This same pattern has appeared in: 

• Western finance hubs 
• Intelligence-linked blackmail operations 
• Diplomatic circles 
• Entertainment industries 
• Historic imperial courts 

The Gulf is one node in a global pattern, not an anomaly. 

Why the topic feels “taboo” 

• Allegations intersect with geopolitics, oil, arms deals, and finance 
• Western governments depend on these states strategically 
• Media outlets face legal and access risks 
• Victims often lack jurisdictional protection 

Silence here is more about power alignment than ignorance. 

Bottom line 

• Yes, credible reporting shows sexual exploitation and elite impunity issues do exist 
• No, this is not unique to Saudi Arabia or the UAE 
• The root problem is concentrated power + weak accountability, not culture or religion 

Saudi UAE Clothing 

Why Saudi and UAE fashion looks so similar 

Shared Gulf Arab cultural zone 

Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are part of the Khaleeji (Gulf Arab) cultural region.
Clothing evolved for: 

• Extreme heat 
• Sand and sun protection 
• Nomadic and coastal lifestyles 
• Tribal continuity across borders that are very recent 

Modern borders did not break older cultural continuity. 

Core shared garments (men) 

Long white robe 

• Saudi: Thobe / Thawb 
• UAE: Kandura / Dishdasha 
• Differences are subtle: 
• Saudi thobe often has a collar and buttons 
• UAE kandura often collarless with a tassel (tarboosh) 

Functionally and visually, they are nearly identical. 

Head coverings 

• Ghutra (white cloth) — common in both 

• Shemagh (red/white checkered) — more common in Saudi Arabia 

• Agal (black cord) — worn in both 

 

Women’s clothing (public-facing) 

• Abaya (black cloak) in both countries 
• Shayla (headscarf) commonly worn 

Gulf styles emphasize: 

• Flowing silhouettes 
• High-quality fabric 
• Minimal external patterning 

Again, differences are stylistic, not categorical. 

 

Why outsiders struggle to tell them apart 

• Same climate 
• Same tribal roots 
• Same Islamic modesty framework 
• Same Gulf etiquette norms 
• Same oil-era wealth fueling luxury versions of traditional dress 

To a non-local observer, Saudi and Emirati dress reads as the same visual system. 

 

Where differences do appear 

• Cut and tailoring details 
• Color preferences (Saudi men more likely to wear darker thobes in winter) 
• Luxury signaling (UAE fashion more visibly branded in elite spaces) 
• Contextual mixing (UAE more tolerant of Western fashion in public) 

These are signals of state identity, not deep cultural divergence. 

 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE dress similarly because: 

• They share a Gulf Arab cultural lineage 

• Their clothing predates modern nation-states 

• Fashion here is environmental technology + identity, not trend-driven 

The similarity is real — and expected. 

they do stand out for the entire region, I don't see anyone in places like pakistan or iraq dressed the same 

Yes — Saudi Arabia and the UAE stand out sharply from much of the broader Muslim world, including Pakistan and Iraq, in how uniform and distinctive their public dress is. 

Why it feels so visually “loud” 

Because Gulf clothing is: 

• Highly consistent 
• Highly visible 
• Worn daily 
• Backed by state norms and wealth 

Elsewhere, Muslim societies are visually diverse and adaptive. 

 

Bottom line 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE stand out across the Muslim world because their dress is: 

• Gulf-specific, not Islamic-universal 

• Uniform, not plural 

• A marker of citizenship and power, not just modesty 

Modern-day region of Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi 

Short answer:
He was from the Hejaz (Hijaz) region, which today lies in western Saudi Arabia.

How that maps onto today’s geography: 

• Hejaz (historical region): A Red Sea coastal and inland strip running roughly from Medina south through Mecca to Jeddah.
• Present-day state: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
• Current administrative areas: Primarily Mecca Province and Medina Province

Contextual notes: 

• Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi was the Sharif and Emir of Mecca, meaning his power base was Mecca itself.
• The Hejaz was politically distinct from Najd (central Arabia). That distinction matters because the Najdi-based Saudi/Wahhabi movement conquered the Hejaz in the mid-1920s.
• His descendants later ruled Transjordan/Jordan and Iraq, but his own regional origin remains firmly Hejazi, not Jordanian or Iraqi.

Bottom line:
If you translate his origin into today’s map, Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi was from what is now western Saudi Arabia—specifically the Mecca–Medina (Hejaz) region.

did the area include uae at one point 

Short answer: No. The Hejaz did not include the area that is today the UAE at any point. 

Clear geographic distinction 

Hejaz 

Location: Western Arabian Peninsula (Red Sea coast) 

Core cities: Mecca, Medina, Jeddah 

Political status: Ottoman province / Sharifate of Mecca 

Modern equivalent: Western Saudi Arabia 

Area of today’s UAE 

Location: Eastern/southeastern Arabian Peninsula (Persian/Arabian Gulf coast) 

Historical names: Trucial States, Oman Coast 

Political status: Independent tribal sheikhdoms under British protection, not Ottoman 

• Modern equivalent: United Arab Emirates 

Why the confusion sometimes arises 

• Arab identity ≠ single political unit
  Shared language, Islam, and lineage did not mean shared administration. 

• Hashemite religious prestige
  The Sharifs of Mecca had spiritual authority, but not territorial control over the Gulf. 

• Later pan-Arab narratives
  Retrospective nationalist writing sometimes blurs firm historical borders. 

What did overlap 

• Trade routes (pilgrimage, maritime trade) 

• Religious networks (scholars, pilgrims) 

• Cultural ties 

But not governance. 

Bottom line 

The Hejaz was always a western Red Sea region.
The lands that became the UAE were never part of the Hejaz, nor ruled by the Sharif of Mecca or the Hashemites. 

• Mecca and the Hejaz

• 1916: Arab Revolt

• 1924–1925: Hejaz conquered by Ibn Saud

• 1932: Saudi Arabia formally established 

UAE (completely separate track) 

• 1800s–1971: Region known as the Trucial States

• 1820–1892: Britain signs maritime truces with Gulf sheikhdoms 

• 1892–1971: British protectorate system (foreign policy controlled by Britain) 

• 1971: Federation formed → UAE 

Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Fujairah 

Ras Al Khaimah joins in 1972 

What the UAE was before 1971 

• Not Ottoman
• Not Hejazi
• Not Saudi

A collection of independent tribal sheikhdoms on the Persian/Arabian Gulf

Britain intervened mainly to: 

• Secure shipping lanes to India 
• Suppress piracy (British definition) 
• Prevent Ottoman or rival European expansion 

This is why the area was called the “Trucial” States — from treaties, not empire. 

 

Why people sometimes think it formed “around the same time” 

Because many Middle Eastern states crystallized after World War I, but they did so in different waves:

• 1918–1930s:
  Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia (post-Ottoman reordering) 

• 1970s:
  UAE, Qatar, Bahrain (end of British imperial withdrawal) 

So they belong to different decolonization phases. 

 

Bottom line 

• Hejaz / Saudi Arabia: shaped by Ottoman collapse + Wahhabi–Saudi conquest (early 20th century)

• UAE: shaped by British maritime empire + late decolonization (1971)

They are geographically, politically, and chronologically distinct, despite sharing Arab language and culture.

 

Phase 1: Post-Ottoman reordering (c. 1916–1930s) 

Britain as imperial architect 

Britain helped dismantle the Ottoman Empire after World War I.

It encouraged and armed the Arab Revolt while simultaneously planning postwar control. 

Outcomes: 

• Mandate systems 
• Client monarchies 
• Borders drawn to serve imperial logistics, oil, and routes to India 

The Hejaz episode (Hussein bin Ali) sits inside this phase: 

• Britain used him tactically
• Then withdrew support, allowing Ibn Saud to take the Hejaz
• Britain did not annex the Hejaz directly, but shaped who survived.

Role type:
Indirect rule, manipulation, king-making, strategic abandonment. 

 

Phase 2: Gulf protectorates → UAE (c. 1800s–1971) 

Britain as maritime manager, then withdrawer 

• Along the Gulf coast, Britain never dismantled an empire — it prevented one from forming.

The Trucial States (future UAE) were: 

• Independent sheikhdoms

• Bound by treaties giving Britain control over foreign affairs and defense 

Britain’s goals: 

• Secure shipping lanes 
• Block Ottomans, Germans, later Soviets 
• Protect oil concessions 

In 1971, Britain formally exited, enabling federation → United Arab Emirates 

Role type:
Protector, broker, stabilizer, then orderly exit. 

Same empire, different imperial modes 

Aspect	Post-Ottoman Middle East	Gulf / UAE
Britain’s role	Border-drawer	Treaty-manager
Method	Revolts, mandates, proxies	Maritime control, contracts
Timeline	1916–1930s	1800s–1971
Outcome	Fragmented states	Stable federation
Violence level	High	Relatively low

 

Bottom line 

Yes — both phases were shaped by Britain, but: 

• Hejaz / early Saudi era: Britain reshaped collapse

• UAE / Gulf: Britain managed continuity, then exited

In popular perception: yes — Saudi Arabia and the UAE dominate the mental map

But analytically: they are only part of a much larger oil landscape in Muslim-majority countries.

Why most people think first of Saudi Arabia and the UAE 

Scale + visibility

Saudi Arabia 

• World’s largest crude oil exporter for decades 

• Custodian of Mecca and Medina → religious + energy centrality 

• OPEC heavyweight and global price setter 

United Arab Emirates 

• Especially Abu Dhabi: massive reserves 

• Dubai: global finance, logistics, and media visibility 

• Seen as “modern,” stable, and Western-integrated 

Together, they became the face of “Muslim oil power” in Western media, finance, and diplomacy. 

 

Major Muslim-majority oil states people forget or underweight 

Iran 

• Among the largest oil and gas reserves on Earth

• Sanctions suppress visibility, not importance 

Iraq 

• Enormous reserves 

• War and instability obscure scale 

Kuwait 

• One of the highest per-capita oil endowments ever 

Qatar 

• Gas superpower (LNG), less oil but more strategic long-term 

Algeria 

• Major oil and gas exporter to Europe 

Nigeria 

• Large Muslim population in an oil-exporting state (often framed as “African,” not “Muslim”) 

Why Saudi + UAE dominate the narrative 

This is not accidental. 

Structural reasons: 

• Political alignment with the West
• Stable export infrastructure
• Dollar-denominated oil trade
• Strong state branding
• Minimal disruption to global supply chains

By contrast: 

• Iran and Iraq are framed as problems

• Algeria and Nigeria as regional

• Qatar as technical (gas)

So public consciousness compresses complexity into two symbols. 

 

A useful way to think about it 

• Saudi Arabia = oil volume + religious legitimacy 

• UAE = oil capital + logistics + finance 

• Others = oil constrained by sanctions, war, or narrative exclusion 

 

Bottom line 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the two most people think of when they hear “oil-rich Muslim countries.”
But that perception reflects media, finance, and geopolitics, not the true distribution of energy power across the Muslim world.

 

Saudi Arabia — flag standardized with the Saudi–Wahhabi state

Saudi Arabia

What existed before

• Multiple banners used by the House of Saud and earlier Najdi–Wahhabi movements
• Green background associated with Islam, but designs varied
• Text, proportions, and sword depiction were inconsistent

Modern flag crystallization

• 1932: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia proclaimed

• 1930s–1970s: Flag design standardized and codified

• Final form:

  • Green field

  • Shahada (Islamic creed)

  • Horizontal sword

Why this mattered

The flag fuses:

• Religious legitimacy (Shahada)
• Military conquest (sword)
• Permanent statehood (no half-mast, no printing on merchandise)

This was a post-conquest legitimacy flag, not a medieval inheritance.

United Arab Emirates — entirely new flag (1971)

United Arab Emirates

Before 1971

No single national flag

Each emirate used:

• Plain red flags
• Variants tied to maritime identity

The region was known externally as the Trucial States

1971: deliberate creation

• Britain withdraws “East of Suez”

• Federation formed

New national flag adopted immediately

Design logic

Pan-Arab colors:

• • Red, green, white, black

Drawn from:

• Arab Revolt symbolism
• Pan-Arab nationalism

Purpose:

• Signal unity
• Signal independence
• Signal Arab identity to the world

This was explicitly a modern state flag, designed for international recognition.

 

Why the redesigns happened when they did

This is the structural point:

Driver	Saudi Arabia	UAE
State formation	1932 conquest	1971 federation
Oil-era sovereignty	Consolidation phase	Entry phase
External recognition	League of Nations / states	United Nations
Flag function	Religious–military legitimacy	Federal unity

Flags were redesigned when sovereignty needed to be legible to:

• Foreign governments
• Oil companies
• International institutions
• Financial and legal systems

 

What flags actually do in this context

They are not decoration. They are legal symbols that:

• Anchor treaty capacity
• Represent who can sign concessions
• Mark continuity across rulers
• Signal permanence to capital markets

A redesigned flag often means:

“This political entity now intends to endure.”

Bottom line

• Saudi Arabia’s flag was standardized alongside the consolidation of a conquest-based, oil-backed religious state.
• The UAE’s flag was created from scratch in 1971 to represent a new federation emerging from British treaty protection.
• In both cases, flag redesign followed power consolidation, not tradition.

 

HOW CONCESSION CONTRACT CLAUSES LOCKED CONTROL (AND HOW STATES SLOWLY UNWOUND IT)

This layer drills into the legal mechanics—the clauses that mattered, when they appeared, and how they constrained sovereignty decades before independence. The emphasis is on Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi / Trucial States (future UAE), with notes on the wider pattern.

PRE-PROOF CONTRACT DNA (1920s–1930s)

Core clause set (established early, reused everywhere)

By the interwar period, concession templates converged on a standard package:

• Duration: 50–75 years (often renewable)
• Territory importing: Entire country or emirate, not single fields
• Exclusivity: Sole right to explore and produce; no rival bidders
• Royalties: Fixed, low per-barrel payments (not profit-based)
• Fiscal stability: Tax terms frozen against future law changes
• Operational control: Company sets pace, technology, staffing
• Dispute forum: Arbitration outside the host country (London/New York)

This is the economic constitution—written before oil certainty.

SAUDI ARABIA — CONTRACT FIRST, OIL LATER (1933–1949)

1933: The Saudi concession

• Ibn Saud grants a nationwide concession to Standard Oil of California.
• Oil is not yet proven; cash and recognition are the immediate needs.
• The concession embeds: long duration, exclusivity, minimal royalties, foreign arbitration.

Result: When oil is confirmed (1938), control is already allocated.

1938–1944: Discovery → consolidation

• Commercial production validates the concession’s value.
• The operating entity evolves into ARAMCO.
• Infrastructure ownership (fields, pipelines, ports) accrues to the company.

1949–1950: The first unwind — profit sharing

• 50/50 profit split replaces fixed royalties.

• This is not nationalization; it is a renegotiation within the concession.

Key point: Profit sharing changes cash flow, not control.

ABU DHABI / TRUCIAL STATES — ACCESS FIRST, PAYOFF MUCH LATER (1939–1969)

1939: Abu Dhabi concession

• A long-duration concession is granted to a British-led consortium.

• Oil is suspected, not proven.

• The same clause stack applies: exclusivity, duration, arbitration abroad.

1958–1962: Confirmation → exports

• Commercial oil is confirmed; exports begin.

• Concession terms—written decades earlier—now govern the revenue stream.

1966–1969: Dubai joins

• Dubai’s Fateh field comes online under similar contractual logic.

Result: By the time of federation (1971), rulers inherit income streams, not operating systems.

THE INVISIBLE LOCKS THAT MATTERED MOST

Duration + renewal options

• Long terms outlast rulers, regimes, and even state formation.

• Renewal options tilt leverage toward operators.

Infrastructure ownership

• Pipelines, terminals, refineries are capital-intensive and immobile.

• Nationalization risks retaliation and operational paralysis.

Arbitration venue

• Disputes resolved outside domestic courts.

• Sovereignty is formally preserved, practically constrained.

Fiscal stability clauses

• Freeze the economic rules regardless of new constitutions or parliaments.

Net effect: Political independence arrives after economic rules harden.

 

THE UNWINDING PHASE (1950s–1970s): SLOW, CONTRACTUAL, EXPENSIVE

Step 1: Revenue rebalancing

• 50/50 profit splits (Saudi, then others).
• Higher state take, same operators.

Step 2: Participation rights

• States acquire minority equity stakes.
• Companies retain operatorship.

Step 3: National oil companies (NOCs)

• Creation of NOCs to build technical capacity.
• Parallel operations alongside concessionaires.

Step 4: Buyback, not seizure

• Majority ownership achieved via purchase, not expropriation.
• Decades-long process to avoid sanctions, lawsuits, and shutdowns.

Critical distinction: What is often called “nationalization” is, in practice, contractual buyout.

WHY THIS SURVIVED REGIME CHANGE

• Contracts are portable across governments.
• Arbitration enforces continuity.
• Capital replacement costs deter abrupt breaks.
• Security alliances raise the price of confrontation.

Thus: A flag can change; a concession endures.

HOW THIS CONNECTS TO 1971–1974 (GOLD → OIL–DOLLAR LOOP)

By the time the U.S. leaves gold (1971):

• Gulf oil production is mature.
• Concessions have already standardized pricing, settlement, and export logistics in dollars.
• Post-1973 institutions formalize revenue recycling, not production control.

The monetary shift locks onto an oil system whose legal spine was written decades earlier.

• Geology reduced uncertainty before borders hardened.
• Concessions allocated control before sovereignty arrived.
• Revenue renegotiation preceded ownership.
• “Nationalization” was a buyback, paced to avoid collapse.
• The dollar anchor latched onto an already-dollarized oil trade.

BOTTOM LINE

Oil did not create sovereignty.
Contracts did.

By independence, states inherited wealth within rules they did not write.
Undoing those rules took half a century—and even then, only partially.

HOW CONCESSION CONTRACT CLAUSES LOCKED CONTROL (AND HOW STATES SLOWLY UNWOUND IT) 

This layer drills into the legal mechanics—the clauses that mattered, when they appeared, and how they constrained sovereignty decades before independence. The emphasis is on Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi / Trucial States (future UAE), with notes on the wider pattern.

PRE-PROOF CONTRACT DNA (1920s–1930s)

Core clause set (established early, reused everywhere) 

By the interwar period, concession templates converged on a standard package: 

• Duration: 50–75 years (often renewable)
• Territory importing: Entire country or emirate, not single fields
• Exclusivity: Sole right to explore and produce; no rival bidders
• Royalties: Fixed, low per-barrel payments (not profit-based)
• Fiscal stability: Tax terms frozen against future law changes
• Operational control: Company sets pace, technology, staffing
• Dispute forum: Arbitration outside the host country (London/New York) 

This is the economic constitution—written before oil certainty. 

 SAUDI ARABIA — CONTRACT FIRST, OIL LATER (1933–1949)

1933: The Saudi concession 

• Ibn Saud grants a nationwide concession to Standard Oil of California.
• Oil is not yet proven; cash and recognition are the immediate needs.
• The concession embeds: long duration, exclusivity, minimal royalties, foreign arbitration. 

Result: When oil is confirmed (1938), control is already allocated. 

1938–1944: Discovery → consolidation 

• Commercial production validates the concession’s value.
• The operating entity evolves into ARAMCO.
• Infrastructure ownership (fields, pipelines, ports) accrues to the company. 

1949–1950: The first unwind — profit sharing 

• 50/50 profit split replaces fixed royalties.
• This is not nationalization; it is a renegotiation within the concession.

Key point: Profit sharing changes cash flow, not control. 

ABU DHABI / TRUCIAL STATES — ACCESS FIRST, PAYOFF MUCH LATER (1939–1969) 

1939: Abu Dhabi concession 

• A long-duration concession is granted to a British-led consortium.
• Oil is suspected, not proven. 
• The same clause stack applies: exclusivity, duration, arbitration abroad. 

1958–1962: Confirmation → exports 

• Commercial oil is confirmed; exports begin. 

• Concession terms—written decades earlier—now govern the revenue stream. 

1966–1969: Dubai joins 

• Dubai’s Fateh field comes online under similar contractual logic. 

Result: By the time of federation (1971), rulers inherit income streams, not operating systems. 

 

THE INVISIBLE LOCKS THAT MATTERED MOST

Duration + renewal options

• Long terms outlast rulers, regimes, and even state formation. 
• Renewal options tilt leverage toward operators. 

Infrastructure ownership

• Pipelines, terminals, refineries are capital-intensive and immobile. 
• Nationalization risks retaliation and operational paralysis. 

Arbitration venue

• Disputes resolved outside domestic courts.
• Sovereignty is formally preserved, practically constrained. 

Fiscal stability clauses

• Freeze the economic rules regardless of new constitutions or parliaments. 

Net effect: Political independence arrives after economic rules harden. 

 

THE UNWINDING PHASE (1950s–1970s): SLOW, CONTRACTUAL, EXPENSIVE

Step 1: Revenue rebalancing 

• 50/50 profit splits (Saudi, then others). 

• Higher state take, same operators. 

Step 2: Participation rights 

• States acquire minority equity stakes. 

• Companies retain operatorship. 

Step 3: National oil companies (NOCs) 

• Creation of NOCs to build technical capacity. 

• Parallel operations alongside concessionaires. 

Step 4: Buyback, not seizure 

• Majority ownership achieved via purchase, not expropriation. 

• Decades-long process to avoid sanctions, lawsuits, and shutdowns. 

Critical distinction: What is often called “nationalization” is, in practice, contractual buyout. 

 WHY THIS SURVIVED REGIME CHANGE

• Contracts are portable across governments. 
• Arbitration enforces continuity. 
• Capital replacement costs deter abrupt breaks. 
• Security alliances raise the price of confrontation. 

Thus: A flag can change; a concession endures. 

HOW THIS CONNECTS TO 1971–1974 (GOLD → OIL–DOLLAR LOOP) 

By the time the U.S. leaves gold (1971): 

• Gulf oil production is mature.
• Concessions have already standardized pricing, settlement, and export logistics in dollars.
• Post-1973 institutions formalize revenue recycling, not production control. 

The monetary shift locks onto an oil system whose legal spine was written decades earlier.

 

• Geology reduced uncertainty before borders hardened.

• Concessions allocated control before sovereignty arrived.

• Revenue renegotiation preceded ownership.

• “Nationalization” was a buyback, paced to avoid collapse.

• The dollar anchor latched onto an already-dollarized oil trade. 

 

BOTTOM LINE 

Oil did not create sovereignty.
Contracts did. 

By independence, states inherited wealth within rules they did not write.
Undoing those rules took half a century—and even then, only partially. 

What they knew — and when

Geological knowledge came before borders were fixed

By the late 1800s and early 1900s: 

• British geologists understood sedimentary basin theory
• Oil had already been found in:
• Persia (Iran) in 1908
• Mesopotamia (Iraq)
• The Arabian Peninsula was widely suspected to sit on the same formations 

This made the Gulf coast and eastern Arabia extremely attractive even before oil was proven. 

Saudi Arabia: expectation first, confirmation later

Saudi Arabia 

• Britain recognized Ibn Saud politically before oil was discovered
• U.S. companies entered later
• Commercial oil discovery: Dammam, 1938

So:

• The Saudis were consolidated before oil

• But recognition and protection aligned neatly once oil was confirmed 

This was not luck — it was risk-weighted strategy. 

UAE (Trucial States): oil suspected, not proven

United Arab Emirates 

• British treaties date back to the 1800s 

Oil discoveries came much later: 

• Abu Dhabi: 1958 
• Dubai: 1966 

Britain had already: 

• Secured maritime control 
• Locked in exclusive concession rights 
• Prevented rival powers from entering 

In other words: 

• Britain positioned itself early
• The oil payoff came decades later

 

What this was not 

• Not a detailed oil map with guaranteed outcomes 
• Not borders drawn because oil was already flowing 
• Not a single master plan 

It was probabilistic imperial planning: 

Secure likely zones first, confirm resources later. 

 

Why this matters 

It explains why: 

• Gulf dynasties were preserved 
• External rivals were excluded 
• Western companies got first concessions 
• Borders hardened after oil confirmation 

Politics followed geology, not the other way around. 

 

Bottom line 

Yes, Western powers strongly suspected where oil would be 

No, they did not have full certainty at the outset 

Yes, political recognition, treaties, and protection aligned with those expectations 

The UAE and Saudi Arabia emerged where geology, empire, and timing converged

The core idea 

Before states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE were wealthy or fully sovereign, foreign oil concession contracts quietly determined: 

• Who could explore
• Who could extract
• Who set prices
• Who controlled infrastructure
• Who collected most of the revenue 

By the time independence arrived, the economic architecture was already fixed. 

 How concession control worked (step-by-step) 

Step 1: Secure political access before oil is proven 

Britain (and later the U.S.): 

• Recognized rulers 

• Signed “friendship” or “protection” treaties 

• Blocked rival powers from access 

This created exclusive access zones. 

 

Step 2: Sign long-duration concession contracts 

Typical early concessions: 

• 50–75 years 

• Covered entire countries or emirates 

• Minimal royalties (often pennies per barrel) 

• No production requirements 

• No local oversight 

• Arbitration in London or New York 

The ruler retained formal sovereignty.
The company gained economic sovereignty. 

 

Step 3: Lock in infrastructure ownership 

Concessions included: 

• Wells 

• Pipelines 

• Ports 

• Refineries 

• Shipping terminals 

Once built, these assets: 

• Could not be easily nationalized without retaliation 

• Required foreign engineers, capital, and spare parts 

Infrastructure = dependency. 

 

Saudi Arabia: concession before oil wealth 

Saudi Arabia 

• 1933: Ibn Saud grants a concession to Standard Oil of California 
• Oil not yet proven 
• Company later becomes ARAMCO

Key point: 

The Saudi state needed cash before oil; the company needed territory before certainty. 

When oil hit in 1938, control was already contractually embedded. 

Saudi “nationalization” decades later was actually a slow buyback, not a seizure. 

 

UAE (Trucial States): same logic, later payoff 

United Arab Emirates 

• British protection treaties prevented rival bidders 
• Early concessions granted to British-led consortia 

Oil discoveries: 

• Abu Dhabi (1958) 
• Dubai (1966) 

By independence (1971): 

• Concessions already defined revenue flows
• Rulers inherited income streams, not control systems 

 

Why concessions mattered more than borders 

Borders	Concessions
Political	Economic
Visible	Invisible
Renegotiable	Contractually locked
Symbolic	Operational

A flag could change.
A concession contract survived regime change. 

 

Why rulers accepted these deals 

Because early rulers: 

• Had no capital 
• Had no technical expertise 
• Faced rivals and debt 
• Needed immediate cash and protection 

Concessions were survival agreements. 

 

The turning point: 1950s–1970s 

Only after: 

• Oil revenues grew massive 
• Technical expertise localized 
• Global politics shifted 

Could states: 

• Renegotiate royalties (50/50 profit split) 
• Create national oil companies 
• Eventually reclaim majority ownership 

Even then, it took decades. 

 

The quiet truth 

By the time people talk about: 

• Independence 
• Sovereignty 
• National wealth 

The real control had already been allocated, contract by contract, clause by clause. 

 

Bottom line 

• Oil did not create sovereignty; concessions shaped sovereignty
• Britain and U.S. firms locked leverage before oil was proven
• Independence arrived after the economic rules were written
• What looks like national control today began as contractual dependency

The timing is closely linked, but it is best described as an overlapping sequence rather than “the day gold ended, OPEC signed a deal.” 

The timeline connection (what happened, in order) 

August 15, 1971: the “gold window” closes 

The U.S. suspended convertibility of dollars into gold (a decisive break from the Bretton Woods gold-linked system).  

1971–1973: Bretton Woods unravels into floating exchange rates 

The Smithsonian Agreement tried (and failed) to stabilize fixed rates; by 1973, major currencies had moved to floating.  

October 1973–March 1974: oil embargo and price shock 

Arab oil producers imposed an embargo during the 1973 war; prices spiked and the event exposed U.S. vulnerability to Gulf supply.  

1974 and after: U.S.–Saudi institutional arrangements + “petrodollar recycling” 

In the aftermath of the embargo and price increases, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia set up formal channels (e.g., the U.S.–Saudi Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation) in the context of rapidly growing Saudi “petrodollar” surpluses.  

What this means for your point about “deals with OPEC” 

• There was not one single, public, signed “OPEC–U.S. dollar deal.”
• What did happen is that dollar pricing became the dominant operating standard for global oil trade, and U.S.–Saudi security/finance arrangements reinforced the system after 1973–74.

Why the gold break and the oil-dollar system sit together 

Once the dollar was no longer gold-backed, the U.S. benefited from a different kind of anchor: structural global demand for dollars (oil trade, plus recycling surpluses into dollar assets). The embargo shock created the geopolitical conditions where that alignment became more explicit and institutionalized.  

 

 

 

 As of today, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries has 12 member countries.  

Middle East  

• Saudi Arabia  
• Iran  
• Iraq  
• Kuwait  
• United Arab Emirates  

Africa  

• Algeria  
• Libya  
• Nigeria  
• Republic of the Congo  
• Gabon  

South America  

• Venezuela  

  

Notable non-members / changes  

• Angola: left OPEC in 2023  
• Ecuador: left in 2020  
• Qatar: left in 2019 (shifted focus to natural gas)  

  

Important clarification: OPEC vs. OPEC+  

• OPEC = 12 members above  

OPEC+ includes OPEC plus non-members such as:  

• Russia  
• Kazakhstan  
• Mexico  

OPEC+ is now the real price-setting coalition.  

Bottom line  

OPEC is a multicontinental group, heavily weighted toward Muslim-majority countries, but it is not exclusively Middle Eastern, and its real power today operates through OPEC+ coordination rather than OPEC alone.  

He was from the Hejaz (Hijaz) region, which today lies in western Saudi Arabia.  

How that maps onto today’s geography:  

• Hejaz (historical region): A Red Sea coastal and inland strip running roughly from Medina south through Mecca to Jeddah.  
• Present-day state: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
• Current administrative areas: Primarily Mecca Province and Medina Province  

Contextual notes:  

• Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi was the Sharif and Emir of Mecca, meaning his power base was Mecca itself.
• The Hejaz was politically distinct from Najd (central Arabia). That distinction matters because the Najdi-based Saudi/Wahhabi movement conquered the Hejaz in the mid-1920s.
• His descendants later ruled Transjordan/Jordan and Iraq, but his own regional origin remains firmly Hejazi, not Jordanian or Iraqi.

Bottom line: 
If you translate his origin into today’s map, Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi was from what is now western Saudi Arabia—specifically the Mecca–Medina (Hejaz) region.  

 

Timeline comparison  

Hejaz / Hussein bin Ali  

• 1908–1925: Hussein bin Ali rules Mecca and the Hejaz  

• 1916: Arab Revolt  

• 1924–1925: Hejaz conquered by Ibn Saud  

• 1932: Saudi Arabia formally established  

UAE (completely separate track)  

• 1800s–1971: Region known as the Trucial States  
• 1820–1892: Britain signs maritime truces with Gulf sheikhdoms  
• 1892–1971: British protectorate system (foreign policy controlled by Britain)  
• 1971: Federation formed → UAE  
• Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Fujairah  
• Ras Al Khaimah joins in 1972  

  

What the UAE was before 1971  

• Not Ottoman  
• Not Hejazi  
• Not Saudi  
• A collection of independent tribal sheikhdoms on the Persian/Arabian Gulf  

Britain intervened mainly to:  

• Secure shipping lanes to India  
• Suppress piracy (British definition)  
• Prevent Ottoman or rival European expansion  

This is why the area was called the “Trucial” States — from treaties, not empire.   

Why people sometimes think it formed “around the same time”  

Because many Middle Eastern states crystallized after World War I, but they did so in different waves:  

• 1918–1930s: 
  Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia (post-Ottoman reordering)  

• 1970s: 
  UAE, Qatar, Bahrain (end of British imperial withdrawal)  

So they belong to different decolonization phases.   

Bottom line  

• Hejaz / Saudi Arabia: shaped by Ottoman collapse + Wahhabi–Saudi conquest (early 20th century)  
• UAE: shaped by British maritime empire + late decolonization (1971)  

They are geographically, politically, and chronologically distinct, despite sharing Arab language and culture.  

Phase 1: Post-Ottoman reordering (c. 1916–1930s)  

Britain as imperial architect  

• Britain helped dismantle the Ottoman Empire after World War I.  
• It encouraged and armed the Arab Revolt while simultaneously planning postwar control.  

Outcomes:  

• Mandate systems  
• Client monarchies  
• Borders drawn to serve imperial logistics, oil, and routes to India  

The Hejaz episode (Hussein bin Ali) sits inside this phase:  

• Britain used him tactically  
• Then withdrew support, allowing Ibn Saud to take the Hejaz  
• Britain did not annex the Hejaz directly but shaped who survived.  

Role type: 
Indirect rule, manipulation, king-making, strategic abandonment.  

  

Phase 2: Gulf protectorates → UAE (c. 1800s–1971)  

Britain as maritime manager, then withdrawer  

• Along the Gulf coast, Britain never dismantled an empire — it prevented one from forming.  

The Trucial States (future UAE) were:  

• Independent sheikhdoms  
• Bound by treaties giving Britain control over foreign affairs and defense  

Britain’s goals:  

• Secure shipping lanes  
• Block Ottomans, Germans, later Soviets  
• Protect oil concessions  
• In 1971, Britain formally exited, enabling federation → United Arab Emirates  

Role type: 
Protector, broker, stabilizer, then orderly exit.  

 

 

Same empire, different imperial modes  

Aspect	Post-Ottoman Middle East	Gulf / UAE
Britain’s role	Border-drawer	Treaty-manager
Method	Revolts, mandates, proxies	Maritime control, contracts
Timeline	1916–1930s	1800s–1971
Outcome	Fragmented states	Stable federation
Violence level	High	Relatively low

  

Bottom line  

Yes — both phases were shaped by Britain, but:  

• Hejaz / early Saudi era: Britain reshaped collapse  
• UAE / Gulf: Britain managed continuity, then exited  

Same imperial power. 
Different tools. 
Different historical phase.  

Why most people think first of Saudi Arabia and the UAE  

Scale + visibility 

Saudi Arabia  

• World’s largest crude oil exporter for decades  
• Custodian of Mecca and Medina → religious + energy centrality  
• OPEC heavyweight and global price setter  

United Arab Emirates  

• Especially Abu Dhabi: massive reserves  
• Dubai: global finance, logistics, and media visibility  
• Seen as “modern,” stable, and Western-integrated  

Together, they became the face of “Muslim oil power” in Western media, finance, and diplomacy.  

But this perception is structurally incomplete  

Major Muslim-majority oil states people forget or underweight  

Iran  

• Among the largest oil and gas reserves on Earth  
• Sanctions suppress visibility, not importance  

Iraq  

• Enormous reserves  
• War and instability obscure scale  

Kuwait  

• One of the highest per-capita oil endowments ever  

Qatar  

• Gas superpower (LNG), less oil but more strategic long-term  
• Algeria  
• Major oil and gas exporter to Europe  
• Nigeria  
• Large Muslim population in an oil-exporting state (often framed as “African,” not “Muslim”)  

 

Why the Narrative Still Compresses to Saudi + UAE 

Qatar is often excluded from the popular “oil-rich Muslim countries” shorthand not because it lacks power, but because its power expresses differently. 

Structural reasons Qatar is framed differently 

• Primary energy identity is natural gas (LNG), not crude oil

• Long-term contracted gas markets (Asia, Europe) rather than spot oil politics

• Smaller population and territorial footprint

• Influence exercised through media, diplomacy, and finance, not volume dominance

• Security posture dependent on U.S. basing + multilateral hedging, not regional force projection 

So while Saudi Arabia and the UAE are seen as visible system pillars, Qatar is treated as technical infrastructure rather than symbolic power. 

 

How the Public Narrative Sorts Energy States 

In simplified media consciousness: 

• Saudi Arabia → oil volume + religious legitimacy

• UAE → oil capital + logistics + finance

• Qatar → gas engineering + contracts + diplomacy

• Iran / Iraq → oil framed through sanctions, war, or instability

• Algeria / Nigeria → oil framed as regional or secondary 

This compression is not about factual reserves — it’s about narrative legibility.

Oil dominance is easy to visualize.
Gas dominance is abstract, contractual, and invisible. 

 

Why Qatar Still Belongs in the Power Analysis 

Despite being narratively sidelined, Qatar is structurally central: 

• World’s largest LNG exporter (with the U.S.)
• Critical swing supplier to Europe post-Ukraine
• Hosts the largest U.S. military base in the region
• Operates global media leverage (Al Jazeera)
• Functions as a broker state (Taliban talks, Gaza mediation, Iran backchannels) 

Qatar’s power is quiet, contractual, and intermediary — which makes it less visible but not less consequential. 

 

Shared Risk Factors Across Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar 

While modalities differ, all three share systemic conditions associated with abuse risk: 

• Extreme concentration of wealth 
• Limited independent press internally 
• Restricted judicial transparency 
• Heavy reliance on migrant labor systems (kafala-style or adjacent) 
• Legal and social penalties for whistleblowing or dissent 

These are structural risk factors, not moral claims. 

 

What Has Been Credibly Reported (Including Qatar) 

Across the Gulf — including Qatar — credible reporting has documented: 

• Exploitation of migrant labor, including coercive and sexual abuse risks in domestic and construction sectors 
• Barriers to legal redress for foreign workers 
• Use of NDAs, settlements, and jurisdictional complexity to limit scrutiny 
• Transit and facilitation roles within global trafficking networks 

Again: not unique, but harder to investigate internally. 

 

What Should Not Be Claimed 

Same guardrails apply: 

• Not official state policy 
• Not collective guilt 
• Not religion-based 
• Not universal among elites 
• Not proof by rumor 

Maintaining this distinction is what keeps the analysis defensible. 

 

The Frame That Still Holds 

A formulation that survives scrutiny: 

Where massive capital flows, secrecy, legal asymmetry, and weak accountability coexist, exploitation tends to emerge — regardless of country. 

This pattern appears in: 

• Western financial hubs 
• Intelligence-linked blackmail ecosystems 
• Diplomatic enclaves 
• Entertainment industries 
• Historic imperial courts 

The Gulf — including Qatar — is one node in a global pattern, not an exception. 

 

Revised Bottom Line (with Qatar Included) 

• Yes — Saudi Arabia and the UAE dominate public imagination when people hear “oil-rich Muslim countries”
• Qatar is excluded largely because gas power is less narratively visible than oil power
• This perception reflects media framing, finance, and geopolitics, not actual energy leverage
• Credible reporting confirms exploitation risks exist across Gulf systems
• The root issue is concentrated power + weak accountability, not culture or religion
•  

Saudi UAE Clothing 

Why Saudi and UAE fashion looks so similar 

Shared Gulf Arab cultural zone 

Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are part of the Khaleeji (Gulf Arab) cultural region.
Clothing evolved for: 

• Extreme heat 
• Sand and sun protection 
• Nomadic and coastal lifestyles 
• Tribal continuity across borders that are very recent 

Modern borders did not break older cultural continuity. 

 

Core shared garments (men) 

Long white robe 

• Saudi: Thobe / Thawb 

• UAE: Kandura / Dishdasha 

Differences are subtle: 

• Saudi thobe often has a collar and buttons 
• UAE kandura often collarless with a tassel (tarboosh) 

Functionally and visually, they are nearly identical. 

Head coverings 

• Ghutra (white cloth) — common in both 
• Shemagh (red/white checkered) — more common in Saudi Arabia 
• Agal (black cord) — worn in both 

 

Women’s clothing (public-facing) 

• Abaya (black cloak) in both countries 
• Shayla (headscarf) commonly worn 

Gulf styles emphasize: 

• Flowing silhouettes 
• High-quality fabric 
• Minimal external patterning 

Again, differences are stylistic, not categorical. 

 

Why outsiders struggle to tell them apart 

• Same climate 
• Same tribal roots 
• Same Islamic modesty framework 
• Same Gulf etiquette norms 
• Same oil-era wealth fueling luxury versions of traditional dress 

To a non-local observer, Saudi and Emirati dress reads as the same visual system. 

 

Where differences do appear 

• Cut and tailoring details 
• Color preferences (Saudi men more likely to wear darker thobes in winter) 
• Luxury signaling (UAE fashion more visibly branded in elite spaces) 
• Contextual mixing (UAE more tolerant of Western fashion in public) 

These are signals of state identity, not deep cultural divergence. 

 

Bottom line 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE dress similarly because: 

• They share a Gulf Arab cultural lineage 
• Their clothing predates modern nation-states 
• Fashion here is environmental technology + identity, not trend-driven 

The similarity is real — and expected. 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE stand out sharply from much of the broader Muslim world, including Pakistan and Iraq, in how uniform and distinctive their public dress is. 

Why it feels so visually “loud” 

Because Gulf clothing is: 

• Highly consistent 
• Highly visible 
• Worn daily 
• Backed by state norms and wealth 

Elsewhere, Muslim societies are visually diverse and adaptive. 

 

Bottom line Saudi Arabia and the UAE stand out across the Muslim world because their dress is: 

• Gulf-specific, not Islamic-universal 
• Uniform, not plural 
• A marker of citizenship and power, not just modesty 

Your observation is accurate — and it points to how oil wealth, small populations, and state-building froze a particular visual identity in place, while much of the rest of the Muslim world evolved more variably

 

Hejaz vs. Najd — this distinction is foundational 

Hejaz 

• Urban, pilgrimage-based economy 
• Cosmopolitan (Mecca–Medina–Jeddah) 
• Long Hashemite religious legitimacy 
• Ottoman-linked administration 

Najd 

• Tribal, interior Arabia 
• Wahhabi reform movement 
• Militarized expansion 
• House of Saud power base 

The Najdi Saudi–Wahhabi conquest of the Hejaz (1924–1925) was not just territorial — it was a replacement of legitimacy systems: 

• From genealogical–religious authority (Hashemites)
• To puritanical–military authority (Saudis) 

This was a civilizational shift inside Arabia. 

What actually “spread "was not DNA — it was Hashemite legitimacy 

Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi did not genetically populate the Middle East. 

What spread was: 

• Lineage-based authority
• Religious prestige (descent from the Prophet)
• British-installed monarchy using Hashemite symbolism

Where that authority was transplanted 

• Jordan
• Abdullah I 

Still ruled by Hashemites today 

Iraq 

• Faisal I and successors (1921–1958) 

These states functioned as containers for displaced Hejazi authority after the Saudis took Mecca.

Why it feels like Hashemite DNA spread “everywhere” 

Three reasons: 

Strategic placement, not population growth

Britain placed Hashemite rulers at key geopolitical choke points: 

• Jordan: land bridge between Arabia, Levant, and Iraq 
• Iraq: oil, rivers, Mesopotamian heartland 

This created outsized visibility for a small family. 

Collapse of alternatives

After World War I: 

• Ottomans gone 
• Caliphate abolished 
• Old elites discredited 

Hashemites filled a symbolic vacuum, not a demographic one. 

 

Survival through adaptability

The Hashemites: 

• Shifted from Ottoman legitimacy → Arab Revolt legitimacy → British-backed monarchy 

• Were flexible, unlike Hussein himself, who overestimated Britain’s loyalty 

 

What did not happen 

To be precise: 

The Hashemites did not: 

• Control the Gulf (UAE, Qatar, Kuwait) 
• Control Najd 
• Create a pan-Arab state 

Their authority remained thin but strategic, not mass-based

The Saudi state, by contrast, expanded territorially and demographically, not symbolically. 

 

The correct synthesis (your intuition, refined)

Here is the accurate formulation: 

The Hashemites lost their Hejazi homeland to the Najdi Saudi–Wahhabi expansion, but their lineage-based legitimacy was exported by Britain into newly created states like Jordan and Iraq, giving a single family an influence disproportionate to its size across the post-Ottoman Middle East. 

That is not DNA spreading — it is imperial redeployment of legitimacy. 

 

Bottom line 

• Hejaz was distinct — and conquered
• Hussein was discarded — but his lineage was preserved
• His sons ruled new states — not his homeland
• The Hashemites became a mobile legitimacy class, not a dominant population 

 

What actually happened (cleanly stated) 

Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi was removed from power in the Hejaz after the Arab Revolt when Britain recalculated its interests.

His sons were not discarded — they were redeployed.

Britain exported Hashemite lineage-based legitimacy into newly created post-Ottoman states, most notably: 

• Jordan 
• Iraq 

This allowed the dynasty to survive and even expand its influence, despite losing its original territorial base in Mecca. 

 

Why this worked for Britain 

The Hashemites offered Britain three things at once: 

Religious–genealogical legitimacy
(Descent from the Prophet mattered in newly Islamic-majority states) 

Arab identity
Useful after the collapse of Ottoman authority 

Political dependence
They ruled by British backing, not by mass mobilization 

From Britain’s perspective, this was low-cost legitimacy insertion.

 

Why the influence looks “larger than life” 

You are correct to note that: 

a single family had influence disproportionate to its size across the post-Ottoman Middle East. 

That is because: 

• They were placed at strategic nodes (Iraq, Transjordan)
• At a moment of elite vacuum
• With external military and financial backing

This is dynastic projection, not demographic dominance.

 

What did not happen (important boundary) 

The Hashemites did not dominate: 

• The Gulf (UAE, Kuwait, Qatar) 
• Najd / Saudi Arabia 

Their authority was thin, symbolic, and state-bound, not popular or expansive

Meanwhile, the Saudi–Wahhabi project expanded territorially and socially inside Arabia, replacing Hashemite legitimacy at its source. 

Although Britain abandoned Hussein bin Ali in the Hejaz, it preserved and redeployed his family by installing his sons as rulers in newly constructed states such as Jordan and Iraq. In doing so, Britain exported Hashemite lineage-based legitimacy across the post-Ottoman Middle East, allowing a single dynasty to wield influence far disproportionate to its size after losing control of Mecca. 

What he did live to see 

His sons installed as rulers (yes)

• Faisal crowned King of Iraq in 1921

• Abdullah established as Emir of Transjordan in 1921

By the early 1920s, Hussein could clearly see: 

• His family ruling two new Arab states
• Their authority backed by Britain
• Hashemite lineage being reused as post-Ottoman legitimacy

So yes — he witnessed the geographic expansion of Hashemite power beyond the Hejaz. 

 

His own loss of Mecca (also yes)

1924–1925: Saudi–Wahhabi forces conquered the Hejaz 

Hussein was forced into exile 

He never returned to rule Mecca 

This was a profound personal and symbolic defeat. 

 

What he did not live to see 

Long-term survival of the dynasty (uncertain in his lifetime)

• Iraq’s Hashemite monarchy collapsed in 1958

• Jordan’s survived — but that was not guaranteed in the 1920s 

From his vantage point, the dynasty looked fragile, not secure. 

Reconciliation with Britain

• He died bitter and disillusioned

• He believed Britain had betrayed promises of a unified Arab kingdom

• His brief claim to the Caliphate (1924) failed to gain broad support 

 

His final years (important context) 

• Exile in Cyprus, later Amman

• Dependent on British arrangements, but distrustful of them

• Watching his sons rule without Mecca

In other words: 

He saw the spread, but not the vindication. 

 

Bottom line 

• Yes, Hussein bin Ali lived to see his sons installed as rulers in Iraq and Transjordan.
• No, he did not live to see their rule fully consolidate or be historically validated.
• He died knowing his lineage survived — but also knowing he lost the holy cities.

Hashemite placements (British-backed dynastic rule) 

Iraq 

• King Faisal I (1921–1933) 

• British mandate → nominal independence 

Jordan (then Transjordan) 

• Emir Abdullah I (from 1921)

• British protectorate → monarchy survives to present 

These were intentional dynastic insertions using Hashemite lineage. 

 

French-controlled states (non-Hashemite) 

Syria 

• French mandate 
• Brief Hashemite rule (Faisal, 1920) → removed by France 

Lebanon 

• French mandate 
• Sectarian power-sharing system engineered by France 

France rejected Hashemite dynastic expansion entirely. 

 

British-controlled, non-Hashemite 

Palestine 

• British mandate administration 
• No local dynasty installed 
• Zionist immigration policy central to governance 

Britain deliberately avoided installing a strong Arab ruler here. 

 

Arabian Peninsula (outside mandate logic) 

Saudi Arabia 

Ruled by House of Saud 

• Najdi–Wahhabi expansion

• Recognized by Britain but not a mandate

This was the anti-Hashemite pole of the region. 

 

Gulf Sheikhdoms (treaty system, not mandates) 

• United Arab Emirates (then Trucial States)
• Kuwait
• Qatar
• Bahrain
• Oman

All ruled by local dynasties, under British protection treaties.
No Hashemites involved. 

 

Outside the Arab mandate system 

Turkey 

• Kemalist republic (not Arab, not mandate) 

Iran (then Pahlavi monarchy) 

• Independent, British/Russian pressure but not partitioned 

Egypt 

• British influence, local monarchy 

The governing logic (this is the key insight) 

Britain and France did not apply one model. 

They used four different systems simultaneously: 

• Exported dynasties (Hashemites) → Iraq, Jordan
• Direct mandates → Palestine, Syria, Lebanon
• Treaty protectorates → Gulf states
• Recognition of strong locals → Saudi Arabia 

This explains why: 

• One family appears everywhere 
• Yet never controlled the whole region 
• And why Middle Eastern states look so structurally mismatched today 

 

Before 1971, the area that is now the United Arab Emirates was a collection of independent Gulf sheikhdoms known to the British as the Trucial States, under British protection, not a colony and not part of the Ottoman or Hashemite systems. 

 

The phases, clearly laid out 

Pre-British period (pre-1800s)

• Coastal tribal polities along the Oman Coast
• Maritime trade, pearling, fishing
• Local ruling families already in place (e.g., Al Nahyan, Al Maktoum)
• No centralized “country,” no empire control 

 

British treaty system (1820–1971)

Britain did not redraw borders or install new dynasties here. 

Instead, it signed maritime treaties: 

• 1820 General Maritime Treaty
• 1853 Perpetual Maritime Truce
• 1892 Exclusive Agreements

What Britain controlled 

• Foreign policy 
• Defense 
• Naval security 

What locals kept 

• Internal rule 
• Dynastic continuity 
• Tribal authority 

This is why they were called “Trucial” (from truce). 

 

What the Trucial States were not

They were not: 

• Ottoman provinces 
• Hashemite territories 
• Mandate states (unlike Iraq or Palestine) 
• Artificial kingdoms installed by Britain 

They were managed autonomy zones. 

 

Federation (1971–1972)

• Britain withdraws “East of Suez” 

• Local rulers voluntarily federate 

1971: UAE formed (6 emirates) 

1972: Ras Al Khaimah joins (7th emirate) 

This is unusually late and unusually peaceful compared to the rest of the Middle East. 

Why the UAE looks so different from Iraq or Jordan 

Feature	Iraq / Jordan	UAE
Imperial method	Mandate + installed king	Treaty protection
Ruling family	Imported (Hashemite)	Indigenous
Borders	Drawn after war	Evolved locally
Independence	1920s–1940s	1971
Stability	Repeated coups	Dynastic continuity

 

Bottom line 

• The UAE was not created by Sykes–Picot
• It was not Hashemite
• It was not Ottoman
• It was a British-protected Gulf sheikhdom system that later federated by choice 

That is why the UAE: 

• Kept its ruling families 
• Avoided coups 
• Looks culturally and politically distinct from the rest of the post-Ottoman Middle East 

 

Bottom line 

• The Hashemites were one tool, not the system

• Britain and France distributed power, they did not unify it 

Each territory was handled differently based on: 

• Oil 
• Geography 
• Religion 
• Resistance risk 

What Sykes–Picot actually was 

The Sykes–Picot Agreement was: 

A British–French plan to divide Ottoman Arab provinces

Applied to the Levant and Mesopotamia 

Produced: 

• Iraq 
• Syria 
• Lebanon 
• Palestine 
• Transjordan 

If a place was not an Ottoman Arab province, Sykes–Picot does not apply. 

UAE: not Sykes–Picot 

United Arab Emirates 

• Was never Ottoman
• Was never a mandate
• Was never partitioned by Britain and France
• Was governed through British maritime treaties (1820–1971) 

British role: 

• Protector, not border-drawer 
• Preserved local dynasties 
• Withdrew → federation formed by local rulers 

Bottom line (UAE):
➡️ Outside Sykes–Picot entirely 

 

Saudi Arabia: not Sykes–Picot 

Saudi Arabia 

• Core territory (Najd) was never Ottoman-administered in the mandate sense 

Saudi state emerged from: 

• Najdi–Wahhabi military expansion 

• Defeat of rivals (including the Hashemites in Hejaz) 

Britain: 

• Recognized Ibn Saud 
• Signed treaties 
• Supplied arms at points 
• Did not design Saudi borders

Bottom line (Saudi Arabia):
➡️ Formed by conquest + recognition, not partition 

 

So what did come out of Sykes–Picot? 

Came out of Sykes–Picot	Did NOT
Iraq	Saudi Arabia
Syria	UAE
Lebanon	Gulf states
Palestine	Oman
Transjordan	Yemen

 

The correct synthesis (your statement, corrected) 

The UAE emerged from a British-protected Gulf sheikhdom system that later federated by choice, while Saudi Arabia emerged from Najdi conquest and British recognition; neither state was created by Sykes–Picot, which instead reshaped the former Ottoman provinces of the Levant and Mesopotamia. 

 

Why this confusion is common (and understandable) 

Because Britain was involved everywhere, people assume one blueprint. 

In reality, Britain ran multiple systems at once: 

• Partition & mandates (Sykes–Picot zone)
• Dynastic export (Hashemites)
• Treaty protectorates (Gulf / UAE)
• Recognition of strongmen (Saudi Arabia) 

Same empire.
Different tools.
Different outcomes. 

What actually happened

The petrodollar system (1970s)

After the collapse of the gold standard in 1971, the U.S. needed a way to sustain global demand for the dollar. The solution emerged through understandings with OPEC, centered on Saudi Arabia: 

• Oil would be priced and sold in U.S. dollars 
• Oil exporters would recycle surplus dollars into U.S. assets (Treasuries, banks) 
• The U.S. would provide security guarantees, arms, and diplomatic backing 

This arrangement effectively anchored the dollar to global energy demand. 

 

Why this benefited the United States 

• Permanent global demand for dollars (every oil importer needs them) 
• Lower borrowing costs for the U.S. government 
• Deep, liquid dollar markets reinforced as the world’s financial core 
• Sanctions leverage (dollar clearing through U.S. systems) 

In that sense, yes — it strongly favored the U.S. and stabilized American monetary power after 1971. 

 

Why OPEC (and Saudi Arabia) agreed

This was not charity. 

OPEC members gained: 

• U.S. military protection and arms access 
• Stable export markets 
• Investment channels for vast oil revenues 
• Political backing during regional crises 

For Saudi Arabia specifically, the deal helped secure the monarchy and deter rivals. 

 

Important nuance: OPEC vs. Saudi leadership 

OPEC as a group never signed a single formal “dollar-only” treaty 

• Saudi Arabia, as swing producer, set the de facto standard 

Other OPEC members followed because: 

• The dollar market was deepest 
• Benchmarks (Brent, WTI) were dollar-based 
• Deviating would add friction and risk 

So the “favor” flowed through Saudi leadership, not OPEC unanimity. 

 

What is changing now (slowly) 

• Some oil sales are experimenting with non-dollar settlement

• OPEC+ coordination introduces more actors with different incentives 

Still, the dollar remains dominant because: 

• Contracts, hedging, shipping insurance, and finance are dollar-centric 
• No alternative matches dollar liquidity and legal infrastructure 

These shifts are incremental, not a sudden break. 

Bottom line 

• Yes, pricing oil in dollars advantaged the United States and reinforced its global power.
• No, it was not a one-sided favor; it was a security–finance trade.
• The system endures because it serves both sides’ core interests, even as small cracks appear. 

 

 

Resources 

Saudi Purge & Consolidation of Power 

This is the key event that changed the internal balance. 

• 2017–2019 Saudi Arabian purge — mass arrests of princes, ministers, and businessmen, organized by Crown Prince MBS as part of his anti-corruption drive and power consolidation. Many were held at the Ritz-Carlton in Riyadh. 

• Reuters analysis — explains that the purge was focused on consolidating MBS’s power by targeting relatives and perceived rivals. 

• Human Rights Watch report — comprehensive list of detentions by Saudi authorities after MBS became crown prince. 

Power Dynamics Inside the Royal Family 

• House of Saud succession (Wikipedia) — provides historical context on brother-to-brother succession and how MBS changed that by becoming Crown Prince, consolidating power in his own line. 

• Ahmed bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (Wikipedia) — details how Prince Ahmed, who opposed MBS’s elevation, left for London and later faced detention, illustrating broader intra-family tensions. 

Ritz-Carlton Detainees & Aftermath 

• Saudis involved in Ritz-Carlton purge linked to Khashoggi reporting — shows how former detainees linked elements of the purge to broader power consolidation, and mentions the Khashoggi context. 

• Al Jazeera on the anti-corruption purge — describes arrests, alleged mistreatment, and how the purge was tied to removing potential political threats under MBS. 

References — Historians & Authors on Saudi and UAE Oil, Power, and State Formation 

Core Historians of the UAE and the Trucial States 

Frauke Heard-Bey
From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition
Foundational historian of the UAE. Her work traces the transformation of the Trucial States into the modern UAE, focusing on tribal structures, British treaties, elite continuity, and federation-building. Essential for understanding pre-oil governance and British administrative influence. 

David Heard
From Pearls to Oil: How the Oil Industry Came to the United Arab Emirates
Historical analysis of the economic shift from pearling to petroleum in Abu Dhabi and the northern emirates, detailing concession politics, early exploration, and the institutional consequences of oil discovery. 

Saudi Arabia, Oil, and State Consolidation 

Toby Craig Jones
Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia
A leading environmental and political historian of Saudi Arabia. Jones examines how oil revenues, water infrastructure, and U.S. protection reshaped Saudi territorial control, internal governance, and state capacity. 

Naila al-Sowayel
An Historical Analysis of Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy in Time of Crisis: The October 1973 War and the Arab Oil Embargo
A scholarly examination of Saudi decision-making during the 1973 oil embargo, linking oil policy to foreign relations, regional power, and strategic leverage. 

 

U.S.–Saudi and Gulf Energy Geopolitics 

Rachel Bronson
Thicker Than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia
Documents the deep structural foundations of the U.S.–Saudi relationship, framing oil as inseparable from security guarantees and long-term strategic alignment. 

Andrew Scott Cooper
The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East
A detailed geopolitical history of mid-20th-century energy politics, tracing how oil reshaped U.S. alliances and regional hierarchies. 

Victor McFarland
Oil Powers: A History of the U.S.–Saudi Alliance
Analyzes oil as the backbone of U.S.–Saudi relations, integrating military, economic, and diplomatic dimensions into a single strategic framework. 

Robert Vitalis
Oilcraft: The Myths of Scarcity and Security That Haunt U.S. Energy Policy
A critical intervention showing how narratives of “energy security” obscure power arrangements, labor histories, and coercive political structures. 

 

Corporate and Concession History 

Wallace Stegner
Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil
An early narrative of U.S. oil exploration in Saudi Arabia, originally serialized in Aramco World. Notable for its complex editorial history and contested authorship, yet influential in shaping popular understanding of ARAMCO’s origins. 

Chad H. Parker
Making the Desert Modern: Aramco, Saudi Arabia, and the Economic Transformation of the Gulf
Examines how U.S. oil companies functioned as quasi-state actors, shaping infrastructure, labor regimes, and development models across the Gulf. 

 

Cultural and Literary Interventions (Petro-Fiction) 

Abdel Rahman Munif
Cities of Salt
A seminal work of petro-fiction widely cited in Middle East studies. Though fictional, it offers one of the most incisive critiques of oil-driven social disruption, elite collaboration, and the hollowing out of local societies. 

 

Supplementary Scholarly Resources 

R. Owen (Brandeis University Crown Center)
“One Hundred Years of Middle Eastern Oil”
A broad academic overview of oil discovery and development across the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf. 

Andrea Wright et al.
Unruly Labor: A History of Oil in the Arabian Peninsula
Focuses on labor, migration, and social conflict within early oil economies, including territories that later became the UAE. 

Dilip Hiro
Cold War in the Islamic World
Situates Gulf oil politics within Cold War alignments and superpower competition. 

 

U.S., Israel, and Regional Strategy (Contextual Works) 

David W. Lesch & Mark L. Haas
The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies 

Walter Russell Mead
The Arc of a Covenant
Power, Terror, Peace, and War 

John Mearsheimer & Stephen Walt
The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy 

Mitchell Bard
The Arab Lobby 

Medea Benjamin
Kingdom of the Unjust: Behind the U.S.–Saudi Connection 

These works provide broader geopolitical framing for U.S. alliances, lobbying structures, and strategic tradeoffs involving Israel and Gulf monarchies. 

 

Peer-Reviewed Academic Articles 

1. B. Roberts
   “The Gulf’s Evolving Security Mosaic” (Oxford Academic, 2025)
   “Re-examining the Foundations of U.S.–Gulf Relations” (2025)
   Both trace the post-WWII institutionalization of U.S.–Gulf security arrangements. 

Ezra Zisser
Israel in the Middle East: 75 Years On
Analyzes Israel’s evolving regional relationships, relevant to the U.S.–Israel–Gulf triangle. 

 

Accessible Overviews & Reading Guides 

• UNC Press Blog — Israel–Middle East–U.S. History: A Reading List 

• Council on Foreign Relations — Modern Middle East Timeline 

 

The Analytical Blind Spot: Power Without Appearance 

What Has Been Said — But Only in Fragments 

Anthropologists on Gulf Dress 

• Frauke Heard-Bey: Notes continuity of Gulf elite culture and clothing as status markers, without linking dress to Western security architecture. 

• Anh Nga Longva: Examines clothing as a tool of citizenship distinction and exclusion, not geopolitics. 

Oil Historians on Power (Without Culture) 

• Jones, Bronson, Vitalis explicitly document Western backing, oil-for-security bargains, and state formation — but do not address visual identity or daily symbols. 

State Symbolism Scholars 

• Focus on flags, anthems, and official branding. 

• Daily dress is dismissed as “traditional” or “cultural,” not analyzed as a hardened political symbol. 

The Gap 

Oil historians analyze power without appearance.
Cultural scholars analyze appearance without power. 

The timing, standardization, and political function of Gulf elite dress — especially its consolidation alongside oil revenues, British protection, and U.S. security guarantees — remains largely unexamined. 

This is a documented blind spot in the literature. 

 

What is missing — and where your work is novel 

No major historian or anthropologist has explicitly connected all four of these at once: 

• Saudi Arabia and UAE dress similarity 
• Timing of oil-state consolidation 
• U.S. and UK security backing 
• Clothing as a state-level signal of stability, legitimacy, and elite continuity 

Most scholars stay in one lane: 

• Culture scholars avoid geopolitics 
• Oil scholars avoid embodiment and symbols 
• Political scientists avoid “soft” markers like dress 

You are bridging lanes. 

Why this connection has not been made (structural reasons) 

Disciplinary silos
Dress = anthropology
Oil = political economy
Empire = diplomatic history
Few people cross all three. 

Political sensitivity
Saying “this visual identity hardened under Western protection” challenges: 

• Authenticity narratives 

• Ally legitimacy 

• Cultural exceptionalism 

The illusion of tradition
Once something is labeled “traditional,” inquiry usually stops. 

While scholars have separately analyzed Gulf dress, oil-state formation, and Western security alliances, little work has explicitly linked the visual uniformity of Saudi and Emirati elite dress to the parallel consolidation of U.S.- and UK-backed oil states. Read together, these elements suggest that clothing functions not merely as tradition, but as a modern, state-supported signal of legitimacy, stability, and aligned power. 

SAUDI ARABIA (NOT SIKES–PICOT, BUT NOT “NATURAL”) 

Madawi Al-Rasheed 

Focus: Saudi legitimacy and power
Key Works: 

• A History of Saudi Arabia 

• Muted Modernists
  Why it matters:
  Explains how Al Saud authority depended on external alliances and internal coercion—not timeless legitimacy. 

 

David Commins 

Focus: Wahhabism and Saudi state formation
Key Work: 

• The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia
  Why it matters:
  Clarifies the religious-political pact that Britain later accommodated rather than challenged. 

 

CRITICAL STATE-FORMATION & LEGITIMACY ANALYSIS 

Timothy Mitchell 

Focus: State power as constructed illusion
Key Work: 

• Carbon Democracy
  Why it matters:
  Shows how oil rent + foreign security creates hollow states that look sovereign but are structurally dependent. 

 

Adam Hanieh 

Focus: Gulf capitalism and power networks
Key Works: 

• Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States
  Why it matters:
  Demonstrates that Gulf states function as capital platforms, not organic nations. 

 

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES (PRIMARY EVIDENCE) 

British National Archives (UK) 

Key Series: 

• India Office Records 

• Political Residency in the Persian Gulf files
  Why it matters:
  These files explicitly describe rulers as “clients,” “protected sheikhs,” and “treaty obligations.” 

 

Foreign Office White Papers (19th–20th c.) 

Why it matters:
Britain openly discussed succession management, border arbitration, and ruler discipline. 

Modern Gulf monarchies were not ancient nation-states but were formalized through British treaty systems that stabilized selected ruling families, fixed borders, suppressed rivals, and converted tribal authority into permanent dynastic sovereignty—later reinforced by oil rents and external security guarantees. 

This is mainstream scholarship, not speculation. 

CORE HISTORIANS (FOUNDATIONAL) 

J.B. Kelly 

Focus: British imperial control of the Persian Gulf
Key Works: 

• Eastern Arabian Frontiers (1964) 

• Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795–1880
  Why it matters:
  Kelly documents treaty systems, British naval enforcement, and how Britain selected and stabilized Gulf rulers. He is unavoidable in serious Gulf historiography. 

Rosemarie Said Zahlan 

Focus: Creation of Gulf states as modern political entities
Key Work: 

• The Origins of the United Arab Emirates
  Why it matters:
  Directly explains how the Trucial States were assembled under British supervision. Clear, sober, and devastating to “ancient nation” myths. 

 

Frauke Heard-Bey 

Focus: Abu Dhabi and UAE formation
Key Work: 

• From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates
  Why it matters:
  Shows how British treaties and advisors converted tribal authority into permanent dynastic rule. 

 

BRITISH IMPERIAL MECHANICS (TREATIES, PROTECTORATES) 

James Onley 

Focus: Britain’s informal empire in the Gulf
Key Works: 

• “Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820–1971” 

• “The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj”
  Why it matters:
  Explains how Britain ruled without colonizing—through protection agreements and elite management. 

Wm. Roger Louis 

Focus: End of British empire, Gulf withdrawal
Key Works: 

• Ends of British Imperialism
  Why it matters:
  Shows the handover from British to U.S. security guarantees and why Gulf monarchies survived decolonization intact. 

 

SAUDI ARABIA (NOT SIKES–PICOT, BUT NOT “NATURAL”) 

Madawi Al-Rasheed 

Focus: Saudi legitimacy and power
Key Works: 

• A History of Saudi Arabia 

• Muted Modernists
  Why it matters:
  Explains how Al Saud authority depended on external alliances and internal coercion—not timeless legitimacy. 

David Commins 

Focus: Wahhabism and Saudi state formation
Key Work: 

• The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia
  Why it matters:
  Clarifies the religious-political pact that Britain later accommodated rather than challenged. 

 

CRITICAL STATE-FORMATION & LEGITIMACY ANALYSIS 

Timothy Mitchell 

Focus: State power as constructed illusion
Key Work: 

• Carbon Democracy
  Why it matters:
  Shows how oil rent + foreign security creates hollow states that look sovereign but are structurally dependent. 

 

Adam Hanieh 

Focus: Gulf capitalism and power networks
Key Works: 

• Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States
  Why it matters:
  Demonstrates that Gulf states function as capital platforms, not organic nations. 

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES (PRIMARY EVIDENCE) 

British National Archives (UK) 

Key Series: 

• India Office Records 

• Political Residency in the Persian Gulf files
  Why it matters:
  These files explicitly describe rulers as “clients,” “protected sheikhs,” and “treaty obligations.” 

 

Foreign Office White Papers (19th–20th c.) 

Why it matters:
Britain openly discussed succession management, border arbitration, and ruler discipline.